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ABSTRACT 
This thesis is an investigation into the effects of the 1992 böryokudan 
countermeasures law (böryokudan taisaku ha or, more simply, bötaihö) on Japan's 
organised crime syndicates (böryokudan or yakuza). Underlying this examination is a 
functionalist perspective of organised crime which rests on the premise that, far from 
being unambiguously socially dysfunctional, organised crime groups exist because 
they satisfy needs held by various sections of society (both in the upper and under- 
worlds). This approach demystifies many of the supposedly unique aspects of the 
böryokudan/yakuza (such as yakuza-authority symbiosis) and places Japan within the 
compass of modem organised-crime studies. An empirical overview of the 
böryokudan's development from 1945 to 1992 shows that the prime dynamic behind 
this evolution has been the legal and law-enforcement environment within which 
these groups exist and that frequently the impact of these changes has been socially 
undesirable. Attempts to examine whether or not the bötaihö has similarly 
exacerbated organised criminality in Japan are hampered by the collapse of Japan's 
bubble economy in 1990. This event had profound consequences for boryokudan 
groups rendering many activities unviable, whilst simultaneously creating new 
opportunities. Despite these extraneous considerations, the bötaihö has had an 
observable impact on many aspects of the böryokudan's activities and some of these 
consequences have been socially undesirable. The legal analysis of the bötaihö is 
placed in the wider context of international organised-crime control measures, in 
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particular America's RICO statutes and European laws, both of which were highly 
influential in the debate within Japan concerning the framing of new anti-böryokudan 
laws. The thesis concludes by arguing that the radically different structure of the 
bötaihö, vis-ä-vis these alternative models, is part of a wider reversion to pre-war 
legal and policing norms in which, in addition to enforcement of the criminal law, the 
police also exercise considerable administrative powers. 
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CONVENTIONS 
Japanese words are transliterated according to the modified Hepburn system, with 
macrons used to express long vowel sounds (with the exception of long "i" sounds 
as in Ishii). Macrons are not used in commonly known Japanese place names. Thus 
Tokyo and Osaka do not take macrons: Hokkaido, Kobe and Kotobuki-chö do. 
Japanese personal names are given in the normal Japanese order with family names 
preceding given names. Where it has been impossible to confirm personal names 
the most likely reading has been given. 
Sterling values of Japanese yen (¥) sums are given at the exchange rate prevailing at 
the year in question. A yen-sterling conversion chart for the years 1970-1998 is 
given in the appendix. At the time of writing (May 2000), the current rate is ¥158 
to the pound. 
- Xlll - 
GLOSSARY 
Amakudari `descent from heaven', post-retirement employment for 
bureaucrats 
Bakuto gambler/gambling yakuza group 
Böryokudan `violent group', official term for Japanese OC groups 
Bötaiho Böryokudan Countermeasures Law 
Botsüsen Centres for the Eradication of Böryokudan 
Chüshi meirei Stoppage order (bötaihö injunction) 
DKB Dai-ichi Kangyö Bank 
Gashira See waka-gashira 
Gokudö `The extreme way', yakuza way of life 
Gurentai Non-traditional Japanese gangster group, racketeers 
Haböho Subversive Activities Prevention Law 
Hamon Expulsion 
Hanzai Hakusho White Paper on Crime 
Heisei (period) 1989 - 
H6mu-shö Ministry of Justice 
HSB Heiwa Sago Bank 
1kka Yakuza (fictive) family 
Jun-kösei-in Uninitiated böryokudan members, apprentices and affiliates 
Keisatsu-chö National Police Agency 
Keisastsu Hakusho White Paper on Police 
Keizai Yakuza Economic yakuza - böryokudan involved in sophisticated 
financial and business crimes 
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Kobun Fictive son, protege, follower 
Kosei-in Full gang member 
Kumi (-chö/-in) Yakuza group (boss/member) 
Kyöbai Bögai Auction obstruction 
Kyödai Brother 
LCN La Cosa Nostra (Italian-American organised crime) 
LDP Liberal Democratic Party, Jimin-tö 
Meiji (period) 1868-1912 
Mizu-shöbai `Water trades', Japan's hospitality/entertainment industry 
MOF Ministry of Finance 
MOJ Ministry of Justice 
Nawabari (Gang) territory 
Ninkyö (-dantai) Chivalry ('chivalrous group' i. e. yakuza) 
NPA National Police Agency 
NRIPS National Research Institute for Police Science 
OC Organised Crime 
Okura-shö Ministry of Finance 
Oyabun Fictive father, patron, boss 
RICO Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Statute 
Saihatsu böshi meirei Repetition prevention order (bötaihö injunction) 
Sakazuki Ritual exchange of sake cups creating fictive familial 
relations within yakuza society 
Sarakin High interest rate loan companies 
Shinogi Any source of yakuza income, fund-raising activity 
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Showa (period) 1926 - 1989 
Sökaiya Corporate blackmailer 
Songiri Loss cutting 
Taisho (period) 1912-1926 
Tekiya Peddler/peddler yakuza group 
Waka-gashira Sub-boss 
Yakuza Traditional Japanese (bakuto/tekiya) outlaws, popular term 
for böryokudan 
Yama-ichi tösö Conflict between the Yamaguchi-gumi and breakaway 
Ichiwa-kai (1984-9) 
Yubitsume Ritual yakuza finger amputation 
Zetsuen Severing of connections, irrevocable expulsion 
CHAPTER ONE 
RESEARCH NOTES 
RESEARCH AIMS 
The researcher's interest in the yakuza/boryokudan (Japanese organised crime 
syndicates), which ultimately resulted in this thesis, was first stimulated by the 
apparent paradox of a number of large, clearly identifiable criminal gangs operating 
openly within a society widely regarded as one of the industrialised world's most 
crime-free. Initial recourse to the popular English-language literature, such as van 
Wolferen (1989) and Kaplan and Dubro (1986), suggested that this paradox was 
resolved by seeing these syndicates themselves as an integral part of the crime- 
control process in Japan and enjoying a quasi-symbiotic relationship with the 
legitimate law-enforcement authorities. 
This raised a number of questions. Is this popular `yakuza as social guardians' folk- 
thesis correct? If so, was this control function unique to Japan or can it be seen also 
in the behaviour of non-Japanese organised-crime groups with respect to their own 
host communities? Is it appropriate to categorise the yakuzalböryokudan as 
organised-crime groups or should some other term be applied? Is Japan actually as 
crime-free as is popularly asserted? 
The researcher's curiosity was further aroused when he learned that, in 1992, a law 
had been introduced that specifically targeted these groups. The existence of the 
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`böryokudan countermeasures law' (böryokudan taisaku ho or, more simply, 
bötaihö) suggested that either the folk-thesis, with its implicit assumption of 
symbiosis, was not entirely correct, or that this law was merely a sham introduced to 
disguise the underlying reality. 
The main purpose of this thesis is therefore to ascertain what effects the 
`böryokudan countermeasures law' has had on the böryokudan. This investigation 
rests on a theoretical model of organised crime derived from American and 
European criminologists. An empirical examination of the pre-botaihö böryokudan 
shows this model to be entirely applicable to these groups. It is therefore 
appropriate to class the böryokudan as manifestations of organised crime. This 
theoretical approach provides us with a powerful analytical tool to examine the roles 
that the böryokudan play in Japanese society and their relationship with the law- 
enforcement authorities. In investigating the effects of the bötaihö, therefore, we 
should also be able to answer the more general questions stimulated by the folk- 
thesis outlined above. 
However, before embarking on this investigation, it is perhaps pertinent to examine 
the other half of our apparent paradox. Is Japan's reputation as a low-crime society 
justified and, if so, what are the underlying causal factors for this? 
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JAPANESE CRIMINALITY 
Over recent decades Japan has been held up as a criminological anomaly in that it 
has uniquely managed to combine increased urbanisation and industrial 
development with a decreasing crime rate. Not only have crime rates been 
decreasing, but they have long been considerably below those of other major 
industrial countries. As a consequence of Japan's apparently low criminality, many 
attempts have been made to explain this phenomenon in the hope that this will lead 
to policy prescriptions for more criminogenic societies. 
It is however necessary to question the underlying supposition that Japan really is 
the criminological aberration that the literature claims. It should, first of all, be 
noted that Japan's (non-traffic) crime rate (non-traffic criminal-law violations per 
100,000 of the population) is no longer declining and has not done so since the mid- 
seventies; more recently it has risen from 1,091 in 1973 to 1,607.5 in 1998 
(Keisatsu Hakusho 1999,116). Professor Shiibashi of Chuo University law 
department points out that of even greater importance than the overall rise is the 
dramatic increase in youth crime which, combined with the declining arrest rate, has 
led to a heightened public perception of crime as a significant social problem 
(interview Tokyo: June 1999). 
Despite this, Japan still boasts crime statistics considerably below those of other 
advanced industrial countries. In 1997,1,511 crimes were recorded by the police 
per 100,000 of the population. The comparable figures for England and Wales, 
Scotland, France and the USA are larger by factors of 5.84,5.42,3.84 and 3.33 
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respectively (Home Office 1998,214). These statistics are, however, misleading 
because the Japanese figure consists only of non-traffic criminal law (keihö) 
violations but not special law (tokubetsuho) infringements including drugs, firearms 
and prostitution-related cases. To give some idea of the scale of special law 
violations, note that the 1997 Hanzai Hakusho (p. 79) records that 1,134,350 people 
were processed by the prosecutor's office for offences of this type. However, even 
if the Japanese crime rate is doubled to account for the difference in measurement 
techniques, Japan still has a lower recorded crime rate than the other countries cited 
above. 
There are perhaps grounds for believing that Japan's `dark figure' of unreported 
crime is higher than that of the other countries with which it is usually compared. 
Reporting levels are difficult to estimate with any degree of confidence but the 1988 
British Crime Survey suggests that the overall reporting rate of crimes in Britain 
was 37% (Mayhew et al 1988,11). Compare this with an investigation reported in 
the Japan Times (16 October, 1978) suggesting crime rates that exceeded the 
official reported ones by factors of 11 for burglary, 24 for shoplifting and 54 for 
assault. More recently, Tanioka (1997,42), in his test of the applicability of control 
theory, found that the total number of offences committed by juveniles in Osaka 
exceeded those known to the police by sixteen times. 
Perhaps more significant is the comparison made by Kersten of rape statistics for 
Germany, Japan and Australia. In this study Kersten observed that, whilst the 
overall rape figures were much lower in Japan, the breakdown of the Japanese 
statistics showed a much higher proportion of rapes by strangers than was the case 
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for the other two countries. Kersten himself is careful not to jump to the conclusion 
that Japanese rape victims systematically fail to report acquaintance rapists. Instead 
he suggests that there may be other factors making acquaintance rape less likely in 
Japan than in either Germany or Australia. He does, however, concede that this 
type of crime is "dramatically under-reported" in Japan (1996: 389). Indeed the 
Japanese police themselves now admit this and accept that, in the past, police 
treatment of victims has been insensitive (Aldous and Leishman 1999: 28). 
Whilst it does not give an overall figure for Japan, an international comparison 
conducted in 1988 of reporting rates for various different categories of crime 
consistently showed Japan to be lower than the other countries surveyed (North 
American and European countries plus Australia). On average Japan showed a 
reporting rate less than two-thirds that of the total sample population (JUSRI 1991, 
130). 
Under-reporting of crime is least likely for homicide and for this crime there is also 
least likelihood of different statistical techniques blurring international comparisons 
(though even here differing legal definitions and recording practices prevent 
problem-free comparisons). In 1997,1,281 homicides were recorded in Japan. This 
translates to a rate (per 100,000) of 1.02. The comparable rates for England and 
Wales, Scotland, the USA and Germany are 1.42,2.51,7.34 and 1.44 respectively. 
Whilst Japan therefore enjoys a much lower homicide rate than the United States, it 
is not greatly lower than England and Wales and is actually higher than Norway 
(0.87) (Home Office 1998: 215). This fact clearly illustrates the pitfalls of taking 
the United States as one's point of reference. Such a comparison tends to 
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accentuate a difference which may be marginal, or even non-existent, vis-ä-vis other 
countries. 
Whilst therefore the statistics concerning Japanese criminality are both worsening 
and not as remarkable as much of the celebratory literature would suggest, it must 
be concluded that Japan is still less troubled by crime than most other modem, 
heavily urbanised societies. Even the most vociferous critics of Japan such as van 
Wolferen (1989: 194) accept this. If we accept these statistics, what possible 
reasons are there to explain Japan's relatively low criminality? 
In a 1997 review of the relevant literature since the 1970s, Won-Kyu Park identifies 
four key trends amongst the various explanations of Japan's comparative absence of 
criminal behaviour. These he categorises as cultural, demographic/geographic, 
socio-economic and finally legal/administrative. Although it is recognised that 
there will inevitably be a degree of overlap in these various factors, with many 
writers proposing multi-causal theses, this convention is adopted for clarity of 
analysis. 
The most common approach taken by the literature is to credit low Japanese 
criminality to cultural factors. This tendency has been especially prevalent since the 
1970s and the development of theories of Japanese uniqueness (nihonjinron) as a 
response to the challenge to cultural identity imposed by rapid economic growth. 
Although these arguments were initially deployed by triumphalist Japanese 
observers, they were subsequently adopted by American commentators such as the 
1975 Citizen's Crime Commission and, most famously, Vogel (1979). The main 
-7- 
components of the culturalist thesis are that Japan is a group-centred society with 
Confucian values stressing an acceptance of authority, conformity, discipline and 
hard work. Moreover, this society exerts effective informal social controls on its 
members, which are reinforced by Japan's status as a `shame culture' (Benedict 
1946) or a dependency (aurae) culture (Doi 1973). 
These cultural arguments are supported by one branch of the 
demographic/geographic trend in the literature. One of the central pillars in the 
nihonjinron thesis is the oft-repeated assertion of Japan's racial homogeneity and 
this is also applied to the criminological debate. As an island nation with a long 
history of isolation, it is argued that Japan is free from the conflicts inherent in 
multi-cultural societies and can more comfortably achieve consensus and social 
stability. On a more concrete level, geographic factors have also been seen as 
significant; Japan's absence of land borders with other countries has inhibited the 
inflow of both drugs and weapons, thereby contributing to its low crime levels. 
Attempts to explain Japan's crime rates with reference to socio-economic factors 
have concentrated on the affluence generated by the high growth of Japan's 
economic miracle and the comparatively egalitarian way in which that wealth has 
been distributed. High rates of economic growth also stimulated a correspondingly 
high demand for labour resulting in unemployment rates lower than those of other 
industrialised countries. Potential criminals have therefore been absorbed into the 
labour market and have not, consequently, been available for recruitment into full- 
time criminal activity. Japan's high rates of education have also been cited as a 
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factor encouraging socialisation and therefore a contributory element in the low 
propensity to crime for the Japanese. 
The final category in Park's typology of the Japanese crime-rate literature concerns 
the effectiveness of legal and administrative factors. The components of this are 
the efficiency of the criminal justice system, good community policing, effective 
controls on drugs and guns and a more enabling environment for law-enforcement 
officers. Japan's high clearance rates of crime by the police and even higher 
conviction rates by prosecutors are taken as indicative of a highly professional 
system of law-enforcement and justice administration. The supposedly excellent 
relations that Japan's police have forged with the wider community, typified by the 
köban (neighbourhood police box) system, have given them a high degree of trust 
and public support. This is seen as a highly significant contributory factor in the 
control of crime. 
On a more ambiguous note, it has been argued by some such as Miyazawa (1992) 
that the Japanese police operate in an environment unhampered by the constraints of 
due process that law-enforcement personnel in other countries are obliged to work 
within. They are therefore free to perform their crime-control function in a more 
efficient manner. Whilst this may well be the case (though several police 
interviewees asserted that the formal powers they have are far less than their fellow 
officers in either Europe or the United States), whether this is a politically 
acceptable price to pay for more effective crime control is open to question. This 
aspect of the Japanese police will be dealt with in more detail later. 
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In his study, Park found that the most commonly cited factor was the efficiency of 
the criminal justice system (mentioned in 67% of the literature). This was followed 
by group-centricity (66%), community policing (56%), ethnic homogeneity (50%), 
effectively controlled drugs and firearms (42%), increasing economic affluence 
(39%), Japan's disciplined, dutiful and law-abiding society (37%), high 
employment (37%) and the effectiveness of informal social processes for exercising 
control (35%). Whilst a critical analysis of each of these factors lies out-with the 
narrow scope of this thesis, the examination of Japan's criminal justice and law- 
enforcement systems provided in the concluding chapter will shed light on the 
significance of these two particular considerations. 
If we accept that Japan remains a society less afflicted by crime, or perhaps more 
accurately disorganised crime, than other modern industrial countries, which of 
these competing explanatory arguments is correct and what are the processes by 
which their effectiveness is currently declining? Whilst it is not the main objective 
of this thesis to answer these questions, it is hoped that the evidence presented in the 
following chapters will offer insights into the way in which law is enforced in 
Japan. In the concluding chapter, therefore, attempts will be made to draw this 
investigation of organised crime in Japan into the wider debate on Japanese 
criminality. 
RESEARCH NOTES 
Research consisted of eight months' fieldwork combined with an examination of the 
available published sources. Unfortunately, due to the extreme paucity of up-to- 
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date and relevant literature available in the United Kingdom, the researcher found 
himself trying to carry out literature searches and research simultaneously. It is 
greatly regretted that it was not possible to make a short exploratory trip to assemble 
the basic literature early in the first year of this research. Not only would this have 
expedited conclusion of this project, but it would also have enabled the researcher to 
commence his fieldwork with a firmer grasp of the subject. 
SOURCES 
PROBLEMS WITH THE LITERATURE 
"Much of what has been written on the subject of organized crime is either 
inaccurate or distorted" (Nelli 1986: 1). 
There are a number of substantial obstacles facing any serious academic study of 
organised crime (hereafter OC) behaviour and this is reflected in the current state of 
the literature. Due to the considerable problems of access, very little academic 
investigation into OC has been based on participant observation or other primary 
research based on direct contact with active crime-group members. As a 
consequence, most of the literature in the field is derived from insider, journalistic 
or governmental sources. These sources are problematic for a variety of reasons. 
Due to the illegal and highly competitive nature of most of such organisations' 
activities, OC groups must, to remain effective, retain a high degree of operational 
security to protect themselves from both law-enforcement agencies and their 
business rivals. Information provided by OC sources themselves must therefore be 
treated with a high degree of caution. Stark (1981: 7) notes that, even when the 
information may be entirely innocuous, members will be reluctant to disclose details 
of their gang's activities as it may be interpreted as a lack of discretion. 
The desire for secrecy is not the only reason for such sources to be considered with 
suspicion; as is the case for all organisations, there is a tendency for OC groups to 
have a public image which they wish to present to the world. Information they 
disseminate to the outside world will therefore tend to be limited to that which is 
highly functional towards propagating this image (Stark 1981: 18). A significant 
proportion of the journalistic yakuza literature has come from the pens of those who, 
whether consciously or not, have been used by gangs to further their public relations 
in this way. Although writers on Japan tend to couch this phenomenon in terms of 
tatemae and honne, or omote and ura1, such behaviour is not peculiar to that country 
as Goffman (1959) and Machiavelli (1983 [1532]) so clearly illustrate. 
Autobiographies by former gangsters may not only endeavour to legitimise OC by 
putting forward the organisation's public image; they may also, paradoxically, 
pander to the dictates of the market place by exaggerating, or even fabricating, the 
more lurid aspects of their trade. One example of this, cited by Abadinsky (1994: 
104), is the bizarre autobiography of self-styled "Mafia kingpin" Sonny Gibson who 
boasted amongst other things to have "executed twenty-four persons; (run) 150 
different corporations; (thrown) nine prison guards over the wall... (and had) sex 
with 10,000 different women". 
1 Making the distinction between the surface appearance/polite pretence (tatemae/omote) and the 
reality (honne/ura) of a given social or political situation. 
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This tendency towards sensationalism is even more pronounced in the treatment of 
OC by the media and in books derived from journalistic sources. Shady conspiracy 
theories and sinister bogeymen make good copy. This problem is exacerbated by 
the use of the media by "sources", in both the underworld and the law-enforcement 
community, to further their own interests. Abadinsky (1994: 103) cites a number of 
cases in which government bodies had leaked fabricated information in order to 
protect their agents or to foment conflict between members of OC groups. 
As well as a desire for a favourable public image, governmental agencies can be 
postulated as having a set of objectives. Foremost amongst these will be the desire 
for increased budgetary allocation and power. It can therefore be expected that the 
information generated and released to the outside world by these bodies will, in 
part, be influenced by considerations as to how these underlying objectives may be 
served. For example, Baer and Chambliss (1997), in a powerful critique of the 
United States' burgeoning `law-enforcement-industrial complex', show how official 
crime statistics are manipulated, either up or down, according to the prevailing 
political imperatives. It should be noted here that those bodies responsible for law- 
enforcement are usually the same as those responsible for the collation and 
presentation of the official data. 
A more mundane problem with the official literature is that it necessarily 
concentrates on those aspects of criminal activity which have, in some way or other, 
failed and thus attracted the attention of the police. Those operations which are 
successful, remain unobserved. A reliance on the official statistics, therefore, yields 
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a highly partial interpretation of a more complex reality. In particular the police 
statistics might be assumed to accentuate the level of violence and other hard-to- 
conceal criminality. 
LITERATURE ON THE BORYOKUDAN 
Within the criminological community in Japan there appears to be a prejudice 
against research into the boryokudan. As a consequence, the bulk of the academic 
literature dealing with this field is almost entirely dependent on the official 
presentation of reality as provided by the National Police Agency. Much of the 
academic literature on the böryokudan, therefore, presents no significant advance on 
the pre-existing official literature. 
Perhaps the most notable exception to this tendency is Iwai Hiroaki's Byori Shüdan 
no Közö (the structure of pathological groups) published in 1963 which is rightly 
acclaimed as the classic text on the yakuza. Writing with a solid grounding in the 
contemporary western literature in social psychology and criminology, Iwai 
provides over eight hundred pages of highly detailed description and analysis of the 
history, structure and operation of the bakuto (gambling), tekiya (peddler) and 
gurentai (racketeering) groups out of which the modern Japanese böryokudan 
evolved. It is now over thirty years since the publication of this work and 
unfortunately no single work of equal stature has emerged in recent years to update 
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it. Iwai has also produced short chapters in English in Lebra (1974) and Kelly 
(1986), and these offer clear and pertinent introductions to the subject. 
The main official source is the National Police Agency's annual white paper 
(Keisatsu Hakusho)2. This document provides a police appraisal of the previous 
year's crime levels, arrests, and police activity, plus whatever topics are perceived 
to be of current importance (for example, the 1999 paper contained a 54-page 
chapter on the fight against trans-national crime). The police white papers tend to 
be written in a highly formulaic way and the reader becomes conditioned to skip 
over the ritual claims that: 
Under these circumstances and in order to chase the böryokudan to 
dissolution and destruction, the police are raising up all their strength and 
powerfully pursuing a general anti-böryokudan strategy based on the three 
pillars of a thorough crackdown on böryokudan crimes, effective use of the 
böryokudan countermeasures law, and the promotion of böryokudan 
eradication activity (identical wording in Keisatsu Hakusho 1997: 183, 
1998: 174,1999: 147 - only marginally different in the preceding two 
years). 
Similarly upbeat wording is to be found in police white papers over the previous 
two decades. Despite this subtext, it is a valuable resource in showing the police's 
2 The Ministry of Justice produces an annual White Paper on Crime (Hanzai Hakusho), a similar 
document, though from the perspective of the Prosecutor's Office. 
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interpretation of reality. It can also shed light on trends in police activity and 
priorities - for example, the increased police interest in victim-support in recent 
years. 
In addition to the police white paper, a valuable official source is the Journal of 
Police Science (Keisatsu-gaku Ronshü) produced by the National Police Academy. 
This is published monthly and largely comprises articles written by serving police 
officers and, less frequently, by researchers from the National Research Institute for 
Police Science and other academics. Whereas the police white papers are 
essentially for public consumption, the readership of this journal is largely 
composed of police officers (especially those preparing for promotion exams). In 
addition to detailed reports on various aspects of police work it regularly gives 
explanations of new laws and how they relate to police work. Although the articles 
in this journal usually contain an early disclaimer that the views are those of the 
writer rather than the NPA, they tend to be highly uncontroversial in their analysis. 
Another journal, Keisatsu Köron, serves a similar, educational, function but is 
directed at lower-ranking police officers. 
The third official source of information is the National Research Institute for Police 
Science (Kagaku Keisatsu Kenkyu jo, or within the police, kakeiken). Although part 
of the NPA, NRIPS is jointly staffed by police officers and academic researchers. 
The Crime and Delinquency Prevention Department of this institute contains highly 
able criminologists who conduct much of the most interesting primary 
criminological research in Japan. In addition to publishing reports of their research 
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findings, NRIPS personnel also produce numerous conference papers; after his first 
visit there, the researcher returned heavily laden with papers dealing with every 
conceivable aspect of contemporary Japanese social pathology. 
Following their retirement, NRIPS researchers, such as Mugishima, Hoshino and 
Nishimura, are recruited by universities as criminology professors. Of these, 
Hoshino is perhaps best known for his work on the böryokudan and he has produced 
an enormous number of papers on this subject in both Japanese and English. Since 
the retirement of Hoshino Kanehiro from NRIPS, the emphasis of the Crime and 
Delinquency Prevention Department's research interests seems to be shifting. 
There is less work currently published on böryokudan-related matters and an 
increased interest in juvenile delinquency and victim-support. 
Despite the caveats about using official sources of information, it is argued here that 
their use is justified. In particular, the NRIPS research and the articles in the 
Journal of Police Science, having the primary function of fulfilling the 
informational requirements of practising law-enforcement officers, can be 
considered to be essentially accurate. Stark, in his outstanding research on the 
yakuza (of which more later) found that the official data were superior to those 
produced by journalistic and academic sources and were corroborated by his own 
research findings (1981: 10). 
The other major source of information is journalistic. Through the system of kisha 
clubs, whereby bureaucratic agencies limit the flow of information to favoured 
groups of journalists, the mainstream press exercises a high degree of self- 
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censorship over what they print. As a consequence, little is printed in the major 
broad-sheet papers on the böryokudan unless a major event unfolds, in which case it 
is covered in an uncontroversial manner relying on police briefings for its material. 
However, in addition to the mainstream press, there is a vibrant and irreverent 
assortment of weekly magazines (shükanshi) which maintain a tradition for 
investigative journalism. Whilst these magazines are unashamedly low-brow, with 
nude photographs and salacious reviews of establishments selling sexual services 
being regular features, the shükanshi provide a much more robust presentation of 
the news and are generally responsible for exposing scandals (an American 
acquaintance, working on the Tokyo desk of a well-known newspaper, confessed to 
this researcher that much of her most interesting work originated in shükanshi 
articles). Alongside exposes of the other sleazy aspects of Japanese society, these 
magazines carry regular articles on the böryokudan. 
Existing as a sub-genre of these magazines are a collection of weekly and, more 
usually, monthly magazines devoted exclusively to dealing with the yakuza. These 
contain news and photographs of recent succession ceremonies and yakuza funerals, 
interviews with bosses and historical articles. These magazines, known as either 
jitsuwashi or gokudöshi, enjoy the same sort of relationship with the böryokudan as 
the mainstream press does with the police. Consequently the journalists covering 
böryokudan affairs take care to present their subject as their sources would like it to 
be seen. Jitsuwashi are popular with gang members themselves, and one of the 
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researcher's lawyer informants reports that he is often asked to take the most recent 
issues to his incarcerated clients. 
Although the status of these magazines as little more than böryokudan- 
propagandists makes them sources which must be treated with extreme caution, they 
are extremely useful in terms of keeping abreast of yakuza personnel developments, 
arrests and inter-gang conflicts. Not surprisingly the police, both at operational and 
bureaucratic levels, are avid readers of these journals (NPA interviewee). On one 
occasion, when the researcher requested background information from the police on 
the loose umbrella federation covering the böryokudan active in the Kanto area, he 
was given a copy of a recent article from Jitsuwa Jidai, one of these magazines. 
Several of these gokudö journalists have written books dealing with the 
böryokudan; these have the same drawbacks as the journals themselves but also 
contain much pertinent information. Yamada's three-volume account of the fifth- 
generation Yamaguchi-gumi, for example, contains a comprehensive chronology of 
the most important events in the organisation's recent history. However, the first 
volume's opening hagiographic account of fifth-generation boss Watanabe's simple 
lifestyle, passion for reading early Chinese history and deep knowledge of the 
bötaihö, sets the tone for the remainder of the series. 
Perhaps the most useful articles produced from the yakuza journalists are collected 
within Takarajima's series `Yakuza to Iu Ikikata' (1986,1992 & 1997). Of these, 
Wore ga Shinogi ya! ', the second in the series, contains the most detailed 
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examination of the various sources of böryokudan income (collectively known as 
shinogi). An Osaka-based lawyer, with a long history of defending böryokudan 
clients, particularly recommended this text as accurately representing the reality of 
contemporary böryokudan economics. As well as featuring such well-known 
yakuza writers as Ino, Yasuda, Hinago and Asakura, these collections also contain 
chapters written by Yamanouchi who achieved notoriety due to his work as legal 
advisor to the Yamaguchi-gumi. Following his resignation from the Japan Bar 
Association, Yamanouchi has capitalised on this notoriety working as a yakuza 
journalist, novelist and film maker. 
Although initially a yakuza journalist, Mizoguchi Atsushi, stands above this genre 
for both the quality of his writing and for the unbiased and highly critical 
observations he makes of the modern böryokudan. As well as making notable 
contributions to the weekly magazines, the Takarajima series and similar 
publications, Mizoguchi has published many works of his own, including a three- 
volume history of the Yamaguchi-gumi's civil-war (the Yama-ichi tösö). Perhaps 
his most significant work, and the best single one-volume introduction to the 
modem böryokudan, is his 1997 work `Gendai Yakuza no Ura-chishiki'. 
Mizoguchi's work was recommended to the researcher by both police research 
officers and serving gang members. Perhaps the greatest boost to his credibility 
came in 1990 when he fell victim to a Yamaguchi-gumi-inflicted stabbing. 
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Another interesting journalistic source is Kyodo News Agency's 1993 `Riken 
Yüchaku', an examination of the links between the worlds of politics, business and 
the böryokudan. This work is unusual in that it is a serious expose of the links 
between these different constituencies and lies outside the field of yakuza 
journalism. Riken Yüchaku concentrates on two specific böryokudan-related 
scandals of the late 1980s (Kbminto and Heiwa Saga Bank) to illustrate the way in 
which the böryokudan continue to play a functional role for both business and 
political elites in Japan. 
There are very few English language sources dealing with the böryokudan, and 
most of those that exist are now highly dated. DeVos (1973) provides a historical 
overview of the yakuza's development and the relationship they have traditionally 
enjoyed with the authorities due to the yakuza's usefulness as agents for the 
repression of a perceived threat from radical and subversive forces. 
DeVos also recounts legends and folk-tales of past yakuza heroes, noting the way in 
which these legends have continued to find favour in Japan as an outlet from the 
repression inherent in modem Japanese society. This mythologised past has also 
furnished the current böryokudan with a romantic public image that persists today. 
Buruma (1984) deals with these media portrayals of the yakuza in greater detail. In 
recent years there has been a tendency, however, for less flattering representations 
of böryokudan in films and television dramas. Toei studios, the film-makers most 
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responsible for the ninkyo eiga genre, stopped making these films in 1994 (though 
grittier hard-action böryokudan movies are still churned out for the video market) 
(Schilling 1996,41). Itami Juza's Minbö no Onna, an irreverent spoof of the 
modem baryokudan, stands outside either genre. 
Without doubt the finest piece of original research on the böryokudan available in 
English is the unpublished 1981 PhD thesis of the anthropologist Harold Stark. 
Stark's work was based on one year's observation of a gang in western Japan. This 
fieldwork was firmly grounded on a command of the available Japanese literature. 
Stark's work successfully demystifies the böryokudan and demonstrates 
convincingly that they are an integral part of the wider social fabric rather than a 
purely parasitic aberration. As well as providing an outstanding analysis of the 
böryokudan, Stark's account of his fieldwork methodology is recommended to any 
aspiring researcher of social life and clearly illustrates the enormous reserves of 
patience and fortitude required for such research. 
The other case of primary anthropological research on yakuza groups available in 
English is that of Jakob Raz (1992). Raz's academic background is in Japanese 
theatre and this is apparent in his 1992 paper which concentrates on "self 
presentation and performance in the yakuza way of life". The choice of the word 
"yakuza" rather than "böryokudan" is significant and reflects the broadly 
sympathetic treatment Raz gives his subjects. Raz's fieldwork was with a traditional 
festival-peddler (tekiya) gang and he uses this experience to explore the 
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contradictions expressed in the language, rituals and dress of this gang, which show 
both their desire for inclusion and their marginality. These strains are manifested in 
their emphatic assertions of Japaneseness and defiance in the face of rejection by 
katagi society. Raz argues that the theatricality of the yakuza, as seen in the 
colourful participation of tekiya in Japan's matsuri, plays a central part in Japanese 
cultural life. 
Although Raz is right to stress the Japaneseness of the yakuza/böryokudan, this does 
not invalidate the thesis developed below that the underpinning theoretical 
considerations of OC transcend the cultural differences of its many manifestations. 
Dale's (1986) contention - that what are often cited as aspects of "Japanese 
uniqueness" can be found to have analogies in traditional patterns in other societies 
- is relevant here. This is clearly the case with the quasi-feudal nature of OC 
groups in America and Europe. 
Due to the official policy of eradicating tekiya from Japanese festivals, such groups 
are now a dwindling minority relic of the traditional yakuza. Raz's work, therefore, 
should not be seen as representing the totality of the contemporary 
yakuza/böryokudan. In addition to his short 1992 monograph, Raz has published a 
fuller anthropological study in Hebrew (translated into Japanese under the title 
`Yakuza no Bunka-jinrui-gaku') though this is not available in English. 
Wolfgang Herbert is currently active conducting primary research on the 
böryokudan. Not only does Herbert have a solid grasp of the relevant Japanese 
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literature and an academic background in critical criminology, he has forged good 
contacts with böryokudan members active in western Japan. Herbert's most recent 
work (2000) adopts the latest contributions to OC theory developed by Gambetta 
(1993) and Fiorentini and Peltzman (1995) (and also deployed in this thesis). 
Unfortunately much of his work is confined to a German-literate audience (thereby 
excluding, for one, this researcher) though his PhD thesis, dealing with illegal 
foreign workers and law-enforcement, has been translated and published (1996). 
Herbert has also published a number of more general, journalistic articles. 
Although now slightly dated, there are two English-language historical analyses of 
Japanese OC. Both Shikita and Tsuchiya (1992) and Huang and Vaughn (1992) are 
largely derived from official sources but, of the two, Huang and Vaughn is superior 
in both detail and scale. After a straightforward account of the five phases in the 
post-war evolution of OC in Japan, the characteristics of the modern boryokudan 
and recent trends in their development, Huang and Vaughn deal with the 
countermeasures the police have taken in opposition to böryokudan activity. They 
conclude, in agreement with the consensus in the literature, that the relationship 
between the police and the böryokudan is essentially a symbiotic one and it is only 
when the gangs go beyond the bounds of acceptable behaviour that the police feel 
compelled to adopt a less accommodating stance. 
Without doubt the most influential English language publication on this topic is 
Kaplan and Dubro's 1986 work, `Yakuza: The Explosive Account of Japan's 
Criminal Underworld'. This book is well-researched and written in a highly 
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readable, fast-paced journalistic style. It has become a major source for non- 
specialist, introductory texts and internet web-sites. Although Kaplan and Dubro 
rightly identify the ever-changing nature of the böryokudan, the emphasis these 
authors give to the historical links between yakuza and political elites, itself an 
evolving relationship at the time of the book's publication, still lingers in much of 
the literature derived from this book. Kaplan has also produced an informative 
occasional paper (1996) on the activities of the böryokudan in the bubble economy 
of the late 1980s. At the time of writing, Kaplan is preparing a second edition of his 
1986 book. 
Tamura (1992) and Vaughn, Huang and Ramirez (1995) have both published useful 
papers, in English, on the role of the böryokudan in Japan's drug trade. 
Szymkowiak (1996) gives a fully comprehensive account of the activities of sökaiya 
corporate-extortionists and their relationship with böryokudan syndicates. Although 
there is no comparable dedicated analysis of the bOryokudan's involvement in other 
economic sectors, a number of English-language works provide useful side- 
references on various aspects of the böryokudan's multifarious business activities. 
For example, Fowler's excellent 1996 work on the day-labourers in San'ya gives a 
good account of the labour-broking and other services provided by the various 
böryokudan groups in that area. Constantine (1993) and Bonnoff (1994) shed light 
on the böryokudan's involvement in Japan's sex industry. 
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LITERATURE ON THE LAW 
The most useful single source on the legal framework within which the police 
operate vis-ä-vis the böryokudan is the NPA's 1997 `Böryokudan Taisaku Roppö' 
(Complete Laws of Böryokudan Countermeasures). In addition to the full text of 
the bötaihö itself, this work contains those criminal, special and administrative laws 
which collectively comprise the böryokudan countermeasures available to the 
police. This work is primarily intended as a reference for serving police officers. In 
addition to this the NPA (including the affiliated Centres for the Eradication of 
Böryokudan) provides a number of explanations of the bötaihö at varying levels of 
complexity according to the target audience. 
More critical analysis of the new law is provided by Endo (1992), a criminal 
defence lawyer famous for his work defending prominent Yamaguchi-gumi 
members, and more recently Asahara Shoko, leader of the Aum Shinri-kyo 
doomsday cult. Another useful critique of this law is given by the published 
proceedings of a 1992 symposium on the bötaihö organised by lawyers and legal 
academics concerned at this increase in police powers (Kai & Ono 1992). 
The Nihon Bengoshi Rengö-kai (Nichibenren or Japan Bar Association) is another 
invaluable source of legal material. In addition to formal legal analyses of the 
bötaihö (see, for example, 1997), this organisation produces simpler guides (such as 
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Böryokudan Hyakutö-ban, 1998) for the benefit of non-specialists who might find 
themselves victims of böryokudan harassment. It also produces more specialised 
guides, such as the introduction to the available legal mechanisms facilitating the 
eradication of b6ryokudan offices (Böryokudan Jimusho Ha Y6 no Höri, 1998). 
An excellent appraisal of the bötaihö set in the wider context of general böryokudan 
countermeasures is given in a set of essays commissioned by the All Japan Centre 
for the Eradication of Böryokudan (ed. Fujimoto, 1997) to mark the fifth 
anniversary of the new law's implementation. Not only does this provide a very 
clear commentary on the law's structure, development and legal rulings, there are 
also interesting chapters on other means of combating böryokudan groups such as 
current böryokudan-eradication activity and the increased use of civil law to sue 
gang members for wrongful harm. 
English language sources on Japanese law are scarce. Whilst the Ministry of Justice 
publishes translations of many laws, the bötaihö has not been officially translated. 
General introductions to Japanese law are provided by Noda (1976) and Oda 
(1992). Not only is the latter text more up-to-date and clearly laid out; it is 
preferable in that, unlike Noda, it does not seek to explain Japan's apparent aversion 
to formal legal procedure in terms of nebulous socio-racial characteristics. This 
tendency to avoid full utilisation of the civil and criminal justice systems in 
preference for informal social mechanisms is brilliantly dealt with by Haley in his 
outstanding 1991 work, `Authority Without Power: Law and the Japanese Paradox'. 
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Haley's central thesis is that this preference for `extralegal, informal mechanisms of 
social control' rather than being the product of some innate cultural characteristic, 
has been artificially imposed by the authorities to compensate for the weakness of 
their coercive power. 
Whilst Haley argues this case convincingly, the most recent judicial statistics are 
suggestive of a shift towards greater reliance on formal legal sanctions. This raises 
a number of interesting questions. Assuming Haley is correct in his analysis, do 
subsequent shifts imply an increase in the coercive power of the state or rather that 
informal social-control mechanisms are no longer effective? Whilst an in-depth 
examination of such questions lies out-with the scope of this thesis, it should be 
remembered that they have important implications for the study of organised-crime 
groups in Japan: norms of informal conflict resolution, combined with a slow, 
expensive and uncertain system of formal justice, are important factors in creating a 
market for private protection that, as we shall see, is the core competence of 
organised crime. 
LITERATURE ON THE POLICE 
Obviously, any study of organised-crime countermeasures must accord a high 
degree of importance to the role of the police. It was not until midway through his 
research, however, that the researcher became aware as to the fuller implications of 
this thesis as an aid to understanding not only the nature of the böryokudan, but also 
Japanese policing norms. 
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The most enlightening Japanese language source on the police, is the Japan Bar 
Association's examination of them (Nichibenren, 1995). In particular this book was 
most useful in alerting the writer to the problems associated with the Public Safety 
Commissions. Tanioka Ichirb's excellent 1998 work on the pachinko industry 
provided a further pointer as to the ways in which the Japanese police may make 
use of administrative law (gy(5seihö), of which the bötaih6 is an example. 
There are also a number of books in English which deal with the modem Japanese 
police. Bayley is largely responsible for creating the perception of the Japanese 
police as a model of community policing centred on the köban system with his 
highly laudatory 1976 work. Parker (1984) adopts a similar tone and both these 
works conclude a direct causal relationship between Japan's supposedly excellent 
community-police relationship and its low crime rate. Ames (1981) offers a more 
balanced analysis noting the strain between the durability of authoritarian traditions 
and modern democratic policing structures. Ames' chapter on the relationship 
between the police and organised-crime groups is particularly excellent. 
Recently there has been a perceptible trend towards a more critical analysis of the 
Japanese police in the English-language literature (though the same pattern is not to 
be found in the Japanese literature). The most notable contribution to this field is 
Miyazawa Setsuo's superb account (1992) of his fieldwork observations and 
interviews of police in Hokkaido3. Miyazawa's work is unique in that since its 
3 Although Miyazawa's work can be seen as part of this trend in the English-language literature, it is, 
in fact, based on an earlier Japanese publication, and his fieldwork was conducted in 1974. 
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publication no prefectural police chief has granted permission for academic 
observation of operational police investigations. 
McCormack (1986) in his damning indictment of the criminal-investigation 
methods employed by the Japanese police, most noticeably their use of `substitute 
prisons' (daiy6 kangoku), also fits into this more critical trend in their portrayal in 
the (English-language) literature. More recently, the concerns expressed by 
McCormack have recurred in Amnesty International's annual reports on Japan. 
These concerns are echoed in Herbert's (1996) examination of law-enforcement and 
foreign workers. Aldous and Leishman (1997 & 1999) are the most recent 
contributors to this `realist' reappraisal of the Japanese police, taking into account 
developments such as the flawed police investigation into the Aum Shinrikycö 
subway gas attack. 
Aldous, in his investigation of the police during their period of post-war reform and 
later reversion, places the authoritarian-centralised and democratic-decentralised 
aspects of the police, identified by Ames, in their proper historical context. Another 
useful historical work is Mitchell's examination of thought-control in pre-war Japan 
(1976). This work illustrates the traditional preference for administrative, rather 
than strict legal, controls and the tendency to use these controls in a surprisingly 
lenient fashion. This idea is further developed in Haley (1991). 
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FIELDWORK RESEARCH 
Fieldwork was conducted between January and September 1998. During this time I 
was a visiting researcher at the Institute of Social Science (Shakai Kagaku Kenkyujo 
or, more usually, Shaken) at Tokyo University. Because this institute has no direct 
research interest in the boryokudan, most of my time on campus was spent in 
literature searches rather than discussing my research with the academic staff there. 
In retrospect it is to be regretted that I did not fully exploit the legal expertise of the 
professors at Shaken as this would have alerted me much earlier to the fuller 
implications of my research. 
Despite affiliation to Shaken, my most important academic contact was Professor 
Hoshino Kanehiro of Teikyo University. Due to his former employment at the 
National Research Institute of Police Science, Hoshino has both an encyclopaedic 
knowledge of the b6ryokudan and a vast network of contacts in both the academic 
and law-enforcement communities. He was most generous in sharing this 
experience with me as well as arranging introductions to many of the other leading 
experts in this field. 
The foremost introduction provided by Hoshino was to the personnel at NRIPS, in 
particular, Tamura Masayuki, Uchiyama Ayako, and Yonezato Seiji. Not only were 
these researchers most generous of their time and research papers, but they were 
also instrumental in arranging interviews with various aspects of the police 
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machinery. Unfortunately, for some reason, these official interviews entailed 
Yonezato having to accompany the researcher to the sites of these interviews. 
These initial interviews were of uneven usefulness. Whilst this is partly due to the 
inexperience and breathtaking ignorance of the researcher in the early days of his 
fieldwork, the official route through which these interviews had been arranged, and 
the environment in which they were conducted, led to their yielding little 
information outside that available in the official police literature. One interview, 
conducted in a busy working office, with the interviewee's colleagues bustling by, 
sticks in the researcher's memory as an abject lesson in how not to conduct 
research. This tendency, combined with my reluctance to further unnecessarily 
disrupt Yonezato's busy working schedule, led me to move away from these 
NRIPS-sponsored interviews. 
Later police research conducted through informal, personal connections proved to 
be vastly more informative. In particular two weeks of fieldwork conducted with 
the police in Iwate prefecture was made possible due to the introduction from my 
old karate teacher to Superintendent (now Senior Superintendent) Numazaki, his 
school-friend. During this period I was based at the Police School (of which 
Superintendent Numazaki was then head) and went each day to conduct research at 
a different department of the Police Headquarters. 
It was later explained to me by an interviewee in the security police (köan keisatsu) 
that Numazaki had kobun (proteges) in every department save security. It had been 
these kobun, mostly acquired during Numazaki's time in the kidötai (riot squad), 
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who had been primarily responsible for facilitating my research and looking after 
me. The importance of informal oyabun-kobun networks, more usually associated 
with yakuza organisations, even within the formal bureaucratic hierarchy of the 
police, is highly illuminating. Without access to this network of personal ties 
provided by Numazaki, it is most unlikely that this research would have been 
feasible; at best it would have taken considerably longer to establish links of my 
own. 
It had initially been hoped to conduct research with böryokudan groups in Iwate. 
During an earlier two-year stay in Iwate, I had met, and enjoyed the hospitality of, 
the boss of the largest gang in the prefecture who was related to my karate teacher. 
This individual had retired in the late 1980s when the Yamaken-gumi had moved 
into the prefecture and taken over his organisation. By the time of my fieldwork, he 
was seriously ill with liver-disease (a major cause of yakuza mortality). Due to my 
well-publicised research with the Iwate police, the poor health of this boss and a 
reappraisal of the social impact my research might have on the numerous friends 
and connections I have in the area, I decided that it would be better to conduct 
primary böryokudan research elsewhere. 
Fortunately my sister's former German exchange, currently studying in Japan, was 
able to introduce me to her initial host in Kobe who was a criminal-defence lawyer 
with many prominent Yamaguchi-gumi members amongst his clients. This lawyer, 
after hearing of my research aims, agreed to meet me and proved to be an invaluable 
contact. During my first, exploratory, visit to the Kobe/Osaka conurbation, I was 
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able to interview this lawyer. He also introduced me to two of his close colleagues, 
one of whom was Yamanouchi Yukio, formerly the legal advisor to the Yamaguchi- 
gumi. These individuals were of enormous help with my research. 
During my second visit to Kobe, my lawyer friend had arranged to introduce me to 
two of his clients that he felt would be of most use to me. Unfortunately, on my 
arrival, I discovered that one of them had just been arrested whilst the other had 
gone to Korea. I was consequently introduced to two other clients of my lawyer 
contact. The first of these, `Torf', was the boss of a third-level Yamaguchi-gumi 
sub-group whilst `Mihara', the second, was a senior executive of the first and boss 
of a fourth-level organisation in his own right. 
At the introduction my guarantor stressed that I was neither a journalist nor a 
policeman and was engaged in academic research. To corroborate this I presented 
them with my name card identifying me as a visiting researcher at Tokyo 
University. Due to the enormous status-consciousness of yakuza members, this was 
an asset. The fact that they had a foreigner from Tokyo University seeking 
knowledge from them, enhanced the status of these interviewees in the eyes of their 
colleagues and associates. 
It quickly became apparent, however, that as research subjects they were far from 
ideal. Although they were happy to entertain me, they certainly, and 
understandably, did not want to provide me with a factual analysis of their business 
operations. Despite visiting both Tori and Mihara's gang offices and spending an 
evening drinking with them alongside two of Tori's more able associates, little 
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credible information was forthcoming. Tori himself seemed to be intent on 
impressing me with ever more outlandish claims as to his martial-arts 
accomplishments and this undermined the credibility of his more relevant 
observations. Whenever I tried to turn the conversation round to my research topic, 
he would fill up my glass and suggest that I ask his associates, `Kurihara' and 
`Inugami', later as they were men of real ability whilst he himself was a foo14. 
Although the short time spent in the company of Tori and Mihara's gangs was by no 
means wasted, I was largely neutralised in my research aims. Given the 
considerable length of time it took Stark to gain meaningful access to the Araki- 
gumi, the superficial nature of my research with Tori and Mihara is not entirely 
surprising. 
During my third visit to Kobe/Osaka, I had considerably more success due to my 
introduction to `Fujimura', a retired fourth-level boss of a Yamaguchi-gumi (later 
Ichiwa-kai) sub-group. Fujimura, whose intelligence was highly rated by my 
lawyer contacts, was an enormously valuable source of credible information. 
Rather than trying to impress me, Fujimura was keen to demythologise the yakuza, 
stressing rather the extremely ordinary nature of such organisations. Consequently, 
Fujimura was my most useful single interviewee. 
Another useful contact was made through the introduction of an old university 
friend whose ex-girlfriend's father, `Ujihara', was a business associate of a high- 
ranking Yamaguchi-gumi official in a provincial city in central Japan. Just before 
4 There is a certain justice in this in that the researcher also frequently adopted the role of harmless 
fool when in an unpredictable research environment. 
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my return to Scotland, this business associate was released from prison and I was 
able to corroborate some of the information gleaned from Fujimura and elsewhere. 
Ujihara was extremely open and helpful though, like Tori and Mihara, he saw me as 
something of a status symbol. At each bar we visited he insisted on my presenting 
my name-card to the mama-san so that they would know of my university affiliation 
whilst he explained to them the nature of my research. 
Whilst my most important interviews were conducted through the introductions of 
personal contacts, where no such contacts existed and there were no great problems 
of sensitivity, I managed to arrange interviews with writers, such as Ino Kenji and 
Mizoguchi Atsushi, and the anti-böryokudan lawyer Yamada Hitoshi, by 
approaching them directly. 
Whilst the majority of formal interviews with official sources were recorded, those 
with gang-related people were not. In addition many recorded interviews were 
followed by invitations to go out drinking. It was frequently during these drinking 
bouts that the most interesting information would start to come out. Whilst alcohol 
has the advantage of loosening people's tongues, it has the disadvantages of 
speeding their speech, strengthening regional accents and impairing the researcher's 
ability to mentally catalogue this new information. 
According to Hoshino, Stark, who apparently had a formidable alcohol-tolerance, 
got round this problem by cultivating a reputation for a weak bladder. During his 
frequent trips to the bathroom, he would quickly take down his research notes. 
Ames, by contrast, was a Jehovah's Witness and consequently drank no alcohol, a 
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fact which made Hoshino wonder how he could ever have done useful research on 
the police. Invariably I would end up sitting in the last train home trying 
desperately to construct sensible notes. 
My third trip to the Kansai area coincided with a mini-conference on organised 
crime in Kobe 5; so, although not able to spend much time in interviewing or 
fieldwork, I was able to make the acquaintance of many criminologists and lawyers 
who were later to provide invaluable advice and comments on my work. Foremost 
amongst these are Dr. Wolfgang Herbert and professors Miyazawa Setsuo, 
Nishimura Haruo and Mike Levi. This conference was part of the larger 12th 
International Congress on Criminology held in Seoul (August 24-9,1998), which I 
was also fortunate enough to attend. Attendance at these conferences was useful not 
so much for deepening my understanding of organised crime in Japan as for 
suggesting to me that my knowledge of the subject surpassed that displayed by the 
papers presented by the various representatives of officialdom. 
In addition to the interviews and meetings outlined above, I also conducted various 
trips to areas of interest. In the day-labourer areas of San'ya, Kotobuki-chb and 
Kamagasaki, I talked to the homeless residents of those unhappy places, communist 
and Christian activists and various low-ranking yakuza. In Kamagasaki, on two 
consecutive days I visited an illegal gambling den. Fellow Shaken visiting 
researcher, Apichai Shipper, introduced me to Kotobuki-cho and the foreign 
s "Organised Crime and Organisational Crime: Frontiers in Research, Theory and Policy" Kobe, 19- 
21 August 1998. 
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prostitutes' area of Shin-Okubo. Chance meetings on the streets (for example a 
group of extreme-right-wing boxers) and in bars (such as the public-relations chief 
of a large religious organisation) also yielded good information or promising 
contacts for future investigation. 
I found this approach tended to be considerably more enlightening than much of the 
more formal research I carried out. It is greatly to my regret that I did not spend 
more time `hanging-around' in bars and other disreputable places rather than 
trawling through libraries or putting on a suit and tie to interview the experts. 
In the summer of 1999, I was able to return briefly to Japan to fulfil a longstanding 
social obligation. The limited research objective of this visit was to clarify various 
legal queries concerning my work. Due to financial and time constraints, little 
primary research was accomplished, though I was able to discuss the development 
of my work with many of my most significant informants. 
RESEARCH ETHICS 
Right at the beginning of this research, an American academic smilingly assured me 
that I would never complete my project but would instead get sucked into gang life 
and `go native'. Yakuza members are indeed frequently highly intriguing individuals 
who entertain their guests well, and the writer must confess to a certain ambivalence 
in his feelings for them. Mizoguchi once remarked to me that this is a general 
characteristic of American and European writers on this topic and results in their 
being soft on the yakuza. Given the tightly defined nature of my project, the danger 
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of becoming too close to my subject was less of a threat than it might have been in a 
more open-ended anthropological study. 
On visiting Tori's gang headquarters, the first questions asked of me were, firstly, 
whether I had any drugs on me and, secondly, what firearms I had at home. Herbert 
has also found this type of opportunism amongst his various contacts. It must be 
remembered that these are people who live on their wits and are always looking for 
business opportunities. Actively aiding böryokudan members in the commission of 
criminal activities was not a price I would have been prepared to pay to further my 
research aims. Over and above ethical objections to this, such activity would 
inevitably have altered profoundly the relationship with my lawyer contact. 
As mentioned above, much of my research was made possible through personal, 
rather than official, connections. This obviously presents potential problems of 
obligation, conflict of interest, reciprocity and, ultimately, objectivity. My work 
with the police in Iwate was arranged through my karate teacher, who for ten years 
has looked on me as a son. Because of this relationship Numazaki agreed to let me 
study with the police in Iwate and said I would stay in his house during my period 
of study. Whilst accepting his hospitality would leave me open to the charge of 
compromising academic objectivity, not to have done so would have caused 
embarrassment to my karate teacher and offence to Numazaki; possibly to the extent 
of jeopardising access to the police. 
Numazaki justified my existence in the police school and prefectural headquarters 
by telling his subordinates, in my presence, that it would provide good PR for the 
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police. Accordingly I not only spent days with the departments related to my 
research, but was also taken to see the aspects of police work that fitted the 
community-policing paragon popularised by Bailey. A typical example of this was 
the residential rural police box (chüzaisho) where an eventful year might entail a 
couple of minor crimes. The main demands on the resident police sergeant's time 
appeared to be ensuring that the elderly were taken care of and providing bells for 
primary-school children in order that they could scare away bears on their way to 
school. Despite this PR objective, to their credit, various senior officers in the Iwate 
police, admitted to me the ambiguous historical relationship they have enjoyed with 
the yakuza. 
In addition to these excursions, I participated in various activities at the police 
school teaching English to the students and taking part in the jüdö and arrest- 
technique (taih6 jutsu) classes. Whilst much of this research time was not therefore 
directly relevant to the immediate purposes of my research, it provided me with a 
much greater understanding of the Japanese police which informs both this and 
future research. The danger of `going native' was therefore far higher during my 
time with the police in Iwate than during my, much more limited, exposure to gang 
members in Osaka. Whilst Numazaki's PR objectives were partially successful, I 
believe that this has not entirely clouded my judgement, and my concluding chapter 
hopefully bears witness to this. 
As mentioned above, much of my research was made possible due to the personal 
guarantees of friends, and this engendered greater trust in my subjects than would 
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have been possible had the same access been derived through official channels. 
This presented ethical problems in that the essentially exploitative nature of the 
researcher-researched relationship made that trust and friendship potentially open to 
abuse or alternatively to dishonestly presenting research findings. Whilst such a 
conflict did not arise, I am aware that the implicit personal guarantees provided by 
my karate teacher, Numazaki and my lawyer in Osaka, acted to moderate what 
might have otherwise been more aggressive research. 
CHAPTER OUTLINE 
Chapter two constructs the theoretical framework of organised crime within which 
the rest of the thesis lies. Little, non-sociological, theoretical work on Japanese 
organised crime has been done and, consequently, the theory deployed in this 
chapter is derived largely from American and European academics. In particular the 
model developed by Gambetta, in his outstanding analysis of the Sicilian mafia as a 
system of private protection, and the work of the American economist Thomas 
Schelling, noting the dual governmental/business nature of organised crime, are 
influential. The perspective adopted in this thesis can be broadly described as 
functionalist in that it locates the existence of organised crime within the broader 
socio-economic matrix and identifies the ways in which different constituencies 
have requirements that may be filled by organised-crime syndicates. 
The third chapter provides an empirical overview of the development of the 
böryokudan over the second half of the twentieth century. This serves to illustrate 
the applicability of the previous chapter's American/European-derived model of 
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organised crime to the Japanese yakuza/böryokudan. In particular, the detailed 
investigation of the various sources of böryokudan income in the second half of the 
chapter shows the centrality of the protective function of the böryokudan. The fact 
that these simple theoretical concepts are as relevant to a study of the böryokudan as 
of the Sicilian Mafia or American crime families helps to strip away the protective 
mystification provided by their arcane rituals and mythologised historical 
antecedents. 
This examination also shows the highly innovative and mercurial quality of these 
groups and, in particular, their economic activities. The empirical observation that 
the main cause for this evolution of new business techniques has been change in the 
legal and law-enforcement climate suggests that the simple symbiosis model 
prevalent in much of the English-language literature demands re-evaluation. 
Given the understanding of the peculiarities of organised crime that the theoretical 
chapter provides, it becomes possible to see why organised-crime countermeasures 
present problems not found in disorganised criminal activity. After discussing these 
problems, the fourth chapter examines the different legal frameworks deployed by 
the authorities in continental Europe and the United States to deal with organised 
crime. Both of these approaches were influential in the Japanese debate concerning 
the introduction of new anti-böryokudan laws. However, as the description of the 
bötaihö given in chapter four shows, the eventual Japanese law was radically 
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different, adopting an administrative approach to regulating böryokudan activity. A 
full explanation of why this should be is postponed until the conclusion. 
The penultimate chapter investigates the impact of this law on the böryokudan 
syndicates. This is complicated by the enormous impact that the collapse of Japan's 
bubble economy has had on these groups. Although it is impossible to completely 
disentangle the effects of these two distinct events, there are specific developments 
in böryokudan activity that can be largely attributed to legal factors. What is much 
less ambiguous is that the böryokudan are currently suffering under the combined 
effects of these two calamities. However, as shown in chapter three, these 
organisations are extremely adaptive and resourceful. Accordingly, as income- 
generating opportunities become blocked, due to either legal or economic factors, 
these groups quickly develop new sources of income. Change due to increased law- 
enforcement may not, therefore, necessarily result in an overall gain to society. 
The concluding chapter attempts to locate the bötaihö within the wider context of 
Japanese legal and policing norms. Only by identifying the traditional preference 
for a wide-ranging regulatory function rather than a narrowly defined law- 
enforcement role, can we understand the deeper implications of the botaiho. This 
thesis therefore has implications for, and generates research questions with respect 
to, police studies out-with the more limited primary objectives of this research on 
which it is based. 
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Finally, we return to the question of criminality in Japan with which this thesis 
started. It will be argued that the most significant explanatory factor for the low 
crime-rates, which made Japan such an object of criminological curiosity, is that, 
for much of the post-war period, Japanese society has successfully exercised greater 
informal social controls than other modern industrialised societies. However, it will 
be further argued that these controls are becoming successively weaker and this is 
reflected in Japan's currently rising crime-rate. The implications of these 
developments are seen as of profound significance for the böryokudan. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THEORY OF ORGANISED CRIME 
INTRODUCTION 
Organised crime (hereafter OC) as it manifests itself in Japan is often portrayed as a 
uniquely Japanese phenomenon with nothing in common with OC in other parts of 
the world. In order to test the extent to which this is true, it is important to develop 
a theoretical model of OC against which Japanese OC can be compared. The vast 
bulk of theoretical work in this field is concerned with the experiences of the United 
States and Southern Italy. A synthesis of these theoretical arguments with the 
empirical analysis in Chapter Three outlining the development of OC in Japan, will 
indicate the degree to which the structural preconditions under which OC exists, 
transcend cultural differences. A theoretical analysis of OC will also offer insights 
into the problems of creating legal measures to deal satisfactorily with this type of 
crime, how these may best be overcome and the effect such resulting 
countermeasures can reasonably be expected to have. 
Unfortunately, there is no universally accepted definition of OC. The first task of 
any theoretical analysis of this phenomenon must therefore be to determine clearly 
what is meant by the term `organised crime'. When we have defined OC, various 
aetiological factors will be considered. The aetiology of crime is far too complex 
and multi-faceted a phenomenon to be reduced to any mono-causal explanation. 
With respect to the more limited field of organised crime, however, anomic 
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conditions resulting from the strain between socially induced aspirations and 
structural barriers to those aspirations being fulfilled, are briefly considered as 
contributory factors. 
In preference to sociological explanations of OC, this chapter argues that an 
economic analysis of this phenomenon is an approach which more effectively 
demystifies this secret, and often romanticised, world. Without doubt the most 
important single economic factor encouraging the development of OC is the 
existence of a market demand for the goods and services that are supplied by the 
groups collectively identified as OC. The theoretical perspective of OC adopted by 
this thesis can therefore be broadly categorised as functionalist. 
There are essentially three different perspectives of OC. Whilst current academic 
debate has largely discounted the "evil empire" perspective, this view still persists 
in political rhetoric. The other two paradigms, the neo-Marxist and the functionalist 
perspectives, both show how OC survives because it provides goods and services to 
a number of different constituencies. These include not only the individual citizen 
consumer of drugs, prostitution and illegal gambling, but also business, the state, 
politicians and even law-enforcement agencies may make use of OC. Following 
Gambetta (1993) it is considered here that, of the various services provided by OC 
groups, the one crucial commodity is protection. As we shall see, the existence of a 
market demand for OC services, and in particular protection, is absolutely central to 
an understanding of the nature of OC. Vis-ä-vis its relationship with the legitimate 
world, OC is therefore in a highly ambiguous position; at times the relationship can 
be characterised as symbiotic, at others as one of rivalry, whilst, at other times, 
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organised crime is purely parasitic. Despite this ambiguity, the net social effects of 
the continued existence of OC are overwhelmingly negative. 
The ambiguous nature of OC is also revealed in the way it functions; OC exhibits 
the characteristics both of a business firm, and of a government. As a firm, it 
provides goods and services to individual consumers in both the legal- and illegal- 
market sectors. As a government, OC makes use of its intelligence networks and 
reputation for violence to adopt a regulatory and tax-extracting role both within the 
underworld and, where possible, within the legitimate economy. This need not 
necessarily imply a purely exploitative relationship; frequently economic actors, 
operating on either side of the law, find the regulatory framework provided by OC 
to be advantageous. 
DEFINITIONS 
In everyday conversation and in journalistic writing, the term "organised crime" is 
used in a very loose fashion. Similarly, references to "the yakuza", "the Mob" or 
"the Mafia" abound with no attempt made at elucidation as to what these 
phenomena actually are. This confusion is further exacerbated by the way in which 
OC can refer to the crime itself or the organisation perpetrating it. Whilst this 
deficiency may not be overwhelming in popular or journalistic writing, it presents 
serious difficulties to law-enforcement officials and legislators. For example the 
United States' Organised Crime Control Act of 1970 provides no clear definition of 
that which it is supposed to control. 
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As pointed out by the President's Commission on Organised Crime (PCOC), "the 
problem in defining organised crime, stems not from the word `crime', but from the 
word `organised'. While society generally recognises and accepts certain action as 
criminal, there is no standard acceptance as to when a criminal group is organised. 
The fact that organised criminal activity is not necessarily organised crime 
complicates the definition process" (PCOC 1986,25). 
As the PCOC indicated, OC is obviously more than crime that is organised. Even a 
comparatively straightforward felony will require a certain amount of planning 
whilst a large professional robbery will involve a high degree of division of labour, 
specialisation and organisation. This does not make them examples of organised 
crime, and to differentiate them the terms `project crime' and `organised 
criminality' have been applied to this type of criminal operation. Similarly, highly 
systematic and sophisticated white-collar crime within organisations is not 
considered to be an example of OC. This is not to imply, however, that OC will not 
involve itself in either type of operation, merely that they are not, in themselves, 
"organised" in the sense of OC. 
Definitions of OC vary according to the priorities of the definer. At a presentation 
of an early draft of this chapter to a group of high-ranking retired Japanese police 
bureaucrats, the audience suggested gently that, in a law-enforcement context, the 
sort of definitions outlined below lacked operational applicability. Whilst this is 
true, such law-enforcement-oriented definitions are not of immediate interest to us 
here, as the purpose of this chapter is to achieve a theoretical grasp of the 
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underlying processes of OC. Strictly legal definitions of organised crime are more 
properly discussed in chapter four dealing with OC countermeasures laws. 
Even within the academic sphere the diversity of disciplines and perspectives 
produces an oriental profusion of differing definitions. For example, Sutherland, 
widely regarded as the father of American criminology, defines OC in terms of the 
crimes themselves. As well as syndicated crime, Sutherland identifies two other 
distinct criminal activities that, he asserts, are manifestations of this phenomenon 
(1937,209). However, as these are "professional" (project) crime and white-collar 
crime, they can be discounted for the reasons given above. Modem studies of OC 
concentrate on the activities of criminal syndicates such as the Triads, traditional 
Italian OC families and the böryokudan. These are very different from Sutherland's 
examples. 
Cressey (1969,319), as a sociologist, sees the relationships between the key 
protagonists as the determining factor: 
An organised crime is any crime committed by a person occupying, in an 
established division of labour, a position designed for the commission of 
crime providing that such division of labour also includes one position for a 
corrupter, one position for a corruptee, and one position for an enforcer. 
Whilst a division of labour, specialised roles and corruption are all undoubtedly 
features of OC, Cressey's definition is problematic in that it does not necessarily 
exclude project crime from this definition. There are peculiarities of OC which are 
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not satisfactorily illustrated by Cressey. There have been attempts to overcome this 
deficiency by defining OC in terms of what OC groups actually do. 
The 1967 US Task Force On Organized Crime states that "the core of organised 
crime activity is the supplying of illegal goods and services - gambling, loan- 
sharking, narcotics, and other forms of vice - to countless numbers of citizen 
consumers" (1967,1). This description is useful in highlighting one crucial 
difference between OC and "normal" crime. This is the way in which, whilst 
disorganised crime can be characterised as unambiguously socially dysfunctional, 
OC exists because it functions as a business satisfying a demand among members of 
the "legitimate" world. The Task Force definition is, however, inadequate in that it 
omits another central feature of OC. 
Schelling (1984) divides OC activity into two different types. The first of these is 
its involvement in illegal markets as described by the 1967 Task Force. The second 
field of OC business is racketeering. This refers to the use, or threat, of violence 
either to run an extortion racket, or to maintain monopolistic control of it. This 
control may be exerted over a legitimate industry, an illegal market, or a key factor, 
such as labour. Schelling (1984,182) therefore asserts that the crucial characteristic 
of OC is its desire to exercise governmental control over the illegal-market sector. 
OC does not just behave as a business, but as a government. 
This view has been criticised by Reuter (1983, xi), who suggests that this stress on 
monopolistic control is not supported by the empirical evidence. Accordingly, he 
provides a much more general definition of OC as "organisations that have 
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durability, hierarchy, and involvement in a multiplicity of criminal activities" (1983, 
175). Though these are all indeed attributes of OC, this definition deals neither with 
OC's desire to control criminal activity nor with its central involvement in black 
markets. It also encompasses political terrorist groups, as well as religious cults, 
which are organisations of a totally different order. 
Whilst Reuter is undoubtedly right that the reality of OC is generally characterised 
by oligopolistic competition rather than central control, Schelling's analysis of OC 
as fulfilling essentially a governmental role is one which offers powerful insights 
into the workings of organised crime. This approach has been refined by Gambetta 
(1993), in his outstanding theoretical examination of the Sicilian mafia. Gambetta 
argues that the essential characteristic of the mafia is that it is "a specific economic 
enterprise, an industry which produces, promotes, and sells private protection" 
(1993,1). Gambetta himself maintains that it is a misconception to equate the mafia 
with OC. This is because, he maintains, the mafia is primarily responsible for 
supplying the "organising force", whilst the range of criminal entrepreneurs subject 
to this organisation (which Gambetta apparently identifies as OC) are "usually 
independent economic agents licensed and protected by the former" (ibid, 227). 
In identifying the provision of private protection as the essential characteristic of the 
mafia, Gambetta therefore places himself alongside Schelling in arguing that the 
mafia, or OC, exercises a governmental function. They differ however in that 
Schelling asserts that OC is also a direct participant in illegal markets. This is an 
empirical observation. Although it remains outside the present writer's expertise to 
comment with respect to the United States or Sicily, as far as Japan is concerned the 
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böryokudan not only provide the governance structure for criminal markets, but 
their members are also the main participants in this sector. 
Due to the enormous problems of establishing a problem-free definition of OC, 
many experts side-step the issue by presenting instead a list of characteristics of 
such organisations. Below are given three attempts to present the main attributes of 
OC by Lupsha (1986,33), Maltz (1985,24-32) and Abadinsky (1994,6). 
LUPSHA MALTZ 
" Ongoing interaction by a group of " Corruption 
individuals over time " Violence 
" Patterns of role, status and " Sophistication 
specialisation " Continuity 
" Use of corruption " Hierarchical structure 
" Use, or threat, of violence " Internal discipline 
" Lifetime careerist structure orientation " Multiple criminal enterprises 
among members " Involved in legitimate business 
" Participants' view of crime as " Initiation rites 
instrumental ABADINSKY 
" Goal of the long-term accumulation of " Non-ideological 
capital, influence and power " Hierarchical 
" Complex criminal activity - long-term " Exclusive membership 
planning and division of labour " Self-perpetuating 
" Interjurisdictional /international " Uses violence and corruption 
patterns of operation " Specialised division of labour 
" Use of fronts, buffers and legitimate Monopolistic 
associates 
" Governed by rules and regulations 
As we can see, these three different sets cover essentially the same aspects of OC. 
It should be remembered that these lists are of the general characteristics and these 
items are not all necessary conditions for categorisation as OC. It is easy to 
envisage, for example, an OC syndicate which operates only within one 
jurisdictional area. Let us briefly examine some of the most significant attributes. 
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Corruption and Violence 
Both violence and corruption are tools that may be used by OC groups to further 
their own interests. Whilst this is not unique to organised, as opposed to 
disorganised, crime, they have a higher operational importance to the former. 
Corruption is primarily used to effect insulation from law-enforcement efforts, 
though it may also be useful in achieving a comparative advantage when OC groups 
are active in the legitimate economy. Violence is more commonly employed as the 
resource empowering an OC group to exercise its rule-making function over those 
in the underworld (where actors are necessarily deprived of legitimate sources of 
protection). Violence may also be useful in acquiring a competitive edge in the 
legitimate economy and discouraging people from co-operating with the anti-OC 
activities of law-enforcement officials. 
It should be noted that the actual deployment of military force carries with it a 
number of costs. Not only is violence expensive in terms of personnel and other 
resources, but it carries the risk of increased law-enforcement. Rather than 
violence, the primary resource of OC groups is more typically the credible threat of 
it. Those OC groups that are most prone to use violence tend to be those that have 
yet to establish their credibility. As Gambetta elegantly points out, "the more robust 
the reputation of a protection firm, the less the need to have recourse to the 
resources which support that reputation" (1993,44). This explains the 
extraordinary importance that individuals involved in OC groups attach to `face' or 
honour and the necessity to seek redress for any suggested slight however trivial. 
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This obsession with honour is a characteristic of social contexts where individuals 
can not rely on outside forces to resolve their disputes (Pinker 1998,413). 
Although the credible threat of violence is an essential characteristic of OC, 
corruption need not be necessary to the continued existence of OC (though, in the 
vast majority of cases studied, it is indeed an important factor). It will be shown 
later how official tolerance of OC can transpire in the absence of corrupt 
relationships between the upper and underworlds. 
Hierarchy 
Perhaps because of their ultimate dependence on violence, OC groups tend to have a 
militaristic multi-tiered power structure consisting of at least three levels with each 
rank exercising power over the one below. These positions are permanent and the 
power vested in any particular position is independent of the individual holding it. 
In this respect Cressey (1969) suggests that OC has a bureaucratic structure similar 
to that of a large corporation or government. However, as will be shown below, 
Cressey's view of OC is no longer held by most contemporary criminologists. The 
extent to which OC is bureaucratic is questionable; lanni (1972; 1974) suggests that 
the organisational structure of OC is essentially composed of personal bonds 
between individuals. Even with this organic, familial model of OC, an authoritarian 
power structure with a clearly defined hierarchy is a central organisational 
characteristic. 
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In this hierarchy composed of bonds of personal allegiance, OC closely resembles a 
feudal structure. This will be brought into sharp focus in the following chapter 
when we are looking at the financial structure of large Japanese OC syndicates such 
as the Yamaguchi-gumi. By contrast, it appears that the highly rationalised business 
of importing cocaine into the United States from South America has adopted a 
highly bureaucratic and anonymous structure. 
Discipline 
Within this hierarchy order is maintained through a code of conduct and regulations. 
This is rigorously enforced with severe penalties, including death, for significant 
infractions. A comparative analysis of the rules adopted by different OC 
organisations shows a marked degree of similarity (see, for example, Chu 2000,3; 
Gambetta 1993,147). Most significant of these are the need for secrecy, obedience 
to one's boss, not interfering with the women of other members, and not cheating 
fellow members. These similarities show us that the structural conditions under 
which OC exists transcend cultural differences. 
Whilst the propaganda of OC groups themselves, as well as that of those seeking to 
portray them as evil empires, accentuate this idea of an iron code of discipline, the 
empirical evidence, both from Japan and elsewhere, suggests that this ideal is far 
from realised. The fact that these rules exist at all, suggests that the temptations to 
maximise self-interest at the expense of the group, or more usually the boss, are 
strong. For example the universal rule against skimming profits from gang-related 
activities is one over which bosses must always maintain extreme vigilance. 
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Exclusive Membership and Bonding 
Not everyone is suited to life as a member of a criminal organisation. More 
importantly, two of the main constraints in the existence of organisations operating 
in a criminal environment are the problem of trust and the need for secrecy. OC 
groups therefore tend to limit membership often by way of shared ethnicity, family 
links, prison contacts, or an established reputation in youth-gang or street-crime 
activity. Recruits will usually need a sponsor or otherwise prove their suitability; 
usually the sponsor will be an organisation member. Apprenticeship training periods 
are common, and joining requirements, such as participation in an OC-related 
homicide (which Italian-American crime families refer to as `making bones'), not 
unknown. 
The idea of exclusivity is frequently reinforced by initiation rituals. These are 
possibly more important for those groups which are not composed of members with 
close blood ties, and in Japan the initiation rite amongst yakuzalböryokudan groups 
specifically forges fictive father-son ties through the exchange of sake cups. The 
bizarre nature of many of these ceremonies has the additional advantage of 
enhancing the mystery, and hence the ability to inspire fear, surrounding these 
organisations. Maltz suggests that these types of bonds possibly also serve as a 
managerial strategy to facilitate the control and exploitation of subordinates by gang 
bosses (1985,32). If we look at the highly unequal distribution of wealth and the 
system of monthly membership dues within Japanese crime syndicates, this 
certainly seems a credible analysis. 
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Division of Labour 
In his definition of OC, Cressey maintains that these organisations contain a number 
of specialist positions, and, as the size and complexity of the organisation increases, 
the number of these roles increases. One essential role is that of enforcer. The 
enforcer's prime task is to direct the threat and actual use of violence to ensure that 
the organisation's wishes are met. An extension of this arm of the organisation will 
be the role of executioner. The fixer is another key specialisation within larger 
organisations. The fixer is responsible for maintaining diplomatic links with 
political and law-enforcement figures for purposes of corruption. Money 
laundering is also an important, and highly specialised, job that is becoming 
increasingly important due both to the large drug-related income that is the mainstay 
of much modern OC activity, and to increased sophistication in law-enforcement 
methods. 
Here again Cressey's analysis seems excessively formal. To the extent that all 
members of crime groups must maintain their own reputation or lose credibility, 
they are their own enforcers. Rather than having a specialised executioner, 
böryokudan murders tend to be carried out by one of the most expendable members 
of the group. Diplomatic links with the upper-world are similarly not the preserve 
of any one individual. Whilst all of Cressey's roles are essential, they are not 
rigidly confined to any particular person. The main division of labour within the 
böryokudan is most usefully considered in economic terms. The prinicpal 
bifurcation along these lines is between entrepreneurs (who develop independent 
-57- 
sources of income) and runners (who do their bidding in return for pay). Maltz 
(1985,28) also questions Cressey's assertion of a formal role-specific structure; so 
these criticisms are not peculiar to the Japanese context. 
Continuity 
An OC group differs from a project-crime gang in that it has a continued existence 
beyond the working life of any particular member, whilst the latter is often 
assembled on an ad-hoc basis for the perpetration of a particular crime. The fact 
that it perpetuates itself enables the organisation to attract new recruits. Able 
recruits are retained by the prospect of ascending the organisation's hierarchy. 
Monopolistic 
The desire for monopoly control may be directed at a particular market or area. The 
overwhelming majority of OC violence is concerned with either defending the 
organisation's territorial or market domination from others, or extending it. Reuter 
(1983) argues that the empirical evidence suggests that in many areas of OC 
activity, such as gambling, no such monopoly exists. Whilst this may be correct, it 
is not inconsistent with asserting that it is the ambition which OC organisations 
share. If we consider the defining, governmental, nature of organised crime, it 
becomes immediately clear that the monopoly to which it aspires above all else, is 
the monopoly of power within a given area or sector. 
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Participation in Multiple Criminal Enterprises 
Whilst we can not exclude a priori the concept of an OC syndicate involved in only 
one type of criminal activity, there are good reasons why in practice this rarely, if 
ever, happens. Foremost amongst these are the economies of scale in the protection 
business. As will be discussed in greater depth below, once a group has acquired 
the military and diplomatic attributes necessary to exercise control over one 
criminal industry, the costs of extending this power to other areas of economic 
activity are low compared to the potential rewards. 
Non-ideological 
Although OC groups may frequently be involved in politics, they do not generally 
have any political agenda of their own. Political activity is aimed at gaining 
political leverage, which will increase OC immunity from prosecution by the 
authorities, boost the organisation's own power and further its economic interests. 
OC groups can therefore be differentiated from terrorist groups in which political 
power is sought for its own sake and often in direct opposition to the state. This 
does not mean that terrorist organisations and political movements are above 
adopting OC practices to fund their operations; in Northern Ireland, both sectarian 
fringes are involved in extortion and attempts to control illegal markets (Thompson 
1995,310-311, Maguire 1993,273-292). 
Much has been made of the link between Japan's extreme right-wing organisations 
and the böryokudan. Whilst this link is undeniable, in so far as it manifests itself 
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today, it is essentially a front to extort money. The role the böryokudan have played 
in the past as strike-breakers should be seen as a commercially-provided protective 
service rather than indicative of any political preference. 
The antipathy that OC groups frequently have for left-wing ideologies may 
similarly be seen as reflecting naked self-interest rather than abstract theories of 
political morality; conditions of unfettered capitalism are those which are most 
likely to create a market for protection that OC groups can exploit. To the extent 
that this pragmatic pursuit of economic self-interest may be considered an ideology, 
Abadinsky's general characterisation of OC as non-ideological is open to challenge; 
as will be mentioned below, such pragmatism may be seen as the apotheosis of 
capitalism. 
Another reason for OC's antipathy to left-wing ideologies is that communist 
governments are thought to be more enthusiastic in OC eradication than free-market 
liberal-democracies (though fascist Italy has also been credited with temporarily 
eliminating the mafia). Certainly authoritarian regimes are less likely to tolerate 
alternative foci of power but it should be noted that a vibrant OC entity built an 
existence on circumventing the numerous obstacles to trade imposed by the Soviet 
Union's command economy. Perhaps the fact that such regimes have a tight control 
over the media ensures that the existence of OC is less likely to be publicly exposed. 
**** 
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Whilst many of the above characteristics of OC groups are not unique to such 
groups but are commonly observed in firms, trade unions, clubs and political 
parties, taken together as a whole they build a picture of a distinct entity which we 
recognise as organised crime. Despite the attractions of this approach, in order to 
clarify what is precisely meant by OC in the course of this thesis, as well as to 
expose the most important elements of what OC actually does, a definition is called 
for. 
Of the attempts to define OC outlined above, the ideas of Schelling and Gambetta 
provide the most profound theoretical insights into this phenomenon and the 
definition developed here owes much to these two scholars. For the purposes of 
this thesis, Organised Crime entities are therefore defined here as structures 
which exercise rule-making, tax-collecting and protective functions over 
primarily, but not exclusively, illegal markets in a given geographical and/or 
economic sector. The questions and issues raised by this definition will be 
discussed below. 
This definition will no doubt displease some as it fails to adequately encompass, for 
example, entrepreneurs engaged in the highly deregulated and competitive drug- 
importation business. Objections of this type lead us to what Levi (1998a, 2) 
cynically considers to be the "true social definition of `organised criminals': a set of 
people whom the police and other agencies of the State, regard or wish us to regard 
as `really dangerous' to its essential integrity". This type of bogeyman treatment of 
OC, inextricably linked with the "evil empire" perspective discussed below, is a 
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serious obstacle to the primary objective of this chapter, which is the rational 
analysis of OC. 
PERSPECTIVES ON ORGANISED CRIME 
Fijnaut (1990,324) identifies three distinct perspectives through which OC has been 
analysed. These can be labelled the "evil empire" view, the neo-Marxist view, and 
the functionalist view. Academic studies of OC, whether consciously or not, fall 
into one of these three categories. 
The "evil empire" perspective is most closely associated with the work of Cressey 
and, until recent years, official publications of the various interested United States 
government bodies. Its central argument is that OC is a monolithic national, and in 
the view of some writers such as Sterling (1995) international, conspiracy. This 
sprawling, unitary organisation exists in a parasitic relationship with its host society 
and, in its relentless drive for wealth and power, "is threatening the foundations of 
economic, legal, and political order" (Cressey 1969,54). The ethnic-minority 
composition of many OC groups enables OC to be portrayed as an alien aberration 
extrinsic to the host culture in which it thrives. 
This highly simplistic and alarmist view has been attacked by proponents of the 
other two perspectives. Whilst both of these apply an essentially functionalist 
analysis of OC, they are most usefully examined separately in that the neo-Marxist 
view offers a more tightly confined view of the services provided by OC than the 
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broader functionalist perspective. Perhaps it would be appropriate to consider the 
former as a sub-set of the latter. 
The neo-Marxist perspective is exemplified by Frank Pearce's Crimes of the 
Powerful (1976). With reference to the history of OC in the United States, the myth 
of a national criminal conspiracy is simply not sustainable; inter-group conflict has 
been the norm (1976,117). Even the idea of a monolithic Italian-American Cosa 
Nostra is not supported by the available evidence, and the shifting alliances and 
cleavage lines between the various OC groups have been based on each group's 
own self-interest rather than ethnicity. Whilst it is true that minority groups are 
disproportionately represented in the ranks of criminal organisations, this is due to 
the fact that such groups are denied equal access to legitimate means of 
advancement. 
Far from the apparent existence of OC as a threat to the state, the neo-Marxist 
analysis identifies OC as a servant of the state. OC has provided many services, 
both to the interests of `capital' and to the government itself. It has not, however, 
threatened either; most legitimate OC business activity is confined to marginal 
industries characterised by a low return on capital, such as garbage carting and 
catering, whilst OC extortion activities are principally directed at small businesses 
located in working-class areas. Primarily OC has been employed by the 
economically dominant class as a means of controlling labour and as a force with 
which to combat a perceived threat from radicalism. It has also played a significant 
role in machine politics, delivering campaign funds and votes as well as disrupting 
the electoral efforts of rivals. 
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Pearce also points out that the "evil empire" perspective is highly functional to the 
state's own ends; by the creation of a moral panic about this evil cancer, a climate is 
generated in which law-enforcement officials are able to increase their powers of 
surveillance and control. These new powers may well be arrayed against the 
perceived threat of political radicalism rather than OC (1976,114). 
The second perspective challenging the "evil empire" view of OC is that of the 
functionalists. Whilst most non-Marxist functionalists would not dispute the fact 
that OC has been useful to political and business elites, they adopt a more 
sophisticated analysis, arguing that reality is a more complex affair than is portrayed 
by Pearce's reductionist exposition. The relationship between state/ruling class and 
OC has not been entirely one-sided; OC will exploit whatever opportunities it can 
find, and these will include both the state and business, and at all levels. Moreover, 
the functionalists, in showing how OC's activities can be beneficial to a wide range 
of groups, provide a better understanding of the factors giving rise to the 
phenomenon as well as its continued existence. This understanding is also likely to 
yield more fruitful suggestions as to effective OC countermeasures than either the 
neo-Marxist or the "evil empire" perspective. Most of the theoretical arguments 
presented in this chapter fall loosely within the functionalist perspective and, for 
that reason, the approach will not be discussed in detail at this stage. 
Essentially functionalism argues that OC exists because it fulfils a role in society. It 
is not an alien aberration as argued by Cressey, but "an integral part of the..... social 
system.. . and should be viewed as one end of a continuum of business enterprises 
with legitimate business at the other end" (lanni 1974,15). Indeed OC may be seen 
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as the apotheosis of the capitalist way as pointed out by Capone (cited in Pearce 
1976,127): 
Listen, don't get the idea that I'm one of those radicals. Don't get the idea 
I'm knocking the American system. . . This American system of ours, call it 
Americanism, call it Capitalism, call it whatever you like, gives to each and 
every one of us a great opportunity, if we only seize it with both hands and 
make the most of it. 
Bell encapsulates this attitude in the title of his chapter on OC in The End of 
Ideology (1965,127) in which he describes "crime as an American way of life: a 
queer ladder of social mobility". Immigrants arriving in the United States would 
find that legitimate avenues for advancement would be blocked to them as previous 
waves of immigrants would have managed to monopolise these. OC presents one of 
the only alternative means to material success for immigrants. Once success has 
been achieved, there will be a tendency for individuals to shift from illegitimate to 
legitimate industries and to adopt the norms of the mainstream culture. There will 
be a pattern of ethnic-progression in OC development with each new group of 
immigrants taking the place of the preceding one, which will itself increasingly 
dissociate itself from criminal sources of revenue. 
Bell argues that this process can be seen at work in the development of the ethnic 
composition of OC from one that was predominantly Irish, then Jewish, then Italian 
to one that is becomingly increasingly dominated by Hispanic and Black groups. 
Whilst there is no doubt that the process of immigration has had a profound impact 
-65- 
on the development of OC in the United States, the ethnic-progression hypothesis 
optimistically assumes that successful incumbents, or at least their progeny, will 
vacate their market niche. Empirically it appears that, whilst some have, many 
others have not. OC in contemporary America is therefore more diverse than at any 
time in its history, with representatives of all of the country's constituent ethnic 
groups actively participating in the industry. A similar process has been observed 
by Amir (1986) with respect to Jewish immigrants in Israel. 
Initially it might seem that the idea of ethnic-progression has little relevance to the 
development of OC in Japan, which prides itself on its ethnic homogeneity. 
However, ethnically Japanese burakumin1, as well as Japan's Korean minority, are 
disproportionately represented in the ranks of the böryokudan. This suggests that 
use of OC as a rational strategy for self-advancement adopted by disadvantaged 
minorities, regardless of their ethnicity, is not confined to the United States but is 
also applicable to Japan. The theory of ethnic-succession suggests that it is 
plausible that the increasing numbers of low-skilled migrant workers from Asia, the 
Middle East and South America, may become a prime recruiting ground for 
böryokudan. 
Not only can a functional analysis be adopted to explain how OC may benefit 
ambitious and talented individuals in minority groups as a means to social mobility, 
but, more importantly, it may also explain how other members of society may find 
the existence of OC advantageous. This includes not only the relationship enjoyed 
1 The descendants of outcast communities in Japan (see chapter three). 
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by OC with political and business elites (as described in the neo-Marxist 
perspective), but also that with the law-enforcement community, ordinary members 
of society, and the members of the underworld who find themselves governed by 
OC. If this were not so, OC would not continue to exist. These different 
considerations will be explored individually below. 
THE AETIOLOGY OF ORGANISED CRIME 
Bell's view of OC as a mechanism to social mobility is implicitly based on the 
strain theory of criminology in its explanation for the development of OC. 
Essentially, in strain theory, crime is seen as resulting from "the disjunction 
between the culturally induced aspirations in society and the structurally determined 
opportunities" (Young 1981,283). Many members of society who are denied equal 
access to the opportunities necessary for the realisation of these aspirations will 
become estranged from it. 
Merton (1964,218-19) suggests that the resulting anomie may take one of five 
forms. Firstly individuals may abandon their aspirations yet retain, and even cling 
to, their low status role in society. A second reaction may be to retreat into a 
passive existence rejecting both their socially imposed role and any aspirations they 
may once have had. Alternatively, individuals may seek solace in rituals, often of a 
religious nature. Others may adopt a strategy of rebellion denying the validity of 
socially constructed aspirations for material success. This group differs from the 
retreatists in that the rejected goals are replaced with others. The fifth response is 
that of innovation. Individuals may retain the goals held by the wider society but 
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seek alternative strategies for their attainment. Crime is therefore a normal and 
rational reaction to a given social context. 
The frequency of a criminal response to anomic conditions will be influenced by the 
social environment in which an individual is raised. In a social setting in which 
criminality is the norm, and where the most widely respected and successful 
members of that society owe their success to criminal activity, it is to be expected 
that individuals will become socialised to that criminal sub-culture. Given that the 
overwhelming majority of OC members are recruited from socially disadvantaged 
and crime-ridden neighbourhoods, strain theory seems to offer a partial explanation 
of why OC finds a continuing supply of personnel. The evidence presented by 
Hobbs (1994,445-9) and Abadinsky (1994,208-9), however, casts doubt on anomie 
being the sole impetus to participation in OC. Autobiographical material suggests 
that a desire to get the better of others through superior cunning or by virtue of 
one's warrior spirit is often the prime motivating force. Far from aspiring to the 
mainstream of straight society, many OC figures have nothing but contempt for the 
"suckers" who comprise it. 
Nor does strain theory explain how OC itself comes into being. To do that, 
economic theories may offer greater explanatory power. Annelise Anderson (1995, 
35-8) identifies three key factors leading to the development of OC: the lack of 
adequate control by the legitimate authorities, an excess of bureaucratic 
intervention, and the existence of market demand for illegal goods and services. 
These are not necessarily mutually exclusive, and a combination of them may be 
expected to further encourage OC's development. 
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The first factor is the lack of effective state control. Where the state is unwilling, or 
unable, to assert its authority, there will be a tendency for individuals to depend on 
private means to protect themselves, their property and the binding force of 
agreements they have entered into. Where individuals are too weak to do this 
themselves, they may find it advantageous to ally themselves, through either the 
payment of tribute or the offering of services, with a group capable of affording 
them security. Whilst the "protection" offered may be little more than freedom from 
further predation by the tribute collecting organisation, it may well be preferable to 
anarchy. OC is, in other words, another manifestation of the iron law of oligarchy. 
This is suggested by the work of Skaperdas and Syropoulos (1995) who use 
economic modelling to show how, in a simple two-player economic model starting 
from conditions of anarchy, exploitation through coercion will be a stable- 
equilibrium outcome if one of the individuals has a comparative advantage in the 
means to violence. 
The example most usually cited of ineffective government power leading to the 
growth of OC is the traditionally lawless Mezzogiorno of southern Italy in the late 
nineteenth century. Other equally valid examples would be the explosion in OC 
activity in what was the Soviet Union following its disintegration and the collapse 
of communism, and the post-war chaos in Japan. Even when the state may 
otherwise exercise effective control, in conditions where people are disinclined to 
make use of legitimate channels of law-enforcement and dispute resolution then a 
market for alternative mechanisms of adjudication and enforcement will exist. This 
may, for example, happen when a minority group or class lacks trust in the 
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legitimate authorities or when the legal machinery for conflict resolution is highly 
priced or inefficient. 
The excess of bureaucratic intervention inevitably creates the potential for 
corruption. This tendency increases when there are no clear criteria on which 
bureaucratic decisions are based or where the mechanisms for monitoring such 
decisions are weak. Corruption of bureaucratic decisions as to the allocation of 
resources and the awarding of contracts need not necessarily lead to OC formation 
but it is certainly a facilitating factor. A classic example of this type of OC- 
bureaucrat interaction is given in Stark's 1981 study of Japanese OC, in which he 
identifies a network of bureaucrats, politicians and colluding construction firms, 
with OC at its nexus (1981,205). 
An excess of bureaucratic regulations and interference in private and commercial 
life may also encourage OC by engendering a culture characterised by a contempt 
for bureaucratic meddling and a dependence on working within the black market. 
Therefore, whilst the second of Anderson's conditions seems to contradict her first, 
this is not necessarily the case. Italy and India, for example, both display Byzantine 
bureaucratic regulations but fail to police them properly. The consequences are 
inevitable. 
It is however problematic to determine what level of state intervention can be 
justifiably identified as excessive. Many examples of state intervention in the 
economy might reasonably be seen as proper manifestations of a civilised society; 
one need only think of rules concerning child-labour, environmental protection and 
minimum standards of work-place safety to see that such intervention may be 
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socially desirable. There are however clear financial incentives to circumvent these 
regulations. 
The most significant of Anderson's conditions is the existence of illegal markets. 
The main impetus to the growth of OC in the twentieth century has undoubtedly 
been this factor. Prohibition of alcohol in the United States, the black market in 
post-war Japan, and, most spectacularly, the enormous market in illegal drugs 
everywhere, have all created the potential for vast profits. This potential has been 
exploited both by traditional OC groups, such as the Sicilian mafia and the Chinese 
Triads, and also by new organisations such as the South American cartels. 
Schelling (1984,77) argues that it is the existence of these illegal markets that 
provides the cash-generating "core" around which the necessary OC infrastructure 
can be built. To function effectively, OC requires both a military capability, on 
which its power is based, and diplomatic relations with the legitimate world, 
through which it attempts to gain protection from law-enforcement harassment. 
Both of these are expensive and do not, in themselves, bring in an income. Illegal 
markets are therefore a major stimulus to OC development. Whilst traditionally 
these markets have comprised prostitution, gambling, loan-sharking, and black- 
marketeering in rationed or highly-taxed goods, in recent decades the traffic in 
narcotics has become an increasingly significant component. 
This is important for two main reasons. The first of these is that, because the profits 
to be made from drugs are so much larger than those from more traditional OC 
industries, market share has become very keenly contested. Some of the newer 
entrants, such as the Colombian cartels, have started to employ unprecedented 
firepower in their bid for control. The second is that the public perception of the 
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trade in drugs, especially white drugs, such as heroin and cocaine, is far less tolerant 
than it is for more traditional sources of OC income, such as gambling, which can 
be portrayed as a victimless, consensual activity. It can therefore be expected that 
increased dependence on drug income will be matched with growing levels of 
public anxiety and condemnation of OC. 
In addition to the conditions suggested by Anderson as being conducive to the 
development of OC, there are a number of factors which can be seen as encouraging 
this phenomenon. If crime is going to exist, there are, in economic terms, 
considerable advantages (to the criminal) in its large-scale organisation. The 
foremost of these are the considerable economies of scale that accrue to the big 
organisation. The corruption of political, judicial, and to a lesser extent law- 
enforcement, figures will only be viable once a certain degree of economic 
centralisation has been achieved. Monopolisation of criminal industries will also 
cut out unnecessary and wasteful duplication of the costs of corrupting the legal and 
political systems. There are also substantial economies of scale involved in money 
laundering. At a more basic level, the larger the size of the organisation, the greater 
will be its degree of market power and its ability to reap the benefits of a price- 
fixing role. 
Another key factor contributing to the development of OC groups is the importance 
of military power, in either its threat or its actual application. This is, at least 
partially, a function of size. Violence is, however, a considerable cost to the 
organisation as it both removes men from money-making operations and raises the 
organisation's public profile, making it harder to avoid harassment from the forces 
of law and order. Violence-minimisation will therefore be beneficial. One way to 
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eliminate this cost is either to eliminate, or to come to a collusive agreement with, 
the opposition. This is another crucial factor in the tendency towards large 
organisations. 
THE BUSINESSES OF ORGANISED CRIME 
Although we have defined OC as the governing structure over-arching illegal 
markets, rather than those markets themselves, an examination of the criminal 
businesses in which OC typically directly involves itself yields valuable insights 
into the nature of OC itself. Under Schelling's analysis, OC exhibits attributes both 
of business organisations and of governments. In these different functions it 
behaves in very different ways. 
As Anderson points out, one of the main reasons that OC exists is that there is a 
demand for goods and services that cannot be legally supplied. This inevitably 
draws us to consider the role of the state in this problem. At a basic level, the law- 
making power, in labelling certain activities as criminal, creates crime. For 
activities that are evidently undesirable and dysfunctional to social life, such as 
rape, murder and theft, the labelling of such activities as criminal is uncontroversial. 
Such acts can be described as bad in themselves (mala in se). Other activities may 
be "criminal" purely by virtue of arbitrary government fiat or to further some policy 
or revenue objective, for example to protect a government monopoly (mala 
prohibita). The fact that many people see nothing wrong in consuming goods and 
services that happen to be illegal implies that there is no universal consensus on the 
category to which these goods and services belong. At best they occupy a grey area. 
Unfortunately the government, in enforcing laws of this kind, may well exacerbate 
the problem. In imposing legal restrictions on activity in certain markets, 
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effectively the government sets significant barriers to entry. This enables those 
individuals prepared to risk government penalties by trading in these markets to 
charge higher prices than they could if the market were truly competitive. This is 
particularly true for those goods and services characterised by high inelasticity of 
demand. According to Abadinsky (1994,294): 
Translating morality into a statute backed by legal sanctions does not 
provide for greater morality; it merely widens the scope of the law and 
creates both temptation and opportunity for a particular set of social actors. 
The obvious conclusion to be drawn from this is that legalisation of the illicit 
businesses in which OC is active will expose it to the full competitive pressures of 
the market. It is not improbable that Glaxo, Richard Branson and Camelot could 
run drugs, sex and gambling businesses more efficiently than the current 
incumbents. This is of considerable significance to a discussion of OC 
countermeasures. 
Although media representations of OC dwell on its violent nature, it should be noted 
that, with regard to its business operations, this is not fundamental. In order to 
attract customers, violence is to be avoided. Even in the loansharking business, 
most usually associated with violent debt-reclamation techniques, such practices are 
the exception and not a desirable outcome for either borrower or lender (Reuter 
1983,98-9). Most customers of a loanshark will have need of his services in the 
future, and this, not just a fear of being worked over, is the main motivation for 
prompt repayment. The majority of loanshark customers are also acutely aware that 
they have no other source of credit. Many gamblers find themselves in need of the 
services of loansharks whilst, simultaneously, it is advantageous for OC to keep the 
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revenues from its various other activities, including gambling, earning yet more. 
There are therefore synergetic forces causing OC to drift into the loansharking 
business. 
If we see OC as a rule-making and protective entity, then when OC group members 
directly participate in markets other than that for protection, "they should be 
considered, as it were, their own customers" (Gambetta 1993,19). Let us now 
examine this central aspect of OC. 
OC AS GOVERNMENT 
Whilst OC involves itself in a myriad of illegal business activities, these by 
themselves are not defining characteristics of OC. A small, unconnected gambling 
operator or pimp is not an example of OC activity as it has been defined. It is only 
when there is an attempt to exert a rule-making function that crime becomes 
organised crime as we understand it. In this respect OC behaves not so much as a 
business enterprise, but as a government. This governmental role is, in all 
probability, a natural spin-off from OC's business involvement in illegal markets 
and due to the peculiarities of those markets. 
There are two key problems for individual entrepreneurs in illegal markets, which 
are not faced by legitimate traders. Firstly, they continually run the risk of incurring 
sanctions imposed by the legitimate world's authorities. Secondly, because their 
operations are illegal, they are unable to seek the help of the state's legal apparatus 
to enforce contracts or uphold property rights. Those involved in illegal markets 
must therefore develop alternative strategies to protect their own interests. The 
most obvious method of security open to criminals is to maintain absolute secrecy. 
However, this is not a viable strategy for those operating in illegal markets as they 
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depend for their livelihood on the patronage of customers and are therefore obliged 
to remain accessible. Two alternative strategies remain. The first, which can be 
called the diplomatic strategy, is to gain the protection of key members of the 
legitimate world through their corruption. This may take the shape of 
straightforward financial bribery, the provision of important services, blackmail, or 
a combination of the above. It may operate at the stratum of street-level law- 
enforcement, or may extend to political and judicial figures. The second option is 
the creation of military power sufficient to defend the business interests of the OC 
group concerned. This will consist of both intimidating the host community from 
informing on it, and defending the group's businesses by ensuring that rivals are 
capable neither of setting up competing businesses within the group's territory nor 
of posing a military threat to it. 
Once a fledgeling OC group has established military and diplomatic control within 
certain territorial limits, it is in a position to use this monopoly of power to exert 
control over other criminal activity within this territory. This is the point at which 
crime becomes organised crime. Criminals operating within the group's 
jurisdictional limits will be obliged to pay a street tax for the right to do so. 
Alternatively, the group may grant franchises for various enterprises. OC may 
expand its tax base to include legitimate businesses too. 
Just as OC occupies an ambiguous position in its role as a business supplying 
desired, but legally prohibited, commodities, OC as a government may not enjoy a 
wholly predatory relationship with regard to its subjects. Since organisations 
participating in illegal activity cannot rely on legal protection, the same is true for 
individual criminal entrepreneurs. By paying taxes to the shadow government, 
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individual criminals may be shielded by its political and military strength from both 
predation by other criminals and harassment by law-enforcement officials. One 
interesting conclusion to be drawn from this is that an increase in law-enforcement 
activity directed against any given illegal market will encourage unaffiliated traders 
in that market to seek the protection that OC links may provide. 
OC may also provide a number of services to its criminal subjects. Loansharks and 
gambling operators may make use of the organisation's reputation for violence to 
ensure that debts are repaid. Gambling operations may need to place lay-off bets or 
have access to large amounts of capital at short notice to finance a big payout. There 
are a wide variety of people, in and on the periphery of the underworld, with a 
desire to curry favour with OC personnel (Abadinsky 1994,297). These will 
provide an intelligence grapevine of information that may be useful not only to the 
organisation itself but to some of its subjects. For example, OC may prove useful in 
providing such individuals with information as to the credit rating of customers. 
Thieves may find that OC-controlled fencing operations are safer and more efficient 
than unprotected ones because of their wider contacts and superior distribution 
networks. 
The governmental nature of OC is clearly seen in the way that it can become 
involved in dispute resolution and negotiations. This can involve actors operating 
in either the criminal or the legal economy. It is important to see that this role need 
not be exploitative. This is perhaps best illustrated by Gambetta's account of 
"Peppe" who is sought out by people wishing to trade but lacking the essential 
conditions of trust. Due to his status as a `man of respect', Peppe is able to act as a 
guarantor for otherwise difficult transactions (1993,17). 
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Although a fee may be charged for this service, that is not always done. According 
to Tanzi (1995,166-9) this may be explained in terns of "social capital" or favours 
owed. One example Tanzi gives is taken from the film The Godfather in which an 
undertaker seeks justice after his daughcr is raped. Years later he repays his debt by 
laying out his dead benefactor's corpse. This type of arbitration service will lend 
legitimacy and moral authority to the local OC group. 
Even when OC extends its tax base to the legitimate sector, this need not be as 
much of an encumbrance on the industries concerned as might at first be imagined. 
To see how this can be so, let us consider the most commonly victimised legal 
industry, the restaurantbar trade. This business is particularly susceptible to OC 
extortion, as even the menacing presence of gangster types is sufficient to drive 
custom away. 
To be acceptable to taxpayers the tax imposed must be seen to be "fair". The most 
obvious , vay of doing this is by providing something in return, in this case 
protection. This need not mean merely protection from predation by OC groups 
themselves. A good example of this is given by the current situation in Russia, 
where protection is tellingly described as a `roof (krysha): 
When a business comes `under the roof' of a ROC (Russian OC) group, it is 
not always seen as a clear case of extortion. Often the Jayslla offers a range 
of services. The business can be expected to be defended from other 
racketeers, including corrupt law-enforcement; effective technical and guard 
protection of property; debt collection; assistance with customs clearance; 
legal and business advice from an adroit `legal staff ; and banking privileges 
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at criminal controlled banks (Center for Strategic and International Studies, 
1997,29). 
Gambetta (1993,28-9) gives an amusing example of one case in which two thugs 
taking money from stall-holders on the spurious pretext of protection became forced 
to become genuine suppliers of protection when one of their taxpayers unexpectedly 
demanded it. If they had not provided this service, they realised that their future 
ability to extract money would be seriously impaired. 
A tax must also be payable in a way that does not damage the self-respect of 
taxpayers, impair the competitive position of the individual entrepreneur vis-a-vis 
his rivals, or cause unaccountable payments that might cause problems with the 
(legitimate) tax authorities. To ensure these criteria are met, the OC group must 
ensure that all competing businesses in this industry within the organisation's 
territory must be paying an equal rate of tax. The businesses can then safely pass on 
the costs to their customers without the fear of losing market share. By maintaining 
a monopoly on the supply of a key commodity such as linen, beer, or snacks, or by 
leasing cigarette, pinball or gaming machines, the OC group can charge an 
extortionate amount that can be presented in the business's accounts as a tax- 
deductible business expense. 
OC, just like any other government, gives structure to what may otherwise be an 
anarchic, dangerous environment for its subjects. When this is seen in the context 
of political theories regarding the state as a body enjoying a monopoly to the means 
of violence within set geographical limits, the validity of this analogy becomes even 
clearer. Political theories of the state fall into two broad categories: those that 
regard the state as an exploitative agency imposed from above and backed up by 
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force, and those that see the state as the product of a social contract. The extent to 
which an individual will find this analogy valid, therefore, clearly depends on that 
individual's perspective of the state. 
Baumol (1995), buying into the exploitative perspective, suggests that the analogy 
is so apt that not only is it fruitful to analyse OC groups as fledgling governments, 
but it is also pertinent to examine states as the logical extension of OC. If the state 
is considered in the broad sweep of both history and geography, Baumol's analysis 
has a disturbing plausibility; exploitation of the majority, in the interests of a small 
elite backed up by power, is the norm, and representative democracy an aberration. 
Some theorists would go further and argue that even these democratic trappings are 
an ideological myth concealing the true structure of power and exploitation. 
Grossman (1995) develops this idea of an exploitative or, in his words 
"kleptocratic", state and sees that OC may act in direct competition with the state. 
Grossman's theory of kleptocracy rests on the assumption that the primary objective 
of the state is the maximisation of revenues. Like all good economic theories of 
maximisation, that of kleptocracy assumes that the economic actor is constrained, in 
this case by the decisions of the state's subjects. One of the key factors influencing 
this constraint is the existence of a rival producer of public services in the form of a 
mafia. The introduction of competition seriously undermines the ability of the state 
to maximise tax revenues. It need not, however, necessarily affect the welfare of 
the taxpayer in a negative way. 
To see how this is possible, let us first consider an economy in which the state has a 
monopoly on the lawful provision of goods and services. The citizen producer 
chooses what proportion of his resources he allocates to lawful economic activity 
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(which is taxable) and what to the black-market (which includes the production of 
both illegal goods and undeclared legal goods). In both black and legal market 
production the individual producer must combine his own resources with state- 
provided public services. 
A major constraint on the government is that the producer can use public services in 
the illegal sector, benefiting himself but lowering tax revenue for the state. If the 
government sets the tax rate too high, then producers will switch their resources to 
the black market thus reducing state revenue. Ultimately, however, excessive black 
market activity will result in a reduction in the supply of public services, with the 
consequent negative feedback on total production. 
Once our "mafia" is introduced to the model, the situation changes. Assume that 
the mafia also provides public services. Let it also be assumed that these services 
can only be utilised in the black-market sector and that the mafia can only collect 
rents in this sector. In this new economic environment, the individual must decide, 
as before, what proportion of his resources to allocate to legal and illegal markets so 
as to maximise his utility. He must now, however, take into account four key 
variables: these are the relative tax rates charged and public services provided by 
both state and mafia. 
State and mafia will therefore compete for market share through the manipulation of 
tax and benefits. In the simple model outlined above the stable equilibrium point 
will set the producers' resource allocation equally between straight and illegal- 
market activities. The beneficiary is the individual producer, whilst the state loses 
its ability to charge monopoly rents. 
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Whilst it might seem at first glance to be extraordinary to consider OC and the 
government to be rivals, given our definition we can see theoretically how this can 
be. Empirically the theory finds supporting evidence. The famous anti-mafia judge 
Falcone once admitted that, due to the inefficiency of the Italian legal system, 
disputants frequently relied on the mafia to resolve civil disputes (Gambetta 1993, 
170). The same has long been true of Japan. Similarly, where the police offer 
protection on a partial or preferential basis, it creates a market for alternatives. 
With respect to the factors influencing the rate at which the state sets taxes, a 
number of considerations should be taken into account. The assumption of a 
revenue-maximising state should be qualified by the existence of a number of 
constraining factors, not least of which is a continued grasp on the handles of 
power. Whilst competitive pressures impacting on tax-rate decisions do exist in 
modem states, they are more usually associated with the ballot box than the 
underworld. Undoubtedly higher taxes do increase the propensity to black-market 
involvement, but it is not thought that this is a major factor in governmental tax- 
setting. 
Grossman's analysis raises one interesting question: if the state and OC are rivals, 
and if, as Baumol suggests, the OC group is a fledgling government, why does the 
state not take more vigorous steps to eradicate this threat to its hegemony? To 
answer this we must examine the relationship between state and OC. 
OC AND STATE 
Pearce (1976), writing from a neo-Marxist perspective, argues that, far from being 
the rival of the state, OC is its servant. OC is just one more means of social control 
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and the perpetuation of the existing hegemonic structure. There is much evidence to 
support this claim, but it will be shown that, in reality, the relationship is much more 
complex and subtle than that suggested by Pearce. Even the oft-used term 
"symbiotic" is not entirely apt, as the state could quite happily exist without OC 
whilst it is likely that, in the absence of effective state control, OC would not only 
flourish, but also be compelled to expand its governmental role. An example of this 
latter scenario might be the republics of the former Yugoslavia where it is hard to 
tell where state starts and OC ends. 
Pearce's paradigm of OC as servant rests on the assumption of a monolithic state 
representing the interests of the ruling capitalist class. Whilst it would be naive to 
deny that the interests of business are a significant influence on governmental 
behaviour, the distribution of power in society is much more diffuse than is 
suggested by Pearce. Even within the apparatus of "the state" there are a number of 
competing agencies with different, sometimes conflicting, objectives. Differences 
might even be apparent in the objectives of different departments and levels within 
the same agency. 
There are, however, numerous examples of OC providing services to different 
branches of the state and its most prominent representatives. The most striking of 
such examples are those in which the security/intelligence apparatus of the state has 
co-opted OC, usually in its fight against political radicalism. A famous example of 
this is the use by US naval intelligence of `Lucky' Luciano to prevent labour unrest 
and aid counter-intelligence on the New York waterfront during the Second World 
War (Abadinsky 1994,137). 
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Though they should not be conflated with the state, individual political figures have 
also been aided by OC. In politics, and especially machine politics2, OC can 
provide campaign funding and organise voters. At a more basic level OC may 
intimidate rival politicians and their supporters. Whilst OC is here serving the 
interests of politicians, it should not be seen as their servant; there is a very clear 
understanding that such support is conditional on OC's business activities being 
viewed leniently by the politician once in power. 
In this respect there is little difference between campaign contributions made by OC 
and those made by legitimate business interests or other lobbying groups. This 
suggests an inconsistency in the neo-Marxist analysis of OC: if the state is the 
servant, or "executive committee", of business interests, and OC behaves like a 
legitimate business with respect to political figures, then possibly it is more 
reasonable to assert that, far from OC being the servant of the state, political leaders 
serve their sponsoring OC group. With the exception of extreme cases of weak and 
corruption-ridden states, with immensely wealthy, powerful criminal organisations 
such as South American drugs cartels, this would be overstating the case. It is more 
reasonable to assume that OC is just one other interest group which may exert 
influence over the political process. 
Another interest to which the authorities must pay heed is that of public opinion. 
The ability of a government to accommodate OC may well be tempered by the level 
of public concern about OC activities. Where OC businesses are perceived as 
victimless transactions between consenting adults, as may be the case with 
gambling, loansharking, and prostitution (whether or not this perception is 
2 The term `machine politics' refers to the systematic corruption of the democratic process into a 
system of patron-client networks designed to ensure a continued monopoly of power. 
-84- 
accurate), there may be a general tolerance of OC and consequently little pressure to 
enforce the relevant laws. Even high levels of OC violence may not engender 
corresponding levels of public anxiety provided it is `kept inside the ghettos'. The 
widespread perception of drugs as a serious threat to society makes a tacit 
acceptance of OC much harder. The increasing importance of drug trafficking to 
OC finances is one major feature in the more overtly antipathetical treatment of OC 
by governments in recent years. 
Even with regard to the drugs trade, law-enforcement resources may well be 
directed at that aspect which most directly concerns the public, street-level trading. 
This is characteristically a level at which there is no direct OC involvement (under 
our definition, street-gangs can be seen as, at best, proto-OC). Given that law- 
enforcement resources are seriously constrained, they will be targeted in electorally 
efficient ways, i. e. against those crimes that voters are most worried about such as 
disorganised violent street and property crimes, and, in so far as the drugs trade is 
targeted, its relatively 'disorganised' retail arm. 
At the level of law-enforcement, officers may also find reasons to accommodate 
OC. These may not be due to straightforward corruption, though such cases are by 
no means unknown, but OC may benefit the police in other ways. Because of their 
extensive network of contacts and consequent intelligence grapevine, OC groups are 
in a position to provide the police with information concerning crimes not 
connected with themselves. Where these crimes represent a threat to the interests of 
the group concerned, it will be advantageous for them to use the police to remove 
their rivals. The 1950 Kefauver Committee discovered that the local police were 
actively employed by the OC group running the illegal gambling wire service in 
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Miami, to ensure that only affiliated gamblers remained in business (Reuter 
1983,124, Schelling 1984,164-5). 
Even if we assume that both law-enforcement officials and policy makers are 
opposed to the continued existence of OC, it is still possible that they may adopt a 
quasi-co-operative policy. The way in which this might happen is explored by 
Celantini, Marrelli and Martina (1995), who use economic modelling to show how 
the state might regulate OC. Celantini, Marrelli and Martina's model is composed 
of a repeated fixed-stage game in which the government is facing two criminal 
groups, both of which are rational discounted-profit-maximisers. The government's 
objective is the minimisation of the combined profits of the two gangs. The 
government has at its disposal fixed resources available for action against these two 
groups, which it can allocate to the two groups in any ratio it thinks fit. The 
probability that a gang will be put out of business is directly proportional to the 
level of resources arrayed against it. If a firm is destroyed by government action, 
then a new one will take its place in the next game cycle. 
At the beginning of each game cycle, the three players choose their game plan and, 
at the end of the game, the result is revealed and they receive their payoff (profits 
for the gangs and a negative payoff for the state equal to the sum of these profits). 
Because the gangs value future as well as current profits, it will not be in their 
interests to adopt an aggressive short-term profit-maximising strategy as this will 
incur a higher probability of being exterminated by the government in the next 
game period. A stable equilibrium can be reached in which the government 
"rewards" gangs that play by the rules and do not antagonise it. 
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This pragmatic relationship can be seen in the real world. The government must 
accept that it does not have a total monopoly of power and must therefore come to 
terms with other power groups. On the other side, OC will tend to adopt codes of 
practice that avoid its coming into direct confrontation with the government. This 
need not imply any cordiality between the two parties; it can be likened to two 
powers locked in a military confrontation having a tacit understanding as to the 
"limitation of war..... and the delineation of spheres of influence" (Schelling 1984, 
173) 
Schelling (ibid, 172) therefore suggests that, from a social point of view, there may 
be at least one advantage organised criminality has over its disorganised variant. 
This rests on the argument that a large organisation may internalise costs that would 
be externalities to a small one. Whilst an act of violence carried out by an 
individual criminal in the perpetration of a crime may register as a significant cost 
to that individual, it also burdens other criminals with additional costs. Because 
violence increases public anxiety, it will stimulate law-enforcement efforts to crack 
down on crime. If crime is organised in regional monopolies, then they will have an 
interest in reducing violence. It may well be the case, of course, that in certain 
circumstances the costs of violence to the criminal organisation will be more than 
outweighed by the benefits. This does not alter the principle that, ceteris paribus, a 
monopolised criminal underworld will have an interest in maintaining discipline 
amongst its members. 
Not only can we see the advantage to OC groups of not antagonising the authorities; 
the argument above suggests that such groups also have a clear incentive to prevent 
others, operating within the group's own jurisdiction, from doing so. It can 
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therefore be conjectured that OC may paradoxically exercise a crime-control 
function over and above its need to eliminate rivals. Empirically there is evidence 
to support this surmise. Gambetta, for example, observes that "the mafia at times 
polices its territory as if it were responsible for public safety" (1993,166). The 
same has been said of the yakuza to the extent that it has become a cliche. 
OC AND BUSINESS 
In conjunction with OC's involvement in illegal markets, it also inevitably becomes 
enmeshed in legitimate business. There are a number of reasons for this. Firstly, 
the considerable profits generated by the illegal "core" activities will need to be 
invested. It is possible that not all of these profits can be usefully reinvested in 
criminal operations as that might entail coming into competition with other groups. 
It is also preferable if this investment is invulnerable to government sequestration; 
so there are clear advantages to investing in legitimate industries (though a few 
countries, notably the USA, have provisions for the seizure of assets even when 
they are not directly related to OC or other criminal activity). 
At the same time, the organisation's illegal activities may require a legitimate front 
to mask such activities. Import-export, road haulage and tourism may provide a 
useful cover for smuggling. Restaurant chains, with frequent deliveries of 
perishable foodstuffs from abroad, may also facilitate drug import and distribution. 
Bars and restaurants have the added advantage of providing a secure base in which 
to meet. 
Money laundering is another reason for the necessity of a legitimate side to the 
organisation's portfolio. Restaurants and casinos, both characterised by a high 
cash-turnover, are good ways of turning tainted money into clean. However, for the 
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large sums generated by successful modern OC syndicates, large-scale real-estate 
speculation and exploitation of global financial markets are increasingly significant 
aspects of money laundering in OC. 
Even disregarding the benefits to its criminal operations that an OC syndicate may 
derive from involvement in legitimate business, a diversified portfolio is always a 
sound investment strategy, and this is even more appropriate when the rest of one's 
capital is involved in comparatively risky criminal ventures. There may also be 
benefits in the increased respectability that ownership of legitimate business gives. 
The ability to provide legitimate employment to retainers, relations, parolees and 
others is a valuable tool in building "social capital" and prestige. Legally held 
businesses can be passed on to one's heirs in a way that is rarely possible in the 
underworld. 
The takeover of a legitimate business as payment of a loansharking or gambling 
debt is frequently cited as a standard OC procedure. Once the business is under OC 
ownership, it may be left with the existing management running the business as 
before but handing the profits to the new owners. Alternatively it may be 
systematically bled dry; existing credit lines will be used to order goods that will be 
resold, with all the proceeds going to the criminal group whilst the company heads 
for bankruptcy leaving huge debts. A tangled mess of documentation will be left to 
protect those responsible from prosecution. Reuter (1983,100-1) questions this 
conventional wisdom, suggesting instead that loansharks rarely desire to take over 
legitimate businesses and few possess the degree of sophistication necessary for this 
type of operation. 
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One type of activity that OC in Japan indulges in, but is not seen to nearly the same 
extent in Europe or the United States, is that of corporate blackmail. Why s6kaiya3 
should be such a prominent problem, whilst their occidental counterparts are not, is 
an interesting question. Whilst an answer might be framed in cultural terms 
emphasising a greater consciousness of `face' in Japan, a more compelling, 
structural, explanation is that accounting practices in the United States and 
European countries provide for higher standards of transparency in their business 
communities than obtain in Japan. In addition, at least as far as the Anglo-Saxon 
world is concerned, there is a general acceptance of the legitimacy of aggressive 
shareholders. 
The relationship between OC and legitimate business need not be entirely 
predatory; OC may also become involved in legitimate business because it is 
beneficial to the firms concerned. The services that OC brings to legitimate 
industry may be considered to be an extension of their "governmental" function as 
they involve the use or threat of violence to enforce rules. The best known example 
of this is the way in which companies employ organised-crime syndicates to control 
potential, or actual, labour problems. Woodiwiss (1990,34) points out that this can 
work both ways; Jimmy-Hoffa, the notorious mafia-connected labour racketeer of 
the Teamsters Union, tended to secure good gains for his members. The major 
tendency is, however, in the opposite direction, with firms finding it considerably 
more cost-effective to pay the relevant gang than to face a strike or become 
involved in free collective-bargaining. On his release from prison in 1949, Kodama 
Yoshio, the far right yakuza fixer (kuromaku), started up the Midori Kikan, which 
3 See chapter three. 
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specialised in providing this type of service (Hunziker and Kamimura 1994,48). 
OC has also been of use to firms in quelling opposition to its actions from citizens' 
groups. Two examples of this are the use of böryokudan by the Chisso Corporation 
(in an attempt to prevent disruption of its annual general meeting by relatives of 
those affected by mercury poisoning in the Minamata area) and Mitsubishi Heavy 
Industries (to deal with similar disruption by anti-Vietnam war protestors) 
(Szymkowiak 1996,105). 
Real-estate development is another area in which business has made extensive use 
of OC groups. In Japan, böryokudan have been instrumental in creating plots of 
developable land by intimidating owners of adjacent small plots to sell up. This 
process, known asjiage (landsharking), became an important source of income and 
a feature of Japan's bubble economy in the late eighties. 
As mentioned above with reference to the Russian krysha, OC may also offer a debt 
collection service to legitimate firms. When faced with a difficult-to-recover debt, a 
company may call in a gang to collect it for them (minus the collector's commission 
and expenses). Alternatively, they may opt for the more clear-cut option, pioneered 
recently by the Tokyo-based Sumiyoshi-kai, of selling the debt on to a böryokudan 
front company at a twenty-percent discount. 
It is clear from the above that the existence of OC in the legitimate sector of the 
economy is not a purely parasitic one. OC provides services that are actively sought 
out by firms of their own volition, just as individual citizens seek out the goods and 
services that OC provides in its black-market operations. Gambetta and Reuter's 
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study of the mafia in legitimate industries suggests that the main beneficiary of this 
relationship may be the firm itself (1995,116-139). Their analysis focuses on the 
use of the mafia to enforce cartel agreements in various industries in both Sicily and 
the United States. 
One of the main problems with market collusion and the maintenance of collusive 
agreements is that there is always an incentive for an individual member of the 
cartel to cheat by undercutting the monopoly price agreed by the colluding firms. 
This will increase its market share and profits at the expense of the other firms. 
Cheating ultimately leads to the breakdown of the cartel and the loss of monopoly 
profits for all. Because this type of agreement is illegal, it cannot be policed by the 
authorities. For this reason there is a role for an `honest broker' with the capacity to 
impose effective sanctions to place the agreement under its jurisdiction. 
One example cited by Gambetta and Reuter of mafia-enforced collusive activity 
shows clear similarity to the Japanese experience. In Sicily building contractors 
share out work on an alternate basis. The colluding firms take it in turns to tender 
the winning bid whilst the others put in much higher "courtesy bids". This enables 
the participants to charge more than they could in a competitive environment. 
Should firms cheat at the last minute by putting in a competitively priced bid, "men 
of respect" will be called in to enforce the agreement. The similarity of this system 
to the dango bid-rigging circles in Japan as described by Woodall (1996) is strong, 
whilst Stark's description of a provincial city's böryokudan-centred clique suggests 
that cartel enforcement is also similar (Stark 1981,196-215). 
As well as policing the cartel agreement, another advantage offered by OC 
involvement in these conspiracies is that it may well cow customers, preventing 
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them from seeking alternative suppliers or complaining about monopoly prices and 
shoddy goods and services. New entrants may also be deterred. It should be noted, 
though, that, as long as the new entrant abides by the cartel rules, and pays the 
mafia for its policing service, the OC group will not share the incumbents' desire to 
restrict entry. Presumably incumbents will have to pay a premium for this extra 
deterrence service. However, the administration costs of cartel supervision increase 
with the number of colluding firms. This will presumably create an upper limit on 
the size of such a cartel. 
Cartel collusion can take one of three forms: price fixing, quotas or market-sharing. 
Gambetta and Reuter find that the first is hard to maintain once the number of 
participants exceeds a certain point whilst the second requires too much detailed 
measurement to be economic to police. The main form of OC-run cartels are, 
therefore, market-sharing deals. There are three forms this can take: sharing by 
territory, customers or queues. The preferred form will depend on the market in 
question. For example, in the case of taxis, queues are a more sensible arrangement 
than market-sharing by territory. 
In the New York garbage-carting industry, customers are shared and become 
effectively one of the firm's assets and can be bought and sold. The high prices that 
these customers are traded for, combined with the low level of rents demanded by 
the policing group (typically 2-3% in this market), indicates that the main gains 
from this arrangement accrue to the firms themselves. It is possible that the 
organisation judges that, if it were to retain all the benefits itself, then there would 
be no incentive for the participants to perpetuate the agreement, and it would have 
to resort to expensive coercive measures. 
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CONCLUSION: DOES OC MATTER? 
As has been shown by the above, the existence of OC is not unequivocally 
disadvantageous to numerous components of the wider society on both sides of the 
law. It provides goods and services to consumers in black markets (which, in so far 
as they are crimes, are "victimless" crimes), justice to the disenfranchised and a 
stable business environment to criminal entrepreneurs; it is also a bastion of the free 
market system in the face of radical and subversive pressures. On a sociological 
level, it is a means to upward social mobility for those who are deprived of 
legitimate opportunities for advancement. Through its fencing operations, it 
functions as a mechanism for the redistribution of wealth from the haves to the 
have-nots. 
Moreover, if crime is going to exist, is it not possible that organised crime is 
preferable to disorganised crime? As we have seen, OC may exercise a controlling 
function on violent excesses that would otherwise upset the apple cart. 
There are a number of flaws with the argument that the existence of OC does not 
matter. The first of these is the premise that the black markets in which OC is 
involved are victimless crimes. Whilst this may be true for gambling, and for 
loansharking (assuming Reuter, Ianni and others are correct in their assertion that 
violence is not a significant feature of it), drugs and prostitution are more 
problematic. Addiction to drugs, especially to heroin, cocaine and crack, means that 
retail transactions are not between freely consenting individuals. Moreover, to feed 
their addiction, individuals are often forced into criminal activity. Therefore, even 
disregarding the illegality of the trade, these drugs are potentially criminogenic. 
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There are also a number of social costs to the trade in illegal drugs; because of the 
unsupervised nature of the business, drugs are cut with any number of substances, 
purity levels are irregular, needles are shared, and as a consequence there are serious 
health concerns. The high cost to individuals with a heroin or crack addiction to 
support engenders poverty and all its attendant miseries. The introduction of 
otherwise law-abiding citizens to the periphery of the underworld may lead to a 
disrespect for the law and encourage a process of criminalisation. These problems 
are all independent of the question of whether or not drugs are, in themselves, "a 
bad thing". 
Prostitution is another black market in which the assertion of victimlessness may be 
questioned. Whilst some women make an informed career decision to go into this 
business, others are forced or tricked into prostitution and then compelled, by the 
threat or use of violence, to remain in it. Frequently such women are further 
prevented from recourse to law by virtual imprisonment, drug-dependency or by 
virtue of the fact that they are illegal aliens with no clear understanding of their 
legal rights. Regardless of the moral stand one takes on prostitution per se, such a 
situation is indefensible. It is interesting to note, however, that the most vociferous 
opponents of the legalisation of prostitution are the working prostitutes themselves. 
This is essentially due to the fact that, under a legalised regime, their income would 
be taxed by the authorities. Does this imply that their current protection costs are 
competitively set vis-ä-vis those of the legitimate world, or is it merely based on the 
fatalistic assumption that legalisation would lead to their paying taxes both to OC 
and the state? 
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There are also a number of costs that OC imposes on the wider society because of 
its effect on the legitimate economy. The consequences of OC-backed market 
conspiracy and OC-protected business are similar to those of monopoly. 
Consumers are forced to pay excessive prices and new entrants are excluded. 
Furthermore, the security that OC-enforcement brings to the cartel increases the 
firm's disregard for quality, efficiency or customer satisfaction. If the industry is 
prone to violent bouts of enforcement, competent businessmen may exit, leaving 
only those firms that lack the skills to survive in any other business. This is a 
further blow to efficiency. 
OC involvement in labour racketeering exploits workers whilst simultaneously 
exposing employers to higher labour costs than would appear in a free labour 
market. In economic terms, this is the worst of both worlds. OC extortion rackets in 
legitimate industries, even if Schelling is correct in his suggestion that the bulk of 
the additional costs are merely passed on to the final consumer, result in a loss to 
the wider society. As taxpayers, citizens also suffer from the fact that the profits 
that OC makes in its various business operations are largely untaxed and this 
represents a considerable loss to public finances. 
Whilst OC protection of companies operating in legal markets has negative 
economic consequences, the protection which it extends to criminal entrepreneurs 
yields even greater social disbenefits. Where crime is organised, there tend to be 
higher overall levels of crime than where it is not. Whilst it is obviously 
problematic to determine the direction of causality, the fact that OC protects 
criminals, and this protection is frequently effective, makes crime a less risky career 
choice for potential participants and a more intractable problem for officialdom. 
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Perhaps the most significant cost of all that the continued existence of OC imposes 
on society as a whole is the cost of corruption. This undermines the legitimacy of 
the state and its institutions. Loss of respect for political, legal and law-enforcement 
agencies in this way will reinforce a culture of corruption and cynicism. If everyone 
is on the take, not to do so is foolish. The consequences of this will be twofold: OC 
will further flourish and ordinary citizens and businesses may be compelled to adopt 
corrupt practices to gain access to justice or bureaucratic decisions. 
On balance, the existence of OC does matter and it is `a bad thing'. This does not, 
however, invalidate the functionalist arguments, which attempt to show how OC 
can be beneficial to different constituent parts of society. These arguments are 
important and it is only through an understanding of the forces giving OC its 
durability that intelligent and clearly-thought-out countermeasures can be 
developed. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF ORGANISED 
CRIME IN JAPAN 
HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS 
Although the history of Japan can hardly be said to be devoid of `violent groups' 
(the literal definition of boryokudan), that of the boryokudan really only starts with 
the end of the Second World War in 1945. The groups commonly referred to as 
yakuza however, do lay claim to a much longer lineage. Whilst much of this is of 
dubious historical validity, the yakuza mythology is important in conditioning the 
perceptions held by both the OC group members themselves and the wider society 
of the place of the yakuza/böryokudan in Japanese society. Historically the term 
yakuza itself is imprecise in that it is commonly used to refer to two distinct groups, 
the bakuto (gamblers) and the tekiya (itinerant peddlers). The derivation of the 
word itself from the `ya' (eight), `ku' (nine) and `sa' (three) making up the worst 
possible hand in a traditional Japanese card game, shows clearly its original 
reference to gamblers. 
It is probable that for as long as there has been commerce there have been peddlers 
travelling around local fairs and markets using trickery and deceit to sell shoddy 
goods and cure-all medicines at inflated prices. However, due to the fragmentary 
and largely unwritten history of the underclass, it is hard to say when these traders 
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first banded together into gangs of tekiya or yashi (Iwai 1963,57). It is however 
clear that for such gangs, employing violence would have been an effective way of 
limiting competition. By 1740 the Tokugawa had appointed the more prominent 
gang leaders as supervisors responsible for organising open-air trading within a 
certain area. This example was followed at the shrines and temples where many 
markets were held. The supervisor was responsible for allocating sites for each stall 
as well as collecting rent from each trader. 
Iwai (1963,34) traces the history of the gamblers back to the seventh century and as 
early as 689 AD an imperial edict had banned gambling whilst contemporary 
documents refer to the existence of organised gambling gangs by the Kamakura 
period (1185-1392). By the early Tokugawa period (1600-1867) recognisable 
bakuto organisations had appeared. The reaction of the authoritarian military 
dictatorship to these groups was initially highly restrictive with severe penalties for 
gamblers. Later however the central government developed a pragmatic policy of 
secretly aiding the more powerful of the bakuto leaders in order to exercise leverage 
over them to its own advantage (DeVos 1973,283). During this period, the police 
authorities also co-opted key bakuto and tekiya personnel into their intelligence 
networks. This is an early example of the symbiotic OC-state relationship that was 
discussed in the previous chapter. 
Under this more relaxed political climate, the bakuto flourished to the extent that the 
most powerful bosses of gambling gangs became significant figures in the upper, as 
well as the under-world. Some of these prominent gamblers also operated as labour 
brokers supplying construction workers for the large public works programmes of 
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this period. Labour broking, and raking off a percentage of the labourer's wages 
(pinhane), is another continuous feature of the history of these organisations. There 
is a happy synergy in these two industries; the lure of gambling attracted potential 
labour whilst, after work, their wages could be fleeced off them at the gaming dens. 
The most famous of these gambler/brokers was Banzuiin Chabeii. Banzuiin's fame 
is due to his perceived role as a protector of the common man against arbitrary 
treatment by gangs of discontented samurai. The unification of Japan under the 
Tokugawa brought to an end centuries of warfare and revolt. With peace, came a 
crisis for the large, and economically useless, warrior class. Whilst many samurai 
responded by becoming bureaucrats and scholars, others reacted against the change 
in the political situation by forming gangs which became known as the hatamoto 
yakko (servants of the Shogun). These bands scorned the decadence of 
contemporary society and set themselves apart by their ostentatious dress, stress of 
the bushidö code of their forebears and devotion to the martial arts. The hatamoto 
yakko would roam the streets terrorising the townspeople. Banzuiin, and others like 
him, supposedly set up civil defence groups composed of his gamblers, labourers 
and other young toughs such as local firemen to counteract the hatamoto yakko. 
These groups, in turn, became known as the machi yakko, the servants of the town. 
Rather than being primarily altruistic anti-hatamoto yakko forces, Ino (1993,44) 
maintains that the rationale for the machi yakko's existence was as mutual-aid 
societies. They were largely composed of victims of the Tokugawa regime such as 
farmers (who had abandoned the land due to land taxes), debtors, and also master- 
less warriors, some of whom had set up martial arts schools for townspeople. 
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The machi yakko quickly became folk heroes and the subject of songs, kabuki plays, 
novels and, more recently, films. This Robin Hood mythology is claimed by the 
modem böryokudan who assert that they are the descendants of the machi yakko. 
Interestingly, in their reactionary political views, exaggerated attire, elaborate rituals 
and defiant self-exclusion, they perhaps share more with the hatamoto yakko. 
Despite the claims made by the bakuto to macht yakko ancestry, these groups were 
finally eradicated by the Tokugawa in the late seventeenth century and the main 
leaders executed (DeVos 1973,286). 
During the struggle for supremacy between the decaying military dictatorship of the 
Tokugawa and the pro-imperial faction, the larger bakuto groups with their reserves 
of disciplined fighting men became important political forces. They adopted an 
opportunistic attitude with different groups supporting whichever side they 
considered more likely to win. The most well-known of these gamblers turned 
politicians was Shimizu Jirocho. Not only were his past crimes pardoned in return 
for his military support, but he was made a local authority (Iwai 1963,45; Kaplan 
and Dubro 1986,30-1). 
Despite the services that various gambling groups had rendered to the Meiji 
government in establishing itself, the new administration persecuted gambling and 
the bakuto groups. This practice by the authorities of making use of gangs when it 
is advantageous and restricting them when they are perceived as a threat to public 
order, is a persistent theme in the history of the relations between Japan's ruling 
elite and the yakuza groups. With the maturation of an industrial capitalist 
economy, an increasingly militant labour movement developed in Japan. This 
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received a large boost from the 1917 Bolshevik revolution in Russia whilst, in 
Japan, high food prices and a post-war depression led to strikes and rioting (Beasley 
1990,126). 
In order to counter this threat both the government and industrialists hoped to 
harness bakuto groups as shock-troops to break strikes and enforce labour 
acquiescence. In 1919, a national alliance of gamblers, the Dai Nippon Kokusui-kai 
(the Greater Japan National Essence society) was set up at the instigation of Home 
Minister Tokonami Takejiro with backing from several top military figures. Like 
later attempts to organise such federations, the Dai Nippon Kokusui-kai was 
wracked by internal conflict and not susceptible to external control. Consequently it 
only had limited impact (Iwai 1963,46). 
However links between political and military leaders on one hand and bakuto and 
tekiya bosses on the other, increased into the early Showa period. Yakuza groups 
played active roles in extreme right-wing groups such as the Kokuryü-kai which 
were involved in violent strike-breaking, combating left-wing and liberal political 
movements and engineering `incidents' in China and Manchuria (Iwai 1963,46-7). 
Whilst some members may have found a political justification for their actions, the 
yakuza also benefited substantially from this relationship. This was profitable both 
in terms of increased political influence, and materially from the revenues to be 
made from protecting the opium dens supplying the Chinese (Vaughn, Huang and 
Ramirez 1995,496). It might be reasonable to conjecture that yakuza gangs had 
also been responsible for supplying `comfort women' to the Imperial Japanese 
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Army. However, Iwai, who before becoming one of the foremost authorities on the 
yakuza had served in the Imperial Japanese Navy, disputes this, saying that there 
was no need for yakuza involvement in this business and legitimate merchants were 
responsible for employing comfort women (interview Tokyo, 1989). 
With the mobilisation of the Japanese economy onto a war-time footing, there was 
no longer any reason to cultivate the yakuza. Therefore, gang members who had not 
been directly incorporated into the war effort were once again the target of official . 
crackdowns. It would not be until the end of the Pacific War that gangs would once 
again become active. 
POST-WAR DEVELOPMENTS 
The forty-three year period between the end of the Second World War and the death 
of the Shöwa emperor (1989) saw enormous changes in Japan and, in response to 
the opportunities and challenges that these changes offered, organised crime in 
Japan developed profoundly too. The 1989 Hanzai Hakusho (Ministry of Justice 
White Paper on Crime) identifies five separate historical periods in this 
development. Although the National Police Agency only considers there to be four 
(Keisatsu Hakusho 1989), the academic literature (Huang and Vaughn 1992, Shikita 
and Tsuchiya 1992) adopts the Hanzai Hakusho classification as facilitating a more 
detailed analysis. These are the Period of Post-war Confusion (1945-50), the Gang 
War Period (1950-63), the Summit Strategy Period (1964-70), the Period of 
Reorganisation, Expansion and Oligopolisation (1971-80), and the Period of 
Generation Change (1981-88). 
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Despite the disparity in these authorities' historical breakdown of the post-war 
Shbwa period, there is no significant difference in their conclusions of the 
significant trends in böryokudan development. 
PERIOD OF POST-WAR CONFUSION 
By the end of the war, Japan was devastated; its major cities lay in ruins, many of 
its people were facing starvation, unemployment stood at 13.1 million (of which 
17.6% were disbanded troops), manufacturing capacity stood at 52.7% of its 1937 
level and rice production at 59% (Nakamura 1981,12-22). To exacerbate matters 
the police had been disarmed, purged and discredited and were temporarily unable 
to enforce public order whilst the occupying American authorities, faced with 
budget constraints of their own, did not treat policing the underworld as a priority 
(Huang and Vaughn 1992,25). 
In the face of these almost impossible circumstances, black market trading became 
the only way that many people could survive. With a lack of effective state control 
and a large potential market, two of Anderson's conditions for the development of 
OC discussed in the preceding chapter were fulfilled; it is only to be expected 
therefore that OC would be the result. The enormous black market that appeared in 
this chaotic situation featured not only the traditional street traders the tekiya, but 
the bakuto and non-traditional gangs of racketeers known as gurentai. This is 
considered a clear break with the past as formerly the tekiya and bakuto had 
specialised in their respective fields of expertise and it would have been considered 
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an admission of incompetence for a gambler to earn money in any other way (Saga 
1991,78). 
Whilst some traditional gambling groups attempted to remain aloof from these 
developments, they tended to be forced out of business or into alliances with the 
more aggressive gurentai (DeVos 1973,295). The development of diversified gangs 
operating in black markets and extortion as well as such more traditional activities 
as gambling can be considered as the birth of OC in Japan as it has been defined in 
the previous chapter. It should however be noted that Japanese gangs ran 
diversified drugs and extortion operations in occupied China and Manchuria in the 
1930's. This was perhaps indicative of the way in which OC would develop in 
Japan. 
Ironically, government actions in the immediate post-war period inadvertently 
accelerated the shift of traditional yakuza groups into alternative economic 
activities. In an attempt to increase government revenue by taking over the most 
popular forms of gambling, the government squeezed the bakuto's main source of 
revenue thereby forcing them to diversify. 
The black market did not just deal in essentials such as food and cooking oil, but 
also in drugs and, in this period, drug use reached epidemic proportions. This was 
chiefly for three reasons: During the war the government had produced large 
quantities of amphetamines to boost both workers' productivity and the endurance 
of troops. With Japan's defeat the remaining stock-piles, as well as the technical 
know-how to produce amphetamines, quickly found its way into the hands of 
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criminal gangs. Secondly, the use of these drugs had been lent legitimacy by their 
role in the war effort and, since many otherwise law-abiding people were already 
making purchases from the black-market, there was no stigma attached to the use of 
amphetamines. Thirdly, given the shortage of food, amphetamines were a useful 
way of suppressing fatigue and hunger (Vaughn, Huang and Ramirez 1995,498). 
Amongst the gurentai groups were large numbers of Koreans, Taiwanese and 
Chinese who had been brought over to Japan as forced labour for Japan's shipyards, 
mines and factories. People from these three countries (known as sangokujin) had 
endured years of appalling treatment at the hands of their Japanese masters and 
many sought revenge in violent reprisals. Therefore the conflicts that inevitably 
arose over control of the illegal and highly lucrative markets often took on a racial 
tone with native Japanese gangs portraying themselves as defenders of the common 
people against foreign hoodlums. Given that many of the participants of these 
fights were battle-hardened veterans with access to military weaponry, they 
presented a severe threat to public safety (Hanzai Hakusho 1989,348). 
GANG WAR PERIOD 
During the 1950's Japan's economy started to pick up. This process of recovery 
received a massive boost when the Korean War created an enormous demand for 
military equipment. The Jinmu boom of 1955-6 and the Iwato boom of 1959-60 
generated large construction projects for roads, apartment blocks and infrastructure 
of all types. At the same time this increased economic activity led to a massive 
increase in shipping cargo. As, by this time, the labour supplies of both the 
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construction and docking industries were largely dominated by OC groups, they 
profited handsomely from this development. 
Whilst economic growth led to the withering away of the black market for 
necessities, prosperity spawned a thriving entertainment industry including 
pachinko, public gambling, as well as mizushobai trades such as bars, restaurants 
and prostitution. The criminalisation of prostitution in 1958 also increased the 
vulnerability of the sex industry to OC predation but it should be noted that the law 
was sufficiently filled with loopholes for much of this business to remain within the 
law. There was therefore considerable scope for protection rackets and extortion. 
This period consequently saw a considerable growth in the number and membership 
of böryokudan groups. As can be seen in figure 3.1, the size of organised crime 
groups reached a peak in 1963 with 184,091 members in 5,216 gangs. 
The increase in opportunities also saw increased competition between the various 
groups over control of these new sources of funds. This is illustrated by figure 3.2 
showing the incidence of violent inter-gang conflicts from 1960 to 1988. The 
violence of these conflicts is demonstrated by the fact that during the peak year of 
1963,48.4% of all böryokudan arrests were for either murder or GBH (Hanzai 
Hakusho 1989,343). This period of warfare resulted in a few organisations 
achieving national prominence by a process of swallowing up their weaker 
neighbours in military alliances or by destroying them in open conflict. In 
particular seven groups were identified by the police as major syndicates. These 
were: the Yamaguchi-gumi, the Honda-kai (later the Dai Nippon Heiwa-kai), the 
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Sumiyoshi-kai (Sumiyoshi Rengo), the Kinsei-kai (Inagawa-kai), the Nippon 
Kokusui-kai, the Kyokuto Aio-kai and the Matsuba-kai. 
Figure 3.1 Böryokudan Gangs and Gang Members 1958-88 
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In an attempt to control böryokudan crimes, a number of laws were introduced. In 
1958 the criminal law was changed to include the crime of witness intimidation and 
provisions were made for the protection of witnesses. At the same time penalties 
against lethal weapons such as guns and swords were increased and a law 
forbidding assembly with weapons was enacted. Given that inter-gang conflict did 
not decrease until 1963, these laws seem to have had little impact. Possible reasons 
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for this will be discussed below. In 1964 legal sanctions against crimes of assault 
with either swords or firearms were further strengthened. 
Figure 3.2 Boryokudan Inter-gang Conflicts 1960-88 
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SUMMIT STRATEGY 
In the early sixties, widespread public discontent, including a 1964 campaign by the 
Mainichi Shimbun, with the high level of gang feuds put pressure on the police to 
take more comprehensive anti-OC measures. The forthcoming Tokyo Olympics 
also spurred the authorities to clean up the capital. The police response was to put 
into effect its "summit strategy" of nationally co-ordinated arrests of gang members, 
targeting particularly high-ranking personnel of executive grade or above. In 
particular the police made efforts to control illegal sources of income and firearms 
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(Shikita and Tsuchiya 1992,88). Both the police and crime white papers try to 
show the success of the summit strategy crackdowns by pointing out that during 
this period a number of powerful groups including the Sumiyoshi-kai, the Kinsei- 
kai and the Honda-kai, as well as a large federation, the Kanto-kai disbanded. What 
they do not mention is that whilst these large syndicates disbanded, in many cases 
their component sub-groups remained in existence. Consequently both the 
Sumiyoshi-kai and the Kinsei-kai were able to re-establish themselves not long after 
and today remain, after the Yamaguchi-gumi, the largest böryokudan organisations 
in Japan (Ino 1992a, 263). Furthermore, as discussed by Kaplan and Dubro, the 
Kanto-kai was the result of a politically inspired attempt to set up a nation-wide 
alliance of böryokudan which collapsed due to internal dissent rather than police 
action (1986,95). 
REORGANISATION, EXPANSION AND OLIGOPOLISATION 
Whilst the summit strategy had a marked effect on the level of inter-gang struggles 
and caused a number of gangs to disband and total membership to decline, it also 
had other, unanticipated, consequences. Because the police crack-downs targeted 
primarily traditional böryokudan crimes such as gambling and violent extortion, the 
main brunt of this assault on the böryokudan fell disproportionately on the small 
and medium sized organisations who depended entirely on these activities for their 
income. The larger groups, with much more diversified portfolios of legal and 
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illegal businesses, were much better able to withstand the effect of police crack- 
downs. 
Furthermore the top leadership of the big groups quickly developed a system which 
effectively insulated them from successful prosecution. This system, known as 
jönökin, consisted of payments from gang subordinates and meant that bosses 
received a substantial income without direct involvement in criminal activity 
themselves. Therefore the large böryokudan, most notably the Yamaguchi-gumi, 
were actually in a position to improve their standing during this period. As overall 
numbers of gangs and gang-members dropped, the large syndicates expanded into 
new territories either by taking over the weakened small gangs or filling vacuums 
left by disbanded groups (Keisatsu Hakusho 1989,13). The police summit 
operations can therefore be considered, at best, only a qualified success. 
The period immediately following the police crack-down era was therefore 
characterised by a process of expansion as a few large gang syndicates came to 
dominate the OC landscape of Japan. This tendency was stimulated in the early 
seventies by the gradual release of some of the most able bosses and executives who 
had been arrested during the previous decade. In particular the growth of the big 
three groups, the Yamaguchi-gumi, the Sumiyoshi-kai and the Inagawa-kai, stands 
out. The relative size of these is illustrated in the table below. 
As well as geographically expanding their territories, these groups found it 
necessary to continually, seek new business activities, both legal and illegal, due to 
the pressure of law-enforcement crackdowns on established OC criminal operations. 
Diversification was also necessitated by the oil shock of 1973, which had a big 
impact on böryokudan income. As a response to economic depression and a more 
hostile legal environment, the böryokudan became increasingly involved in new 
fields, such as organising foreign gambling trips, s6kaiya corporate blackmail, 
finance and forming spurious social movements and right-wing political 
organisations, as pretexts for raising money. 
Table 3.1 Indexed Changes in Boryokudan Strength 1968 - 1979 
(1968 =100) 
Total Böryokudan 
Seven Designated Groups 
Big Three 
Gangs Members 
69.9 77.2 
134.9 119.9 
153.9 140.4 
(Source: Hanzai Hakusho, 1989) 
During this period böryokudan also became increasingly heavily dependent on 
amphetamines as a source of income. Tamura (1992,102-3) identifies the 
beginning of the "second stimulant epidemic" as 1970 and suggests that this 
industry provided the cash-generating engine which financed the expansion of the 
big groups. This agrees with Schelling's observations on the need for a "core" 
business providing the resources to build the necessary political and military 
infrastructure of a large OC operation. It also seems to be corroborated by the 
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empirical evidence; the epidemic originally started in the Osaka area which is next- 
door to the Kabe Headquarters of the Yamaguchi-gumi, the most prominent of the 
large groups. 
GENERATION CHANGE 
Throughout the 1980's the trends of the previous period continued: the large 
organisations became increasingly sophisticated and diversified whilst the smaller 
groups were swallowed up by one or other of the large syndicates, disbanded or 
condemned to a marginal existence. However, the seemingly relentless progress of 
the big three gangs was rocked in July, 1981 when the third-generation boss of the 
Yamaguchi-gumi, Taoka Kazuo, died. In February of the following year, his 
designated successor, Yamamoto Kenichi, also died. The organisation quickly 
became divided as to who would succeed Taoka. After two years of political 
manoeuvring Takenaka Masahisa was finally selected as fourth-generation boss of 
the Yamaguchi-gumi in 1984 and the organisation was split in two as Yamamoto 
Hiroshi, another top executive, broke away forming a rival organisation, the Ichiwa- 
kai. The resulting gang war lasted for five years and was on an unprecedented 
scale: in nineteen prefectures and two metropolitan areas over three hundred violent 
incidents took place causing twenty-five deaths (including the new kumi-chö, 
Takenaka), seventy injuries including four innocent bystanders, and over five 
hundred arrests for crimes directly related to the conflict (Yamadaira 1993,287-8). 
Although the Ichiwa-kai had initially consisted of 13,000 members, its numbers 
quickly dwindled. This was due to the Yamaguchi-gumi successfully luring back 
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many of the defectors. This was aided by the fact that many Ichiwa-kai members 
found that without the established reputation of the Yamaguchi-gumi behind them, 
it was much harder for them to raise money (Yamadaira 1992,37). This illustrates 
the crucial importance of reputation and brand image to OC groups as discussed in 
the previous chapter. Eventually, in 1989 the defeated rump of the Ichiwa-kai 
disbanded. Although severely hit by the schism of 1984, the Yamaguchi-gumi 
quickly restored its pre-eminent position and by the last year of the Shöwa period 
the organisation consisted of 737 groups and 20,826 members (Keisatsu Hakusho 
1989,17) whilst its reputation for invincibility had, if anything, been enhanced. 
The problem of generational change affects not only the Yamaguchi-gumi. Other 
large gangs also have an ageing leadership and due to the changing age structure of 
böryokudan in the last decade of the Shbwa period, it is possible that gangs will find 
it increasingly difficult to find suitable personnel to fill their key leadership 
positions. The process of gerontification (köreika), though a reflection of 
demographic change in Japan as a whole, is particularly acute for the boryokudan. 
The trend towards an increasingly aged OC community is shown in table 3.2 below. 
"Formerly it had been said that the supply of böryokudan members would never dry 
up, but now they are facing a severe crisis of new personnel" (Hanzai Hakusho 
1989,349). In one extreme case a Hokkaido-based group found itself so short of 
personnel that it felt compelled to advertise in an employment magazine for students 
to work on a part-time basis (Yamadaira 1992,140). This process of "böryokudan 
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banare" (movement away from the böryokudan) may well be a major long-term 
problem for Japanese OC. A number of hypotheses are generated by this 
phenomenon and the reasons for, and consequences of the böryokudan banare merit 
further research. 
Table 3.2 - The Ageing Composition of Böryokudan 
20-29 year olds over forty year olds 
1966 73,259 (49.8%) 21,185 (14.4%) 
1976 39,614 (36.7%) 27,523 (25.1%) 
1985 22,594 (24.2%) 34,295 (36.7%) 
Source: Hanzai Hakusho 1989 
It first seems essential to determine whether this is an industry-wide process; if it is 
confined to the smaller, declining groups, then this would merely reflect a rational 
career move on the part of young potential gangsters to avoid employment in groups 
with no perceived future. If youngsters are also avoiding the dynamic, growing, 
large groups, then it would seem that other factors are the cause. One possible 
explanation is that, rather than being seen as glamorous, böryokudan life is now 
perceived as kitsui, kitanai and kiken (arduous, dirty and dangerous) and 
consequently recruitment is becoming harder amongst an increasingly soft and 
pampered Japanese youth. Another possible factor at play is that the social 
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conditions encouraging böryokudan recruitment are changing. Merton's theory of 
anomie amongst an underclass and an innovative response of some members of that 
underclass may well be of relevance here. 
It does not seem plausible that the decline in the apparent ability of Japanese OC to 
attract young apprentices was due to a decline in the profitability of the industry in 
the eighties. The bubble economy generated enormous wealth and böryokudan 
became heavily involved in real-estate and stock market speculation. In particular 
the böryokudan developed the lucrative business of f/age (land-raising) in which 
small landholders on adjoining plots would be forced to sell so that a larger, more 
profitably developable site could be created. The heady economic atmosphere of 
the late eighties also engendered financial irresponsibility, in which böryokudan 
were able to acquire enormous loans. At the same time companies, awash with 
money, were easy prey for corporate blackmail and extortion. 
Another development during this period was the increase in crimes targeting 
ordinary citizens and businesses (minji kainyü boryoku). Traditionally, part of the 
code of ethics of the yakuza had been to avoid inflicting harm on the common 
people. This is shown by the pride taken in the legends of the machi yakko as 
defenders of the commoners against exploitation by the rich and powerful. Whilst 
certain sections of society, especially those working in mizushobai/entertainment 
industry had always been susceptible to violence and exploitation, for most of the 
post-war era the majority of ordinary people had not been victimised by the 
bdryokudan. With the diversification of the boryokudan's business activities as 
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they felt compelled to seek out new sources of funds, the old yakuza code of 
respecting straight (katagi) society became increasingly disregarded. 
Throughout the periods of reorganisation and generation change the modernising, 
diversifying and expanding böryokudan had developed an international dimension 
to their operations. This process has continued into the Heisei period with gathering 
momentum. There are a number of reasons for this. Firstly the modem böryokudan 
depend on overseas countries, especially in Asia and the Pacific-rim, as a source of 
drugs, firearms and prostitutes. These are all commodities that play an increasingly 
important part in the boryokudan economy. Secondly, international investment, 
especially real-estate, provides an avenue for money-laundering. Thirdly, the boom 
in overseas travel from Japan, spurred by the strong yen, created opportunities for 
the böryokudan and they became involved in organising sex-tourism and gambling 
trips in various Asian countries for Japanese businessmen in conjunction with local 
OC groups. 
As mentioned above, from about 1970 onwards, the böryokudan have become 
increasingly well-armed and there has been a marked shift from swords and daggers 
to modern firearms. This tendency has become especially pronounced since the 
mid-eighties, though seizure rates from that period may be attributed to the 
abnormal circumstances of the Yama-Ichi tasö. It is possible that the böryokudan 
are trying to compensate for their manpower crisis by increasing their firepower 
through investing in efficient modern weaponry (Ifanzai Hakusho 1989,353). 
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BEHIND THE SCENES 
The historical development outlined above is largely derived from official sources 
and in particular from the Keisatsu and Hanzai Hakusho. One question that arises 
from the official picture is how, given the apparently concerted attempts by the 
police to eradicate the boryokudan (especially since the mid-sixties), did OC 
manage to remain such a large and vibrant aspect of Japan in the late Shöwa period? 
Indeed the largest groups actually grew in both relative and absolute terms during 
this period. To answer this question it is necessary to go behind the surface 
(tatemae) of official arrest-rate statistics. 
The links between the post-war böryokudan and, usually right-wing, politicians are 
well known. This is not so much due to fearless investigative journalism or mass- 
arrests of corrupt politicians as to the extraordinary degree to which these links were 
openly displayed for most of this period. In some cases during the period of 
immediate post-war chaos, the links were in fact so close as to make it impossible to 
differentiate between the authorities and OC. In Nagahama City in Shiga 
prefecture, the oyabun of the IIakuryusha crime-gang not only sat on the city 
council, but also served as the city's chief of police. The Flakuryasha were 
therefore able to control the local black-market and terrorise the populace with 
impunity (Iwai 1963,692). Corruption of this type was largely a result of attempts 
by the occupying authorities to impose a decentralised system of policing on Japan. 
The problems associated with this will be discussed in later chapters. 
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One of the most prominent gangsters of this period was the leader of the Kanto 
Ozu-gumi, Ozu Boss, who controlled the Shinjuku black-market. Having refused 
an invitiation to join the Socialist Party, Ozu was persuaded to run for the Diet by 
the leadership of the Liberal Party with which he had very cordial relations; the 
foreword to his autobiography was penned by the then Finance Minister, Ishibashi 
Tanzan, whilst another senior Liberal Party figure, Ono Banbuko, was his sworn 
blood-brother. As conditions returned to normal and the police reasserted their 
control over the more overt abuses, exceptional cases such as the above 
disappeared. However, politicians still found it useful to maintain links with the 
böryokudan. 
One major reason for this apparent flourishing of large OC groups despite changes 
in the law and high levels of arrests by the police is that, once again, certain 
powerful constituencies found the existence of these groups beneficial. Initially, the 
occupying American forces under General MacArthur had intended to purge 
Japan's government and business elites of extreme right-wing figures. With the 
onset of the Cold War and the fear of Japan's indigenous communists and trade 
union activists, this policy underwent a gyaku koosu or "reverse course". One result 
of this is that certain members of the government saw the böryokudan as a means to 
counteract trade-union militancy and the threat of socialism. Various anti- 
communist organisations such as the Jiyu Kurabu and the Meikyokai brought 
together conservative politicians, bOryokudan and right-wing extremists in an 
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alliance reminiscent of the ingaidan (political lobbying groups) which characterised 
Japan's pre-war politics (Iwai 1963,693). 
The role played by these ingaidan is graphically illustrated by an incident in which 
socialist Diet members and left wing students were trying to oppose the passage of 
the Subversive Activities Bill (Hakai Katsudö Boshi Ha or Haböhö). Fearing that 
the Diet was to be invaded, Justice Minister Kimura and Chief Cabinet Hori 
contacted Unabara Seitaira, a prominent liberal party politician, who also happened 
to be the chairman of one of these associations, the Dbkb-kai. Unabara quickly 
arranged for a composite force of the strongest fighting men from the main tekiya 
groups in Tokyo to surround the Diet and the Bill was passed (Iwai 1963,693; 
DeVos 1973,299). 
In 1951, Justice Minister Kimura was also responsible for attempting to organise a 
200,000-strong force of assorted rightists, gamblers, tekiya and gurentai. This 
organisation, known as the Battö-tai (literally drawn-sword squad), was to act as an 
anti-communist shock-troop opposing the revolution that Kimura believed to be 
imminent. As a sweetener to this arrangement, Kimura revised the criminal law so 
that gambling offences were only indictable on the basis of red-handed arrests. 
Only when Kimura presented a request for the Battö-tai's proposed annual budget 
of ¥370m to Prime Minister Yoshida, was this plan scrapped (Hori 1983,137-8; Ino 
1993,254-7). 
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Kaplan and Dubro (1986,85) give another example of the government's use of the 
largest Tokyo-based gangs in their arrangements for the security of Eisenhower 
during his projected visit during widespread discontent and rioting opposing the 
Japan-America Security Treaty in 1960. The visit was eventually cancelled but the 
boryokudan had already agreed to help and had made their preparations. Between 
five and six hundred million yen had been provided by the government to finance 
Eisenhower's protection but, following the cancellation, the money disappeared 
(Ino 1992a, 269). The link-man between the Kishi government and the böryokudan 
in this operation was an extreme right-winger, Kodama Yoshio'. 
t The career of Kodama is a case study of the interaction between the worlds of 
politics and OC. After an apprenticeship in various ultra-nationalist organisations 
interspersed with three prison terms, Kodama spent the war as an agent of the 
Imperial Japanese Navy charged with securing essential raw materials. To this end 
he created the Kodama Kikan which amassed enormous wealth including interests 
in precious metals, industrial diamonds, fisheries, forestry, mining and opium. So 
successful was the Kodama Kikan that Kodama was able to finance not only the 
Shanghai branch of the Kempeitai, but an extensive intelligence network throughout 
the sphere of his operations from Manchuria to Indochina (Hunziker and Kamimura 
1994: 48). 
At the end of the war, the Navy, keen to distance itself from the activities of the 
Kodama Kikan, effectively handed it over to Kodama. With this vast personal 
fortune he was able to set himself up as a key kuromaku (behind-the-scenes power- 
broker) linking together the extreme right-wing, OC and mainstream politics. 
According to Kaplan and Dubro, after his release from prison, Kodama also had 
extensive links with American intelligence agencies (1986: 68-9). One of 
Kodama's first, and most significant, post-war political acts was to provide one 
hundred and sixty million yen to finance the formation of a new political party at 
the request of Hatoyama Ichirb. Aided by the further financial support of Kodama, 
Hatoyama was later to become Prime Minister, as did another Kodama protege, 
Nakasone Yasuhiro, in 1982. The Liberal Party merged with the Democratic Party 
in 1955 and this conservative coalition successfully monopolised political power for 
the next four decades. 
Alongside his political interests, Kodama set up a business, the Midori Kikan, 
which specialised in strike-breaking and labour intimidation. Kodama was also a 
central figure in the formation in 1963 of the Kanto-kai, an ill-fated federation of 
böryokudan groups in the Tokyo area. Initially this had been intended to be a pan- 
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In addition to providing muscle to oppose truculent radical elements and silencing 
opposition, the OC-politician link has proved to be very useful to politicians in 
terms of fund raising, organising voters and discrediting opponents. It is for this 
reason that throughout the `fifties and `sixties large floral wreaths, with the donating 
politician's name prominently displayed in the centre, were a common feature at 
böryokudan succession ceremonies, weddings and funerals. Important politicians 
would often be the guests of honour at such parties. This relationship did, however, 
go far beyond the ritual exchange of social pleasantries; in 1958 a petition calling 
for the release of a gang member arrested for his participation in a territorial gang- 
war was signed by the prefectural governor, the mayor and the head of the 
prefectural assembly as well as several Diet members (Iwai 1963,692-5). 
Even as late as 1971, bail for a Yamaguchi-gumi boss arrested for murder was 
guaranteed by former Prime Minister Kishi and former Education Minister 
Nakamura (Kaplan and Dubro 1986,116). However, the exposure of the Lockheed 
scandal in the mid-seventies and the generally worsening public perception of the 
böryokudan generated a climate in which the open flaunting of OC-politician links 
was becoming electorally disadvantageous. This is not to say that such connections 
no longer existed, merely that they became more discreet. By the time that Stark 
Japanese yakuza alliance with a decided political emphasis. However the 
Yamaguchi-gumi refused to have anything to do with it and the organisation 
disbanded in 1965 due to internal dissent and the police summit strategy. 
On another occasion Kodama was instrumental in making peace between the fierce 
rivals the Yamaguchi-gumi and the Inagawa-kai. Only the breaking of the 
Lockheed bribery scandal in 1976, displaced Kodama from his nebulous role as 
political-OC fixer. 
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was carrying out his fieldwork in the late 1970's they were firmly part of the ura 
(behind-the-scenes) of Japanese society. 
Stark's description of "the clique" composed of the locality's prominent 
businessmen, politicians, representatives of the bureaucracy and with Noda Boss of 
the Araki Gumi as its nexus, shows how these different worlds interact and make 
use of their clique connections to further their own particular interests (1981,196- 
209). The business members provide money to the other clique members. In return 
the other members of the group aid the business interests in the competition for 
contracts. Businessmen may also be useful to politicians in mobilising employees 
and dependents as a voting block. The political figures are responsible for the 
awarding of public works contracts and consequently wield considerable power 
within the clique. The bureaucrats play the relatively minor role of flexible 
application of regulations concerning contract bidding. The bureaucrats' rewards 
are correspondingly minor consisting of money and perks such as free entertainment 
in gang owned or associated bars and clubs. 
The role of the OC within the clique is to fulfil the "quasi-governmental functions" 
of adjudicating and enforcing clique decisions. As discussed in the previous 
chapter, when business transactions are of dubious legality, the participants are 
unable to seek legal enforcement of contracts. The gang boss, with expertise in 
clandestine extra-legal control and access to the machinery with which to carry it 
out, is therefore uniquely placed to provide the structure within which the clique 
operates. 
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Although Stark was describing the workings of a local clique in a provincial city, 
there is a high degree of similarity to the high-level structural corruption illustrated 
by Woodall (1996). The one significant difference is the absence of böryokudan in 
Woodall's analysis. One possible explanation is that there is a significant difference 
in the nature of business-politics connections at local and national levels though this 
is suspect on the grounds that national politics can hardly be said to be free from 
corruption scandals. An alternative explanation might be that in the intervening 
fifteen years, the böryokudan have been successfully purged from the clique but this 
seems unlikely given that the corruption itself persists (as successive scandals 
illustrate). The fact that these scandals are coming to light, and the revelations acted 
upon, suggests, however, that the media are becoming more outspoken, the 
electorate less tolerant and efforts are being made to clean up government. 
THE BORYOKUDAN AND THE POLICE 
Another factor widely held to be responsible for the continued existence of 
böryokudan organisations is the relationship between the police and the gangs. The 
English language literature generally stresses the "symbiotic" nature of this 
relationship (Ames 1981, Huang and Vaughn 1992, Kaplan and Dubro 1986, van 
Wolferen 1989). Consequently it is claimed that "no serious attempt to break the 
gangs has ever been made" (van Wolferen 1989,103). This extravagant assertion 
seems to be in direct contradiction to the police white papers with their constant 
references to repeated and intensified crackdowns and widespread arrests. To assess 
- 124 - 
the validity of these rival views of the nature of OC-law enforcement interaction in 
Japan, it is necessary to look at the evidence. 
Ames, during his fieldwork with the police in western Japan in the late 1970's was 
struck by the "remarkable cordiality" between böryokudan members and police 
officers (1981,105). Even during interrogations of arrested gang members, both 
sides would maintain a jocular banter. Ames, however, does point out that this is 
not necessarily indicative of close friendship interpreting excessive joking as 
suggesting a potentially hostile relationship. Ames (1981,107) notes that it is 
recognised by both parties that it is not in their interests for this underlying hostility 
to manifest itself: 
The relationship is mutually beneficial: Police and gangsters each find it 
advantageous to maintain rapport and to enhance it with a facade of 
cordiality. This nucleus of goodwill and understanding seems to remain 
when the police must severely crack down on a gang after a major incident. 
A complete rupture in the relationship would be counter-productive for both 
sides. 
It is also important to note that this cordiality does not imply corruption. Given that 
these organisations exist, the police may conclude that it is preferable to adopt a 
pragmatic strategy in their dealings with them. This is exactly the conclusion 
reached by Celantini, Marrelli and Martina in their model discussed in the previous 
chapter; both OC and law-enforcement players adopt an unantagonistic stance vis-a- 
vis each other. 
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Police tolerance of the böryokudan in the post-war era has historically been aided by 
a number of factors. Firstly the well-known links existing between conservative 
politicians and prominent gang leaders have not encouraged the police to actively 
pursue böryokudan infringements of the law. Secondly, as noted in chapter two, 
OC acceptance is facilitated when OC activity can be characterised as `consensual' 
and `victimless'. Despite the evidence to the contrary, the böryokudan of the post- 
war era have profited from romantic associations with the outlaw heroes of the past 
and a perception that throughout this period, they have remained essentially 
concerned with gambling and peddling. 
A final factor encouraging police acceptance of OC groups is the degree of 
sympathy found amongst the police for the idealised value system of traditional 
yakuza chivalry expressed by such terms as jingi, ninkyo and kyökaku. This is 
evinced by the widespread following enjoyed by yakuza films (also known as 
chivalry films - ninkyö eiga) amongst both police and böryokudan circles. These 
films typically depict extreme devotion to a code of honour and such traditional 
Japanese virtues as endurance (gaman), duty (girl), humanity (ninjö) and self- 
sacrifice and, as such, appeal to the conservative world-view that is shared by 
policemen and gangsters. Ames suggests that a degree of identification between the 
böryokudan and police might also be fostered by the fact that both groups have, in 
the past, recruited members from comparable social and educational backgrounds. 
Given that almost two-thirds of the recruit intake for the prefectural police were 
university graduates in 1995, this can no longer be considered a relevant factor. 
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It has been argued that the OC-police connection is founded on more than an uneasy 
co-existence. Ino (1993), Kaplan and Dubro (1986), van Wolferen (1989), Huang 
and Vaughn (1992) amongst others, suggest that, tacitly, the police have actually 
welcomed the existence of the böryokudan. As in the projected use of the 
böryokudan in the security arrangements for Eisenhower's visit, or their opposition 
to radical groups, it is believed that the gangs have played an active role in 
containing social disorder. They are also seen to have played a part in controlling 
disorganised crime within their nawabari thereby contributing to Japan's reputation 
as a `crime-free society'. As we saw in the previous chapter, this perception is by 
no means unique to Japan. 
The Japanese police, like the bureaucracy, have long enjoyed a reputation for 
competence and honesty. This reputation has been enhanced both by Japan's low 
crime statistics, and by a number of highly laudatory books written by Americans 
(Bayley, 1976; Clifford, 1976; Parker, 1984). Recently however, a number of 
corruption scandals have broken which suggest that the cordial relationship 
described by Ames is occasionally based on more than a desire to avoid rocking the 
boat. Kaplan and Dubro give evidence of one case in Osaka in which police 
officers routinely took bribes to provide advance warning of raids on gaming- 
machine operations. Eventually 124 officers in the Osaka police force were either 
dismissed or disciplined, whilst the former police chief, who had also been 
implicated, committed suicide (1986,157-9). 
Bornoff, writing about the sex industry in Japan, also notes that premises are usually 
aware beforehand of impending raids due to "a lot of money changing hands under 
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the table" (1994,495). Ames suggests that the high-profile raids since the days of 
the summit strategy "assume almost a ritual air" and most arrestees are quickly 
released due to a lack of concrete evidence or the insignificant nature of any crimes 
proved. Sometimes the bOryokudan have been informed prior to a raid, thereby 
enabling them to hide incriminating evidence, weapons and drugs. However, often 
they will enable the police to confiscate a few weapons in order to save face (1981, 
127). This illustrates the problem of relying too heavily on official statistics; whilst 
they may be accurate, they show only the surface (omote) appearance concealing a 
more profound (ura) reality. 
Corruption in Japan is notoriously hard to pin down. This is largely due to the 
deep-rooted culture of gift-giving, reciprocity and obligation in which all major 
social occasions are marked by presentations of envelopes filled with cash. On a 
more subtle level, just as retiring bureaucrats find rewarding employment in the 
industries they formerly regulated (a process known as amakudari, descent from 
heaven), it is not unknown for retired police officers to be employed in industries 
concerned with the sale or distribution of gambling machines. 
However, there are grounds on which to question the extent to which this dominant 
symbiotic perspective is still relevant. Although books and articles published in the 
last decade (Huang and Vaughn, 1992; van Wolferen, 1989) have still put forward 
this line, much of the primary research on which this paradigm of symbiosis has 
been based, is decidedly dated. Since the rise in the levels of gang violence in the 
gang war period and the increasingly diverse criminality of gangs from the period of 
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reorganisation, it has become progressively harder for the police to turn a blind eye 
to böryokudan activity. 
Stark (1981,16-7) describes the relationship between the Araki Gumi and the local 
police in less glowing terms. Whilst there is contact between gangs and the 
authorities, the 
limited amount of co-operation with law-enforcement personnel is all 
behind-the-scenes, marked by mutual contempt, and necessitated only by 
their respective self-interests. 
This antagonism was reflected in the poor relations that Stark had with the police 
authorities within his fieldwork area. Despite Stark's backing by the National 
Research Institute of Police Science, the local police attempted to frustrate his 
research by intimidating his informants. 
Ames also accepts that the police have been adopting an increasingly hard line 
against the böryokudan since the summit strategy period of the mid-1960's (1981, 
124-9). This has manifested itself not only in high-profile arrests and harassment of 
gang members but in the development of public awareness campaigns, education 
programmes and the initiation of, and support for, the citizens' anti-böryokudan 
movement. As the gangs have become perceived as increasingly violent and 
involved in non-consensual crimes in which ordinary citizens have become victims, 
the police have come under growing pressure to take serious steps against them. 
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Whilst individual cases of corruption may still persist, it therefore seems that the 
cosy picture of symbiosis portrayed by van Wolferen (1989) can no longer be 
sustained. The extent to which the police are making a serious attempt to get rid of 
the gangs in contemporary Japan is one of the central areas to be explored later. By 
the end of the Shbwa period, the police had recognised the boryokudan as a serious 
problem and had managed to reduce both gang numbers and membership from their 
1963 peak. However, the formidable state of the böryokudan by 1988, especially of 
the big three national syndicates, suggests that police countermeasures were still far 
from adequate. 
THE BORYOKUDAN IN THE LATE SHÖWA PERIOD 
STRUCTURE AND ORGANISATION 
In December 1988, there were 3,197 boryokudan groups with a total membership of 
86,552 men, recognised by the police. Of these 1,397 gangs (34,492 men) were 
affiliated to one of the three national syndicates, the Yamaguchi-gumi, the Inagawa- 
kai and the Sumiyoshi-kai, whilst 737 (20,826 men) of these groups were connected 
with the Yamaguchi-gumi (Keisatsu Hakusho 1989; 17). As mentioned above, 
whilst in the previous two decades there was a decline in overall böryokudan 
statistics, the three large gangs have grown in both relative and absolute terms. 
These syndicates are composed of ikka, or (fictive) families. These ikka (sometimes 
also referred to as kumi) are the fundamental organisational units of the böryokudan 
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(Iwai, 1986,214). Stark (1981,62-88) identifies three distinct overlapping internal 
structures within the ikka: 1) a formal administrative hierarchy; 2) a hierarchy based 
on the traditional Japanese model of the household (ie); 3) the hierarchy within 
internal groups. These structures give "cohesion and tightness to the group and 
counter the factionalism inherent in the three hierarchies" (1981,62). 
The administrative, or "rank and duty" hierarchy is the most visible feature of 
Stark's structures. It describes the formal structure of the organisation with clearly 
defined strata each with specified tasks, duties, status and privileges. These are: 
Kumi-cho (family head/boss); dai-kanbu (senior executives); kanbu (executives); 
soldiers (kumi-in); and jun-kösei-in (trainees) (Stark 1981,65). The category of 
jun-kösei-in also includes peripheral figures (shühensha), such as kigyö shatei 
(business brothers), who are not officially connected with the ikka, but who profit 
from maintaining informal links. With respect to this formal hierarchy the gang is 
similar to a legitimate corporation or military organisation. It is also practically 
identical to the formal rank structures of the American La Cosa Nostra and Chinese 
Triads. 
Ultimate responsibility for the ikka's business activities rests with the kumi-chi. 
He is advised on gang business by the senior executives, one of whom may act as 
under-boss (usually known as waka-gashira). Both the dai-kanbu and kanbu are 
entitled to form their own internal groups, though not all may have sufficient funds 
to maintain the branch office and personnel that this entails. The kumi-in are 
responsible for guard duties, driving, manning the telephone, cleaning, serving 
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guests and supervising the apprentices. The kumi-in may also be employed in 
businesses owned by the kumi"chö or kanbu or otherwise connected with the ikka. 
The apprentices are usually given the most menial tasks. As well as working for 
their boss, kanbu and kumi-in often operate on their own account though where such 
business activities are illegal and make use of the ikka's reputation, some of these 
earnings will usually be passed on to the boss. Until the 1970's these payments 
were generally a percentage of earnings but the system was subsequently changed to 
a fixed amount as too many gang members were under-reporting their incomes. 
Figure 3.3 Böryokudan Rank Hierarchy 
KUMI-CHO 
DAI-KANBU 
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KANBU 
a 
KUMI-IN 
JUN-KOSEI-IN 
In the Araki Gumi, the organisation studied by Stark, of the roughly 125 men below 
the Araki kumi-chö, 12% held kanbu rank, 68% kumi-in and 20% jun-kösei-in. 
These figures deviate from the national average for the same period in which 3.2% 
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are kumi-chö, 26.9% are kanbu, 54.2% are kumi-in, and 15.7% are jun-kösei-in. No 
particular reason is given for this difference but it is possible that the leadership of 
national syndicates would have an incentive to promote personnel as higher level 
personnel pay higher levels of tribute (jönökin) to their superiors. Recent rank 
structure data are not currently available and this needs to be rectified as the 
situation will certainly have changed in the last two decades. The recruiting crisis 
mentioned above, combined with the increasing sophistication of böryokudan 
crimes, can be expected to have encouraged a positive skew towards the upper 
echelons of böryokudan rank structure. 
The type of formal hierarchy and division of labour outlined above has been used by 
OC researchers, such as Cressey and Salerno, to assert that OC groups are 
effectively bureaucratic organisations. What Cressey fails to realise is that there are 
parallel hierarchy structures within both Japanese and traditional Italian OC groups, 
based on traditional kinship ties, that coexist with this corporate/bureaucratic 
structure. Within the ikka these social bonds are based on the family relationships 
of father-son (oyabun-kobun) and brother-brother (kyödaibun). It is important to 
note that these bonds connect individuals to each other rather than to a group. 
These fictive kinship links are seen as crucial in maintaining group cohesion both 
vertically (oyabun-kobun) and horizontally (kyodaibun). 
These relationships are established by the ritual exchange of sake in the sakazuki 
ceremony. The nature of the relationship is determined by the ratio of sake in the 
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recipients' cups; for example, an equal kyodai relationship would involve equal 
quantities of sake whilst an unequal aniki-shatei relationship would be reflected in a 
six-four or a seven-three distribution of sake. OC groups are considerably more 
meritocratic than traditional large Japanese enterprises characterised by seniority 
promotion. Consequently, the social kinship hierarchy within the ikka is fluid and 
this is reflected in the way that an equal kyödai relationship can become a six-four 
relationship as one member progresses faster than his less able brother. Equally, a 
kumi-in, on promotion to kanbu status may become the shatei (younger brother) to 
other executives who may have formerly been his uncles or even his oyabun. 
The third hierarchy within the ikka is the internal group, which forms when an 
executive takes on his own kobun. Within the ikka, individual members occupy two 
different positions; that within the ikka as a whole and that within the internal 
group. Most internal groups tend to be small groups composed of less than ten 
members. Due to their small size and the fact that most day-to-day business and 
interaction is carried out at this level, internal groups tend to be the most cohesive 
and intimate units within the böryokudan world. 
Stark stresses that it is vital that these three structures are flexible enough to 
accommodate the constantly changing vicissitudes of gang fortunes. Arrest, 
imprisonment, inter-gang conflict, temporary cessation of certain business activities 
due to law-enforcement harassment and new market opportunities make OC a 
highly precarious and dynamic process unsuited to a rigid bureaucratic structure. 
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A large area syndicate may form when a strong group subsumes weaker ones into 
its organisation either voluntarily or through military pressure. The kumi-chö of the 
weaker group will become a kobun of the boss, or the younger brother of an 
executive, of the dominant one. Alternatively internal groups may expand out 
forming semi-autonomous ikka in new territory. In a national syndicate such as the 
Yamaguchi-gumi, this results in a multi-tiered pyramidal arrangement in which 
executives within the central group are themselves oyabun heading kumi, the 
executives of which also have their own groups, and so on. This is shown in figure 
3.4 
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Alternatively, a syndicate can arise when groups voluntarily form an alliance of 
equals. The obvious benefits of such an arrangement are the economies of scale, 
security from outside predation and reduction in competition arguments put forward 
in chapter two. The group studied by Stark was a member of a nine-member 
alliance in the west of Japan, which had formed to block the spread of the 
Yamaguchi-gumi. Alliances of this type are cemented by sakazuki rituals in which 
the leaders of the participating groups become brothers. 
Another example of a federation of gangs is the Sumiyoshi-kai (formerly known as 
the Sumiyoshi-rengb) in which the leaders of the large component groups retain 
control over their own organisations although a president is selected from among 
their number (refer to figure 3.5). The president is responsible for maintaining the 
overall smooth running of the organisation and adjudicates in cases of intra- 
federation disputes (Iwai 1986,225-6). This operates in an analogous way to the 
commission composed of the leadership of the top Italian-American crime families 
or the cupola by which Sicilian Mafia families attempt to maintain inter-familial 
harmony. 
Within large-scale syndicates of either type, control exerted over sub-gangs by the 
parent body is usually confined to major decisions that will have ramifications 
beyond the sub-gang's established territory (Keisatsu Hakusho 1989,32-3). For 
example approval from above will be required when dealing with problems such as 
succession of leadership, expansion of the gang's nawabari, the dissolution of the 
gang and the use of punishment torture. Most gangs do not require permission to 
sell drugs or move into new areas of criminal activity. In part this may be because 
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large syndicates maintain an official policy of non-involvement in the drugs 
business. 
Figure 3.5 Structure of the Sumiyoshi-kai 
Confederation of Gang Leaders 
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Although the Japanese criminal syndicates have not managed to forge a nation-wide 
governmental organ along similar lines to the commission of the Italian-American 
crime families or the cupola of the Sicilian Mafia, within the Kantb area the major 
bakuto gangs have a loose association which fills a similar function. The Kanto 
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Hatsuka-kai traces its lineage to the Kanto-kai set up by Kodama in 1963. Although 
the Kantöi-kai was disbanded the following year due to the increased police pressure 
on the yakuza brought about by the summit strategy, in 1972 the original members 
formed the new organisation. The membership consisted of the two largest Tokyo- 
based groups, the Inagawa-kai and the Sumiyoshi-kai plus the Matsuba-kai, the 
Kokusui-kai, the Gijintö, the Tba-kai, the Kawa-kai (all of which had been in the 
former Kanto-kai), the Nibiki-kai and the Soai-kai2. 
The Kanto-kai had originally been politically motivated but the Kanto Hatsuka-kai 
was set up purely as a mechanism for promoting peaceful co-existence between the 
various bakuto groups within the Kanto area and for ensuring that, when conflict 
does break out between sub-groups, this trouble does not escalate and is quickly 
resolved. This is carried out through a rotational system of chairmanship (tsuki 
töban) by which the member groups take it in turns to be responsible for resolving 
problems within the association. In addition to this, the original charter of the 
Kanto Hatsuka-kai provides for strict penalties for those who jeopardise intra- 
association harmony. 
The Kantö Hatsuka-kai derives its name from its habitual meeting on the twentieth 
day of every month (unless this clashes with an important event in which case it is 
shifted to the preceding or following day). The meeting is composed of two parts. 
2 Gang names are given in their most modem form. At the time of formation the Sumiyoshi-kai still 
called itself the Sumiyoshi-rengo-kai and the Kokusui-kai, the Nippon Kokusui-kai. 
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The first of these is the business meeting attended by the headquarters chiefs of all 
the component groups at which any areas of inter-group friction or other problems 
are discussed. The second phase of the monthly meeting is a purely social affair in 
which senior executives of the member groups share a meal in the private room of a 
restaurant and then take turns in singing karaoke. Because this second meeting is 
conducted in a non-secure environment, announcements concerning gang-related 
business are not made. 
To further minimise the risk of trouble within the Tokyo area the Kanto Hatsuka-kai 
also maintains fraternal relations with the Kanto Shinno Dbshi-kai which is the 
federation comprising the Tokyo-based tekiya gangs. This group has observer 
status within the Kanto Hatsuka-kai and each February a formal dinner is held in 
order to further the amicable relations between these two groups (Jitsuwa Jidai, July 
1999,94-6). 
The group studied by Stark in Okayama prefecture was also the member of a loose 
association of independent groups. However, in this case the prime motivating 
force had been a desire to withstand the relentless advance of the Yamaguchi-gumi, 
rather than an attempt to restrict conflict between the component groups (although 
doubtless this was an important side product) (Stark 1981,49-56). 
It should be stressed that associations such as the Kanto Hatsuka-kai are not 
themselves monolithic gang organisations under the guidance of some `Mr. Big'. 
Decisions concerning the internal discipline, economic activities or military 
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endeavours of member groups remain entirely at the discretion of these individual 
member groups' bosses unless they directly impinge on other members. It should 
also be pointed out that the Kanto Hatsuka-kai has been very successful in reducing 
trouble within the Tokyo area. This is indicative of the way in which the Kanto- 
based yakuza groups have traditionally been much more sensitive to the need to 
prevent provocative displays of violence than the Kansai yakuza groups (interviews: 
Iwai, Tokyo, June 1998; Yoshimura, Tokyo, June 1998). 
INTERNAL CONTROL 
As a self-governing entity, operating in a hostile environment with no recourse to 
legal protection, böryokudan organisations must create and enforce their own rules. 
Essentially there are five cardinal rules which have remained unchanged for 
centuries: 1) don't disobey, or cause a nuisance to your superiors, 2) don't betray 
your gang or your fellow gang members, 3) don't fight with fellow members or 
disrupt the harmony of the gang, 4) don't embezzle gang funds and 5) don't touch 
the woman of a fellow gang member. As mentioned in chapter two, these rules bear 
a remarkably close similarity to those of Italian-American and Chinese OC groups 
suggesting that OC groups are continually subject to the same sorts of pressures. 
The most important virtue within the böryokudan code is unquestioning obedience, 
even in defiance of logic. This is reflected in the well-known traditional yakuza 
saying, which states that if the oyabun says that the passing crow is white, then the 
kobun must agree. A police survey of members of large syndicates carried out in 
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1985 found that 64% of their interviewees said that they would unquestioningly 
carry out the orders of their oyabun. A further 21 % said that they would carry them 
out if they agreed (Keisatsu Hakusho 1989,30). The opinion of the remaining 15% 
is not recorded but it can be seen that this virtue is largely, but not universally, 
recognised. 
A graphic illustration of kobun obedience is the phenomenon of migawari, in which 
low-ranking kumi-in hand themselves in to the police and admit to crimes 
committed by their superiors. This obedience is of course rewarded by promotion, 
financial remuneration and an elaborate ceremony on the release from jail 
(demukae) of the individual concerned. During his incarceration, maintenance will 
be paid to his dependants. For a kumi-in of low ability, migawari may actually be 
the best career move he could make. Hoshino suggests that incidence of migawari 
is in decline as sentencing patterns become more severe. In addition to this, one 
case related to the researcher in Iwate prefecture concerns the local boss forcing a 
subordinate to go to prison in his place and then failing to provide adequate support 
or remuneration on the subordinate's release. Both these points show that the 
relationships governed by traditional yakuza codes, are under strain. 
Whilst the fictive kinship bonds and socialisation imbued during the period of 
apprenticeship go someway to fostering this spirit of blind, self-sacrificing 
obedience and kumi-harmony, the authoritarian nature of böryokudan can place 
great strains on the oyabun-kobun relationship. Referring to this, Iwai (1986,222) 
writes: 
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Frequently this gives rise to a strong, usually unspoken, antipathy between 
the leader and his followers which may threaten the oyabun's authority and 
the cohesion of the group at large. In spite of the obsequious displays of 
loyalty and fealty, it is not rare for a kobun to reject his oyabun. 
It is therefore necessary for control within böryokudan to be reinforced by a system 
of rewards and punishments. As mentioned above, cases of migawari are rewarded 
by money and promotion. Similarly money and promotion are the two major 
reward mechanisms for other outstanding examples of obedience, ability and 
results. At the other end of the scale there are a number of punishments available to 
the kumi-cho in order to enforce discipline. For relatively light offenses these 
include shaving off hair (narcissism is an accepted facet of the böryokudan 
subculture), confinement, fines, and temporary expulsion from home (Yamadiara 
1992,48). More serious breaches will be punished with beatings (known 
confusingly as rinchi), yubitsume (finger amputation), hamon (expulsion from the 
ikka), and zetsuen (the irreversible severing of links); the ultimate sanction is death. 
Yubitsume (also known within yakuza circles as enkozume) is perhaps the most 
famous aspect of traditional yakuza culture and one that arouses considerable 
fascination outside Japan. It is significant that both of the most widely known 
American films concerning Japanese organised crime, Black Rain (1989) and The 
Yakuza (1975), include scenes depicting this custom. Usually yubitsume is not 
demanded as a punishment but will be the decision of the transgressor to show 
atonement for his misdeeds and in the hope of escaping a heavier punishment. It 
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seems that the custom of yubitsume is becoming less prevalent amongst younger 
gang members who prefer to pay fines. Whether this is due to an increased desire to 
avoid identification as a gang member as the böryokudan become less open, or 
whether it reflects a weakening of traditional yakuza ethos amongst the böryokudan 
is not clear. In 1971,42% of members of bakuto groups, 45% of gurentai and 30% 
of tekiya had at least one amputated finger (Mugishima et al 1971,133). By 1994, 
police data suggested that the national average of finger amputees amongst 
böryokudan had declined to 33% (Yonezato et al 1994,43). 
Yubitsume exists not only as a punishment/sign of atonement but may also be 
undertaken for positive reasons. Whilst a finger cut off to erase some misdeed is 
referred to as a `dead finger' (shinu yubi), a `living finger' (iki yubi) is one which is 
sacrificed to show one's commitment to "resolve an issue or conflict that one is not 
directly responsible for" (Stark 1981,113). Both of the gang bosses in Stark's 
fieldwork had lost more than one iki yubi, usually in order to bring peace between 
conflicting gangs3. 
A more significant punishment than yubitsume is expulsion (hamon). Hamon 
differs from zetsuen in that there remains a possibility of return for expellees 
depending on the nature of the offence and their behaviour whilst outside the gang 
(Yamadaira 1992,48). On expulsion, special post-cards known as hamon jö are 
sent to all böryokudan groups throughout the country with which that group enjoys 
3 Originally the significance ofyubitsume was that it reduced one's grip on a sword therefore limiting 
self-defence ability. More recently it has adversely affected amputees' golf swings. 
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friendly relations informing them that the person concerned no longer has any 
connection with the gang and respectfully asking them not to employ or help him. 
Hamon jö are printed in either black or red ink with red indicating a more severe 
punishment and a correspondingly smaller possibility of rehabilitation (fukuen). 
Obviously for an ikka to employ, or otherwise help, an expelled gangster from 
another group without that group's consent, is both a severe breach of the traditional 
code of the yakuza and a grave affront to the dignity of the group that will demand 
redress. More recently it appears that hamon messages have come to be sent by fax. 
An expellee is forbidden to take part in illegal activity, to make use of his former 
affiliation with the gang, or even to adopt the loud dress and arrogant behaviour 
patterns of a gang member. Those that disobey may be challenged, beaten or, if this 
persists, killed (Stark 1981,109). Expulsion is severe for gang members because it 
is not easy for them to make a living outside their group's protective fold. Whilst 
they have been deprived of illegal employment, few legitimate employers will want 
to take them on. It is particularly difficult for those that have been permanently 
stigmatised as böryokudan, either through yubitsume or a body tattoo (ireaumi4), to 
conceal their former status. If, after an appropriate length of time, expellees have 
conducted themselves properly outside of the gang and show a reformed attitude, 
they may be reinstated. This will be accompanied by the sending of fukuen jö to 
böryokudan throughout Japan. 
4 This term carries slightly negative associations with the medieval practice of tattooing convicted 
criminals. For this reason tattoo artists prefer to talk about horimono whilst yakuza themselves refer 
to their tattoos as monmon (private correspondence, Herbert). 
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RECRUITMENT 
In order to make up for the wastage in numbers due to imprisonment, retirement, 
illness and members leaving for other reasons, böryokudan are constantly struggling 
to maintain their existing strength. As mentioned in the 1989 Hanzai Hakusho, in 
the late 1980's the process of recruiting new, young, members, seems to have 
become particularly problematic for böryokudan. Recruitment is important not only 
at the gang level; advancement within the organisation is aided by an individual's 
ability to bring in suitable new blood. This is especially important for an executive 
wishing to create his own internal group. Gang members are therefore always on 
the lookout for likely material. Böryokudan life is obviously not suited to 
everybody and recruitment tends to be concentrated within certain clearly defined 
groups. 
The underlying rationale behind the theory of ethnic progression put forward by 
Bell (1965) and Ianni (1974), is that, when certain ethnic groups are denied access 
to legitimate means to self-advancement, OC may remain the only route by which 
these disadvantaged groups can attain their material goals. This argument is often 
applied to Japan where it is held that discrimination against burakumin and 
sangokujin (particularly ethnic Koreans) is a prime motivation forcing members of 
these groups into OC associations. Many böryokudan leaders play on this idea of 
discrimination to justify their existence: society is to blame not them, moreover 
(they say), the böryokudan play a vital social role in providing a niche for society's 
outcasts. 
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Due to the sensitivity publishers, editors and even official publications have in 
dealing with burakumin issues (van Wolferen 1989,342), there is no recent hard 
data on the levels of burakumin and Korean involvement in the boryokudan, and it 
is not in anybody's interest to provide any. Even for the police to conduct surveys 
would be considered discrimination whilst the legitimate buraku liberation 
movements are not keen for their minority group to be tainted with böryokudan 
associations in the minds of the public. 
It is however widely believed that the proportion of minority groups within the 
yakuza is disproportionately high: whilst roughly 0.5% of the population is 
considered ethnically Korean and 2.5% of burakumin origin, unofficial police 
estimates cited by Ames (1981,112) suggest that within the Yamaguchi-gumi 10% 
of total böryokudan strength is Korean and 70% burakumin. These figures are 
however problematic and illustrate the dangers of inappropriate extrapolation of 
data. Whilst in areas of Japan with high concentrations of such minorities, such as 
Okayama prefecture where Ames conducted most of his research, these figures are 
credible, it is highly dubious that they apply to the country as a whole. 
Attempts to establish the extent of minority representation within the ranks of the 
boryokudan during the course of the researcher's fieldwork were not successful. 
Criminal defence lawyers Shimamura and Yamanouchi agreed that it was `still 
high' but were reluctant to give even a rough figure. One group of third-level 
Yamaguchi-gumi executives estimated that about two-thirds of Yamaguchi-gumi 
- 146 - 
members were of Korean extraction but this does not seem credible and, at best, 
probably only reflects the composition of their own immediate group. Their own 
gang office was situated in the Nishinari area of Osaka, which has a high percentage 
of residents of Korean ancestry. 
Discrimination also exists against those who fail to meet the demands of Japan's 
gakureki shakai (school-record society). Police statistics show that 80% of recently 
joined gang members had either left school after completing compulsory schooling 
or dropped out during high school. In their last year at school 66% had played 
truant for one month or more (Keisatsu Hakusho 1989,37-8). This contrasts with 
national educational advancement rates of 95% for high school, and 30% for 
university (Tökei Kyoku 1990,666). Educational and ethnic discrimination need not 
necessarily be mutually exclusive. It is likely that there is a correlation between 
low, culturally induced expectations, and those expectations being met. 
Another significant aspect of böryokudan recruits is their home background. Whilst 
it might be expected that they tend to come from poorer families, what is surprising 
is the high levels who come from single parent families (43%) or feel they have 
been neglected as children (50%) compared to those who had been "doted upon" or 
"looked after too much" (10%). One third had run away from home (Keisatsu 
Hakusho 1989,37; Ames 1981,112-3). More recently it seems that the significance 
of single-parent families has been declining but parental neglect within conventional 
two-parent families has increased as a factor contributing to böryokudan recruitment 
(Hoshino 1994,139). It seems reasonable to assume that the tight, closed social 
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structure of the böryokudan, and the kinship bonds of the sakazuki take on an added 
significance in the light of the dysfunctional family background of many 
böryokudan entrants. 
As would be expected by Merton's theory of crime as an innovative response to 
anomic conditions discussed in chapter two, not all members of these disadvantaged 
groups become members of böryokudan. Böryokudan talent scouts do not try and 
induct individuals because they are Korean, or burakumin, or have no educational 
qualifications but because they are suitable. In böryokudan terms suitable recruiting 
material is to be most readily found amongst those who have already embarked 
upon a career of deviancy. In the 1989 police survey of recent böryokudan recruits, 
11.3% were shoplifters, 33% solvent abusers, 75% had been arrested prior to 
joining böryokudan and 50% more than once. Of the survey's interviewees, the 
majority (60%) had been involved in delinquent groups especially bosozoku hot-rod 
groups and local street-gangs (Keisatsu Hakusho 1989,38-9). 
Böryokudan `talent scouts' will patrol game centres, street corners and other 
delinquent hang-outs making contact with likely individuals (Yamadaira 1992, 
141). Potential recruits may be given pocket money, meals, or drugs. They may 
then be employed on errands and slowly drawn into the talent scout's circle. 
Herbert reports that karate clubs at some of the less-prestigious universities have 
also been targeted as potential recruiting grounds; whilst this has not been 
corroborated by other sources it is not unfeasible. Martial arts schools have long 
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been run by Chinese Triad groups purely as recruiting and training vehicles (Booth 
1999,173; 212) whilst this researcher is aware of at least one foreigner who used 
his credentials as a karateka to gain part-time employment as a driver and `acrobat' 
for a Tokyo-based gang. 
Recruitment need not be a one way process. All of the interviewees who 
commented on their motives for joining, joined of their own volition. Tanomura, a 
tekiya in Iwate prefecture, had been attracted to the bright lights and excitement of 
festivals. In contrast to this, Fujimura joined in his mid-twenties because his bars 
were consistently pestered by yakuza seeking to squeeze money out of him in some 
way or other. Most of the interviewees had joined at an early age having spent a 
childhood apprenticeship. In one police survey, as much as 15.8% of recruits had 
approached the böryokudan on their own initiative whilst 26.8% had asked to join 
rather than waiting to be invited (Keisatsu Hakusho 1989,40). This attraction to the 
böryokudan is reflected in the reasons given by interviewed böryokudan arrestees 
for joining their organisations: 
Table 3.3 Motivation for Joining Böryokudan 
Initial Motivation Agreement Rating 
Attracted by the yakuza image (kakoii) 36.5% 
Attracted by the world of giri-ninjö 29.1% 
They will recognise even someone like myself 17.1% 
You can achieve an enjoyable lifestyle 16.7% 
- 149 - 
To support immediate lifestyle 12.2% 
Feel attraction for controlling through violence 9.5% 
Convenient for work 7.2% 
It is easy economically 7.1% 
It is easy work 3.9% 
Forced to join against will so no motivation for joining 3.5% 
No reason in particular 4.1% 
(source: Keisatsu Hakusho 1993,31) 
It is significant that gang members themselves see the flashy image and giri-ninjö 
value system, beloved by Japanese film makers, as more important than the 
perception that the ikka will recognise even people like them (whilst society 
doesn't). This does not necessarily contradict the discrimination thesis. Narcissism 
is a common factor within OC sub-cultures (Hobbs 1994,448-9) and may be 
considered to reflect low self-esteem and a defiant rejection of societal judgement. 
Whilst most members join in their youth, this is not necessarily the case. Released 
convicts, dismissed policemen and failed salarymen (possibly fired for fraud or 
similar irregularities), may all find themselves deprived of legitimate employment. 
The latter two categories may bring particular skills to the organisation. Due to the 
increasingly white-collar nature of Japanese OC activity, computer and financial 
expertise is especially welcome. 
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Although it is not given above as a major motivating factor in joining, interviews of 
kumi-chö frequently reveal that economic considerations are also important. Whilst 
money itself is not necessarily given as a reason for joining, the status and power 
that money gives is undoubtedly important (Yasuda 1993,207). This is reflected in 
the ostentatious display of wealth, which is such an important part of the yakuza 
image. An often overlooked factor in this is that people join böryokudan for the 
simple reason that, for the successful, crime pays extremely well. 
FINANCIAL FLOWS 
In 1989, the police estimated that the total income of böryokudan groups in Japan 
was over ¥1.3 trillion (£5.8 billion) (Keisatsu Hakusho 1989,46). This translates 
into an average annual per capita income of ¥15 million (£66,371). 1979 police 
data on böryokudan income (the first year such measurements were made) put total 
boryokudan income at ¥1 trillion and average annual income per head at ¥1O 
million (Mizoguchi 1986,183). If these figures are correct, it implies that although 
income has grown only by 30%, due to the smaller less competitive ikka being 
forced out of business, productivity has increased by 50%. In real terms 
(discounting inflation) these increases are, of course, less. 
To put böryokudan per capita income levels in perspective, the average annual 
salary of a regular company employee in 1989 was ¥3.6 million, or one quarter of 
the average gang member's (Tökei Kyoku 1992,98). Of course, böryokudan are 
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not egalitarian organisations and the distribution of the organisation's income 
reflects this. Uchiyama (1989,89) in a survey of 925 böryokudan arrestees found 
that the average annual income for bosses (¥26.7m) was nearly eight times that of 
average kumi-in (¥2.46m); executives averaged ¥7.7m. It should be noted that 
these figures are averages; for senior bosses this differential will be considerably 
higher. Retired third-level Ichiwa-kai boss Fujimura states that most ordinary 
young kumi-in are permanently broke, living a parasitical hand-to-mouth existence 
off the income of girlfriends, parents or their oyabun (Fujimura interview Osaka, 
August 1998). Most of the proceeds from OC end up in the higher echelons of the 
organisation. 
Large syndicates operate on a system of tribute known by the police as jönökin 
(literally `upward payment money') whilst the yakuza themselves prefer the term 
kaihi (association fees). Under this system subordinate gangs must pay a monthly 
amount to their parent organisation. This system evolved as a direct consequence of 
the first and second police summit strategies of the mid-to-late1960s. Because of 
these concentrated arrests of senior executives and bosses it became necessary to 
insulate the top leadership from direct criminal involvement whilst retaining a 
secure and stable source of income. As a result of the jönökin system the number of 
arrests of senior böryokudan figures declined dramatically and remains a serious 
problem for police böryokudan countermeasures (Ino 1992a, 264). It should be 
noted that, within second and third-level gangs, there is no hard rule concerning 
jönökin and it remains at the discretion of the boss of the gang in question. 
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Fujimura states that within the Mizohashi-gumi (a second-level group within the 
Yamaguchi-gumi and then the breakaway Ichiwa-kai) there was no jön6kin but he 
voluntarily paid the telephone bill for the gang headquarters (Fujimura interview 
Osaka, August 1998). 
Figure 3.6 Jönökin payments within a large syndicate 
Gang 
Leadership 
Monthly Total 
¥212.5m 
A Class Executives -120 men x ¥500,000 = ¥60m 
B Class Executives -250 men x ¥250,000 = ¥62.5m 
C Class Executives -600 men x¥ 150,000 = ¥90m 
Source: Keisatsu Hakusho 1989 
The jönökin structure of a typical large syndicate is shown in figure 3.6. In the 
example in the diagram, the syndicate leadership receives a monthly income of 
Y212.5 million (roughly Elm at contemporary exchange rates) without recourse to 
direct criminal involvement. Since its introduction, there has been a trend for 
jönökin to rise. Within the Yamaguchi-gumi this process started with a 
reorganisation of the syndicate's finances under the then gashira, Yamamoto 
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Kenichi, in 1971. At that time, members of the first level Yamaguchi-gumi would 
each pay ¥50,000 per month. By 1982 this had doubled to ¥100,000. Over the next 
decade jönökin increased over thirteen-fold to an astonishing Y1,340,000 yielding 
the headquarters an annual income of Y21.26bn (approximately £90m at 
contemporary exchange rates)5 (Mizoguchi 1997,54; 58). Consequently, meeting 
the burdens of jönökin payments has become problematic for many ikka, especially 
for the second and third level gangs on whom the financial responsibility ultimately 
rests (Ames 1981,118). In some cases this has resulted in the dissolution of the 
gang. 
SHINOGI- SOURCES OF INCOME 
Whilst the police estimates of gang income may seem large, journalistic sources 
consider the figures to be highly conservative. In particular, doubt may be cast on 
these figures in that the previous official police estimates of böryokudan income 
conducted in 1979, yielded a figure of ¥1 trillion (Mizoguchi 1986,183). In the 
succeeding ten years, böryokudan sources of income had substantially increased, 
diversified and become more sophisticated. In the light of this, it is simply not 
credible to maintain that böryokudan income only increased by 30% in this period. 
s Although such detailed figures are not available for the other two large syndicates, police estimates 
suggest that the 2,900 executives of the Inagawa-kai paid a monthly average of ¥137,000 yielding an 
annual total headquarters income of ¥4.77bn (£20m). Within the Sumiyoshi-kai 2,500 executives 
paid an average monthly fee of 52,000 yen which provided an annual income of Vl. 56bn (£6.6m). 
The lower level of Sumiyoshi-kai janökin reflects the flatter management structure of that particular 
syndicate. 
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Ino Kenji, a well-known writer on the yakuza, suggests that police figures 
underestimate the real figure by a factor of three (Kaplan and Dubro 1986,183). A 
former lawyer (presumably Yamanouchi Yukio) of the Yamaguchi-gumi criticises 
the 1979 figures for ignoring the substantial revenue from Japan's sex industry, 
debt-collecting and out of court settlement of bankruptcy charges. Professor Nato 
Takatsugu of Tokyo International University has suggested that total annual 
böryokudan income could be as much as seven trillion yen (Reuters 16/11/1994). 
Seven trillion yen is also the figure cited by Mizoguchi (1986,182) though he 
suggests this represents böryokudan turnover rather than profit (which he estimates 
at 70-80% of this total arguing that most yakuza businesses have very low costs). 
From his direct observations of the standard of living of senior böryokudan 
personnel, Mizoguchi does not find such a figure surprising6. 
Perhaps more significantly, within the NPA itself, doubt has been cast on the 
official figures. One of the research officers at the National Research Institute for 
Police Science (NRIPS), who had been responsible for creating the methodology by 
which the data were obtained, pointed out in interview that some sources of funding 
were seriously under-represented in the final figures. In particular the amounts of 
money that böryokudan groups extract from businesses was under-estimated and the 
interviewee asserted that this had been a politically-motivated decision by superiors 
within the NPA (NRIPS interview Tokyo, March 1998). Another senior researcher 
at NRIPS confessed with unnerving cheerfulness that despite a never-ending stream 
6 Hoshino Kanehiro also confessed to the researcher that, having visited top yakuza and seen the 
opulence of their lifestyle, he found the official figures to be suspect. 
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of journalists and researchers beating a path to his door with requests for facts and 
figures, he was unsure to what extent the data his institute produced were accurate 
(NRIPS interview Tokyo, February 1998). 
Figure 3.7 Sources of Böryokudan Income 
0 Amphetamines Q Gambling 
  Mikajimeryo   Minbo 
Q Violence Targeting Business Q Other Illegal 
Q Legitimate Business   Other Legitimate 
  Total Illegal Income Q Total Legal Income 
Source: Keisatsu Hakusho 1989 
As can be seen from figure 3.7, according to police estimates, the overwhelming 
majority of böryokudan income is derived from illegal sources. What is more 
surprising, given the changing nature of böryokudan activity, is that conventional, 
established sources of income, namely, gambling and bookmaking, amphetamines, 
protection and other traditional forms of extortion, still account for over 60% of this 
total. Within the böryokudan world, all types of economic activity from which they 
derive money are known collectively as shinogi. Shinogi is defined in Kenkyusha's 
New Japanese-English Dictionary as "to be in a helpless condition; be driven to the 
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wall; be quite at a loss how to tide over difficulties". This captures quite well the 
desperate and transient nature of the hand-to-mouth existence of many low-ranking 
yakuza. The main forms of shinogi are as follows: 
PROTECTION 
As we have defined OC in the preceding chapter, it is the provision of protection 
which gives organised crime its special characteristics. It is the ability of OC 
syndicates to provide protection to their members and those who pay for it, as well 
as to deny it to others, which enables them to obtain all other forms of shinogi. 
Protection therefore overarches the diverse set of business activities, both legal and 
illegal, in which böryokudan members are active. 
Protection (known colloquially as mikajimeryö) is therefore the most basic of 
böryokudan businesses. According to the police estimates, even in the late eighties, 
it accounted for just under 10% of böryokudan revenue. Traditionally the main 
focus of böryokudan protection has been the entertainment industries comprising 
restaurants, bars, night-clubs and sex industry known collectively as mizu shöbai 
(water trades). There are many ways in which böryokudan can extort money from 
shops and bars. The most straightforward form of mikajimeryö is to demand 
yojimbodai (bodyguard fee). A more subtle approach is to pressure the victim to 
buy goods and services from ikka-run businesses at inflated prices. Oshibori (hot 
- 157 - 
hand towels) and tsumami (snacks) are often provided to bars and restaurants in this 
way. Alternatively, pictures, potted plants and other decorations may be leased at 
above market rates. 
A 1988 questionnaire of 1,500 traders carried out by the police in Ishikawa 
prefecture yielded the data shown in table 3.5: 
Table 3.5 Payment of Mikajimeryö 
Currently paying mikajimeryö 
Of which ¥1,000/month 
¥5,000/month 
Have paid mikajimeryö in the past 
Being forced to buy goods 
of which ¥5-10,000/month 
¥3-5,000/month 
Have made use of boryokudan in the past 
of which, used to sort out trouble 
recover money owed 
6.6% 
0.1% 
6.5% 
5.4% 
19.6% 
0.5% 
19.1% 
1.4% 
1.0% 
0.4% 
(Source: Keisatsu Hakusho 1989) 
Although these percentages are not high, within the sample population this 
represents total monthly payments amounting to roughly ¥2.2 million. When it is 
considered that böryokudan protection activity has traditionally been concentrated 
in Japan's vast mizu shöbai (entertainment) industry, then they become more 
significant. A 1980 survey carried out by police in the Yokohama area, showed that 
more than 70% of enterprises in the mizu shöbai sector paid mikajimeryö to 
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böryokudan. This yielded an annual figure of approximately ¥1.5 billion (Kaplan 
and Dubro 1986,169). A rough estimate by a yakuza associate working in the 
entertainment area of Shinjuku suggests that two-thirds of the 3,000 bars and clubs 
in Kabuki-chö were paying an average of ¥30,000 per month. This gives an annual 
pay out of ¥720 million (Hinago 1992b, 75). This is probably an underestimate in 
that Kabuki-chb bars may well have paid more. The figures cited by Mizoguchi for 
typical mikajimeryo payments in the Kobe area are ¥100,000 per month for a club 
and ¥300-500,000 for apachinko (pinball) parlour. In the fashionable Ginza district 
of Tokyo, some clubs pay as much as ¥1 million per month (1997,82). 
Protection covers not only the entertainment industry. Sagawa Kyübin, the parcel 
delivery company, reputedly paid ¥2 billion per year to Ishii Susumu, Inagawa-kai 
boss 1986-90, to ensure trouble free business (ibid. ). In total the Tokyo 
Metropolitan Police estimate that roughly ¥100 billion flowed to Ishii from Sagawa 
Kyübin. It is not clear whether this was all protection money but many observers 
think so (Nakagawa 1992,235). 
The construction industry is also one in which böryokudan protection is significant. 
Like the trucking industry it is vulnerable to the pilfering of articles and delays. It is 
also dependent on a large, unskilled workforce. As argued in the preceding chapter, 
such industries are more likely victims of OC than capital-intensive industries with 
a small, highly-skilled workforce. As will be shown below, böryokudan 
involvement in construction is facilitated by partial control over the supply of labour 
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to this industry (see labour-broking). Because of the high value of land in Japan, 
especially at the time of the bubble economy, construction costs are a lower 
proportion of the total project than in most other countries. Delays may also 
therefore be more expensive than elsewhere. For these reasons, the Japanese 
construction industry is especially susceptible to yakuza protection7. 
The standard fee to ensure trouble-free construction is three percent of the total 
construction cost (Fujimura 1998, interview). In 1985 total investment in 
construction reached ¥50 trillion, or 16% of GNP for the same year. Of this ¥30 
trillion was private sector investment and the remaining Y20 trillion, public 8 
(Hasegawa 1988,2-3). Assuming that protection is extended to just one third of this 
total, the böryokudan are earning ¥500 billion from this industry alone. Although it 
is not clear to what extent the construction industry pays protection, the police 
recognise that it is a major source of boryokudan income (Hiraoka 1987,71). 
Of course, böryokudan involvement in construction operates at more than one level. 
The other ways in which criminal groups extract funds from this industry are more 
properly dealt with in the sections concerning legitimate business and activities 
targeting legitimate business. 
These factors are even stronger in Hong Kong where an estimated 12% of the total cost of, for 
example, skyscraper construction is consumed by protection and bribery payments (Booth 1999: 
243). 
8 Coincidentally, three percent was also the sum typically paid to LDP cliques in exchange for public 
construction contracts (Johnson 1995: 216-7). The high costs of corruption within the Japanese 
construction industry, combined with the inefficiency it engenders, go some way to explaining why it 
costs nine times more to build a road in Japan than in the USA (McCormack 1996: 35). 
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The term mikajimeryö carries wider connotations than the provision of protection in 
that it also applies to payments made to a group in return for permission to conduct 
business within that gang's territory. Therefore, traders at the economic and legal 
margins such as outdoor stall-holders, drug-dealers and street prostitutes pay a street 
tax to the relevant gang. For women on the streets of Shin-Okubo this amounted to 
three thousand yen per woman per day (police interviewee, Tokyo, 1998). 
This tax need not be an entirely exploitative relationship. One Israeli stall-holder9 
explained why he had little trouble with the police in the following way: 
The bosses (those running the Israeli jewellery hawkers) have a relationship 
with the yakuza and they have a relationship with the police. It is a good 
system and it works well (stall-holder Kobe, 1998). 
For bar-keepers, protection ensures that problems involving unruly customers, or 
those that refuse to pay their bill, can be resolved quickly. In one incident 
witnessed by the researcher in a bar in central Japan, the local boss arrived within 
five minutes of a situation developing. Whilst it is not to be argued that payers of 
protection get value for money, the protection relationship is not a purely 
exploitative one and many entrepreneurs actively seek out protection rather than 
finding it thrust upon them. 
9 Street-stalls selling jewellery are monopolised by Israeli organisations. Stalls are usually manned 
by young Israelis in need of funds for their post-military service travels. These organisations operate 
as territorial franchises and generally purchase their supplies of jewellery from the regional boss to 
whom they also pay a percentage in exchange for their spot. 
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The need for this service is not confined to traders in the entertainment business; as 
has been discussed above both politicians and businesses have long found it useful 
to maintain a relationship with boryokudan elements. Although, by the late 1980s, 
overt yakuza connections were no longer a political advantage, many politicians 
retained such links behind the scenes as the Sagawa Kyübin scandal, to be discussed 
in chapter six, illustrates. The business-yakuza nexus is discussed below in the 
section dealing with minji kainyü böryoku. 
DRUGS 
As is the case with Great Britain, Japan's history with recreational drugs is far from 
unambiguous. During the 1930s and early 1940s Japan had a twin-track narcotics 
policy. Within Japan the use of drugs was strictly prohibited, whilst in the occupied 
territories, opium trafficking was seen as both as a source of revenue and a means of 
keeping the populace docile. On taking control of Manchuria, Japan quickly 
established an opium monopoly. By 1939 this industry was yielding $90 million in 
tax revenues to the Japanese government. Because this industry was legal, 
legitimate traders could operate though yakuza groups provided protection at the 
numerous opium dens (Vaughn et al. 1995,495-6). 
At the same time amphetamine-based stimulants were freely and legally available in 
Japan. The first such product came on the market in 1931 under the brand name 
Hiropon and was sold either as ampoules of injectable liquid or as lozenges. At the 
time amphetamines were widely regarded as an almost miraculous panacea and used 
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to treat a number of conditions ranging from low blood pressure to obesity 
(Abadinsky 1994,382-3). They were also recognised as having considerable 
military application not only for raising the stamina of combat troops, but also for 
ensuring continued industrial production despite an increasingly malnourished 
workforce. Most famously, kamikaze pilots would be given a `special attack 
lozenge' before boarding their aircraft (Yamanouchi 1992a, 79-80). 
At the end of the war, huge stocks of military amphetamines came onto the civilian 
market where they became a popular means of combating the fatigue and hunger 
resulting from chronic food shortages. The consequences of this were that 
amphetamine abuse exploded in what became known as the `first epidemic period' 
(1945 to 1955). At its peak in 1954, it involved an estimated 2 million (2.2% of the 
total population). By 1948, amphetamine had become officially recognised as a 
`dangerous drug' (though still legal) and the potency of the ampoules was reduced. 
In 1951, the Stimulant Drug Control Law (Kakuseizai Torishimari Ho) was passed. 
This was followed in 1953 by a widespread public awareness campaign (Brill and 
Hirose 1969,179-80). 
As a response to the harsher penalties imposed by the revision of the Stimulant 
Drug Control Law in 1954, there was a rapid decline in amphetamine consumption 
and by 1957 the problem was effectively over10. However, as pointed out by Brill 
and Hirose, "as amphetamine abuse declined, there was a sharp rise in heroin 
10 Although the first epidemic period finished in Japan, its effects lingered elsewhere; American 
troops stationed in Japan became acquainted with injected amphetamine usage in Japan. Many of 
them brought this habit back home with them and, as college students on the G. I. Bill, used 
amphetamines as an aid to pre-examination cramming. This "laid a foundation for the later patterns 
of (American) amphetamine abuse" (Rawlin 1968: 51-65). 
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addiction" (ibid. ). This is interesting because it is frequently claimed that the 
current absence of heroin in Japan is due to its not suiting the `Japanese 
temperament'. 
The second period of epidemic amphetamine abuse started in 1970. It peaked in 
1984 and by 1988 was slowly starting to decline. In contrast to the first epidemic, 
the böryokudan played a crucial role in its development. As the senior böryokudan 
figures who had been arrested due to the police summit strategies of the mid-1960s 
were released from prison, they needed an easily developable cash-generating 
activity on which they could re-establish their syndicates. The epidemic started in 
the Osaka area and spread from there to the rest of Japan. It is reported that this was 
facilitated by construction workers, who had gathered in Osaka to build the Osaka 
Expo World Fair, later returning to their homes taking their newly-acquired habit 
with them (Tamura 1992,102-3). 
Although illegal drug abuse in Japan overwhelmingly involves the injection of 
meth-amphetamine hydrochloride (known colloquially as shabu or `pon), other 
types of substance abuse are not unknown. Narcotics abuse is a relatively minor 
problem; in 1988 only 105 arrests were made for narcotics violations and 1,464 for 
cannabis whilst 20,399 were made for stimulant violations. Police interviewees 
reveal that the böryokudan are not seriously involved in cannabis trafficking which 
is largely carried out on a disorganised basis by individuals involved with what the 
police identify as `alternative' lifestyles such as surfing, the arts and rock-music. 
Cocaine-related arrests in 1988 numbered a comparatively negligible 35 (Keisatsu 
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Hakusho 1997,140). More significant, however is the number of cases of solvent 
abuse amongst juveniles. 
The trade in amphetamines is monopolised by the böryokudan as only they have the 
organisational networks, connections and ability to deploy sufficient protection to 
operate, or allow those paying the appropriate `street-tax' to operate, within this 
illegal market. Furthermore, many gang members themselves are users of 
stimulants (Tamura 1992,101-3). However, by no means all böryokudan 
participate in this type of fund-raising activity or shinogi. Nor does any one 
particular group hold monopoly power over this market. The three large syndicates 
maintain a formal policy of non-involvement in the amphetamine trade. The 
Yamaguchi-gumi has taken this a step further by forming the Zenkoku Kokudö Jöka 
Dömei (National Purification League) which is supposedly dedicated to the 
eradication of amphetamine abuse. 
The police dismiss this as, at best, a poor public relations exercise or a cynical 
attempt to run the competition out of town. However, amongst most boryokudan 
and related interviewees there was undisguised contempt for drug dealing yakuza 
who they dismissed as those lacking either the strength or brains to succeed at any 
other type of shinogi. There are also very good reasons why these organisations 
would wish to distance themselves from this particular business. Because it is 
perceived in Japan as a more pernicious crime than gambling or prostitution, 
involvement in amphetamine dealing is likely to incur more rigorous law- 
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enforcement and severe penalties. It is also likely to exacerbate a negative public 
perception of organisations involved in this business. 
Despite this, it seems clear that the pressure to pay the expenses which a 
böryokudan lifestyle entails, forces many subgroups into the amphetamine business. 
However, Yamaguchi-gumi members arrested for drugs-related offences are 
formally expelled. In the case of Pao, a young kumi-in expelled from a Yamaguchi- 
gumi Yamaken-gumi sub-group visited during fieldwork, rehabilitation was 
achieved after a year. It seems reasonable to suggest that as long as jönokin 
payments are forthcoming, a blind eye is turned to discreet trading. In Britain, 
professional criminals reputedly had a similar disdain for the drugs industry - and 
similarly this disdain has disappeared once its lucrative nature becomes fully 
apparent (Morton 1992,399). 
Just how lucrative Japan's market for meth-amphetamine is exactly, is extremely 
difficult to gauge. Tamura (1988) illustrates these problems in a 1988 review of the 
various attempts by the NPA to estimate the scale of amphetamine use in Japan. 
Early police estimates rested on a number of questionable assumptions that render 
their results highly dubious. For example, a 1978 estimate rested on the assumptions 
that the volume of amphetamine seizures represented 5% of the total amount of the 
drug in circulation. Similarly, drug-related arrests amounted to 10% of all 
consumers. This led the NPA to conclude that roughly two tons of amphetamine 
were imported in 1978 and consumed by 200,000 individuals. Making the further, 
but more reasonable, assumption that the average consumer injects one shot of 
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0.03g per day gives a total annual consumption of 2.19 tons (0.03g x 365 x 200,000) 
which is not so far off their estimate for circulation. 
To evaluate the level of profit generated by this trade, the NPA multiplied this 
figure by the street price minus initial wholesale price (at the time, ¥250,000/g and 
¥10,000/g respectively). This yielded a total profit of ¥4.6 trillion (£l 1.4 billion). It 
was further assumed that all of this profit accrued to böryokudan members and 
those actively participating in dealing were numbered at 40,000 (working on the 
assumption that 20% of all dealers are arrested per year). The NPA therefore 
calculated the average annual profit per böryokudan dealer in 1978 at Y11.6m 
(£28,8OO). 
Even disregarding the NPA assumptions concerning the ratio of seizures and arrests 
to the "dark figures", the estimates as to profit levels are too simple. For example 
they disregard the facts that street-level dealing is often carried out by non- 
böryokudan members and that many dealers are also users who withdraw a certain 
amount, at whatever level of the distribution chain they occupy, for their own 
consumption. The 1978 methodology also falls down when applied to 1987 arrest 
and seizure statistics. This was because the volume of drugs seized had increased 
by over six times whilst the number of arrests had remained roughly constant. 
By the late 1980s a more sophisticated picture had emerged due to the collation of 
intelligence gathered by the various prefectural police headquarters. The results of 
the 1987 NPA survey of the amphetamine situation are considered by Tamura to be 
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much more dependable than anything hitherto conducted (1988,54). It was 
estimated that 2,125 böryokudan groups were involved in the sale and distribution 
of amphetamines (this represented 85% of all gangs in Japan). Of these groups, 300 
were considered to be operating at the wholesale level (dealing in kilograms rather 
than grams). About 50,000 böryokudan members were dealing and this was 
augmented by 50,000 non-böryokudan which gives us a total employment of 
100,000. Of this, 90% (including all non-boryokudan) were dealing in units of 1g 
or less. 
From interviews of arrestees it appeared that each dealer had an average of five 
customers. In addition it was apparent that most dealers were themselves 
consumers. The total number of consumers was therefore estimated to be 550,000 
((90,000 x 5) + 100,000). This is roughly 27 times the number of drug-related 
arrests made each year. The total amount of consumption was estimated by 
assuming that the amphetamine-consuming population could be broken down into 
five equal groups according to usage frequency as shown below. 
Usage Frequency g/p/a %ge # users Total (Kg) 
3x /day 30g 20% 110,000 3,300 
2x /day 20g 20% 110,000 2,200 
1x /day log 20% 110,000 1,100 
2x /week 3g 20% 110,000 330 
2x /month 1g 20% 110,000 110 
TOTAL 7,040 Kg. 
- 168- 
Whether this frequency is based on police interview data or not is unclear, however 
the all too tidy breakdown of the figures urges caution. Despite this, the total 
consumption figure of just over seven tons seems reasonable given that 620kg (or 
8% of the total imported) was seized by the police in 1987. 
There are a number of ways of attempting to estimate the revenue this seven tons 
generates. The most elementary is to simply subtract the amount that the 100,000 
dealers themselves consume and then multiply the remainder by current street prices 
as follows: 
Street price 
Total consumed by non-dealers 
Total revenue 
Y 100,000/g =¥l 00m/kg 
7,040 x 0.82 = 5,760 kg 
5,760 x 100m =¥ 576 billion (£2.5bn) 
This however assumes that dealers share the consumption patterns of their 
customers. It seems plausible that dealers, with ready access to supplies, will be 
heavier consumers than non-dealing users. Given that we are interested in 
böryokudan income rather than dealers' income we should perhaps not exclude non- 
böryokudan dealers from our calculation. To complicate matters these individuals, 
as dealers themselves, are not purchasing at street price. 
Taking into account the differing prices at the various stages along the distribution 
chain, the NPA have constructed a diagram representing the structure of the 
amphetamine trade in Japan as of 1987. This yields total sales of ¥450bn and profit 
of ¥209bn (roughly £1.9bn and £O. 9bn respectively). Tamura stresses that these are 
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estimates and that there is a need for further research to clarify the nature of this 
industry (1988,60). 
Most of the groups involved at the importation level of the business are relatively 
small. Typical of these is the `M-gumi' a sub-group of the Fukuoka-based Dbjin- 
kai consisting of about twenty members. This group imported several hundreds of 
kilograms per year, meeting with Taiwanese exporters on the open sea, where 
amphetamines would be exchanged for ¥1,000 per gram. This would be distributed 
via parcel-delivery companies to Dojin-kai sub-groups in Hokkaido and Kybsei-kai 
sub-groups in Hiroshima. At a wholesale price of ¥4,500 per gram, M-gumi had 
annual sales of Y600m (Mizoguchi 1997,85-6). 
The monthly finances of `S-gumi', a lower-level drug dealing organisation, are 
given below: 
Table 3.6 Breakdown of drug dealing group's finances 
SALES ¥9,400,000 £40,343 
COSTS Y600,000 £2,575 
PROFIT ¥8,800,000 £37,768 
EXPENSES 
Jönökin Y250,000 
Food for duty kumi-in Y90,000 
Gang office building rent ¥250,000 
Land rent ¥300,000 
Heating/lighting ¥300,000 
Insurance ¥70,000 
TOTAL ¥1,260,000 
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DISTRIBUTION TO SUB-GROUPS ETC. 
A Gumi ¥300,000 
B Gumi Y200,000 
Kumi-in O ¥120,000 
Kumi-in © ¥120,000 
Living-in wakashu ¥360,000 
Boss's children's education ¥100,000 
TOTAL ¥1,200,000 
SAVINGS ETC. 
Boss's accounts ¥1,200,000 
Boss's family accounts ¥300,000 
Imprisoned kumi-in accounts ¥120,000 
Loan repayments ¥1,000,000 
Boss's safe ¥3,720,000 
TOTAL Y6,340,000 
Source: Mizoguchi 1997,87 
This clearly shows that, at the level of a small-scale drug-dealing gang, this trade is 
economically attractive. After allowing for the necessary expenses of maintaining 
gang infrastructure, the group is able to clear ¥76m a year (£326,000) most of which 
accrues to the boss. As illegal income, this is obviously not subject to tax. It should 
however be noted that the boss will also be expected to attend various yakuza 
ceremonies each month. At each of these he is obliged to present a gift of money. 
This can be a considerable drain on resources. 
As of 1988 purity levels remained high as the drug is uncut with other materials. 
This is because consumers are experienced users who would seek out alternative 
sources of supply if sold a sub-standard product (interviews Drug Countermeasures 
Rooms - Iwate Police Headquarters, April 1998 and Fukugawa Police Station, 
Tokyo, May 1998). Price levels are unresponsive to major drug seizures suggesting 
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sufficiently large stockpiles of amphetamines exist to maintain steady supply 
(Tamura 1988,60). 
Stimulants are almost entirely imported from other countries in Asia as domestically 
produced drugs are hard to manufacture secretly, the raw materials are controlled 
and the high exchange rate makes them uncompetitive vis-ä-vis foreign imports. 
Originally Korea was the main source of supply; in 1980 police analysis of 
confiscated drugs indicated that 79% came from Korea and 21% from Taiwan. 
However, due to Korean attempts to `purify' the country in the run up to the 1988 
Seoul Olympics, there were widespread crackdowns on Korean OC groups. 
Consequently, there has been a shift in purchasing patterns and by 1987,78% of 
amphetamines were imported from Taiwan and just 11% from Korea (Tamura 1992, 
104). 
In both of these countries, böryokudan groups have good, established links with 
local OC groups. In particular, the Four Seas and United Bamboo Triad 
organisations in Taiwan and the 14K in Hong Kong have mutually beneficial 
associations with baryokudan groups. Japanese drug manufacturing technology has 
been provided to Chinese OC groups (Booth 1990,142). This close co-operation 
extends beyond merely supplying amphetamines to the Japanese market; Japanese 
and Chinese OC groups are now apparently involved in joint heroin ventures. Due 
to its significance as a leading trading nation, Japan has become a major transit 
point for heroin shipments to Europe and America (Vaughn et al. 1995,506-7). 
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Chinese heroin dealers have also proposed setting up partnerships with boryokudan 
selling heroin in Japan but they have been turned down (Booth 1999,199). 
The other significant sources of amphetamines are the Philippines and Hawaii 
where the böryokudan are well established in their own right. 
GAMBLING 
Gambling has long been illegal under Japanese law. The current criminal law of 
1907 provides no break with this tradition and provides two categories of gambling 
`simple criminal gambling' (tanjun tobaku zai) and `habitual criminal gambling' 
(jöshu tobaku zai). However, special laws provide exemption for gambling on 
certain types of officially-sanctioned racing and lotteries (Sibbitt 1997,571). 
Boryokudan participation in gambling in Japan takes three quite distinct forms: 
organising various types of card, dice and, latterly, roulette games (bakuchi); illegal 
bookmaking (nomikoi); involvement in Japan's pachinko (a kind of electronic 
bagatelle). 
Gambling alongside peddling are the economic activities which gave rise to the 
yakuza. Prior to post-war legal changes it was difficult to prosecute individuals for 
habitual criminal gambling because arrests could only be made when gamblers were 
caught red-handed. In addition, as a victimless-crime, gambling was accorded a low 
priority by the law-enforcement officials. However, with the police summit strategy 
of 1964, this change in the law allowed the authorities to prosecute yakuza for 
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gambling related crimes purely on the testimony of two witnesses regardless of 
when the offence took place. Over half of the arrests of gang-bosses and top 
executives made during the first summit strategy period were arrests of this type 
(Yamadaira 1992,88). As mentioned before, in this way the first summit strategy 
was largely instrumental in causing a reduced dependence on gambling as a source 
of income and the diversification of the yakuza into alternative economic activities. 
Despite this, some organisations were still actively engaged in this type of business 
throughout the 1980s. For example Takenaka Masahisa, the Yamaguchi-gumi's 
fourth-generation boss, was a pure gambler. It was reputed that his organisation, the 
Takenaka-gumi, made ¥1 billion in the three years 1979-82 (Yamadaira 1992,88). 
The diversity in scale of yakuza gambling operations offers a good illustration of the 
different levels at which böryokudan economic activity exists. At the bottom end of 
the market one-man dicing operations at a minimum stake of ¥100 exist on the 
streets of the day-labourers' quarters. The stall of this type in Kotobuki-chb visited 
by the researcher during the course of his fieldwork existed openly though not long 
after his appearance, protection arrived with a bulge under the waistband of his 
trousers to ensure that the researcher posed no threat. 
At the other end of the spectrum are luxury gambling trips for the seriously wealthy. 
These take place at private country villas, hot-spring resorts, mountain retreats or, 
since the late sixties, abroad. The foreign gambling trip was pioneered by the 
highly able and innovative Inagawa-kai executive (and later boss) Ishii Susumu in 
an attempt to create gambling income which was secure from police interference 
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(Ishii had himself been arrested for gambling during the first summit strategy). The 
standard procedure was to provide flights, luxury accommodation and sumptuous 
entertainment (including female company) free of charge. Suitably pampered, 
clients would then be allowed to win small amounts before being systematically 
fleeced. Usually customers would pay up as they had been entertained so well. In 
1976, however, Ishii was arrested when a client on a Korean trip complained of 
cheating. Apparently the dealer had attached a small mirror to the shoe enabling 
him to read the cards (Nakagawa 1992,227-8). 
At a more typical level an apartment will be rented and the windows heavily 
blacked out. Clients will be directed to park their cars some distance from the 
gambling place and then will be escorted there by a low-ranking member. A 
number of lookouts (tachiban) surround the premises to maintain security. These 
precautions illustrate that, although it is a low priority target for law-enforcement, 
gambling still exists in a hostile legal environment. 
Although it is not clear as to the sums generated by this type of gambling, the fact 
that Ishii managed to provide travel, lavish accommodation and entertainment free 
to his customers suggests that despite the legal changes, it remains an attractive 
source of income. 
Illegal bookmaking exists in direct competition with government-run bookmaking 
and police intervention becomes effectively a defence of the government's 
monopoly, a fact not lost on the manager and lookout of one bookmaking premises 
in Kamagasaki visited during the course of the researcher's fieldwork. At such 
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places bets are placed on the horse, cycle and motor-boat races of the officially 
sanctioned industry. However, because they are illegal operations, they do not pay 
the ten percent tax that the legal bookmakers at race-courses or `television tracks' 
are obliged to. The odds offered by illegal operations are however the same as legal 
bookmakers and therefore illegal operations generally offer much better value to the 
customer. However, unlike their legal equivalents, illegal bookmakers impose a 
ceiling on the payout on a single bet (¥10,000 on an initial stake of ¥100 and a total 
maximum of ¥1 million) (Yamanouchi 1992b, 129). 
Although most illegal bookmaking has been successfully driven out of race-courses, 
apparently the Osaka-based Sakaume-gumi successfully avoided this fate due to a 
highly efficient advanced-warning system which enabled them to disappear before 
the police arrived. Apparently this warning system functioned satisfactorily even 
when top-ranking NPA officers decided to make a snap inspection without 
informing the Osaka police (retired NPA-related interviewee 1998). 
Security at an off-course illegal bookmaker's premises, such as the one visited in 
Kamagasaki, was maintained by a guard-man manning a heavy steel door. This was 
augmented by a system of lookouts at crossroads further up the street. Twice in the 
course of conversations with guard-men they disappeared mid-sentence to slam 
their doors shut and await the all-clear signal. Because such businesses are heavily 
concentrated within a small number of streets within the Kamagasaki area, the costs 
and benefits of maintaining this lookout system are shared. Yakuza involvement 
insures that there are no free-riders. 
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Within the bookmaker's premises itself, security is further enhanced by limiting 
communication between the trading floor and the office by a small trap-door in the 
ceiling through which the paperwork, and presumably also takings, on each race are 
passed via a small basket on a string. Security at similar premises in Kotobuki-chb 
seemed much lower. Possibly this reflects the reputation for laxity of Kanagawa 
prefectural police. 
The standard penalty for bookmaking is a fine as well as the confiscation of 
television monitors and other paraphernalia. Given that the site visited was 
equipped with 11 large screen monitors as well as two closed-circuit television 
cameras, seizure would present a very real financial downside. Partly for this 
reason, but more significantly for reasons of security, most bookmaking is carried 
out by telephone. Usually an apartment will be rented and a number of telephone 
lines installed. These lines will be manned and all calls recorded. As a security 
precaution powerful magnets are kept on hand to wipe cassettes should the police 
try and break through the doubly-locked doors. 
Telephone bookmaking offers a convenient service to the customers as they can 
conduct betting from the comfort of their own home. Typically the customer's 
account will be cleared on a weekly business by a gang-member. Alternatively, the 
customer may pay money into a special bank account. In addition to boat, horse 
and cycle racing, telephone bookmakers also accept bets on baseball, sumö and 
other popular sports. In order to reduce their exposure to risk, bookmakers adopt a 
system of point spread or handicaps. Setting the handicap of any given event is a 
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highly-skilled job requiring close attention to the sporting press and the likely 
preferences of customers. 
Reputedly a very profitable business with margins of about 25% of total sales, 
telephone bookmaking offers a good income on minimal overheads. One typical 
third-level boss cited by Yamanouchi received a monthly income of ¥8-10 million 
per month from four phone lines manned by three kobun (1992b, 129) whilst 
another Yamaguchi-gumi executive generates a profit of Y6 million per racing day 
(Mizoguchi 1997,79). However, success in this business is not automatic and 
requires a sharp assessment of customers' likely betting patterns and the reduction 
in exposure through lay-off betting with other bookmakers. 
Pachinko is a staggeringly lucrative industry in Japan. The most reliable estimates 
as to the turnover of this business vary from around ¥26 to ¥31 trillion (£167-£199 
billion). The profits generated are even less clear (the tax authorities consider this 
industry second only to bars and clubs for the inaccuracy of their tax returns) 
(Tanioka 1998,18,113). The pachinko industry in Japan occupies an "amorphous 
legal space" in that, whilst this business is not unambiguously excluded from the 
gambling provisions of the criminal law, the Public Morals Law categorises 
pachinko as a `type seven business'. As such these businesses are subject to police 
restrictions as to the value and type of prizes they issue (Sibbitt 1997,571-2). 
To get round this, successful pachinko players take their prizes to a small booth 
situated close to the pachinko parlour and exchange their prizes for cash. Under the 
provisions of the Public Morals Law it is considered illegal if this exchange booth 
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(kökansho) then resells prizes directly to the pachinko parlour. It is also held to be 
illegal if both exchange booth and pachinko parlour are owned by the same person. 
It is however permissable for the exchange booth to sell prizes on to a third 
company (keihin monya) (Mizoguchi 1997,83). The legal grey area of this stage of 
the pachinko industry makes it one which easily falls victim to böryokudan 
predation. It should however be noted that, due to close police supervision of the 
pachinko parlours, under the auspices of the Public Morals Law, böryokudan 
members are unable to directly run pachinko businesses (an estimated 70% of 
pachinko owners are ethnic Koreans resident in Japan (Tanioka 1998,112)). 
Originally yakuza developed the prize-exchange industry. When, in the face of 
fierce competition, parlours started issuing cigarettes as prizes, gang-members 
would stand outside the parlour and purchase them at 70% of their retail value. 
They would add a percentage then resell them directly to the parlours. Since about 
the mid-sixties and the first summit strategy, the police in most parts of Japan 
started to put pressure on the pachinko industry to sever links with organised crime. 
Because the police, through their control of the Public Morals Law, exercise 
considerable regulatory power over the industry this was largely effective. In most 
areas of Japan the böryokudan were effectively excluded from this source of funds. 
In particular, Hybgo prefecture and Osaka have developed a system by which the 
exchange business became the preserve of public welfare businesses (the top 
executive positions of which are held by retired police officers) and there is 
consequently no yakuza involvement in this area of the business. 
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Up until the end of the Shöwa period the two noticeable exceptions to this, 
otherwise successful, eradication of böryokudan from the exchange business are 
Tokyo and Hokuriku (the northern part of Japan). The available literature fails to 
offer any explanation as to why this should be. As far as Hokuriku is concerned, it 
seems likely that this was not deemed necessary as the local yakuza were not 
perceived to be a major social problem during the period currently under 
consideration. The police in Iwate prefecture responsible for böryokudan 
countermeasures certainly admitted as much during the course of the researcher's 
fieldwork. 
In Tokyo it seems plausible that the pachinko industry was left untouched by the 
police as a stick hanging over the böryokudan to ensure good behaviour vis-ä-vis 
less socially acceptable forms of organised crime activity. Discussions with police 
during the course of the researcher's fieldwork repeatedly emphasised the more 
sophisticated and politically savvy behaviour of the Kanto yakuza compared to their 
much less socially responsible colleagues in the west and that this is reflected in the 
different styles of policing in the two regions. 
Whatever the reasons, continued access to the prize exchange business yielded 
enormous funds for the Tokyo syndicates. The Tokyo metropolitan police 
estimated that the exchange business generated by the roughly 1,500 pachinko 
parlours in the capital yielded Tokyo böryokudan groups ¥60 billion per year 
(Hinago 1992 a, 201). 
- 180- 
Even in areas in which the böryokudan had been driven out of the exchange 
business, they had by no means severed all links with the industry as a whole and 
pachinko remained a highly attractive target for extortion and protection type 
activities. 
TEKIYA 
Most modern treatments of the contemporary yakuza completely ignore this 
traditional source of income (for example it does not even feature in the police 
estimates of gang income). The notable exception is Raz who conducted fieldwork 
with tekiya groups. The group to which his friend belonged travelled from town to 
town setting up their stalls at over 200 festivals per year (1996,198). The goods 
sold by tekiya are extremely cheap and cheerful in appearance but sold at a 
considerable mark up. However, it seems that very little of the profit accrues to the 
stall-holder himself. Firstly, he must pay a fee for the use of his stall site to the boss 
of the tekiya organisation in whose territory" the festival is. According to the two 
former tekiya interviewed by this researcher in Iwate prefecture, this varied from 
V2,000 to ¥10,000. Included in this would be electricity and cleaning fees. Because 
the potential profits of a stall are dependent on where the stall is situated, the 
allocation of sites is highly important (interviews Iwate, August 1998). Originally 
this was decided by threats and pressure from the bosses of the various groups 
attending the festival. More recently this came to be decided by precedent (Raz 
1996,202). 
II Within tekiya groups, territory is known as `shima' (island) rather than nawabari. 
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In addition to paying shobadai, the Iwate tekiya also had large capital outlays 
related to their membership of yakuza groups. One of the interviewees paid 
¥50,000 per month jönökin. In addition he was occasionally obliged to fill the duty 
(toban) roster at his gang headquarters and attend gang ceremonies such as funerals 
at which he was expected to present a cash gift. Such events would take place at an 
average frequency of three per month. His total monthly cash outlay on yakuza 
affairs therefore totalled ¥2 million (£8,600) per year. Neither interviewee claimed 
to have any source of income other than that from tekiya activities. 
By the end of the Shbwa period, tekiya business probably contributed no more than 
a negligible fraction to total yakuza income. For instance, bshima, at this time the 
most powerful gang boss in Iwate prefecture, although officially the leader of a 
tekiya group, was far more heavily involved in other böryokudan sources of income 
and this is probably true for other successful tekiya bosses. 
LABOUR-BROKING 
As mentioned above, the early history of the bakuto was closely linked with the 
history of the brokers responsible for assembling labour for the large public 
construction projects of Edo Japan. This has remained a role traditionally filled by 
yakuza. The construction industry in Japan depends on a pyramidal structure in 
which a few very large companies sub-contract work to medium sized companies 
which in turn sub-contract work to smaller companies. This enables these firms to 
maintain a small core of skilled labour, based on the lifetime employment system, 
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which can be almost instantly, and cheaply, augmented by unskilled and semi- 
skilled labour. At the base of this labour market are the day labourers (hiyatoi 
rödösha12) who assemble at dawn each day in the labour markets (yoseba), most 
notably San'ya in Tokyo, Kotobuki-chö in Yokohama and Kamagasaki in Osaka. 
Before containerisation transformed the docking industry, yakuza brokers 
performed a similar function in the great ports of Kobe, Yokohama and Tokyo. 
The labour-brokers (tehaishi) responsible for supplying these workers to the 
construction industry are overwhelmingly either themselves yakuza or in some way 
connected to the yakuza. The workers' wages are paid to the broker rather than to 
the labourers themselves. From this sum the broker takes his cut (known as 
pinhane) before paying the labourers. Although wages vary according to the level 
of demand, the going rate for an unskilled labourer would typically be ¥13,500, 
whilst that for a skilled steeple jack (tobi) would be ¥18 - 20,000 per day. From 
this the tehaishi skims between ¥2,500 and ¥3,000. Occasionally brokers find some 
pretext to refuse payment to labourers though if this happened too often, labourers 
would presumably find a more reliable broker. Inagaki San, a remarkable guardian 
and protector to the day labourers of Kamagasaki, states that in cases of non- 
payment the official channels for complaint do not work effectively though he is 
usually able to resolve the problem with a telephone call to the broker in question 
(interview, Kamagasaki, June 1998). 
12 Usually known more colloquially as ninpu (coolies). It should be noted, however, that not all day 
labourers are unskilled navvies as steeple jacks (tobe) and other skilled craftsmen are also employed 
in this way. 
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Although there exists a formal labour exchange for the employment of day 
labourers in the form of the shokuan (kökyo shokugyö antei sho or public 
employment security office) and the local labour centre, these however only account 
for the minority of employment in the yoseba; Fowler (1996,33) suggests a figure 
of less than one quarter whilst a political activist interviewed in Kotobuki-cho 
(1998) gives a figure of between 20-30%. This is because, even when their 
commission has been removed, tehaishi offer higher rates of pay than the official 
labour market as they exercise greater quality control over those they employ 
(Fowler 1996,34). It is also observed that construction companies prefer using 
yakuza-related tehaishi as their involvement is seen as facilitating trouble-free 
labour-relations (interviews Inagaki, Yamanouchi, et al. ). 
During the late 1980s there were over one hundred labour-brokers operating in the 
San'ya labour market (interview, San'ya, July 1998). The much larger market in 
Kamagasaki would have had at least three times that number during the same 
period. At the beginning of the 1970s there was a police movement to drive out the 
böryokudan from the tehaishi business in the Kamagasaki labour market. This was 
partially successful and the Yamaguchi-gumi and the Matsuda-gumi temporarily 
disappeared. Not long after, however, they returned. Since then, observers on the 
ground report that, although there are occasional raids on gambling and drug- 
dealing, no police efforts have been made to eliminate gang-members from the 
labour-broking business. It is hard to escape the conclusion that the police in these 
areas see the böryokudan as a useful bulwark against the unpredictable and 
potentially dangerous day-labourers of the yoseba. 
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PROSTITUTION 
Until the passing of the Prostitution Prevention Law (baishun böshi ho) in 1956, 
prostitution was not illegal in Japan. Indeed for much of Japan's history, rulers 
have encouraged a system of licensed prostitution which was seen not only as an 
essential component of maintaining public order but a useful means by which the 
police, through their brothel-keeping informants, could keep a close eye on the 
population. Even such noted advocates of Western thought, including monogamy 
and women's rights, as Fukuzawa Yukichi could claim in 1885 that licensed 
prostitution was "the only way to preserve social peace" (in Garon 1997,101). 
Although the system of military prostitution, known euphemistically as `comfort 
stations', adopted by the Imperial Japanese Army may be seen as a logical 
development from the licensed prostitution system, this type of arrangement was by 
no means unique to the Japanese: the brothels run by the legions of imperial Rome 
bear a "remarkable similarity to (those of) the Japanese military" whilst parallels 
also exist with the British Army in India and the Wehrmacht in occupied Europe to 
name but two (Hicks 1994,29-30). 
Because prostitution was legal until 1956, it was not an industry directly managed 
by yakuza. This is not to say that it was not a consumer of protection. However, 
close links between brothel-keepers and the police, reinforced with free 
entertainment for some police officers, may have entailed that this was not as 
necessary as is the case under different legal regimes. 
-185- 
After 1956 the situation became more complex. The Prostitution Prevention Law 
has been described to this researcher as a kagohö13 (a `bamboo cage law' i. e. full of 
holes) (Hoshino interview Yokohama, June 1998). Under Article 2 of the 1956 law 
prostitution is defined as "sexual intercourse with an unspecified other party for 
compensation or for a promise of compensation". This means that any sexual 
services that exclude vaginal penetration fall outside the provisions of this law. 
As a consequence, Japan has spawned a large and legitimate sex industry ranging 
from `soapland', in which naked, soap-covered women massage customers with 
their bodies, to `fashion-health' massage parlours offering masturbation and fellatio 
services. Because these industries come under the jurisdiction of the Public Morals 
Law, and consequently require police certification, it is difficult for yakuza to 
directly manage such businesses. Even the overt traditional brothels of the Tobita 
area of Osaka are officially licensed as eating and drinking establishments and as a 
consequence tend to lack direct yakuza involvement. A further barrier to yakuza 
entry into this end of the market is provided by the high degree of capital outlay 
required for the installation of suitable premises (Yamanouchi interview Osaka 
August 1998, Yamanouchi 1992a, 51). 
There are, however, two areas of the sex industry that are monopolised by the 
boryokudan. These are `date clubs' and the management of street and foreign 
prostitutes. The advantage of these types of businesses is that they require very 
13 For comparison, prostitution itself is legal in Britain but soliciting, kerb-crawling, advertising and 
managing brothels are all illegal. Similarly, in many European countries prostitution is legal but 
circumscribed with legal restrictions. The most bizarre of these is the legal requirement under Greek 
law that prostitutes must retire by 55 (The Times 28/8/99, p. 11). 
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little fixed-capital investment which runs the risk of police seizure. Date clubs 
require little more than a number of telephone lines, a driver, a receptionist and a 
stable of prostitutes. Clients telephone the number advertised on fliers fixed to the 
interior of public telephone boxes and are directed to a love hotel where they will be 
met by a prostitute. 
If run successfully, date clubs are an attractive source of revenue. Fujimura, a 
retired third-level boss from the Kansai area, earned profits of roughly Y20 million 
per month on sales of ¥60 million during the early 1980s from his stable of 80 
women (Fujimura interview, Osaka August 1998). Unlike the Sicilian mafia, 
Japanese gangsters have no compunction about living off the earnings of prostitutes 
and about one-third of the women working in date clubs have yakuza boyfriends 
(Yamanouchi 1992a, 59). This is corroborated by the police data showing the high 
proportion (28%) of, usually low-level, yakuza who are financially dependent on 
their girlfriends (Mizoguchi 1997,64). 
To minimise potential problems with the police it is in the date club manager's 
interest to look after his employees well. According to one of Yamanouchi's 
interviewees it is also important for pimps to screen employees for drug-users, as 
well as under-age and runaway girls. The former tend to have violent mood-swings 
which causes problems with both colleagues and customers. The latter group is 
subject to greater police vigilance and the employment of minors carries heavier 
legal penalties. Date club employees can freely enter and exit this sector of the 
labour market, though many reportedly find the financial rewards and flexible 
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working hours such that other sources of income become difficult to readjust to 
(Yamanouchi 1992a, 59-60). 
The treatment of foreign prostitutes is an altogether different matter. Because these 
women have usually either entered the country illegally or are overstaying their 
visa, they are unable to seek legal protection. Most of these women are recruited in 
Asian countries such as Thailand, the Philippines, Malaysia and Indonesia (though 
more recently Chinese and South Americans have increased) by brokers promising 
them jobs as waitresses, factory workers, hostesses and nannies (although one fifth 
of the women in a survey conducted by Sala14 intended to work as prostitutes). On 
arrival in Japan, the broker typically sells them on to a second broker for between 
¥1.5 to ¥2 million (which covers the cost of ticket, passport, visa and overheads). 
The secondary broker then sells or auctions these women on to clubs for between 
Y3.5 to Y4 million. Generally the initial broker will be a native of the country 
concerned and the second broker will belong to a böryokudan group. 
These women therefore start their careers as indentured labourers with a substantial 
debt, which must be paid off before they can earn any money for themselves. In 
addition they are expected to pay for their own food and clothing, though 
accommodation is often provided. Frequently a woman about to repay her debt, or 
found to be pregnant will be resold to another club and therefore incur a new debt. 
In addition to these debts, foreign prostitutes are subject to fines for such offences 
14 A charity running hostels for, and otherwise assisting, runaway prostitutes. 
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as putting on weight or failing to have a customer in three days (Sala 1996,1-7). 
Much of the information concerning this business comes from women who have 
successfully fled their employers. It is hard to know whether their tales of brutality 
and confinement are representative of the business as a whole. The facts that some 
women return to Japan for another stint whilst others end up being driven to murder 
their managers suggest that the range of experiences is broad. 
Foreign prostitutes typically work on the streets in areas such as Shin-okubo near 
Kabuki-chb in Shinjuku, or in foreign clubs where they formally work as hostesses. 
In the early 1990s there were reportedly between two and three hundred such clubs 
in Kabuki-chb alone (Hinago 1992b, 70). 
LOAN-SHARKING 
The modern Japanese banking system has primarily concerned itself with serving 
the needs of its business clients and consumer banking services remain extremely 
poor. Many Japanese use post office accounts or credit unions (shinyö kinko), 
rather than bank accounts, to deposit their savings. As a consequence of this, 
commercial banks are not active in the market for loans to small businesses and 
individual citizens. This niche is generally filled by companies known as sarakin. 
These organisations offer loans at very high rates of interest to small businesses and 
individuals experiencing short-term liquidity problems. 
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Money lending in Japan is governed by several laws. The Interest Rate Limitation 
Law (risoku seigen ho) limits the interest rates charged by deposit-taking financial 
institutions (such as banks) to 15% per year for loans of more than ¥1 million, 18% 
for those between ¥1 million and ¥100,000, and 20% for loans of less than 
¥100,000. The second law, the Investment Law (shusshi ho) limits the interest rates 
on loans to 109.5% per year. In 1983, the Sarakin Regulation Law (sarakin kisei 
ho) was added. Under the provisions of this law, sarakin loans were limited to 
annual rate of interest of 73%. Since then this rate has been reduced to 40.004%. 
The 109.5% limit of the Investment Law only applies in particular circumstances so 
for most purposes the two other laws cover the majority of cases. 
Provided that they stay within the limits of the Sarakin Regulation Law, sarakin 
businesses are legal. Contrary to public perception, these sarakin operations are not 
run by boryokudan groups, except for very small outfits. Under the provisions of 
article six of the 1983 law, those who have been punished for violating the Finance 
Law, the Violent Acts Law, the Price Control Ordinance or any criminal-law 
provisions within the past three years are unable to register as sarakin businesses. 
This limitation had the express purpose of removing böryokudan from this business. 
Sarakin do however retain links with böryokudan (as well as the police) as an 
insurance policy (Keisatsu-chö 1997,623,281; Mizoguchi 1986,191 and private 
correspondence 1999; interview Fujimura, 1998). 
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For those who are denied access to sarakin finance, either because their credit rating 
is too poor or they are operating in wholly illegal markets, there exists a parallel 
system of financing. Böryokudan loan-sharking generally operates on a system 
known as tö-ichi (ten-one). This means that every ten days, a charge of ten percent 
of the principal is paid to the lender until the principal is repaid in full. The annual 
rate of interest, assuming the loan was kept outstanding for one year, would 
therefore be 365% ((365/10) x 10). Because many borrowers are themselves yakuza 
requiring short-term finance, there is always the risk of a strong gang-member 
defaulting on a debt to a weaker one (interview Fujimura, 1998). 
MINJI KAINYU BORYOKU 
Perhaps the most significant development in the böryokudan in the post-war period 
is their adoption of new techniques of money earning known collectively as minji 
kainyu böryoku (usually abbreviated to minbö). As was the case with their 
increased involvement in the drugs trade, this type of business was a response to 
increased police pressure on traditional sources of income like gambling. The 
jönökin system, also a response to the police summit strategies, further encouraged 
this development. 
Minji kainyü böryoku, literally the violent intervention in civil affairs, is defined by 
the police as "those activities in which böryokudan members or associates make use 
of the threat of that böryokudan in order to intervene in the everyday lives of the 
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general public or, by taking the form of rightful or interested parties and taking 
advantage of areas in which the legal procedures do not function adequately, 
intervene in economic transactions". The police have a number of sub- 
classifications of böryokudan activities falling under this definition. These are: 
1. Debt-collection (saiken toritate). 
2. Activities targeting company annual shareholders meetings (sökaiya and 
kaisha goro). 
3. Incidents related to finance. 
4. Incidents related to promissory notes. 
5. Bankruptcy management (tösan seiri). 
6. Real-estate and rent related problems (esp. jiage). 
7. Out-of-court settlements of traffic accident disputes. 
8. Disputes over prices of goods and other everyday matters. 
9. Other civil disputes. 
As will be seen from a brief analysis of these different activities, minji kainyu 
böryoku is effectively another type of protection. The justification for dealing with 
it as a separate topic is that it is essentially a new (post-summit strategy) 
development in Japanese organised crime. In particular, it is significant in that it 
involves the increasing penetration of legitimate society and business by the 
böryokudan. 
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Böryokudan intervention in civil affairs represents a particular problem for the 
authorities for three main reasons. The first of these is that in many of these 
activities, the perpetrators are not committing a crime as defined by law. Although 
a threat is being made, it is usually implicit and falls short of the legal definition of 
intimidation. Consequently many minbö activities occupy, at best, a legal grey 
zone. Secondly, as admitted in the police definition, many of these activities take 
place due to inadequacies of the legal system. In particular, the cost in both time 
and money that civil cases take to reach a conclusion means that potential litigants 
may find it advantageous to employ boryokudan, rather than official, channels for 
the resolution of their civil disputes. Consequently, here again, we see a clear 
demand for böryokudan services. These two problems will be discussed in greater 
detail in later chapters. 
The final problem with this type of practice is that, unlike other böryokudan 
activities, it directly impinges on the lives of ordinary members of the public, as 
opposed to marginal elements such as day labourers, prostitutes and bar-keepers. 
There will consequently be a greater political pressure on the authorities to be seen 
to be doing something about dealing with the böryokudan. 
PRETEXT RACKETEERING 
At the most basic level of minb6-type operations, böryokudan exploit some injury, 
real or invented, to gain financial advantage. The most well-known example is 
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böryokudan intervention in traffic disputes. The legal machinery involved in 
insurance claims is complex and time consuming. These problems can be 
circumvented if the injured party subcontracts his or her claim to a böryokudan 
group. In the face of pressure from such groups, insurance companies have 
generally paid much more quickly than they would otherwise. For this service, 
böryokudan groups typically charge a commission of between 30 and 50% (Hiraoka 
1987,71). 
Operations of this type once more show that the relationship between criminal 
organisations and members of the business community/civil society may not be a 
universally predatory one. In an imperfectly functioning world, such groups may 
have a competitive advantage in the provision of protection services vis-ä-vis 
legitimate alternatives. However, this system of intervention in discussions has also 
degenerated into one whereby böryokudan deliberately engineer incidents for their 
own advantage. 
Another type of pretext for racketeering commonly used by böryokudan is to find 
some fault with a good or service. For example, the boss's expensive suit sent to 
the dry-cleaners may have been `ruined' and compensation demanded. 
Alternatively a product purchased may be sub-standard or overpriced and therefore 
recompense appropriate. The examples of this type of activity given in the Juzo 
Itami film `Minbö no Onna', though fictitious, show the breadth of minbö extortion: 
a cooked cockroach is `found' in a plate of lasagne; a bag containing money is 
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mislaid; guests at a hotel are unable to use the swimming pool and sport their 
expensive new swimming trunks because they have extensive body tattoos. 
A further twist is given to many of these racketeering practices by their being 
performed under the guise of social or political movements. These are dealt with in 
greater detail below. 
Whilst activities of this kind may cause the most inconvenience to ordinary 
members of the public, they are largely at the bottom end of the scale of böryokudan 
economic activity. Many of the more sophisticated fund-raising techniques falling 
under the broad definition of minji kainyü boryoku are far more lucrative. 
DEBT-COLLECTION 
Under Japanese law, only lawyers are authorised to collect debts. However, the 
length of time and expense involved in employing the appropriate channels means 
that many creditors prefer to cut legal corners. The standard rate charged by 
boryokudan debt-collectors is 50%. In addition they may charge expenses (known 
as ashidai or leg-fee) (Yajima 1992b, 22-3). As a consequence of this, the majority 
of the money involved usually accrues to the debt-collector rather than the creditor. 
Because both parties are officially criminal conspirators, the creditor is unable to 
seek legal redress should he be charged exorbitant expenses. 
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Former gang boss Yajima evaluated this form of activity as one that earns a lot of 
money if conducted successfully and is relatively easy to carry out. For this reason 
it is one form of shinogi that even the least able boryokudan member can involve 
himself in. However, as it frequently involves intimidation, it is a business in which 
the risk of imprisonment is high and, as a consequence, could not be said to be a 
terribly good source of income (Yajima 1992a, 11). Despite Yajima's assessment, 
the criminal-law's provisions concerning intimidation only governed explicit 
threats. For the implicit threat involved with yakuza turning up at a debtor's house, 
in a highly conspicuous fashion, and at a time when the neighbours would be in, the 
criminal law could do very little. It is only when such an implied threat is 
insufficient that collectors escalate to legally-actionable intimidation followed by 
the actual use of violence. 
As has been mentioned above, organised crime mirrors the legitimate economy. As 
a consequence of this, the bursting of the bubble economy in 1989 saw a big 
increase in the market opportunities for yakuza involving themselves in this 
business (as was also the case for bankruptcy management). Therefore, concrete 
examples concerning the upper-underworld interaction in this area will be discussed 
in subsequent chapters. 
JIAGE 
Another recent development in börykudan activities in which ordinary citizens are 
victimised is the business of land-sharking (jiage). Jiage refers to the practice of 
forcing small landholders on adjacent plots to sell up. This renders a larger, more 
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lucratively developable site. Common tactics involved the playing of loud music 
and banging of metal sheets at night, threats, crashing of cars into targeted property, 
and even arson. On one occasion, a jiageya from Osaka went to the extent of 
installing one hundred live chickens next to a property he had targeted in the hope 
that the smell would drive out the occupants (Business Week 29/1/96,15). Sage 
reached its heyday during the bubble economy of the late eighties when land prices 
reached absurd levels. During the period of the bubble economy jiage became the 
biggest single source of income for böryokudan in both the Kansai and Kanto 
regions (Mizoguchi 1997,66). 
The complicity of real-estate companies in the jiage process once more indicates the 
ambivalent relationship existing between OC and the `straight' world. Initially the 
böryokudan were employed by real-estate agents to clear a given site. For this 
service they would typically receive a commission of 3% of the market value of that 
site (2% or 1.5% if it was a particularly valuable property). On discovering the 
scale of profits to be made in this industry, the more astute böryokudan executives 
became directly involved in the property-development business. In order to 
maximise profits they developed the tax-evasion technique of using the land as 
collateral on a loan so as to obscure ownership of the property in question. 
Alternatively the site would be sold on to a number of bogus intermediaries before 
its final disposal (ibid. ). 
Most prominent of the böryokudan-members involved in jiage operations was the 
quintessential white-collar gangster (keizai yakuza), Ishii Susumu of the Inagawa- 
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kai. On his release from prison in 1985, Ishii used his prison release celebration 
donations to start up Hokusha Sangyo, Kasen Sangyo, Daishin and other 
companies, which he then used to move in on Tokyo's real-estate business. The 
extent of his success in jiage operations, largely in the Shinjuku area of Tokyo, is 
illustrated by the rapid increase in the turnover of Hokushb Sangyb from Y250 
million (£l. m) in 1986 to ¥12.2 billion (£51.5m) the following year (Nakagawa 
1992,233-4). Much of the immense profits which the more able böryokudan 
members, such as Ishii, made from jiage were ploughed into stock market 
speculation. 
BANKRUPTCY MANAGEMENT 
Bankruptcy management (tösan sein) is one of the most sophisticated and skilled 
techniques by which böryokudan members make money. When a company goes 
bankrupt in Japan, the legal machinery for the settlement of the various creditors' 
claims usually takes several years (occasionally up to ten) and the amount of debt 
eventually repaid is a small percentage of that actually owed. Creditors may 
therefore find it advantageous to sell their debt to a specialist bankruptcy manager 
(tösan seiriya) even for as little as 5% of face value (Mizoguchi 1986,189). 
Emotionally fragile managers of bankrupt firms may also prefer to bring yakuza on 
board to protect them from the wrath of angry creditors (Fujimura, 1998, interview). 
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The two most important things for bankruptcy management specialists are speed of 
action and the accumulation of more debt than other creditors. What seiriya will 
often do is identify a company on the point of collapse and then move in with short- 
term financial support. From this position of strength, the seiriya will force the 
manager to write and seal a document granting power of attorney and gain 
possession of the firm's books, seals and deeds. The seiriya may then forge 
promissory notes and other documents in his favour. Once the company has finally 
gone bankrupt, it is important to occupy the company's premises and collect any 
money outstanding from credit sales before any other creditors, or böryokudan, can 
get their hands on the company's assets. 
Speed is important because, once a company has been declared bankrupt, the courts 
appoint a lawyer as the legal trustee (kanzainin) of the company to ensure that it is 
disposed of lawfully. The trustee is however weak vis-ä-vis the major creditor. 
From his position as major creditor in possession of the company's assets, the 
seiriya can have himself nominated chairman of the creditors' meeting and can 
consequently control its proceedings and cow opposition into submission. Through 
this mechanism, the skilled seiriya can therefore ensure that the lion's share of the 
bankrupt firm's realisable assets ends up with himself. If there are items which can 
be quietly appropriated before the trustee appears, so much the better. However, 
excessive concealment may undermine the seiriya's credibility (Yajima 1992a, 16- 
21). 
Because tösan seiri is a specialised operation in which comparatively few 
boryokudan are involved, the amounts of money made from it are not clear. It is 
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however clear that the potential earnings are enormous. In 1977 there were 18,000 
bankruptcies in Japan (the comparable figure for the United States was 800) and the 
total liability of Japan's bankrupt businesses in this year was valued at ¥ 4.3 trillion 
(E9.2 billion) (Saxonhouse 1979,290). Throughout the first half of the 1980s the 
rate of bankruptcy remained at around 18,000 per year though after a 1984 peak (of 
over 20,000 with total debts of Y 3.6 trillion or £11.4 billion), the rate declined and 
by 1988, only 10,123 companies went bankrupt with total liabilities of Y2 trillion 
(£8.8 billion) (Tokei Kyoku 1985,384; 1990,386). The high rate of bankruptcy in 
Japan is largely due to the precarious position of small companies who are forced to 
act as shock-absorbers for the big firms for which they carry out subcontracting 
work. Given the high rate of bankruptcy in Japan and the cumbersome machinery 
for the legal unravelling of such incidents, it is reasonable to assume that this is a 
significant source of income for those capable böryokudan who choose to specialise 
in it. 
SOKAIYA 
Sökaiya translates literally as `general meeting specialist' and this well illustrates 
their modus operandi. Sokaiya are essentially corporate blackmailers. Having 
bought one share (until changes to the commercial code in 1982) in a company's 
stock, sökaiya are entitled to attend that company's annual general meeting. They 
then use this right to extort money from companies by threatening to disclose 
sensitive information about either the company's financial status, irregular 
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management practices (including scandals concerning the private lives of managers) 
or simply to disrupt the shareholders' meeting. This is facilitated by the fact that the 
commercial code of Japan does not oblige companies to issue annual financial 
reports or allow transparency into their business operations at all. Information 
concerning a company's performance has traditionally been privileged information 
only available to favoured major stockholders. 
Sökaiya first started to appear in the rumbustious and murky beginnings of modern 
Japanese capitalism at the end of the nineteenth century. However, with the notable 
exception of the gambling boss Takebe Kosaku, these individuals were unconnected 
to the traditional yakuza groups of that time. It was not until the late 1960s that 
yakuza involvement in this business became a significant phenomenon. As had 
been the case with the development of other non-traditional sources of böryokudan 
income, the stimulus for this phenomenon was essentially the first summit strategy 
of 1965 in which traditional yakuza activities were targeted by the police. 
One of the first of these yakuza-sökaiya was Ogawa Kaoru, of the Hiroshima-based 
Kyosei-kai, who formed the `Hiroshima Group'. In 1971, this group became 
involved in a violent conflict with a traditional sökaiya, Shimazaki Eiji, at a 
shareholders' annual general meeting in Tokyo. This confrontation was resolved by 
a traditional yakuza-style reconciliation (teuchi) in which Shimazaki relied upon a 
retired Matsuba-kai boss for support. This incident (reportedly the first of its kind) 
was significant as it illustrated the way in which the traditional sökaiya were to 
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become dependent on the protective umbrella of the böryokudan (Szymkowiak 
1996,91-4). 
As has been mentioned above, the inability of groups or individuals to benefit from 
legitimate sources of protection creates a market niche for providers of alternative 
protection. As companies found themselves unable to effectively combat or pay off 
all sökaiya targeting them, many companies found it expedient to employ sökaiya- 
yakuza to protect them from other groups. This gave rise to the sub-classification of 
s5kaiya into 
`yoto-sokaiya' (insider or protector sökaiya) and `yatö-sökaiya' 
(outsider or aggressor sökaiya). 
Protection was helpful not only in dealing with predatory extortionists but also with 
demonstrators protesting at the company's business practices. Most notable of these 
were the protests directed at the Chisso Corporation, by victims of that company's 
dumping of mercury compounds into the sea off Minamata, and at Mitsubishi 
Heavy Industries, by peace campaigners criticising MHI profiting from the Vietnam 
war. In both these incidents the companies concerned relied heavily on yakuza and 
extreme right-wing groups to violently confront protestors attempting to disrupt 
their shareholders' annual general meetings. Szymkowiak identifies these protests 
as a "watershed in Japan's postwar corporate history" as they revealed the full 
extent to which companies' reputations were vulnerable to criticism through 
disruption of shareholders' meetings. As a consequence of this, companies became 
increasingly reliant on the services of protective sökaiya (ibid. 98-104 ). 
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Following this watershed, the numbers of sökaiya rose rapidly throughout the 
1970s. In 1973, the police estimated a sökaiya population of 1,763; by 1982 this 
number had risen to 6,783 - an increase of 385% in a decade. The increase in 
yakuza involvement in this industry was even more dramatic, jumping by 615% 
over the same period (ibid. 70) 
Yakuza involvement in sökaiya activities was not only due to their provision of 
protection to existing groups and yakuza intimidation of sökaiya at the behest of 
business contacts. Szymkowiak reports that throughout the 1970s, promising 
bOryokudan executives served apprenticeships with sokaiya groups after which they 
set up their own organisations. As a consequence of this process, by 1982 the 
police estimated that, of the total sökaiya population, 2,012 (30%) were böryokudan 
members (ibid. ) 
In response to the rapid increase in the number of sökaiya, the Commercial Code 
was revised in 1982 to make it harder for sökaiya to operate. There were two legal 
changes affecting the operation of these groups. The first of these was that a 
threshold of ¥50,000 worth of stock became necessary for an investor to hold full 
shareholder's voting rights and, more importantly, the right to attend shareholders' 
meetings. Secondly, it became illegal for companies to pay money to sökaiya 
(Okumura 1997,13; Szymkowiak 1996,145-7). 
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The immediate effect of the minimum stock rule was a drastic 75% reduction in the 
numbers of sökaiya identified by the police from 6,783 in 1982 to 1,682 the 
following year. The drop amongst yakuza-sökaiya was even more pronounced, 
falling from 2,012 to just 167 over the same period. Rather than reflecting a real 
change in the situation, however, this drop was largely due to different accounting 
practices. In order to act as a sökaiya under the post-reform regime, an individual 
required ¥50,000 worth of stock in a given company. Those that fell short of this 
threshold were, by definition, no longer sökaiya regardless of the way in which they 
made money. 
The police were therefore forced to create a new category to accommodate those 
extortionists who fell short of the post-reform requirements. Such individuals 
became known as shinbun goro, zasshi goro, and kaisha goro (newspaper, 
magazine and company ruffians respectively). Instead of disrupting shareholders' 
meetings, these groups would extort money from companies by such techniques as 
threatening to disclose company scandals in their publications. Other groups 
developed fronts behind which they could continue extortionate activity. Most 
noticeable of these were fake burakumin liberation movements (ese döwa) and fake 
right-wing political organisations (ese uyoku). Ese döwa groups are dealt with in 
greater detail below. 
The second anti-sökaiya measure of the 1982 Commercial Code reform also failed 
to have a decisive impact on this problem. Although it became illegal for 
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companies to make pay-offs from company funds to sökaiya, there were a number 
of ways in which these payments could be disguised. Most commonly, sökaiya 
groups would set up research organisations, business consultancies or bulletins 
supposedly containing economic analysis. Alternatively, they might set up front 
companies leasing art works or potted plants to companies (Alletzhauser 1990, 
284). Entry fees to golf tournaments, or parties are another means of camouflaging 
payments. Szymkowiak relates how at least one company even resorted to paying 
excessive bonuses to the employees working in the general affairs section which 
were then returned to the department in order that the money could be paid out to 
sökaiya (1996,147). 
The 1982 reform of the Commercial Code can not be seen, therefore, as completely 
successful. This is illustrated by a succession of sökaiya scandals during the 1980s. 
These included some of the most prestigious companies in Japan. For example, in 
1985 Japan Air Lines called upon the research department of Rondon Doyukai, a 
well known . sökaiya organisation, to ensure a smooth shareholders' meeting 
following a particularly unprofitable year. Another case involving the payment of 
sökaiya with the then rapidly-appreciating Mitsubishi Heavy Industries convertible 
bonds was dropped by the police when it became apparent that numerous senior 
politicians had also received allocations of these bonds (Alletzhauser 1990,286-90). 
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FAKE SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 
A more recent development in böryokudan activities is the hijacking of social 
movements, which can then be exploited for financial gain. In particular, the 
development of böryokudan-related organisations pretending to be dedicated to the 
liberation of burakumin, usually known collectively as ese döwa (döwa now being 
the politically-correct term for burakumin) became noticeable in the mid 1980s. In 
1986 the NPA identified the new category of `Fake Social Movement Thugs' 
(shakai undö hyobö goro) as a target for police countermeasures (Hiraoka 1987, 
67). 
There have been legitimate organisations dedicated to fighting burakumin 
discrimination since the early 1920s. In more recent years, however, this movement 
has been characterised by division as rival political parties formed their own döwa 
associations" which have been characterised by ineffective leadership and intra- 
group struggles (Herzog 1993,74). 
After ignoring the problem of burakumin discrimination, in 1969 the government 
introduced the Döwa Countermeasures Special Provisions Law (döwa taisaku jigyö 
15 The main and oldest group, the Buraku Emancipation League (Buraku Kaiho Domei) is associated 
with the Socialist Party, whilst the Liberal Democratic Party countered this by forming the All Japan 
Döwa Association (Zen-Nippon Döwa Kai) in 1960 and in 1970 the Communist Party established 
the Buraku Emancipation League National Liaison Conference (Buraku Kaihö Dörrei Seuöka 
Zenkoku Renraku Kaigi). The All Japan DOwa Association disbanded in 1986 amidst internal 
squabbles. 
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tokubetsu sochi ho) to ameliorate the condition of the buraku communities. In 
particular, this law provided financial help for developing housing, roads, social 
amenities, educational programs and the like. As a consequence of this, obtaining 
government money "became the main business of the buraku organisations" (ibid. ). 
As a consequence of increased police pressure on traditional böryokudan activity 
and the change in the Commercial Code in 1982 targeting sökaiya activities, a 
pattern of yakuza groups changing their organisations into spurious döwa liberation 
groups began to appear. By 1986, over two thousand groups purporting to be 
dedicated to buraku liberation were in existence (Mizoguchi 1986,194-6). 
In 1986 the Ministry of Justice Human Rights Protection Office published the 
preliminary findings of a nation-wide survey of 5,030 companies in seventeen 
different industries concerning the extent of ese döwa activity. Of the survey's 
respondents, a total of 26% had been victimised by groups of this kind. In the 
Osaka area (a major concentration of people of buraku extraction), this figure rose 
to 36.5%. The construction industry was the most heavily targeted but banks, credit 
unions and insurance companies also reported victimisation rates of over 50% 
(Hiraoka 1987,66-7). 
Fake döwa group victimisation of the business community first caught the attention 
of the Osaka police in July 1985 when a group started sending bulletins to 
companies which were asked to purchase them for the edification of their 
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employees. Those that refused would be angrily confronted and asked what 
measures they were taking to deal with the burakumin problem. The persistence 
and vehemence of these confrontations often resulted in firms agreeing to purchase 
the bulletins. The finances of this classic technique are seen from another case 
brought to the attention of the police. Every month a group would receive 500 
copies of a bulletin from its parent group. It would sell five copies each to 100 
companies, from each of which it would receive ¥10,000 per month. This therefore 
yielded annual sales of ¥12 million. Of the respondents to the MOJ survey, 19.8% 
had been subject to such demands (ibid. 68-9). 
Another area in which fake social movement racketeers have been active is in the 
standard böryokudan activity of intervening in traffic disputes. Ese döwa groups 
have similarly been employed by sarakin for the collection of debts, by 
businessmen seeking an official permit and ordinary citizens wanting authorities to 
pay attention to a complaint (Hiraoka 1987,71; Mizoguchi 1986,194). 
Insurance companies are also subject to fraudulent claims by ese döwa groups. 
Fraud is employed by these groups in other ways as well. In one case a group 
instructed people in techniques for evading inheritance tax by forging spurious 
debts for the deceased. This group naturally took a commission of the money 
saved. When tax officials became suspicious and started to investigate, they were 
subject to threatening phone calls at their homes (Mizoguchi 1986,196). 
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In addition to these techniques, ese dowa groups are constantly on the lookout for 
pretexts for extortion. For example, construction companies that are breaking 
building regulations or causing a nuisance in the neighbourhood are blackmailed 
with threats of court injunctions. One group, in little over one year, targeted one 
hundred such firms, was successful in half these cases and extorted ¥16 million. 
Because of cases like this, construction firms frequently find it advantageous to 
have links with böryokudan groups. Another suitable pretext for denunciation may 
be publishing material detrimental to the cause of buraku emancipation. 
Consequently, publishers are extremely sensitive to publishing any material 
concerning this issue. Ames' excellent work on the police, for example, had to have 
offending sections excised before being published in Japanese. 
Alternatively, ese döwa groups make demands for subcontracting work, the 
purchase of goods and services at extortionate prices, or loans on favourable terms. 
Those that refuse are aggressively denounced for discriminatory practices. 
The MOJ survey however gives an incomplete picture of fake döwa activity in that 
it ignores the extensive abuse of government measures to help burakumin under the 
provisions of the 1969 special measures law. Such techniques were actually 
responsible for the bulk of ese döwa revenue. There were a number of ways in 
which ese döwa groups could exploit these measures: the 1969 law provided tax 
breaks for döwa-promotion activities and ese d6wa racketeers could extract rebates 
and commissions from these; they could gain licenses for developing land, 
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ostensibly for the benefit of buraku communities, which could then be sold on to 
real-estate developers at a substantial profit; they could extract government money 
for spurious buraku-related projects; the list goes on. These activities were backed 
up by a highly aggressive and confrontational attitude towards public officials who 
opposed them; Mizoguchi (1986,196) reports that after they became pseudo dowa 
groups, former böryokudan actually employed more violence than before and 
government officials are particularly afraid of this type of violence. 
In his 1988 book examining the döwa problem and döwa groups, Takagi Masayuki 
drew a number of conclusions concerning the aetiology and persistence of the ese 
döwa phenomenon. The first of these was that executives within the legitimate 
döwa movement had become corrupted by the money making opportunities their 
position afforded. The splintering of the movement and internal conflict within the 
main groups exacerbated this problem and resulted in a number of independent 
groups and lone operatives. At the same time, increased police pressure on both the 
mainstream böryokudan groups and the sökaiya, encouraged their adoption of this 
less dangerous business (Takagi 1988,152-3). 
The development of these groups was facilitated by three key factors. The first of 
these was the low level of understanding of the nature of the burakumin problem by 
most people. This misunderstanding engendered a high degree of fear. Secondly, 
Takagi identifies an attitude amongst both businesses and government officials to 
accept peace at any price. It is also likely that victims of ese döwa activity, have 
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been confused by the protection the Döwa Countermeasures Special Provisions Law 
affords to legitimate dowa activity into thinking that they are powerless to confront 
pseudo döwa activists. Thirdly, the measures taken by the police have been 
inadequate to deal with this problem (ibid. ). This is evinced by the remark made by 
a victim, cited by Hiraoka, explaining why he had not notified the police because he 
had been in doubt as to "whether or not the police were really serious about getting 
to grips with it" (1987,74). 
FAKE RIGHT-WING MOVEMENTS (ESE UYOKU) 
Although there have long been links between the right-wing and yakuza, fake right- 
wing movements as a front for böryokudan fund raising became a significant 
problem at around the same time as the ese döwa phenomenon and for the same 
broad reasons. The activities in which they participate are also remarkably similar. 
In addition to these standard practices, which fall largely under the category of minji 
kainyu böryoku, fake uyoku activity also includes the use of armoured cars 
(sendensha) fitted with enormously powerful speakers and Japanese flags. The 
most common practice is to position one of these vehicles outside a targeted 
company, which is then bombarded with high volume martial music and political 
speeches, usually demanding the return of the Russian-occupied islands in the 
Chishima (Kurile) chain, until the group's demands for political contributions have 
been accepted. 
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Within all prefectures there are administrative ordinances governing excessive noise 
pollution (bösö'on jörei) which theoretically should provide a legal antidote to the 
problem of right-wing propaganda trucks. The ordinance in Iwate prefecture for 
example limits publicity trucks to 85 decibels. Unfortunately these ordinances are 
limited to empowering the police to tell the noise-polluter to stop. Only if the 
offending activity continues can action be taken against them. Dealing with fake 
right-wingers is also problematic because they skilfully exploit the constitutional 
guarantees to freedom of speech and freedom of association. 
LEGITIMATE BUSINESS 
Throughout the period under consideration, there was an increasing trend for 
böryokudan to involve themselves in legitimate business. There are many factors 
which have encouraged this. As mentioned in the previous chapter, individuals 
involved in OC activity find it advantageous to establish legitimate sources of 
income to reduce the risk of seizure and other uncertainties inherent in illegal 
activities. As police pressure on böryokudan criminal activities increased, these 
considerations became more important. 
Police pressure on traditional yakuza crimes also encouraged the process of these 
groups moving into crimes, known collectively as minji kainya böryoku, targeting 
both civil society and the business world. This growing proximity to corporate 
Japan, in which business was frequently a willing accomplice, further encouraged 
this process; as mentioned above, having been employed by real-estate companies 
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to perform land-sharking services, it was no great jump for yakuza to directly 
participate in real-estate speculation on their own account. 
An increasingly aggressive attitude taken by the police towards yakuza crime has 
also made it more important to have a legitimate front through which illegal income 
can be channelled and criminal activity organised. Frequently, the owner of this 
business will attempt to further insulate it from law-enforcement intervention by 
registering the business in the name of a wife or girlfriend. 
The enormous wealth generated by the system of jönOkin payments also led high- 
ranking oyabun to seek new legitimate sectors in which to invest their money. 
Although businesses traditionally associated with Japanese OC such as construction, 
outdoor stalls, trucking and the entertainment industry are still heavily represented, 
the böryokudan have been moving into real-estate, finance, English-language 
schools, private hospitals and hotels. In short, anything that will provide a 
legitimate front whilst earning a good return on their capital. 
Whilst it might be argued that it is socially advantageous for criminals to `go 
straight', increased böryokudan involvement in the legitimate business is not 
necessarily to be welcomed. This is because, all too often, OC group members 
retain their former operating procedures when shifting from the illegal to the 
legitimate market sector of the economy. For example, böryokudan businessmen 
might use the threat that their gang-affiliation implies to demand loans on 
favourable terms, reduced prices from suppliers of goods and services whilst their 
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own customers might be expected to pay a premium. Alternatively, competitors 
might be given disincentives to underbid böryokudan-owned firms. 
A variation on this theme became apparent with the development of kigyö shatei 
(business brothers). Kigy6 shatei refers to businessmen who, whilst not formally 
members of böryokudan organisations themselves, make use of their affiliation with 
such a grouping to achieve an unfair competitive edge in the marketplace. Such 
people may be former gang members who retain their underworld links, or 
alternatively, businessmen who have formed a quasi-brotherhood relationship with a 
senior gang-member to further their business interests. Needless to say, this 
development presents particular problems for law-enforcement authorities in that 
identifying these seemingly legitimate businessmen is much harder than dealing 
with well-known criminals. This problem is exacerbated by the fact that these 
businessmen do not advertise their relationship through ostentatious displays of 
yakuza-style attire or tattoos. Furthermore, the nature of the influence that 
böryokudan-affiliation gives is often such that the existing criminal and commercial 
legal codes are incapable of effectively combating the activities of the business 
associates of böryokudan. 
One industry in which böryokudan find they have a competitive advantage is 
industrial waste disposal. The waste disposal business in Japan is said to be worth 
P trillion (£18 billion). Since the rampant pollution of Japan's high growth period, 
typified by the tragedy of mercury poisoning at Minamata and elsewhere, 
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environmental controls and regulations governing the disposal of rubbish have 
become progressively stricter. Because böryokudan are less scrupulous in their 
adherence to these regulations than legitimate waste disposal companies, they are 
able to operate much more cheaply and can pass on some of these savings to their 
customers in the shape of lower haulage costs. Moreover, the low start-up costs of 
this type of business, consisting merely of the cost of a four ton lorry or large dump- 
truck, make this an attractive business for even low-level yakuza to enter 
(Mizoguchi 1992a, 142). 
In order to participate in this business it is first necessary to receive a licence from 
the prefectural governor. This is not granted to those who have spent time in prison 
within the previous three years, so in many cases, boryokudan members conduct 
this business under another name. Licences are much harder to gain for the 
management of rubbish dumps themselves, especially those dealing with hazardous 
material. However, many gang-members simply ignore these obstacles. 
An example of this is the case of S, an executive in a second-level Yamaguchi-gumi 
gang in ilyögo prefecture. This man, who ran his own contracting company, 
collected rubbish from construction companies in several cities in Ilyögo prefecture. 
S charged only Y1,000 per ton for this service, which was less than half the going 
rate amongst his legitimate competitors. The rubbish would then be taken at night 
to nearby publicly-owned mountains where it would be burned and buried. Despite 
complaints from local residents, this enterprise was given no more than repeated 
official warnings, which were ignored. Although S was eventually arrested for 
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violations of the Industrial Waste Disposal Law, this was not before he had illegally 
dumped several tens of thousands of tons of waste. Mizoguchi suggests that one 
interpretation for this lack of effective measures is that such is the amount of 
rubbish, the local Public Health Centre must rely on illegal dumping to get rid of it 
all (1997,144). 
In another case an executive of a Yamaguchi-gumi front company rented land in the 
mountains which he then opened up as an illegal industrial waste dump. Because 
none of the expensive legal requirements concerning the treatment of such waste 
were observed, he was able to undercut legitimate dumps charging only half the 
industry standard. Every night, about 90 trucks would come to deposit rubbish at an 
average charge of ¥13,000. This therefore yielded a daily income of ¥1.17 million 
(£5,131) and, in total, the executive and partner netted several tens of millions of 
yen (ibid. ). 
As well as involving themselves directly in business management, during the 1980s 
many ambitious böryokudan became aggressive speculators in the Japanese stock- 
market. Frequently this was financed by borrowing money. As in their investment 
in legitimate businesses, böryokudan investment strategy has not been hindered by 
an excessive concern for the finer points of the law. In one incident in 1985 the 
Shinjuku branch manager of Nomura Securities passed on to some of his 
underworld clients information concerning a miracle drug at Yamanouchi 
Pharmaceutical. Unfortunately for him rumours concerning unpleasant side-effects 
of this drug caused a drop in the share price and, after months of stalling, one of 
these irate customers severely beat him up leading to a coma followed shortly by the 
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broker's death (Alletzhauser 1990,205-6). More typically, when faced with a stock 
that fails to perform up to their expectations, böryokudan investors approach their 
broker and demand that they be reimbursed for their losses. 
The most famous of these yakuza speculators was Ishii Susumu of the Inagawa-kai. 
Ishii's involvement in the Heiwa Saga Bank take-over and his subsequent 
investment in the Tokyu Corporation made him a household name in Japan. This 
scandal is discussed in chapter five. Although such high-profile cases as Ishii's hit 
the headlines, it was not only the elite of the böryokudan world who were active in 
stock market speculation during this period. At a time of extremely low interest 
rates and when banks were actively pressuring their clients to borrow more money, 
riding the wave of rapidly rising land and stock prices was seen as too good an 
opportunity to miss. It would not be until things had gone horribly wrong with the 
collapse of this bubble and even more so with the disaster of the jüsen problem that 
the extent and implications of this became appreciated. Indeed, at the time of 
writing, the exact scale of böryokudan speculation during this period remains 
unclear - but we get ahead of ourselves. 
CONCLUSION 
Looking at the historical development of the yakuza/böryokudan, a number of 
trends become evident. The most striking of these is the way in which the 
authorities have oscillated between two very different attitudes towards OC. At 
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times they have adopted a pragmatic policy of tacit acceptance. This has 
periodically developed into attempts to co-opt the yakuza/ böryokudan into their 
machinery of social and political control. When they have been perceived either to 
have outlived their usefulness, or to have become a threat to social order, the 
yakuza/böryokudan have become the target of official crackdowns. Whether this 
cycle of acceptance and repression has finally been broken due to the increasingly 
unacceptable nature of böryokudan activity, remains to be seen. It is however 
certain that since the first summit strategy of 1964, the authorities have adopted an 
increasingly hostile stance vis-a-vis OC groups. 
The key consideration in the modern history of Japanese OC is the way in which the 
böryokudan have developed and adapted to reflect changes in the host culture. OC 
is a social phenomenon and, given the enormous changes in Japanese society during 
the post-war period, it is only to be expected that the böryokudan too will have 
modernised. Böryokudan evolution in the post-war period has been characterised 
by two parallel trends. The first of these trends is the tendency towards 
oligopolistic control of OC in Japan by three large, national syndicates. This 
process has, in part been encouraged unwittingly by increased police pressure on 
traditional yakuza crimes, which has tended to be more effective in eradicating 
smaller groups, with a limited portfolio of criminal activities, than in dealing with 
large diversified syndicates. 
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Secondly, these large syndicates have developed increasingly diverse and 
sophisticated means of making money in both the legal and illegal market sectors. 
The forces acting on böryokudan stimulating this process of diversification are both 
internally and externally generated. The main internal pressures spurring the 
unending quest for new sources of funds are the demands imposed by the janökin 
system of the large syndicates. Whether the feudal system of the Yamaguchi-gumi 
and other large syndicates can survive if jönokin payments can no longer be met 
remains to be seen, but it can be imagined that it has been severely strained as 
economic conditions declined in the Heisei period. 
The main dynamic behind this process of change is, however, the relationship 
between the forces of law-enforcement and OC groups themselves. Each time that 
there have been legal changes or more rigorous controls of böryokudan activity, 
these groups have developed in ways enabling them to survive in this new 
environment. Usually this has been by developing new sources of criminal or 
quasi-criminal income. This has led to a vicious circle in which diversification into 
less acceptable, increasingly `criminal', activity has brought about a political 
climate demanding increased law-enforcement. This, in turn, has pushed the 
böryokudan into yet another phase of diversification. 
It is this amorphous quality of OC that frustrates attempts by the authorities to 
control it. In the light of this it is expected that the assault on the böryokudan under 
the bötaihö since 1992 will have elicited a similar response. Whether this is indeed 
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the case and, if so, in what way the böryokudan have evolved since 1992, will be 
one of the central concerns of the following chapters. 
These cycles of diversification have been accompanied by a marked rise in the 
importance of drugs as a source of finance and the use of sophisticated modern 
weaponry. Both guns and drugs require contacts in foreign countries and, since the 
1970's, the böryokudan have become increasingly international in their outlook. As 
such they are no longer a purely Japanese law-enforcement problem. The trans- 
national nature of global OC has clear implications for OC countermeasure 
strategies. 
According to the 1989 Hanzai Hakusho, another development in Japanese OC in 
recent years is the process of böryokudan-banare (the movement away from 
böryokudan by young, potential recruits). It remains to be confirmed whether or not 
the böryokudan are facing a recruiting crisis. If they are, this raises a number of 
interesting questions concerning possible causal factors as well as the response of 
böryokudan groups themselves. One plausible hypothesis is that a process of ethnic 
succession may be taking place with illegal immigrants from the rest of Asia and 
Iran filling the gap left by an increasingly affluent Japanese youth. Alternatively, 
the increasingly sophisticated nature of böryokudan activity may no longer require 
such a large unskilled workforce. 
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It is of course possible that the recruitment problems faced by böryokudan are 
indicative of the changing public perception of böryokudan and the hardening of the 
police attitude towards their activities. By the late 1980's, the continued validity of 
the perceived wisdom of a symbiotic relationship between the police and 
boryokudan had become hard to sustain. With the introduction of the botaihö, it no 
longer seems tenable. It seems reasonable to suggest that increasingly effective 
law-enforcement will act as a deterrent to recruitment. If this is indeed the case, 
then böryokudan recruiting problems may well support the argument that the police 
are actively pursuing viable long-term böryokudan countermeasures. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
BOTAIHO: ORGANISED CRIME COUNTERMEASURES 
JAPANESE STYLE 
The discussion in chapter two of the peculiarities of OC vis-ä-vis the diverse 
collection of other crimes suggests that the legal strategies employed to deal with 
individual criminal activity may not be appropriate to control organised criminality 
even when the laws being violated are the same in both cases. To successfully 
analyse OC countermeasures it is therefore necessary to apply our theoretical 
understanding of this phenomenon to identify the particular problems of designing 
effective OC control measures. 
From a synthesis of the two preceding chapters an important conclusion is reached. 
In all significant respects the functionalist theoretical exposition of OC given in 
chapter two, which has been essentially generated by analyses of traditional 
syndicated crime in Italy and the United States, proves to be applicable to the 
Japanese variant of this phenomenon. In fact, far from being a uniquely Japanese 
phenomenon, the yakuza/böryokudan may be identified as conforming to an ideal 
type of traditional syndicated crime. Given that this is the case, it is reasonable to 
conclude that similarly, there will exist a high degree of cross-applicability in the 
legal strategies employed to combat OC. It will therefore be fruitful to preface a 
discussion of Heisei era developments in Japanese böryokudan countermeasures 
with an analysis of the major legal approaches specifically targeting OC which other 
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countries have adopted. It is significant that this conclusion was shared by many of 
the writer's legal and law-enforcement interviewees who clearly identified the 
American RICO statutes as the benchmark for OC countermeasures. 
From the historical overview of the böryokudan's development in the Showa period 
it is apparent that there was a large gap between the declared aim of the law- 
enforcement community, as given in such publicly available material as the 
Keisatsu Hakusho and the Keisatsu-gaku Ronshü, of "the annihilation of the 
böryokudan and the eradication of illegal violent activity" (Keisatsu Hakusho 1989, 
70) and the reality of the widespread existence of highly visible böryokudan groups 
seemingly immune to these police efforts. Böryokudan countermeasures clearly 
were inadequate to satisfy these proclaimed aspirations. 
In May 1991, a "Law Regarding the Prevention of Unjust Acts by Böryokudan 
Members" (böryokudanin ni yoru futö na köi no böshi nado ni kan-suru höritsu) 
was passed into law and implemented the following March. This title was usually 
dropped in favour of the more manageable "böryokudan taisaku ho" or böryokudan 
countermeasures law, which was itself truncated to "bötaihö". Gang members 
themselves, as always rejecting the label "böryokudan", preferred to refer to this 
law as "yakuza shinpö" or the new yakuza law. What is this law, how does it work 
and what were the reasons for its introduction? How does it compare to other 
countries' OC-specific laws? How can we interpret this law given the theoretical 
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and empirical grounding of the previous two chapters? How does this law fit into 
the wider context of legal and other controls by which the authorities attempt to 
maintain social harmony within Japan? Addressing these questions should enable 
us to assess the significance of this law and draw conclusions as to whether or not 
this law marks a break with the past and unites the tatemae of police declarations 
with their real intentions. 
BACKGROUND TO THE BÖTAIHO 
In order to make sense of the bötaihö it is necessary not only to consider the 
problems of OC control measures and the major foreign OC laws, but also to 
examine the domestic context. What, in particular, were the factors causing this law 
to be introduced in 1991? Does the introduction of the bötaihö indicate that the 
böryokudan were becoming less socially acceptable, or does this legal change 
suggest a more profound underlying change in the political and legal administration 
in Japan? An alternative explanation might be found in external factors with the 
nature of both the gangs and authorities remaining constant. A final hypothesis is 
that all of these factors were working in interplay to create the conditions in which it 
became necessary for Japan's legislators to pass this law. 
As has been shown in the previous chapter there was an evolution of traditional, 
locally-based bakuto and tekiya groups involved in gambling, labour-broking and 
open-air vending to gurentai organisations conducting black-marketeering and 
extortion. The most successful of these became the large-scale böryokudan 
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syndicates that came to exert oligopolistic control of the underworld economy. 
With increased pressure on their traditional sources of income and the relentless 
demands for jönökin payments, members of these organisations were continually 
seeking new ways of raising money. Oligopolisation was therefore accompanied by 
diversification and increased sophistication. 
One of the most important of these diversifications was that of minji kainyü böryoku 
(violent intervention in civil affairs or minbö). Minbö, though initially a dispute- 
resolution service capitalising on the inadequacies of the civil courts, quickly 
became a form of extortion, targeting sections of society that had not traditionally 
been prey to böryokudan groups. Chapter two discusses the way in which OC 
tolerance may be facilitated by the characterisation of OC crimes as consensual, 
victimless activities. The increase in minbö as a source of revenue for these groups 
can be expected therefore to have had the effect of increasing public perception of 
böryokudan as sociopathic organisations. 
Under the then existing criminal-law, minbö occupied what the Japanese literature 
almost universally refers to as a "gure zön" (grey zone). The böryokudan members 
obtaining money through this type of activity would typically ensure that their 
requests for money were couched in such a way as to avoid infringing the law's 
provisions regarding intimidation or extortion. The member would hand over his 
name card, with his organisational affiliation prominently displayed in the top right- 
hand corner, or ensure that his tattoo and amputated fingers were visible. The 
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organisation's reputation for violence was therefore clearly displayed and the 
recipient of the request left in no doubt as to the consequences of non-compliance. 
However, no explicit threat had been made. Technically, much of this activity was 
not illegal, and that which was illegal was very difficult to prosecute. 
From the last decade of the Showa period onwards, the increasing böryokudan 
involvement in the affairs of ordinary members of the public was matched by an 
increased involvement in quasi-legitimate business activity. Although yakuza had 
long been involved in various industries such as running bars and construction 
firms, the economic conditions of the bubble encouraged much greater böryokudan 
participation in the legitimate economy. 
The first of the factors encouraging this development was that cash-flush banks 
during this period were so desperate to lend that some of them even resorted to 
threatening their clients that, if they wouldn't borrow whilst conditions were good, 
then credit would be denied them in the future. In such a climate, little effort was 
made to assess the credit-worthiness of borrowers and böryokudan members were 
easily able to raise money based on the collateral of unrealistically-valued land. 
The funds raised in this way could then be employed in real estate and stock market 
speculation. Although, in this respect, the böryokudan were behaving no differently 
from anybody else, what was different was that at each stage there was the 
possibility that the böryokudan would use their organisational leverage to achieve 
loans and purchases either on favourable terms or on credit. When a share price 
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behaved less well than expected, böryokudan speculators might demand 
compensation from the firms that had sold them the shares. 
Another factor contributing to diminishing public tolerance of the böryokudan was 
the continuing outbreak of inter-gang conflicts in the years preceding and following 
the imperial succession. It is clear that from the time of the Yama-ichi tös6, the 
major inter-gang conflict of the 1980s, members of the NPA responsible for 
boryokudan countermeasures had felt the need for new legal powers to control these 
groups. Similarly, it is reported that in 1986 during this conflict, Ishii Susumu, the 
then head of the Inagawa-kai, had tried to persuade the Yamaguchi-gumi leadership 
to bring the war to an end. He argued that it was adversely affecting public opinion, 
bringing increased police attention on the yakuza world as a whole, and that the 
police were currently considering a new yakuza law (Mizoguchi 1992b, 247-8). 
However there is a time-lag between the peak of the Yama-ichi tösö in 1985 and the 
final decision to introduce new anti-boryokudan laws. This suggests that the Yama- 
ichi tösö was not by itself the prime causal factor. It is clear that by 1988 senior 
members of the NPA were considering that a change in the law was overdue; in 
reaction to a 1988 incident in Hamamatsu-chb involving the Ichiriki-ikka', the then 
head of the NPA's Criminal Investigation Bureau was quoted (Miyagi 1992,97) as 
See chapter six. 
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saying: 
The most effective böryokudan countermeasure is to seal off their sources of 
income. In America there is a law that cuts off the Mafia from their 
financial base. The time has come when in Japan also we should investigate 
a similar kind of law. 
After the conclusion of the Yama-ichi tösö there were two significant inter-gang 
violent struggles both of which had a significant impact on public opinion and 
police attitudes. 
The first of these conflicts preceding the introduction of the bötaihö was the 
Hachibji war in the western outskirts of Tokyo. In February 1990, two executives 
of a Yamaguchi-gumi Takumi-gumi sub-group were battered and stabbed to death 
in Hachiöji by members of the Nibiki-kai, a locally based group. Although 
officially the Yamaguchi-gumi had an understanding with the Inagawa-kai that they 
would not raise the Yamaguchi-gumi diamond crest in Tokyo, at the time it is 
reported that there were over 30 Yamaguchi-gumi related offices and nearly 300 
men in the capital. On not one of these offices did the gang's diamond emblem 
appear (Yamada 1994a, 265-8). 
In order that honour be satisfied, the Yamaguchi-gumi mobilised a 150-man 
revenge force composed largely of Takumi-gumi members. In a ten-day succession 
of revenge attacks two people were killed and a number of revenge shots fired on 
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buildings before the Yamaguchi-gumi called a halt and a settlement was reached 
with the Kanto Hatsuka-kai, the Tokyo groups allied to the Nibiki-kai. The reason 
for the truce was not so much fear of the Tokyo gangs as the response of the 
authorities to this conflict. The Tokyo Metropolitan Police mobilised twelve 
hundred officers specifically to deal with this incident, and increased pressure was 
put on the organisation's other activities. At the same time a hostile press reaction 
further damaged the syndicate's public image. 
Despite the comparative unimportance of this conflict, the Tokyo Metropolitan 
Police viewed it with alarm as they feared that it might have a more profound 
significance; "although it was sparked off by a drunken quarrel, this (incident) has 
deep roots in that, with the establishment of the fifth-generation leadership, the 
expansion into Tokyo brings (the Yamaguchi-gumi) into opposition with other 
groups" (ibid. 266). The Tokyo Police have long held the view that there is a 
profound difference in the organisational culture of the Kantb-based and Kansai- 
based böryokudan groups. The former are seen as much more prepared to adopt a 
co-operative relationship with the police. Yamaguchi-gumi expansion into the 
capital would also inevitably lead to widespread conflict with the incumbent groups 
including a collapse of the relationship with the Inagawa-kai. The police were 
obviously highly concerned that this should not happen. 
The second, and perhaps the more significant, conflict was the Okinawa war, which 
lasted from September 1990 to February 1992. Although this war was fought 
between the third-generation Kokuryu-kai and the breakaway Okinawa Kokuryü- 
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kai, at the time it was called a proxy war between the Yamaguchi-gumi and the 
Inagawa-kai. The cause of this conflict was the expulsion of a group of executives 
from the third-generation Kokuryü-kai because they refused to support a move to 
increase links with the Yamaguchi-gumi (against which they had fought in the 
seventies; several of their fellow members were still serving prison sentences for 
attacks made during that struggle). These expelled executives then formed the 
Okinawa Kokuryti-kai. 
Although the Yamaguchi-gumi top executives urged resolute treatment of the 
renegade group, this was problematic for two reasons. Firstly, the new Okinawa 
Kokuryu-kai had six hundred members whilst the third-generation group remained 
with only four hundred. Secondly, the expelled executives had gained the support 
of the Inagawa-kai, with which the Yamaguchi-gumi officially enjoyed friendly 
relations. In the ensuing conflict seven people were killed and nine injured. 
Included amongst this total was a high school student who had been mistaken for a 
gang member whilst he was painting a fence at a gang office in order to earn pocket 
money. Two police officers were also injured in the course of this fight (Mizoguchi 
1997,42-4). Uchiyama Ayako, of the National Research Institute of Police Science, 
identifies this conflict, and in particular the death of the high-school boy, as the 
single most important factor in changing public-opinion concerning the nature of 
the böryokudan and consequently as a major stimulus in the creation of the bötaihö. 
The increasing reliance on minbö, the increased intrusion of the böryokudan into the 
legitimate economy, and the victimisation of innocent bystanders and the police in 
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inter-gang conflicts are the standard reasons given in the Japanese literature for the 
introduction of the bötafhö. There are also, however, underlying political and 
international factors which have not been given due consideration in these accounts. 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, the authorities made use of criminal 
syndicates as agents of social control in the post-war period. The two key factors 
for this were firstly, the weakness of the police and secondly, the real fear of large 
left-wing organisations. Throughout this period however, changes in both these 
factors meant that the basis for this relationship was gradually eroded throughout 
the latter part of the Shbwa period. The increase in police power, and especially the 
growth of the security police since the early sixties (Katzenstein 1996,61), has 
meant that the police are now confident of their ability to deal with violent 
opposition without recourse to outside groups. 
Over the same period, the perceived threat posed by extreme left-wing groups has 
largely been diffused, as Japan's economic success has undermined the support for 
the large labour and student organisations advocating radical change during the 
fifties and sixties. Such groups as remain are small marginal organisations and, 
though the security police take their existence very seriously, they present no mortal 
threat to the continued existence of the Japanese state. This contrasts with the post- 
war situation as perceived by Justice Minister Kimura at the time that he attempted 
to establish his anti-communist yakuza shock-troops, the Battötai (Hori 1983,137- 
8). The end of the Cold War, with the collapse of the Soviet empire, underlined this 
development. 
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On a more immediate political level, events involving the ruling Liberal Democratic 
Party must also be considered as possible factors for the introduction of new 
böryokudan control measures. In September 1988 it became apparent that a number 
of senior figures within the LDP had received cut-price shares in Recruit Cosmos, 
the real estate branch of the Recruit business group, prior to the company's official 
listing on the Tokyo Stock Exchange. By the following month, police 
investigations had revealed that a large proportion of the former (Nakasone) cabinet 
had purchased unlisted shares whilst many members of the current cabinet, 
including Prime Minister Takeshita himself, had received money from the company. 
A number of senior bureaucrats were also implicated (The Economist 12/11/88; 
Mitchell 1996,124-5). 
Eventually Takeshita resigned as Prime Minister (though he continued to exert 
considerable influence within the party) to be replaced by the ineffectual Foreign 
Minister Uno, largely because he had not been considered worth bribing and was 
therefore one of the few senior LDP politicians untainted by the scandal. Uno's 
leadership lasted for two months, during which time he was undermined by a sex 
scandal (unusual in Japanese politics) in which a former mistress complained of his 
meanness and coarseness. The mainstream Japanese press had ignored this story 
until The Washington Post ran the story, whereupon they felt obliged to follow suit. 
Popular contempt for Uno, and for the LDP (which had struggled to elect even him), 
was compounded by the highly unpopular consumption tax to create widespread 
public dissatisfaction with the governing party. It seemed to many voters that the 
government was forcing austerity on the general public whilst lining their own 
pockets (Mitchell 1996,125). 
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These factors combined to reduce the LDP's electoral support to a mere 27% in the 
upper house elections of July 1989. The opposition, which had campaigned on a 
platform of anti-corruption and opposition to the 3% consumption tax, for the first 
time gained mastery of the upper house (The Economist 27/789; Tökei Kyoku 1990, 
708). Taking responsibility for this defeat, Uno resigned, and in August was 
replaced as Prime Minister by Kaifu Toshiki. 
Kaifu struggled to repair the tarnished image of the LDP with such measures as the 
reform of the consumption tax, the introduction of two women to the cabinet, and 
promises to reform the political system, specifically the ways in which it was 
funded, in order to reduce corruption. It was also under Kaifu's leadership that the 
political go-ahead was given for the NPA to draw up its proposals for new 
boryokudan control measures that would become the bötaihö. It is not therefore a 
large jump to postulate that the bötaihö was part of a wider strategy to present a 
cleaner image to the electorate. 
The domestic audience was not, however, the only political pressure on Kaifu's 
government. Since the early 1980s there was an increasing awareness amongst 
American law-enforcement officers, particularly the FBI, that Japanese crime 
syndicates were operating in the United States (Kaplan and Dubro 1986,241-2). 
This was largely confined to those areas with large Japanese communities and 
tourist destinations, such as Hawaii and California. With the rise of the keizai 
(economic) yakuza, overseas böryokudan activity started to include real-estate 
development as well as more overtly criminal activity. At a time when Japan's 
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enormous trade surplus with America was a serious stumbling block in the two 
countries' relations, the fact that Japan was now exporting its crime as well was a 
gift to the media, providing it with excellent ammunition for "Japan-bashing". 
Ino Kenji, in an interview conducted in Tokyo on 9 April 1998, described the 
impact of this development: 
In 1987 the Japanese and American Police held the first of the Japan-US 
Joint Meetings (Nichibei Gödö Kaigi) in Hawaii. At that time there was talk 
that the Japanese böryokudan, the Japanese yakuza, had started a process of 
linking up with the American Mafia in places like Hawaii and Los Angeles, 
where there are an extremely large number of Japanese tourists, and was 
conducting business with them..... Therefore the American side pressed that 
Japan abandon its indulgent way of thinking of these groups as fulfilling a 
bodyguard function within traditional Japanese society. 
In reply to the question `so it was gaiatsu (foreign pressure)? ', Ino continued: 
Yes, yes, exactly as you say.... Thereafter there were about three meetings of 
this Nichibei GOdö Kaigi. FBI officers participated on the American side, 
whilst, for the Japanese, for the most part they were chiefs of the Second 
Investigation Departments of the NPA and the Metropolitan Police, with 
responsibility for organised violence and organised crime investigations. 
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Another interviewee, Yamada Hitoshi of the Nichibenren's böryokudan 
countermeasures group, also suggests an international dimension: 
The consciousness of the police has changed. The most sensitive ones are 
the police executives who attend international meetings... at these meetings 
they are frequently asked how Japan's böryokudan counter-measures are 
going. It would be no good if they weren't doing anything so they made it, 
this law (the bötaihö). 
Whilst Ino and Yamada assert that on a police-administration level gaiatsu was a 
factor, something police interviewees indignantly reject, there was also pressure at a 
much higher political and diplomatic level. With the end of the Cold War, there 
was considerable political rhetoric concerning the establishment of a "New World 
Order". Under this new system the rich industrialised countries, having defeated 
communism, were to switch their attention to the fight against the new bogeymen of 
Organised Crime and the international menace of drugs. 
The major motivating force behind this was the American War on Drugs, which 
Bush had enthusiastically inherited from Reagan. Whilst, as far as American 
political interests were concerned, the War on Drugs and the fight against OC were 
synonymous, the reality of Japan's position was very different. The böryokudan, 
according to police statistics, made one third of their income from drug dealing, 
though, given that the official figures underplay the amount of money received from 
business, this figure is probably too high. Also the drugs with which the United 
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States were concerned, cocaine and heroin, have not recently been a significant 
problem in Japan, which has an overwhelming preference for amphetamines. 
However, despite these differences, in September 1989 Kaifu publicly united with 
Bush in "declaring a global partnership in the war against drugs" (Friman 1996,64). 
Friman goes on to identify the reason for this partnership: 
(T)he extent of co-operation has been largely determined by domestic 
factors. Japan's participation in the global partnership reflects the link 
between drug issues and bilateral economic relations with the United States. 
Faced with increasing threats of economic retaliation, Japanese policy 
makers have viewed co-operation on drug issues as a means to defuse 
broader bilateral tensions. 
At the 1986 G7 Tokyo Economic Summit, the participating countries issued a joint 
declaration supporting improved international co-operation in anti-drugs measures. 
The following year the United Nations held a special drugs conference and this led 
directly to the 1988 United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic 
Drugs and Psychotropic Substances. Under this convention, signatory countries 
were required to co-operate with other countries in the punishment of money- 
laundering, and the identification and seizure of illegal profits from drug dealing 
(Hörau-shö Keyikyoku Keijihöseika 1997,1). 
At the time Japan did not sign. This was considered to be due to the fact that 
Japan's laws did not contain the provisions necessary for compliance, although 
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newspaper reports at the time indicated that both the NPA and the MOJ were 
considering the required legal changes. Failure to show concrete achievements 
towards this end meant that, at the Paris Summit of July 1989, US Secretary of State 
Baker criticised Japan and urged it to adopt a more proactive attitude. It was in this 
international context that the newly installed Kaifu entered into his "global 
partnership" (Friman 1996,77-8). 
The roles of summit embarrassment and direct gaiatsu as causal factors in Japanese 
legal change is clear. The evidence is however strongest for the new Drugs Law of 
1991, anti-money-laundering measures and the three OC countermeasures laws 
(soshiki hanzai taisaku ho) passed in August 1999. The comments of Miyazawa 
Koichi, a member of the specialist research group assembled by the NPA to 
consider böryokudan countermeasures (the findings of which became the initial 
draft of the bötaihö), confirm that international considerations also played a part in 
the creation of the bötaihö: 
The böryokudan problem is not just an internal problem. We cannot ignore 
the fact that the Japanese yakuza are causing a nuisance in various other 
countries, especially several nearby Asian countries... . As a country 
governed by law, it is a very grave problem to leave böryokudan crimes as 
they are. Considering the strength that Japanese business has in the world 
economy and this sort of strange existence forever prevalent on the surface 
of Japanese society and continuing to exert an influence on the economy, 
-237- 
these illegal groups stir up international opinion and provide good material 
for Japan-bashing when they proceed into European and American society. 
In this situation, we must do something (Jurisuto 1/1/1991,14). 
There were therefore a number of political, diplomatic and attitudinal changes, as 
well as changes in böryokudan behaviour, which encouraged the introduction of 
new anti-böryokudan legislation. There is no conclusive evidence to support any 
simple monocausal explanation as to why the bötaihö should have been introduced. 
It seems likely, however, that all of the factors discussed above were influential in 
creating an environment in which legal change became expedient. 
PROBLEMS OF OC COUNTERMEASURES 
There is an inherent strain within every constitutional liberal-democratic state 
regarding its efforts to maintain law and order. In classical liberal political theory, 
in order to protect the rights and freedoms of citizens, paradoxically, laws partially 
restricting some of these rights and freedoms, and officers of the state empowered to 
enforce these restrictions, are deemed necessary. In order that these officers, or the 
state itself, do not exceed or abuse their powers, restrictions are in turn placed on 
these powers. Law-enforcement must itself be carried out within the law; evidence 
gained and arrests made through extra-legal means are, according to this legal 
principle, inadmissible in a court of law. Law-enforcement officers within liberal- 
democratic states therefore are at a disadvantage vis-ä-vis their colleagues in 
authoritarian or totalitarian states in that they have considerable constraints of due 
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process placed on their ability to identify and apprehend criminals. Disregard for 
the moment whether the reality of this situation is quite as tidy as this simple 
exposition, or whether classical liberal theory is relevant when discussing Japan. 
The point is that those countries with a written constitution that can satisfactorily be 
described as liberal-democratic, of which Japan is one, have these clearly-defined 
formal constraints on police and judicial powers. Similarly, in such systems, 
individual citizens have clearly stated rights. 
Whilst the problem of due process is general to all law-enforcement efforts, there 
are a number of peculiarities of organised as opposed to other categories of crime 
that make OC-specific countermeasures problematic. The first of these is that, 
given the functionalist analysis of OC in chapter two, the whole concept of OC 
countermeasures is itself open to question. If the existence of OC may be beneficial 
to certain constituencies, possibly including judicial, political and law-enforcement 
personnel either at street or at administrative level, are all of these actors seriously 
committed to the enactment, implementation and enforcement of such measures? If 
these actors have different or even conflicting objectives, then it may be expected 
that countermeasures will have no clear strategic aim but represent rather an untidy 
political compromise. Having noted in chapter two the use of organised crime as a 
political buzz-word, we can further postulate that the introduction of new 
`countermeasures' may have a purely symbolic role. 
The most obvious way in which OC groups may provide benefits to the 
constituencies identified above is via a straightforward exchange of money or goods 
in exchange for immunity. The ability of a large criminal syndicate to corrupt those 
-239- 
in positions of authority will typically be greater than that of an individual criminal 
operator. 
Even if we are to accept that OC control measures are genuine in their intent and 
actively enforced, there are severe obstacles to their success. Because many OC 
activities are consensual crimes providing goods and services to consumers, they 
will not be reported to the authorities as would be more likely to happen in the case 
of a crime in which there was a clearly defined victim. Much predatory OC crime is 
also unlikely to be reported as those victimised are themselves operating within the 
criminal economy. A purely reactive police strategy is therefore totally inadequate 
for OC control. 
Because the main trading commodity of OC is the reputation for, rather than the 
actual exercise or explicit threat of, violence, it is very difficult to prosecute the 
significant category of activities in which economic advantage is gained through the 
exploitation of that reputation. It is very difficult to construct laws concerning 
intimidation and extortion which include this type of unstated, but universally 
recognised, threat. 
The criminal organisation's reputation for violence and penalties for co-operating 
with the authorities are further obstacles to effectively controlling OC. Even when 
gang-members are brought to trial, if witnesses refuse to testify against them, then 
even the best-planned of control measures may come to naught. Credible witness- 
protection schemes are therefore an integral part of any viable OC control strategy. 
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In extreme cases such as Sicily, Colombia and the former Soviet Union, it may be 
necessary to routinely extend this protection to judges as well. 
As has been seen from chapter three and its description of Japanese böryokudan 
development, OC is a highly amorphous phenomenon, which is constantly adapting 
to changes both in economic opportunity and in the legal and administrative 
environment. Given that it is involved in a number of different economic activities, 
increased enforcement vis-a-vis one of these sources of income may be successful in 
inflating arrest statistics and driving out OC members from that sector, only for 
. 
those displaced to seek alternative employment in other types of criminal activity. 
"It is hardly a net gain to society if bookies become drug dealers or hold up men" 
(Maltz 1990,14). 
With specific reference to the Japanese experience in the 1960s and `70s, increased 
police targeting of traditional yakuza shinogi had not only exactly the effect 
described above but drove the smaller, locally based gumi into extinction to be 
replaced by the more highly diversified wide-area syndicates. Such considerations 
show the importance of clearly defining one's strategic goal (even if it can not be 
explicitly stated in public) and designing a set of control measures that offer the best 
hope of achieving that goal. 
Although most criminal-law codes contain provisions concerning conspiracy, it is 
usually much harder to prove collective responsibility to prove a crime, in which 
only one or two actors may have been directly involved, than for the individual 
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criminal liability of those one or two gang members. Giuliani (1987,104), writing 
from an American perspective, clearly identifies this problem: 
We have a system of justice in which laws defining crimes for the most part 
focus upon individual behaviour and proscribe conduct in the context of 
isolated criminal episodes.... Even the crime of "conspiracy", generically 
defined as a criminal partnership, requires each member of the conspiracy to 
join in the same criminal scheme. 
Typically, those at the higher end of the hierarchy will attempt to dissociate 
themselves from direct participation in criminal activity, especially crimes which 
carry a high risk of arrest. Because these higher-echelon figures often receive much 
of their income from taxes, tribute or dues paid by their subordinates, they are 
effectively insulated from indictment. Therefore OC arrests may be made but, 
without access to special legal provisions and surveillance techniques, these arrests 
are typically of lower-level members on an individual basis for an individual crime. 
Consequently the organisational infrastructure remains intact and business carries 
on much as before. Kato (1991,50-58, ) likens this to mogura tataki (mole- 
bashing), the fairground entertainment in which the object is to hit mechanical 
moles with a mallet as they randomly stick their heads out from a number of 
different holes. 
Even control measures specifically targeting, and successfully indicting, the 
leadership of an OC group, may have only a limited effect if the criminal 
infrastructure is untouched despite the favourable publicity such high-profile arrests 
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may generate. The Japanese "summit strategy" of the 1960s and American arrests 
of La Cosa Nostra (LCN) family leaders in the 1970s both show clearly that, in 
isolation, this type of strategy is ultimately ineffective. 
There is therefore clearly a need for special legal devices, specifically designed to 
combat OC, which take into consideration these problems. In particular 
consideration should be given to the last point concerning the problem of dealing 
with organisationally conducted crimes by the use of laws intended for individual 
criminal activity. Before the creation of the bötaihö there were two main 
approaches which those responsible for drafting the new law could refer to, the 
European and the American. Whilst there are other anti-OC strategies, the debate 
within Japan on changing the laws with reference to the böryokudan was essentially 
fought out within the parameters of these two approaches. For this reason they will 
be given priority in the discussion below. 
OC LAWS 1- EUROPEAN MODEL 
THE CRIME OF CRIMINAL ASSOCIATION 
The origins of the European approach to OC control laws can be traced back to the 
1810 criminal law under the Napoleonic code (Morishita 1997,290). The countries 
which are most usually cited as examples of laws targeting criminal association, 
France, Italy and Germany, have all been heavily influenced by this code. This 
approach is without doubt the most direct and straightforward legal strategy for 
dealing with OC. Quite simply the law in these three countries criminalises 
membership of a criminal organisation. Whilst this is straightforward it is not 
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completely unproblematic. The most obvious difficulty is that of framing an 
operationally enforceable definition of criminal association without infringing the 
rights of individuals to join legitimate associations. 
Although German criminal law has various provisions referring to criminal gangs, 
"in Germany, there is no legal definition of organized crime" (Kühne, private 
correspondence 1998). However, in January 1991, a working definition was 
drawn up by the Interior Ministers of the various Länder as a guide for German 
federal police (Bundeskriminalamt) and prosecutors. This definition states that: 
Organised crime is the planned violation of the law for profit or to acquire 
power, for which offences are each, or together, of a major significance, and 
are carried out by more than two participants who co-operate within a 
division of labour for a long or undetermined time span using 
a) commercial or commercial like structures, or 
b) violence or other means of intimidation, or 
c) influence on politics, media, public administration, justice and the 
legitimate economy. 
Although this definition is widely adopted by European law-enforcement bodies, 
Kühne asserts that "everybody - including the ministers of justice - agrees that this 
definition is pretty vague and can only give some hints to describe this 
phenomenon". For example it remains open to interpretation exactly what is meant 
by "major significance" (Levi 1998b, 2). 
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Under Article 416 of Italian criminal law a "mafia-type association" is defined as 
one in which, in order to commit crimes, or to gain an unfair profit for themselves 
or others, the members of that association directly or indirectly control economic 
activity, sales, or the allocation of public contracts and licenses, by making use of a 
rule of silence, based on the power of the organisation's threat (Kato 1991,56). 
Under the provisions of the same article, members of such a grouping composed of 
three or more persons are liable to between three and six years imprisonment. 
Kato, a hawkish critic of Japanese OC countermeasures, evaluates this approach 
highly, crediting it for the absence of OC groups in Germany (1991,57). This line 
of argument was also reflected in the comments of several retired police bureaucrats 
in their reaction to a paper the researcher presented during the course of his 
fieldwork. This argument is surprising given that the existence of the Mafia, the 
Camorra and the `Ndrangheta in Italy would have suggested that this law, by itself, 
was by no means sufficient to eliminate, or even control, OC. It is also 
unreasonable to assert that there are no OC groups in, for example, Germany. 
Whilst, for largely historical reasons, Germany does not have a tradition of 
syndicated crime such as can be found in Italy or Japan, representatives of many 
different criminal syndicates are operating in Germany especially since the fall of 
the Berlin wall and reunification (Freemantle 1995,23-4,272-3; Sterling 1995, 
passim). 
Morishita (1997,291) suggests that, in fact, very few guilty court verdicts are 
reached under this type of law. For obvious reasons, if membership of a criminal 
association, however that is defined, is made illegal, then such affiliation is 
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concealed. It is arguable that this in itself is a desirable strategic goal; if OC groups 
are going to exist, then let them at least be consigned to the darkest reaches of the 
underworld. In terms of OC eradication, however, this type of law will not offer the 
magic bullet. 
OC LAWS 2- THE AMERICAN MODEL 
THE RICO STATUTES 
The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organisations Act (RICO) is the "most 
important substantive and procedural law tool in the history of organized crime 
control" (Jacobs 1994,10). Passed on October 15,1970, with the express purpose 
of seeking "the eradication of organized crime in the United States" (OCCA, 84 
Stat. at 923 in Randolph 1995,1191), RICO shares with the crime of criminal- 
association approach the aim of targeting the criminal organisation itself rather than 
the individual crimes of its members. Whilst it also makes membership of an 
organisation falling under the jurisdiction of the RICO statutes a crime, the main 
significance of this law is that it makes possible the "single prosecution of an entire 
multidefendant organized crime group for all of its many and diverse criminal 
activities" (Giuliani 1987,105). The RICO law also makes possible the 
sequestration of the organisation's assets gained through RICO violations. In short 
it is "a law that leaves the `crime' to other laws and addresses the idea of being 
`organised"' (Rebovich 1995,141). 
Although there are other crimes under the provisions of the RICO law, the most 
often used and overwhelmingly the most significant is Section 1962(c): 
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It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any 
enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign 
commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of 
such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or 
collection of unlawful debt. 
The three crucial considerations here are the definitions of `enterprise', `pattern' and 
`racketeering'. Under Section 1961(4) "`enterprise' includes any individual, 
partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of 
individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity". 
With respect to our second term, 1961(5) states: 
A pattern of racketeering requires at least two acts of racketeering activity, 
one of which occurred after the effective date of this chapter (15 October 
1970) and the last of which occurred within ten years (excluding any period 
of imprisonment) after the commission of a prior act of racketeering activity. 
Racketeering is defined in Section 1961(1) to include "any act or threat involving 
murder, kidnapping, gambling, arson, robbery, bribery, extortion, or dealing in 
narcotic or other dangerous drugs, which is chargeable under State law and 
punishable by imprisonment for more than one year. " This is supplemented with 
"a `laundry list' of federal offenses" (Abadinsky 1994,453) including loansharking, 
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obstruction of justice, fraud, Hobbs Act violations (labour or commercial 
racketeering), counterfeiting, contraband cigarettes and white slavery. 
Those found guilty of RICO violations are liable to a fine of up to $25,000 or 
imprisonment of up to twenty years, or a combination of the two. In addition to 
these considerable penalties, there are even more substantial costs to RICO 
violators. Under the provisions of 1963 (a) those found guilty of RICO offences are 
liable to the sequestration of any assets or interests acquired, either directly or 
indirectly, in violation of these statutes or acquired with the proceeds thereof. This 
forfeiture includes gross profits thereby precluding a defendant from claiming 
reductions for overheads or taxes paid on illegally gained proceeds. RICO also 
allows for citizens who have suffered materially due to these violations to sue with 
respect to this loss and to claim for threefold damages and legal costs. 
Whilst RICO is a federal statute confined to federal crimes or violations carried out 
in an inter-state or international context, as of 1995 twenty-nine states had enacted 
their own anti-OC legislation closely modelled on this law (Rebovich 1995,141-2). 
As can be seen from the brief outline above, RICO clearly circumvents one of the 
most significant problems of legal OC countermeasures, that of Kato's mole- 
bashing; rather than prosecuting individual members for individual crimes leaving 
the organisation itself intact, RICO enables blanket prosecution of the 
organisation's membership. Moreover, the "second major purpose of RICO is to 
attack the economic infrastructure of organized crime, depriving it of its life blood, 
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by providing for criminal forfeiture and civil injunctive relief " (Giuliani 1987, 
107). 
Despite the attractiveness of this approach and its evident potency as an OC control 
measure, RICO has met with a number of criticisms, four of which are listed by 
Abadinsky (1994). The most significant of these is that historically the courts have 
interpreted the provisions of this law in a flexible fashion. In 1981 the Supreme 
Court upheld the judgement that the term `enterprise' is to include illegal as well as 
legal organisations in United States v. Turkette (Randolph 1995,1191; Giuliani 
1987,105). This is of course the point of the law; however in NOW v. Schiedler 
1994, the same court asserted that the law "does not require that the enterprise be 
economically motivated" (Randolph 1995,1189). This judgement enabled RICO to 
be used to prosecute activists "conspir(ing) to shut down abortion clinics through a 
pattern of racketeering activity" (ibid). 
Similarly this law has been successfully employed to prosecute other cases, not 
coming under the rubric of traditional syndicated crime: as well as serious cases of 
enterprise crime perpetrated by the "junk-bond king", Michael Milken, and 
executives involved in the Savings and Loan fraud scandals (Rosoff, Pontel and 
Tillman 1998,158,208), RICO has been employed to prosecute a firm for 
commodities transactions so common "that on some days they account for a third of 
the volume on the New York Stock Exchange" (Epstein in Abadinsky 1994,456). 
In another case cited by Abadinsky, a firm was forced into liquidation before a 
RICO charge was even brought to trial due to the $24 million bond demanded by 
the prosecutors (ibid. ). 
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Another criticism of RICO is that the pre-trial freezing of assets allowed for under 
its provisions can place devastating strains on a business. So much so that "the 
threat of freezing assets can induce corporate defendants to plead guilty even when 
they believe themselves to be innocent" (ibid. ). 
The third of Abadinsky's criticisms is that, given that this law has been employed 
against defendants who would not normally be described as racketeers, the 
stigmatisation as such resulting from a successful RICO prosecution may not be 
suitable. The threat of this, combined with the threefold damages provided for, may 
intimidate defendants to settle a case they would otherwise have disputed. 
The fourth problem given by Abadinsky also concerns RICO's provisions for 
threefold damages. These present such an enticing prospect to litigants that cases are 
brought under RICO when they would otherwise not be considered worth the 
trouble. This runs the risk of unnecessarily clogging up federal courts. To avoid 
this courts have fined lawyers who have filed spurious RICO claims. 
Another important question mark concerning RICO is the way in which forfeiture 
has actually been applied. Forfeiture is considered to be a major tool in OC and 
drug countermeasures where the enormous size of the financial rewards often far 
outweigh the costs of incarceration. The potency of this approach is evinced by the 
comments of a pentito mafioso (Sterling 1995,287): 
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"What bothers us most is when you take our money away. We'd rather stay 
in jail and keep the money than be free without the money; that's the main 
thing". 
Forfeiture is a very appealing measure to the authorities for the added reason that it 
provides them with government revenue without taxation. 
Despite these attractions, there must be clear restrictions on the ability of the state to 
seize the assets of citizens without satisfactory proof that the assets in question were 
derived, either directly or indirectly, from crime. Because this is often extremely 
difficult to do, in America the onus has been shifted so that citizens must prove that 
property confiscated under civil forfeiture provisions (for which no criminal 
conviction is necessary) has been acquired through legitimate means. With the 
escalation of America's War on Drugs, in the eighties and early nineties, the burden 
of proof for civil forfeiture became progressively lighter (Baum 1996,112,172, 
196). 
In addition, since 1985, the proceeds from asset seizure are paid in to the National 
Assets and Forfeiture Fund. The Fund then distributes this money to the various 
law-enforcement agencies, which are obliged to use it in some way on the War on 
Drugs. The consequences of these two factors is that the system has been abused, 
with over-zealous law-enforcement officers seizing property out of all proportion to 
the scale of the crimes committed and occasionally when no crime had been 
committed at all (Baum 1996,243,317). It is important that seizure provisions are 
framed in such a way as to prevent the law-enforcement community behaving 
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effectively as bounty-hunters. It seems that recently these abuses have been 
recognised by the authorities and the Supreme Court has recently made decisions 
demanding proportionality in the level of seizures (Levi 1998a, 20-1). 
The radical and complicated nature of the RICO statutes meant that initially courts 
and law-enforcement agencies were unsure as to how this law should be applied. 
Consequently it took some time before the full impact of this law could be 
ascertained. It is now clear, however, that RICO has been an extremely effective 
tool in combating OC in the United States. 
The effectiveness of RICO depends however on the availability of sufficient 
evidence for a successful prosecution. Due to criminal organisations' stress on 
organisational security, problems connected with the reliability of informers and the 
reluctance of victims or witnesses to provide useful intelligence to the authorities, 
gathering this kind of evidence is difficult using conventional police techniques. 
Attempts have been made to plug this gap through the use of such measures as 
electronic surveillance. In order to prevent abuses of this tool, investigative 
agencies in the United States, and most other liberal-democratic states, wishing to 
tap a suspect's phone or bug his/her property, are required to obtain a court warrant 
authorising this. This authorisation is typically limited in both duration and scope. 
Because of these restrictions, the heavy costs in manpower such an investigation 
requires, and the obvious countermeasures taken by professional criminals to limit 
their susceptibility to electronic eavesdropping, surveillance of this type is actually 
limited in its effectiveness. According to Abadinsky the cost of an average thirty- 
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day operation in the United States is "in excess of $40,000... and less than 20 
percent produce incriminating evidence" (1994,484). In contrast to Abadinsky's 
down-beat assessment of electronic surveillance, Jacobs (1994,8) identifies it as 
one of the three "most important legal weapons deployed in the (US) government's 
attack on organized crime" (along with RICO and the Witness Security Program). 
Controlled delivery 2, undercover investigators, and sting operations are also 
considered major tools whereby the authorities can gather evidence in OC and drugs 
cases. Whilst these are not without their problems they can yield spectacular results 
as in the six-year undercover operation involving FBI Special Agent Pistone which 
contributed to the successful conviction of more than one hundred members of 
various LCN families. 
Japanese OC countermeasures must therefore be considered not just with reference 
to the substantive laws of other countries but to the investigative techniques 
available to, and used by, the officers entrusted to enforce these laws. The legal 
framework within which the Japanese police have operated in the post-war period 
has precluded extensive use of the investigative techniques outlined above. 
THE BÖTAIHO - DRAFT ONE 
In November 1990, the NPA set up a research group composed of external 
2 Whereby law-enforcement officers maintain tight surveillance over shipments of illegal goods 
rather than seizing them at the port of entry. This reveals a greater section of the distribution chain, 
thereby maximising potential arrests. 
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academics and legal experts with the express task of preparing an anti-böryokudan 
law. At the time, with the exception of the chairman, Professor Narita of 
Yokohama University, and the two representatives from the Nichibenren, the 
identities of the members of the fifteen-man committee were kept secret. Originally 
the group had been told that they had two to three years to prepare this law but this 
was soon cut down radically and their initial proposals were published after only 
four meetings, the last of which was held on February 6,1991. The extraordinary 
speed with which this draft was produced has led some observers to suggest that the 
NPA had already done provisional work towards the drafting of this bill (Miyagi 
1992,97-8). Shimamura (1992,9) claims that the way in which this law was 
prepared was unusual in that it did not proceed through a legislative deliberative 
committee and then legislative office under the oversight of the MOJ. Instead it 
was drafted under conditions of secrecy by the NPA. 
On February 27, the NPA produced its "Basic Considerations on the Bill 
Concerning Böryokudan Countermeasures" (böryokudan taisaku ni kan-suru höan 
no kihonteki na kangaekata). Whilst in many respects the "Basic Considerations" 
was what became the bötaihö, there were a couple of important provisions that were 
included in this document that were dropped from the draft bill. These were the 
seizure of illegally gained profits and the exclusion of böryokudan members from 
certain industries. 
The seizure of illegally gained profits was seen by the research group and the NPA 
as an important part of their general anti-böryokudan strategy and was clearly 
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influenced by the American RICO seizure provisions. These provisions were 
dropped from the bill not only due to the operational problem of identifying what 
were illegally gained assets and what legitimate, but also because there were more 
profound legal implications in seizure. If assets were seized under the criminal law 
(keUi bosshü), then it was considered that there would be the risk of double 
punishment (Shinozaki et al 1991,24). 
It should be noted, however, that the "Basic Considerations" had been drafted in 
such a way as to avoid this problem; technically, illegally gained assets were not to 
be subject to seizure (bosshü) but subject to a surcharge payment order (kachökin 
nöfu meirei) in which "violation money is levied administratively" (interview 
Fujimoto, Tokyo, March 1998). Because the bötaihö was drafted by the NPA, 
rather than the MOJ, this type of administrative approach, which operates without 
recourse to the courts, was employed. As will be seen from the finally enacted 
version of the law, the botaiho relies entirely on administrative law (gyöseihö) 
rather than criminal law (keihö). 
The other reason that this type of seizure/surcharge payment was not included in the 
finally enacted law was that at the same time the MOJ was drafting a law which 
would enable Japan to conform to the requirements of the UN Convention Against 
Illicit Drugs and Psychotropic Substances. Included amongst the proposed 
provisions for the law were the seizure (under the criminal law) of the proceeds 
from drug trafficking and it was therefore felt a good idea to wait and see how the 
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new drugs law ended up. Some members of the committee also felt that, given the 
various legal problems and the pressure to create this law quickly, it would be better 
to omit it for the time being and consider it at greater length at a later date 
(Takebana in Shinozaki et al 1991,24). 
The other item dropped from the bill was the proposal to exclude böryokudan 
members from certain industries. In particular, the involvement of böryokudan 
members in debt-collection, real-estate racketeering (jiage etc. ) and bankruptcy 
management were seen as the main targets. However it was concluded that attempts 
to include provisions to exclude börykudan members from the relevant industries 
would possibly conflict with Article 22 of the 1947 Constitution. This guarantees 
the freedom of individuals to choose their own occupation, though this guarantee is 
qualified in that this freedom shall exist "to the extent that it does not interfere with 
the public welfare". It seems, therefore, that a good legal case could have been 
made for the retention of this provision. 
On a more practical level it seems that to have included this measure would have 
resulted in interminable discussions with the various ministries controlling the 
industries from which böryokudan members were to be excluded. It seems more 
likely therefore that, rather than for constitutional reasons, this proposal was 
dropped in the interests of speedy enactment and implementation of the whole (ibid. 
25). 
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THE BOTAIHO 
Only one month passed from the date of cabinet approval for the submission of this 
legislation to the date of its being passed by the Diet in May 1991. This was 
exceptionally fast. Moreover it was passed unanimously with no parties or 
individual members offering criticism. Miyagi (1992,100) suggests that due to the 
media build-up to this law "an atmosphere had been created in which it was hard for 
the communist and socialist (opposition) parties to oppose (this law) even if they 
thought it strange". 
The central aspects of the bötaiho were the designation of böryokudan groups by 
the Public Safety Commission, administrative control over certain prescribed 
activities by members of these groups, increased limitations on the use of gang 
offices during inter-group conflicts, and the establishment of regional centres to 
assist the victims of böryokudan activities and forward the cause of böryokudan 
eradication. 
Under the provisions of the new law, a boryokudan is defined as "a group of which 
there is the risk that its members (including members of its component groups) will 
collectively or routinely promote illegal violent behaviour" (Article 2 paragraph 2). 
"Illegal violent behaviour" (böryokuteki fuhö köi) is in turn defined as those "illegal 
acts which meet the criteria at the discretion of the National Public Safety 
Commission" (Article 2 paragraph 1). Having provided these definitions, the law 
empowers the regional Public Safety Commissions (hereafter Public Safety 
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Commissions) to designate böryokudan groups. A designated böryokudan is 
defined as a "böryokudan of which there is a high risk that its members will 
collectively or routinely promote illegal violent behaviour" (Article 3, emphasis 
added). 
Despite the definitions of designated and undesignated böryokudan differing only 
with respect to one word -a "high risk" rather than just a "risk" - there are more 
concrete criteria on which designation is to be based. The first of these is that it has 
been shown that, "regardless of the ostensible purpose, a member of a böryokudan 
makes use of that böryokudan's influence" to gain some kind of financial advantage 
(Article 3 paragraph 1). 
The second factor required for designation is that a certain proportion of the group's 
members have a criminal record. This proportion declines as the size of the group 
increases: whilst 66.6% or more of the members of a three to four-man group are 
required to have a record to merit designation, this proportion drops to 4.2% for a 
group, or syndicate, of 1,000 men or more (see appendix). For the purposes of this 
law the criminal record of an individual is no longer taken into consideration if a 
certain period of time, varying according to the severity of the offence, has elapsed. 
The details of this are given in Article 3 paragraph 2 at 
When a Public Safety Commission attempts to designate a böryokudan group it is 
obliged to hold public hearings in which representatives of the group in question are 
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able to put forward arguments and evidence in their defence. The organisation must 
be informed in advance of the time, place and reason for these hearings and this 
notification must also be publicly displayed. The obligation on the Public Safety 
Commission to hold a public hearing is waived if it is not possible to locate 
members of the group in question and if they fail to attend the hearing when due 
public notification has been given. 
Once the Public Safety Commission has satisfied itself that a group meets the 
criteria for designation, it must present the appropriate evidence and a record of the 
official hearing to the National Public Safety Commission for official confirmation. 
For the National Public Safety Commission to confirm this designation it must base 
its judgement on the opinion of a specialist examining board. Once the National 
Public Safety Commission has reached a decision, it is obliged to quickly inform the 
relevant Public Safety Commission. 
If designation is confirmed then the Public Safety Commission must inform a 
representative of that böryokudan. Designation is also publicly notified in the 
official gazette (Kanpö), from which time the böryokudan's designated status is 
effective. If designation is not confirmed then the group in question can not be 
designated as a böryokudan. Designation remains in force for a period of three 
years. 
Once a böryokudan group has been designated, then its members are forbidden to 
carry out a number of activities by means of which they could attempt to gain some 
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kind of financial advantage through making "violent demands" (böryokuteki yökyü). 
For the purposes of this law a "violent demand" describes a demand or request 
which is made by a member of a böryokudan whilst in some way using the 
influence of the organisation to which that member belongs. Therefore referring to 
one's group or passing over a name card on which gang affiliation is shown, 
combined with a request coming under the provisions of Article 9, is a "violent 
demand". 
The categories of demands prohibited under the provisions of Article 9 are as 
follows: 
1. Demanding money, goods or other benefits in return for not revealing secrets 
about the victim of these demands. 
2. Demanding donations and contributions for whatever reason. 
3. Demanding contract work or the supply of goods. 
4. Demanding that individuals pay a fee in order to conduct business within the 
designated böryokudan's territory. 
5. Demanding that businesses operating within the boryokudan's territory purchase 
goods, or certificates, or that they pay for bodyguard or other services. 
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6. Demanding payment of interest rates in excess of the maximum rate allowed 
under the 1954 Interest Limitation Law. Demanding compensation for non- 
payment of debts in contravention of the same law. Making a nuisance, on 
behalf of creditors, in connection with debt repayment. 
7. Demanding postponement or non-repayment of debt either in part or full. 
8. Demanding loans on favourable terms, demanding loans in spite of refusal, 
demanding loans of individuals not involved in the money-lending business. 
9. Demanding that site or building occupiers leave and give up title to that site or 
building. 
10. Entering into discussions concerning a traffic dispute or other incident and 
demanding compensation for damages incurred. 
11. Demanding compensation for damage or injury due to a traffic accident or other 
incident. Demanding compensation for losses due to changes in stock or goods 
prices. 
If a member of a designated böryokudan group makes a demand falling under the 
provisions of Article 9 then the victim of the demand can notify the authorities and 
the Public Safety Commission is empowered to issue an injunction (chüshi meirei) 
preventing the member from making these demands. In cases where the Public 
Safety Commission judges that a designated böryokudan member is likely to make 
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similar demands in the future it can issue an injunction prohibiting a recurrence of 
that type of demand (saihatsu meirei). This type of injunction remains in force for 
no more than one year. The Public Safety Commission is also empowered to issue 
an injunction prohibiting designated böryokudan members from making violent 
demands in order to force juveniles (under Japanese law those under twenty years of 
age) to join their gang. 
Before a saihatsu meirei injunction is issued, the Public Safety Commission in 
question must hold a public hearing concerning that injunction. The time and place 
of this hearing must be publicly displayed beforehand and the boryokudan member 
responsible for the alleged demands informed of the time, place and reason for the 
hearing. These hearings may, however, be held in private if it is thought necessary 
for reasons of confidentiality. If it is not possible to contact the böryokudan 
member in question or if he does not show up within thirty days of the public 
notification, then the injunction can be issued without recourse to a public hearing. 
A provisional injunction (kari no meirei) can also be issued in cases of great 
urgency when there is not time to arrange a public hearing. Provisional orders are 
effective for a period of no more than fifteen days within which time a hearing must 
be held. 
As well as dealing with "violent demands" by members of designated böryokudan, 
the Public Safety Commissions are able to issue injunctions concerning the use of 
gang offices. During times of inter-gang conflicts and if the Public Safety 
Commission judges that there is a risk that this office will be used for assembling 
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groups of gang members, command and control, or the storage or construction of 
weaponry concerned with this conflict, then it can issue an order lasting for up to 
three months preventing the use of this office. An injunction can also be issued if it 
is judged that office use during periods of inter-gang conflict endangers the public. 
This injunction can be extended for a further three months. 
Even during periods of peace there are certain restrictions imposed by this new law 
on the use of gang offices. Publicly displaying signs in the vicinity of gang offices 
(or inside in such a way that they can be seen by passers-by) that the Public Safety 
Commission judges likely to intimidate members of the general public are liable to 
a Public Safety Commission order for their removal. Acts in the vicinity of gang- 
offices, which are judged to similarly upset the general public, are also potentially 
subject to an injunction prohibiting their repetition. 
The penalties for violating an injunction issued by a Public Safety Commission 
under the provisions of this law are, at their most severe, up to one year 
imprisonment, a fine of up to one million yen or a combination of the two. Less 
serious violations carry the penalty of six months imprisonment, a fine of up to half 
a million yen or a combination of the two. For the least significant infractions a fine 
of up to two hundred and fifty thousand yen is payable. 
In addition to the provisions concerned with controlling boryokudan violent 
demands and limiting the use of their offices, the bötaihö also takes measures 
designed to encourage the eradication of these groups and assist their victims. 
Central to this end is the designation of Centres for the Elimination of Böryokudan 
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(Böryoku Tsuihö Undö Suishin Sentaa) in each administrative region (Todöfuken). 
Designation of a centre is at the discretion of the National Public Safety 
Commission but each region is to have no more than one centre and, to qualify, an 
applicant must meet certain minimum requirements. Firstly, it must be a legal 
entity (höjin) under the terms of the civil law. It must also have personnel with the 
necessary expertise and be otherwise capable of accomplishing the various tasks 
required of it. 
There are ten separate responsibilities that the centres are given under the provisions 
of the bötaihö and they are as follows: 
1. Running publicity campaigns to increase public awareness of the threat 
posed by böryokudan. 
2. Providing help to non-governmental anti-böryokudan movements. 
3. Holding discussions with, and offering advice to, victims of böryokudan 
demands. 
4. Taking measures to remove the harmful influence of böryokudan on 
juveniles. 
5. Taking measures to help böryokudan members who wish to leave. 
6. Operating training courses for employees of businesses particularly 
susceptible to violent böryokudan demands. 
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7. Providing assistance to the appropriate bodies dealing with information 
on böryokudan violent demands. 
8. Providing help for victims of böryokudan violent demands with civil 
suits, making contact with böryokudan groups to facilitate the return of 
goods and money, and providing sympathy money (mimaikin). 
9. Conducting training for youth instruction officers. 
10. Conducting the administration necessary for the above-mentioned tasks. 
Under the provisions of the law the National Public Safety Commission also 
designates a body as the National Centre for the Elimination of Böryokudan 
(Zenkoku Böryoku Tsuih6 Undo Suishin Senta). This centre is responsible for 
overseeing the operations of the regional centres, providing the necessary training 
for their specialist staff and conducting research on the social impact of böryokudan. 
REVISIONS OF THE BOTAIHO 
Since the law was introduced it has been revised twice, once in May 1993, and then 
again in May 1997. The purpose in both cases was, mainly, to expand the scope of 
the law to take into account ways that designated böryokudan had adapted their 
operations to avoid the main provisions of the bötaihö. 
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The 1993 revision had four main themes. The first of these was concerned with 
encouraging the process of secession and rehabilitation of members of these 
organisations. Whilst the original law had attempted to restrict the manpower of the 
designated böryokudan by prohibiting forcible recruitment of juveniles, it had not 
taken adequate steps to encourage secession and rehabilitation of gang-members. 
To rectify this the 1993 revision contained provisions prohibiting the obstruction of 
members wishing to leave their organisation. In particular, demanding either finger 
amputation or money as a mark of contrition before leaving, could be subject to an 
injunction. As both amputated fingers and body tattoos were identified as major 
obstacles to successful rehabilitation, demands that a juvenile member have a tattoo 
also came under the provisions of the revised law. In order that these provisions 
could be deployed against the gang-bosses and executives as well as ordinary kumi- 
in, it was also prohibited to request or order another gang-member to make these 
demands. 
The second measure of the 1993 revision was concerned with tightening up the 
provisions concerned with forcible recruitment of juveniles. It had become apparent 
that, ' rather than putting direct pressure on the juvenile in question, designated 
böryokudan members were putting pressure on close relatives or people with a close 
relationship (missetsu kankeisha) with that juvenile. Such activity was therefore 
included under the provisions of the revised law. Similarly ordering, entreating or 
relying on other people to make demands that a juvenile join a designated 
böryokudan group became liable to an injunction. 
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From the limited success at attempts to rehabilitate gang-seceders, it became 
apparent that the vaguely worded duty of the Centres for the Elimination of 
Böryokudan to "assist those people who wish to leave böryokudan" must be 
expanded. In particular the regional centres were required to provide the necessary 
advice to those gang members wishing to leave (ridatsu kibösha) and facilitate their 
transition to a normal social environment. The most important aspect of successful 
rehabilitation is employment; so the centres were also obliged to conduct public- 
awareness campaigns to reduce discrimination against former böryokudan 
members. It was also recognised that the centres would have to increase co- 
operation with related groups such as probation officers (hogoshi), corrections 
service (kyosei shidö), and the Employment Security Administration (shokugyö 
antei gyösei kikan). 
The final part of the 1993 revisions was the increase in the categories of violent 
demands covered by the provisions of Article nine. There were three new 
categories and they were a direct response to developments in böryokudan activity 
since the introduction of the bötaihö. The first of these prohibited designated 
boryokudan members from demanding that stockbrokers should let them conduct 
share-trading on credit or that they should waive the usual conditions for credit- 
trading (Article 9 paragraph 9). Secondly, demanding that companies sell shares, or 
demanding that shares be sold on favourable terms, also became liable to an 
injunction (Article 9 paragraph 10). Finally, in response to the increased 
involvement of böryokudan in auction-obstruction following the collapse of the 
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bubble (see chapter five), prohibitions were made against making demands for 
compensation with respect to leaving premises or removing gang paraphernalia 
(Article 9 paragraph 12). 
In addition several of the pre-existing categories of violent demands contained in 
Article 9 were expanded. Paragraph 5, concerning demands for bodyguard fees etc., 
now includes a prohibition against selling entrance tickets to böryokudan-connected 
shows or parties. Demands for discounts on the sale of promissory notes was 
included in paragraph 8 and the provisions of paragraph 14 were enlarged to cover 
making demands for compensation on a spurious or inflated pretext. 
Although the pre-revision law had forbidden non-gang members from asking, or 
hiring, designated böryokudan members to make violent demands, there were no 
provisions covering non-member participation in these activities. This was rectified 
in the 1993 revision, which made the act of assisting a designated böryokudan 
member to make violent demands liable to a bötaihö administrative order. 
The 1997 revision of the bötaihö contained five changes, which further expanded 
the scope of this law. The first of these was to create another category of demand 
coming under the umbrella of Article nine. This was the "collection of debts under 
unjust circumstances" (futö na taiyö ni yoru saiken toritate). Under Article 9 
paragraph 6 of the pre-revision law there had been provisions concerning the 
collection of debts that violated the Interest Limitation Law but not normal fully 
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legitimate debts. Under Article 9 paragraph 6.2 of the revised law, the use of 
"phone calls, visits and rough language or other actions causing a nuisance", by 
members of designated böryokudan demanding repayment of these debts, became 
actionable. 
The second change brought about by the 1997 revision was the widening of the 
scope of the possible subjects of Public Safety Commission injunctions. Under the 
original law, an injunction would be issued with respect only to the perpetrator of a 
violent demand. This meant that typically lower-level kumi-in would become 
subject to such injunctions whilst the higher authority responsible for directing 
violent demands would remain untouched. To remedy this it became possible 
under Article 12 paragraph 2 of the revised law to issue injunctions to those 
designated böryokudan members in positions of authority over those violating the 
provisions of Article 9 (jöisha sekinin seido). 
Since the introduction of the bötaihö, it had become clear to the authorities that a 
large number of designated böryokudan members were successfully circumventing 
the provisions of the law. This was achieved by what the NPA came to describe as 
"semi-violent demands" (jun-böryokuteki na yökyü). Semi-violent demands are 
those acts which would come under the provisions of Article nine were they to be 
carried-out by designated böryokudan members, but are carried-out by people who, 
though not members themselves, employ the threat of a designated group to 
reinforce these demands. The 1997 revision therefore took account of this 
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development by expanding the scope of Article 9 to include demands made by 
peripheral figures (shühensha) such as jun-kösei-in and kigyö shatei (Article 12 
Paragraphs 3-6). 
Due to the inclusion of semi-violent demands within the remit of Article 9, a further 
revision was to expand the provisions concerning assistance for victims of 
boryokudan demands so as to include people who had been subject to this class of 
demands (Article 13). 
Another trend in the post-bötaihö böryokudan was the further oligopolisation of the 
large wide-area syndicates. This process, combined with reduced opportunities to 
make money following the collapse of the bubble economy, meant that different 
groups within the same syndicate increasingly came into conflict with one another. 
This increased the risk of intra-syndicate warfare. Whilst, under Article 15 of the 
pre-revision law, it was possible to restrict the use of gang offices in times of inter- 
gang conflicts, intra-group struggles had not been included. This was rectified in 
Article 15-2. As will be shown in the next chapter, the timing of this was most 
fortunate for the police. 
ANALYSIS OF THE BOTAIHO 
As can be seen from the description of this law above, the bötaihö is a very different 
type of OC countermeasure from either the European model of outright 
criminalisation, or the American RICO statutes with their whole-organisation 
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prosecution and substantial seizure provisions. The fundamental difference is that 
both RICO and the European model are parts of the criminal legal code (although 
RICO also contains extensive civil components) whilst the bötaihö is an example of 
what the Japanese refer to as administrative law (gyösei h(5). The significance of 
this difference is that acts which violate the criminal law can be subject to 
prosecution and punishment whilst behaviour coming under the provisions of 
administrative law is subject to an injunction directing the perpetrator to stop. It is 
only when that injunction is violated that punishment can be administered. 
Comparatively, therefore, the bötaih6 seems at first glance to be an extraordinarily 
weak weapon in the fight against organised crime. It should however be noted that 
this law also differs from RICO in that it is essentially concerned with only one type 
of OC activity, namely the exploitation of a group's reputation in order to secure 
financial or other advantage. As has been noted above, these minbö-type activities 
fall short of extortion or intimidation as defined under the criminal law. It would be 
practically impossible to frame provisions under the criminal code which could 
effectively tackle this type of activity without the law also applying to legitimate 
social exchanges. Due to this fact, it is arguable the use of gyösei hö is more 
appropriate to deal with böryokudan intervention in civil disputes and other `grey- 
zone' operations. 
Whilst it is very different from the two foreign models, the bötaihö combines 
features of both. In creating a separate class of individuals who are to receive 
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different treatment under the law because of their connection with a criminal 
organisation, the bötaihö has similarities to the European model. At the same time, 
in creating a new category of actionable behaviour ("violent demands" or "pattern 
of racketeering") supposedly specific to OC groups, there are similarities between 
RICO and the bötaih6. Although the bötaihö is, in this respect, a hybrid OC 
countermeasure, it lacks the most potent features of either RICO or European-style 
criminalisation. 
From the comparative weakness of the penalties and the restriction of the bötaihö to 
one area of böryokudan activity, it is apparent that, ceteris paribus, the introduction 
of this law can not achieve the goal, declared by the police, of eradicating these 
groups. At best, and assuming that it actually works as described, it will only drive 
out gang participation in minbö, protection and those other categories of "violent 
demand" covered by Article 9, without reducing the many other, more overtly 
criminal, enterprises in which the boryokudan are engaged. 
In fact, there are very good reasons for believing that the bötaihö will fail to achieve 
even that. Firstly, and at a most basic level, it must be noted that the boryokudan 
have not refrained from acts just because they are out-with the bounds of legality. If 
we accept that economic rationality is applicable to OC groups3, then if the 
projected costs are only marginally raised by a change in the law (or level of 
3 An assumption that is more reasonable for OC groups than individual, disorganised criminals as a 
whole. 
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enforcement) and benefits remain constant and above expected costs (the costs of 
punishment multiplied by the probability of being caught), then little or no change is 
to be expected. It can be seen from the description of the bötaihö above that the 
penalties are light compared to those for either RICO violation or membership of a 
mafia-style association in Italy. Moreover, because böryokudan violent demands 
are first to be met with an injunction rather than a concrete penalty, there are no 
immediate material costs to making these demands until an injunction has been 
issued. It is, of course, possible that less tangible costs such as the loss of face 
incurred in backing down when confronted by an injunction may be taken into 
account. 
If the functionalist analysis expounded in chapter two is correct, then the 
relationship between OC and other socio-economic entities is complex and not 
entirely predatory. Although they may be overpriced, there are real services 
provided by OC groups especially to those for whom the law fails, or is unable, to 
provide adequate protection. In particular, those involved in mizu shöbai such as 
bars and sexual-entertainment establishments may rely on these groups for 
protection not just from OC predation but from problematic customers. To what 
extent the bötaihö can be expected to limit protection racketeering (mikajimeryö) 
can not therefore be determined a priori but it is unlikely to eliminate it totally. 
Despite these potential weaknesses, the botaihö was seen as "epoch making" 
(kakkiteki) by many commentators, both opposing and supporting this law (Boku 
1997,27; Ino 1992b, 50; Uchiyama et al in interview). This was not just because 
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the new law was targeting activities that were hitherto immune from legal 
intervention, or because of the novel way in which it tackled them. The bötaihö 
was seen as a clear break in that, for the first time, there was a legal definition of 
boryokudan and a law existed that specifically and explicitly identified these groups 
as a social evil to be subject to special controls. In addition, therefore, to the 
substantive provisions of the new law, the symbolic significance of the botaiho 
must be considered in evaluating the impact of this legal change. The full 
significance of this will be seen when examining post-bötaiho böryokudan 
behaviour. 
Although the bötaihö was passed unanimously by both houses of the Diet, this 
should not be interpreted as an indication of universal approval. In fact, it met with 
criticism both from those considering it excessive and from those who felt the new 
law to be risibly feeble and quite inadequate for the task of eradicating the 
böryokudan. Boku (1997,28) categorises these groups as the anti-control lobby 
and the pro-control lobby respectively. The anti-control group had effectively five 
main criticisms of the law: its conflict with the constitution; its potential extension 
to groups other than böryokudan; the increase in police powers it introduces: the 
possibility of the police hijacking the autonomous anti-böryokudan movement; the 
lack of attention to underlying causal factors and the role played in Japanese society 
by yakuza/böryokudan groups. 
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The major criticism of the new law put forward by those opposing the increase in 
state powers was that it conflicted with the constitution. Fukuda (1992,24) sees the 
attitude one has towards this law as a "litmus test" as to whether or not you 
understand the values on which the post-war constitution was based. 
Article 98 of the 1947 Constitution states: 
This Constitution shall be the supreme law of the nation and no law, 
ordinance, imperial rescript or other act of government, or part thereof, 
contrary to the prescriptions hereof, shall have legal force or validity. 
The charge that the bötaihö conflicts with the constitution is therefore a most 
serious one. Under Article 21 of the constitution the freedom of assembly and 
association is guaranteed. This is usually cited as the reason why the Japanese 
could not adopt a European-style law criminalising membership of a böryokudan 
group. It was argued by these critics of the bötaihö that this law interfered with this 
freedom and was therefore unconstitutional. Because the bötaih6 does not actually 
penalise membership per se, but acts which these members commit, this criticism 
can be questioned. What is much harder to refute is the argument that the new law 
conflicts with Article 14, which affirms the equality of all citizens under the law and 
that there shall be no discrimination "because of race, creed, sex, social status or 
family origin". The second criterion for böryokudan designation under the bötaihö 
is the proportion of members with a criminal record. This, it was argued, is a clear 
case of discrimination. Whilst this is the case, it should be noted that discrimination 
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against those with a criminal record is not specifically covered by Article 14 of the 
constitution. 
However, the equality-under-law argument seems more telling. Under the bötaihö, 
an action committed by the member, or following the 1997 revision, an associate, of 
a designated böryokudan is subject to legal prohibition, whilst this is not the case 
when the same action is carried out by a person with no böryokudan connection. 
That this conflicts with the letter and the spirit of Article 14 appears to be 
unambiguous. However, as can be seen from the existence of the Self Defence 
Forces despite Article nine's assertion that "land, sea and air forces, as well as other 
war potential, will never be maintained", it has long been possible to interpret the 
constitution in more than one way. 
The second main argument deployed by the opponents of increased legal controls 
was that these new powers would be deployed against not only böryokudan 
members but also left-wing groups and trade unions. This fear is based on historical 
precedents. For example, the 1926 Law Concerning the Punishment of Violent 
Activities (böryoku köi nado shobatsu ni kan-suru höritsu) was used to repress the 
labour movement during the early Showa period. This was despite the fact that at 
the time of its introduction the cabinet issued assurances that it was "a law to 
control yakuza.... it won't be applied to the left-wing movement" (Endo 1992,28). 
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Similarly, in 1958, the criminal law was amended to include the crime of 
assembling with lethal weapons. Contemporary Diet records show that the 
government made similar assurances that it was a law designed to control gang 
conflicts and would not be used to combat the left. However, two years later, this 
law was frequently used in an attempt to control students and unions during, and 
after, the Ampö disturbances (ibid. ). The way in which these laws have been 
employed out-with their original ostensible remit has left those on the political left 
with a deep-rooted suspicion of the police. 
To support this argument, a number of critics, such as Fukuda (1992,26) and Ino 
(1992b, 51), have pointed out that the foundations on which this law is built are 
vague; the two key definitions, "illegal violent activity" and "böryokudan" 
ultimately rest on the subjective interpretation of the National Public Safety 
Commission. "Illegal violent activities" are those illegal acts which are so defined 
at the discretion of the NPSC. Endo (1992,29-33) argues that many of the legal 
provisions included amongst those categorising illegal violent activities are 
practices which have traditionally been deployed against left-wing groups, including 
some that are not typical of böryokudan such as the use of fire-bombs. Moreover, 
employing the implicit threat of an organisation's power in order to gain some 
economic advantage, which is the central concern of Article 9, is hardly unique to 
the böryokudan; it is, for example, the raison d'etre for trade unionism. 
Police interviewees have pointed out that these arguments are groundless in that 
there is the additional, and more objective, necessary criterion for designation: the 
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presence of a given proportion of members with criminal records. Indeed, they 
argue that the reason for including this criterion was precisely to exclude the 
possibility that the law would be applied to suppress legitimate political expression. 
The third main criticism deployed against the bötaihö by the anti-control lobby 
follows on from the second. Given the widespread fear and mistrust of the police 
amongst left-wing and many liberal commentators, an extension of police powers 
will inevitably be a cause for alarm. From a reading of the law, it seems at first that 
at each stage of its operation there are checks on the police provided by the 
provisions requiring hearings and ratification by the various Public Safety 
Commissions. If these bodies actually operated as envisaged in the 1954 Police 
Law, then they would provide oversight of the bötaih6's implementation. However, 
as will be shown in chapter six, the work of the Public Safety Commissions is 
effectively carried out by the police. The checks provided for by the bötaihö are 
therefore an irrelevance. Because so much of the detail required for the actual 
operation of the law is `left at the discretion of the Public Safety Commission', and 
because the law provides for no appeals procedure further than the National Public 
Safety Commission, the introduction of the bötaihö does indeed represent a 
significant, unchecked increase in police powers. 
The introduction of the Centres for the Elimination of Böryokudan also came in for 
criticism from the anti-control lobby. It was argued that the official imposition of 
anti-böryokudan centres would stifle the pre-existing citizens' movements opposing 
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gang-activity. These movements had sprung up spontaneously as an expression of 
local communities' reactions to their own experiences of the böryokudan. Imposing 
bureaucratic or police control over these groups would radically change their 
character so that they no longer reflected the needs or aspirations of the 
communities from which they had sprung. 
Whilst there is nothing in the law which explicitly states that these centres will be 
police-controlled, the fact that designation of regional centres is in the power of the 
NPSC suggests that this would be a strong possibility. As will be shown in the 
following chapter, this has in fact happened and, despite formal independence, the 
regional centres are located within the prefectural police headquarters and the 
permanent staff are retired police officers. Whilst there may be ample justification 
for this on the grounds for expertise and experience, it does leave the police open to 
the charges of empire-building and generating amakudari positions for former 
employees. 
The final charge of the anti-control tendency was that the law is fundamentally 
flawed as an anti-böryokudan measure in that it fails to recognise the close links 
which exist between these groups and members of Japan's political, financial and 
law-enforcement communities. As has been discussed, attempts to eradicate OC 
without adequately dealing with the various aetiological factors, can not be expected 
to meet with complete success. If the bötaihö were really to be judged as the central 
pillar in a böryokudan eradication programme, then this criticism would be 
pertinent. However, if we accept that it has the more limited aim of removing 
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böryokudan from civil disputes and legitimate industry, this argument loses its 
relevance. 
It can also be argued that the work for which the Centres for the Elimination of 
Böryokudan are responsible includes tackling some of the broader social 
considerations concerning the böryokudan's place in Japanese society. It is 
debatable, however, how effective public-awareness campaigns and training of 
employees responsible for dealing with böryokudan can be when their employing 
companies are benefiting from links with these same groups. As the Centre's 
propaganda implicitly accepts when it exhorts the public "don't make use of 
böryokudan", these groups can be useful. A comprehensive böryokudan- 
eradication programme must take this into account. 
The yakuza themselves took on board these arguments as well as putting forward 
several of their own. There were essentially three supplementary arguments 
employed by böryokudan groups against the new law. The first of these is that they 
provide a valuable control function within the Japanese underworld. They operate 
as employers of last resort to violent, ill-educated and otherwise unemployable 
young males, subjecting them to a hard code of discipline and control. Without this, 
these individuals would be wandering the streets causing random trouble. It is true 
that newly-inducted trainees are subject to a harsh regime of training in which 
correct manners are beaten into them. However, this argument lacks the validity it 
would have had in the days when the primary sources of yakuza income were 
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gambling and festival stall-holding. In an age of minb6 and corporate blackmail, 
the question must be asked whether centrally-controlled, organised violence is 
preferable to its disorganised, random equivalent. 
The second yakuza critique of the bötaihö was that the protection role they have 
traditionally played within the entertainment industry has had the valuable social 
side-effect of policing the streets of their respective nawabari. Gang-members 
argued that, without this service, the level of disorganised street-crime would rise as 
there would no longer be an effective deterrent to juvenile delinquents. Similarly it 
was argued that, with the disappearance of yakuza from the mizushöbai industry, 
their place would be filled with less-scrupulous Chinese and other foreign OC 
groups (Ino 1994,10-15). 
Even if we accept that there is a policing function, this argument is open to question 
on the grounds that, if the böryokudan actually provide a service within the 
miaushöbai industry, then the bötaihö is not likely to have any noticeable effect on 
boryokudan participation in this sector. With respect to displacement by Chinese 
OC groups, it can be argued that these groups can equally be subject to designation 
as böryokudan under the provisions of the bötaihö as well as those of the criminal 
law (though admittedly police intelligence concerning these groups is harder to 
accumulate than that for the native Japanese groups). 
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A more significant criticism of this law coming from the gangs themselves is that 
the effect of the law will be to exacerbate the problem that they pose both to the 
police and the wider Japanese society. Driven out of business activities at the 
margins of legality and unable to make open use of their gangs' reputations, gang- 
members will become increasingly reliant on income from amphetamines and theft 
in order to survive. As they become more overtly criminal in nature, the 
böryokudan will necessarily sink further underground and become increasingly like 
America's LCN (which, the yakuza insist, they have never resembled). The bötaihö 
will therefore prove to be counter-productive. 
As has been seen from the description of police anti-böryokudan efforts in the 
1960s and `70s presented in chapter three, as well as the general discussion of the 
problems of OC countermeasures provided in this chapter, increased enforcement in 
one sector of OC activity can result in displacement to new areas of criminality. 
This may well result in a net loss to society. Therefore this prediction seems highly 
plausible, and cannot be refuted a priori. For this reason, special attention must be 
paid to this point when examining the effects of the bötaihö. 
On the other side of the ideological barricades, the pro-control lobby criticised both 
the liberal and left-wing proponents of the arguments above as anachronistic 
yakuza-apologists, and the law itself for its lack of teeth. Although the arguments 
outlined below are largely derived from Kam (1991), they are representative of 
views held by senior police-related interviewees unable to speak on-record. The 
first major drawback, according to this perspective, is that the most potent items 
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contained in the research group's report, `Basic Considerations', were dropped from 
the final legislation. With the watering down of the law the "movement to eradicate 
the böryokudan ends up as a mere declaration" (Kato 1991,52). 
In particular the failure to include provisions for seizure of böryokudan assets was a 
major object of criticism. On this point the pro-control critics bifurcate into those 
who demanded the introduction of a tough RICO-style law and those who suggested 
that this was unnecessary as the existing criminal law already contained provisions 
for seizure (Article 19). It was argued by the second group that these little-used 
provisions should be more proactively deployed against boryokudan. The problem 
with this line of argument, the RICO advocates point out, is that the existing law 
would fail to deal with the considerable assets held by top-level bosses and 
executives derived from jönökin (ibid. 53); under the provisions of Article 19 of the 
criminal law, only assets that can be directly linked to crimes can be seized 
(Bbryokudan Taisaku Roppo 1997,480). 
KatO also attacks the failure to include outright criminalisation of boryokudan 
membership in the new law. Having gone to the trouble of providing a legal 
definition of böryokudan clearly identifying them as criminal organisations, why 
stop at administratively curtailing their `violent demands'? Given that the 
constitutionality of the bötaihö is already questionable, and that the constitution is 
interpreted loosely in other areas, the argument that criminalisation would violate 
the constitution's guarantee of freedom of association lacks force. It seems 
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reasonable to assume that there are therefore more practical reasons for excluding 
this measure from böryokudan countermeasures. 
One such reason is that, despite the apparent simplicity. of criminalisation, there are 
clear operational problems in applying it within the Japanese context. Police figures 
for 1989 give total böryokudan membership of 86,552 identified men (Keisatsu 
Hakusho 1989,15). The Japanese prison population in the same year was only 
45,736 (Hanzai Hakusho 1997,252). Would criminalisation result in almost 
trebling the overall prison population? Regardless of the cost of such a measure, 
would it be desirable? In the vacuum left by mass böryokudan incarceration what 
sort of groups would appear to meet consumer demand and take control of legally 
prohibited markets? Even mass-fines could overload Japan's creaky judicial system 
to the point of collapse. 
KatO argues that even if a criminalisation law is not introduced, it is possible to 
employ the Subversive Activities Prevention Law (hakai katsudö böshi ho or, more 
simply, haböhö) to order the disbanding of organised crime groups. This law has 
largely fallen into disuse, because of its discredited history as a tool for attacking 
left-wing students and other radical groups, and its use remains politically sensitive. 
It would indeed be ironic for it to be used as an anti-böryokudan measure, because 
politicians had mobilised a shock-force of tekiya street-fighters to counteract the 
demonstrators trying to prevent this law's enactment. 
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It is similarly argued that other laws, already existing in the criminal code, could be 
more robustly employed to drive böryokudan groups out of existence. KatO 
identifies the 1926 Law Concerning the Punishment of Violent Activities (böryoku 
köi nado shobatsu ni kan-suru höritsu) as being particularly useful since it includes 
provisions dealing with collective violence and the showing of a group's threat 
(Article 1), customary and collective blackmail and intimidation in interviews and 
discussions (Article 2) and entrusting others to commit acts of violence (Article 3) 
(B6ryokudan Taisaku Roppö 1997,516). As mentioned above, although this law 
was used largely to suppress left-wing dissent, at the time of its introduction it was 
claimed to be a law specifically to combat the yakuza. Although Kato claims that 
Article 2 of this law could be used to deal with minbö and sökaiya scams, the way in 
which many of these activities are at the margins of legality would make practical 
application very difficult. It is precisely this grey-zone which the bötaihö is 
designed to tackle. 
It would be satisfying to show that the existing criminal law contained all the 
necessary provisions to adequately combat the böryokudan. If this were the case 
then it would be reasonable to conclude that the bötaihö had been introduced for the 
purely symbolic reason of showing, to both the domestic and international audience, 
that the authorities were `getting tough' with the böryokudan. Several academic as 
well as senior and retired law-enforcement-related interviewees asserted that the 
legal structure prior to the bötaihö was indeed sufficient to control these groups. 
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However, it is by no means certain that courts would accept stretching the law to 
encompass scams which the yakuza had painstakingly developed to avoid infringing 
those same laws. In this respect, the bötaihö does seem to have a role that is not 
adequately filled by other laws. 
The criticism that the existing laws should be employed more robustly does not 
seem to be a coherent criticism of the b5taih6. The introduction of this new law 
does not logically preclude a more aggressive use of these other laws. The mistake 
of many critics of the bötahihö was to fall under the spell of its hype and to see it as 
an all-encompassing böryokudan-countermeasures law. If we view it more 
realistically as one weapon in a wider armoury, then this criticism loses relevance. 
Whether the introduction of the bötaih6 was matched with stricter enforcement of 
other laws, will be investigated in the following chapter. 
Kato's final criticism of the bötaih6 was that it did not include provisions covering 
those areas not adequately dealt with under the existing law; money-laundering, 
electronic surveillance and police sting operations (otori sösa). Limited money 
laundering provisions had been introduced into the drugs legislation of 1991 as will 
be discussed in chapter six. Chapter six also details the constitutional problems 
with wire-tapping and legal prohibitions on sting operations. 
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CONCLUSION 
The bötaihö, despite its description as epoch-making, is a comparatively mild OC 
countermeasures law. Compared to either the European model of criminalisation, 
or the United States' RICO statutes (both of which were highly influential in the 
debate within Japan on framing new OC laws), its scope and penalties are small. 
Given that this is the case, the question must be asked whether the authorities are 
serious in their professed aim of böryokudan eradication. For a comprehensive anti- 
bbryokudan drive, the introduction of the bötaihö would need to be accompanied by 
significantly increased use of the existing criminal law. 
The influence of gaiatsu and the reaction to repeated political scandals as catalysts 
in the creation of this law suggest that a certain degree of symbolism may be 
involved. However, it seems fair to accept that the new law does have a role to play 
in reducing the adverse effects of böryokudan intervention in the private and 
business affairs of law-abiding members of society. To what extent this has been 
successful will be examined in the following chapter. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
HEISEI YAKUZA - BURST BUBBLE AND BOTAIHO 
SCANDALS 
Around the same time as the bötaihö was being prepared and passed through the 
Diet, a succession of scandals came to light which provided the world with a 
glimpse of the nature of the relationship that the b6ryokudan enjoyed with both 
business and political elites. These incidents also illustrated clearly that the police 
estimates for böryokudan income discussed in chapter three significantly 
underplayed the amounts of money that these groups were generating from financial 
and business sectors through both the provision of various protection services and 
more straightforward extortion. Most significant of these incidents were the 
Sagawa Kyübin scandal (with its related scandals of the Kbmintb and Heiwa Sogo 
Ginkö incidents) and the Itoman scandal. 
Although throughout the early post-war period of the 1950s and 1960s, the links 
between politicians and underworld figures had been, more or less, openly 
displayed, since the 1970s it had been generally felt that such open connections 
were no longer an electoral asset. By 1979, when Stark was conducting his 
fieldwork, the operation of the böryokudan-centred `clique' occurred behind closed 
doors. Whilst cases of böryokudan-related politicians appeared from time to time, 
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they tended to involve individuals who had fallen into serious debt and lacked more 
acceptable financial backing. However, the complex web of the Sagawa Kyübin 
scandal revealed that the two most powerful and well-funded politicians in Japan at 
the end of 1980s were making direct use of the boryokudan. 
In 1992, prosecutors started investigating the activities of Sagawa Kyübin, a parcel 
delivery company. During the course of these investigations it became apparent 
that, in 1989 Watanabe Hiroyasu, the then president of Tokyo Sagawa Kyubin, had 
provided Kanemaru Shin, then LDP vice-president and king-maker, with ¥500 
million (£2.2m) in cash. Approximately one hundred other politicians also received 
money, totalling more than ¥2 billion, from Watanabe including those in positions 
of influence in the Ministries of Transport and Labour. Because of the highly 
regulated nature of this particular industry, Sagawa Kyübin had found it prudent to 
maintain good relations with important political figures'. Watanabe also used his 
connections with Kanemaru to keep Tokyo Sagawa Kyübin's bankers from causing 
trouble over the company's outstanding debts, which at the time stood at around 
Y500 billion (£2.2bn) (Japan Access 31/8/1992). As the investigation continued 
however, it revealed more than a simple case of business-political corruption. 
In May 1987, a party was held at the Tokyo Prince Hotel in Minato ward as part of 
Takeshita Noboru's campaign to gain the LDP nomination for Prime Minister in the 
forthcoming general election. During the course of this event, seven armoured 
' As mentioned in chapter two, this type of business is also highly susceptible to delays and pilfering. 
As a consequence, Sagawa Kyobin also paid Ishii Susumu, head of the Inagawa-kai, to protect 
deliveries against these eventualities. 
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trucks equipped with public-announcement equipment (sendensha) circled the hotel 
with their speakers blaring out exhortations to "support Takeshita for prime-minister 
for the straight reform of politics". Over the following months, these trucks cruised 
round Nagatacho, Japan's political centre, encouraging people to "make Takeshita 
prime-minister - in all Japan he's the best at making money". Far from furthering 
Takeshita's political ambitions, the purpose of this campaign was to destroy 
Takeshita's career with a tactic known as `homegoroshi' (killing with praise). 
This black propaganda campaign was launched by an obscure extreme right-wing 
organisation, of about forty members, from Kagawa prefecture called the Nihon 
Komintö (which translates roughly as the Emperor's Subjects' Party of Japan). This 
group had been founded by the former Shirakami-gumi gang under-boss (gashira), 
Inamoto Torao, who had left his gang, to follow a political career, when it was taken 
over by the Yamaguchi-gumi in the early 1970s. Inamoto retained his links with his 
former gang through gang-boss Shirakami Hideo, who became the Nihon 
Komintb's advisor. He also held a brother relationship with Takumi Masaru, then 
one of the most important and able men in the Yamaguchi-gumi who occupied the 
post of gashira hösa (assistant under-boss) and later became gashira (under-boss). 
In response to the Kaminto's homegoroshi, a number of parliamentarians from 
Takeshita's faction approached Inamoto to try and persuade him to cease this attack. 
Most notable of these politicians was Hamada Koichi, who had formerly been a full 
member of the Inagawa-kai and still retained a nodding acquaintance with the 
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underworld. Despite this persuasion, Inamoto refused to call his trucks back to 
Kagawa prefecture. 
Therefore, late in the summer of 1987, Kanemaru approached Watanabe, the Tokyo 
Sagawa Kyabin president, and discussed the problem with him expressing the fear 
that if the Komintb continued to undermine Takeshita, then prime minister 
Nakasone might withdraw his nomination of Takeshita as his successor. In 
response to this, Watanabe suggested that Ishii Susumu would be the person best 
qualified to deal with the Kamintb. Kanemaru therefore entrusted Watanabe to seek 
Ishii's help. 
In turn Ishii approached Mikami Tadashi, the boss of an Aizu-kotetsu sub-group, 
with whom Ishii enjoyed a close relationship. Mikami also knew Inamoto and was 
therefore capable of introducing the two men. Inamoto refused to accept money but 
agreed to stop his propaganda campaign if Takeshita were to go and apologise to his 
former patron, Tanaka Kakuei, for betraying him. Mikami fixed the day for this 
visit for October the fifth. However, when Takeshita went to make his apology, he 
called it off at the last minute due to the large number of press reporters waiting at 
the gates for him. Eventually, the following day, Takeshita appeared at the gates of 
Tanaka's compound in Mejirodai to pay his respects only to find that, once more, 
the assembled ranks of the press were waiting for him. Both Inamoto and Mikami 
had tipped them off. 
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In February the following year, Kanemaru approached Ishii directly to resolve 
another problem. Hamada Koichi, the former Inagawa-kai member and 
parliamentarian, had publicly called a colleague a murderer. Kanemaru wanted 
Hamada to resign from his position as chairman of the Lower House Budget 
Committee as penance for this and secured Ishii's help in persuading him to do this. 
Ishii was also responsible for silencing right-wing criticism of Kanemaru following 
his trip to North Korea in 1990. In December of 1988, Kanemaru personally 
thanked Ishii by inviting him to a high class Japanese style restaurant. The public 
testimony given later by one of those present reveals that both Kanemaru and Ishii 
offered the other the place of honour at the head of the table. Furthermore 
Kanemaru praised Ishii's `thing' as `real chivalry' (Mizoguchi 1997,114-125; 
Kyödo 1993,118-128; Schlesinger 1997,246; Reuters 05/11/1992; Japan Access 
10/08/1992). 
These extraordinary revelations beg two questions: firstly, why did Inamoto launch 
his negative publicity campaign against Takeshita? Secondly, why did Takeshita 
and Kanemaru treat such a small and insignificant political group as the Komintb so 
seriously? The usual answer provided at the time by the press to the first question is 
that Inamoto was outraged by the way in which Takeshita had betrayed his mentor 
and patron, Tanaka Kakuei. Takeshita had secretly created a faction within the 
Tanaka faction and, alongside Kanemaru and their lieutenant Ozawa Ichirb, used 
this to usurp Tanaka's position as power broker and financial fountainhead. The 
fact that Inamoto refused offers of ¥3 billion (£12.6m) at the time (though he later 
- 292 - 
received a small `political contribution' of ¥50 million from Ishii) would seem at 
first glance to support that2. 
Kyddo (1993) however suggests an alternative explanation that Inamoto had had a 
financial relationship with Takeshita's office in his home constituency in Shimane 
prefecture. This had later been terminated and Inamoto intended to wreak his 
revenge on Takeshita for this. Kyödo cites the executive of the Nippon Seinensha, a 
right wing organisation with links to the Sumiyoshi-kai, to illustrate the prevalence 
of this type of link in Japanese politics: 
In elections, a number of LDP candidates are running in the same 
constituency. If a local right wing group backs one candidate, then other 
right wing groups quickly appear on the scene. Nearly all LDP Diet 
members have these links3. However, in front of the microphone, they make 
out that böryokudan and right wing extremists are disgraceful. 
(Kyödo 1993,130) 
If this hypothesis were correct, it seems probable that other commentators would 
have picked up on the Komintcö's links to Takeshita. Admitting this link to the 
public prosecutors during the subsequent investigation of this scandal would have 
2 This need not necessarily follow. When targeting banks with propaganda trucks, right wing groups 
frequently refuse money from their first victims so as to make it easier to collect money from future 
victims. 
3 Yamada Hitoshi, head of the Japan Bar Association's Baryokudan Countermeasures Committee, 
suggests that the current level of LDP parliamentarians with links to extreme right-wing groups is 
between 10-20% (interview Tokyo, 1998). 
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been perhaps the best revenge that the Kbmintb could bring on Takeshita. 
Another, more murky, explanation is put forward by Mizoguchi Atsushi in "Gendai 
Yakuza no Ura-chishiki" (1997) in which he connects the Kbmintcö incident to an 
earlier scandal surrounding the take-over of the Heiwa Sbgb Bank (hereafter HSB) 
by the Sumitomo Bank in 1986. By 1985 HSB was extensively debt-ridden and 
threatened by take-over. It did however have an extensive network of branches in 
the Tokyo area and this made it attractive to Sumitomo Bank which lacked a strong 
presence in the capital. After a power struggle within the company, Komiyama 
Eiichi, whose family had founded the firm, retired and sold his 33% holding of HSB 
to one of the bank's major creditors, Sato Shigeru, for Y8 billion (£26m) in 1985. 
Sato, president of Kawasaki Teitoku, was a businessman with extensive connections 
within both the legitimate and underworld economies. 
Within the HSB a group of senior executives was desperate to reject the attentions 
of Sumitomo. To this effect they contracted Ishii Susumu to prevent a take-over. 
This was facilitated by the fact that Ishii felt a debt of gratitude towards the bank 
after it had helped finance his mistress's mansion block whilst Ishii himself had 
been in prison. 
In order to secure their position, HSB also made efforts to purchase Sato's 33% 
block of shares. Satö, however, refused to sell. HSB was then approached by 
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Manabe Toshinari, director of Yaesu Gallery in Tokyo. Manabe was a friend of 
Sato's and claimed that if HSB purchased a gold lacquer-work folding-screen, he 
would persuade Sato to sell the shares. The price Manabe demanded for his folding 
screen was Y4 billion (£13m) whilst it had an estimated market value of only 
¥120m. At the negotiations for this sale was Takeshita's private secretary, Aoki 
Ihei. At the time Takeshita was Minister for Finance and had the power to block or 
approve the proposed take-over. Part of the money from this sale was shared out by 
Sato and various Takeshita-related politicians and it is widely believed that 
Takeshita also received a cut. 
Despite this, the shares were not sold to HSB. Moreover, Ishii had been persuaded 
to drop HSB. This was accomplished by giving him the chance to fulfil his lifelong 
ambition, that of owning a golf course. HSB owned a subsidiary company, the 
Taiheiyb Club, which owned a number of courses throughout Japan. Once it had 
taken over the HSB in August 1986, Sumitomo Bank disposed of Taiheiyö Club's 
assets and agreed to sell the Iwama Country Club Development Company to 
Watanabe of Tokyo Sagawa Kyübin for ¥4.8 billion (£19.4m). The company was 
placed under the management of Sato and a trusted associate of Ishii's. Not long 
after the development permission had been obtained in 1988,60% of this company 
was obtained by one of Ishii's front companies (Kyödo 1993,94-115; Mizoguchi 
1997; 119-125, Tokyo Business Today 12/1994). 
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Mizoguchi argues that, having been swindled over the sale of the folding screen, the 
HSB executives resisting Sumitomo's take-over, made use of their right-wing 
connections to strike back at Takeshita for permitting the take-over. This is made 
credible by the fact that HSB had earlier made use of the right-wing fixer Toyoda 
Kazuo to lobby the Diet over a scheme involving one of HSB's bad investments. 
Toyoda had been responsible for introducing Inamoto's former gang boss and 
Kamintb political advisor, Shirakami Hideo, into politics (Mizoguchi 1997,21). 
A further twist to this scandal was provided by Ishii in 1989 when the Iwama 
Country Club issued receipts for fake membership licences through which Ishii 
raised ¥38.4 billion (£170m). The companies from which Ishii received this money 
included two of Japan's largest securities companies, Nomura and Nikko, as well as 
Tokyo Sagawa Kyubin and two large construction companies. These 
`memberships' were essentially worthless as the Iwama Country Club was public 
and did not operate a system of preferential membership. For all of these firms, 
however, Ishii had provided bodyguard or trouble resolution services (Nakagawa 
1992,234). 
With this money, Ishii started to purchase shares of Tökyü Dentetsu, a railway and 
property holding company. By the end of 1989, Ishii's holding in this company had 
reached 29 million shares (26% of the company). Nomura Securities then ramped 
the value of these shares by advising other clients to purchase Tokyo Dentetsu. By 
November 1989 the share value peaked at ¥3,060 making Ishii's block worth on 
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paper ¥88.74 billion (£6.5bn). Unfortunately for Ishii, however, in January of 1990 
the Tokyo Stock Exchange collapsed before he had realised this capital gain. 
It seems that Ishii then sold the shares to a company belonging to his business 
partner Sato with the intention of pressuring Tokyo Dentetsu to buy them back at a 
higher price (a technique known as green-mailing). When this did not happen, Sato 
later claimed that Inagawa-kai personnel came back to him and requested that he let 
them handle the situation. These Inagawa-kai executives implied that they would 
kill some Tökyu bosses, if necessary, to encourage the others. Sato apparently 
persuaded the yakuza not to follow this strategy through (Kyödo 1993,241-2; Tokyo 
Business Today 12/1994). 
The other case with which we are concerned is the Roman scandal. This incident 
was the largest single financial scandal in post-war Japanese history and resulted in 
an unprecedented flow of capital from the legitimate economy to the böryokudan 
and their associates. Although the full details of this incident remain unclear (due to 
Sumitomo Bank's taking over the Itoman Corporation before too many 
embarrassing revelations became public), enough is known to show another 
important facet of modern böryokudan fund raising activity. 
Ito Suemitsu was a typical product of the bubble economy of the 1980s. After 
aggressively expanding his father's wedding hall business in Hokkaido, Ito quickly 
diversified into real-estate speculation in the Tokyo area and elsewhere. In 1985, he 
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made his biggest investment by purchasing 1,300 square metres in the Ginza area of 
Tokyo for ¥83.8 billion (£273m), on which he built a large development, the 
Ginichi Building. This building was then used by Ito as a never-ending source of 
funds. 
In 1988, Ito raised a loan of ¥27 billion (£118m) using the Ginichi Building as 
collateral. He then lent this money to Ikeda Hbji, a former member of the 
Yamaguchi-gumi and, at the time, a business brother (kigyö shatei) of the same 
organisation. Not long after this, Ito also became a business brother of Takumi 
Masaru, the Yamaguchi-gumi's under-boss (gashira). It was at this point that the 
financial scandal began. 
When Ikeda disappeared that year, Ito was left with Ikeda's collateral, shares in a 
sightseeing company, but no capital. However, in 1989, Nagoya Itoman Real-estate 
Corporation gave Ito ¥46.5 billion (£206m) in exchange for equal rights on the 
Ginichi Building which it wanted to use as its new Tokyo headquarters. In June the 
following year, Ito was made a director of Itoman. Thereafter, Itoman was 
systematically raped by Ito and his associates. Artwork was purchased at several 
times its market worth; money lent without adequate security; and equal rights on 
other properties held by Ito transferred for large sums. By the time of Ito's arrest in 
July 1991, it was estimated that between ¥500 - 600 billion (£2.1- 2.5bn) had been 
diverted from Itoman to the criminal economy. Of that, ¥200 billion (£840m) had 
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reached the Yamaguchi-gumi (Mizoguchi 1998,193-6; Tokyo Business Today 
12/1994). 
Taken together, these three incidents show the extent to which the modern 
böryokudan were playing an integral role in the operations of both business and 
political life. They also show that, whilst in the case of the Roman scandal the 
relationship between böryokudan groups and legitimate commercial interests may 
be wholly predatory, this may not always be the case, and both political and 
business elite groups have been unforced consumers of the protective services that 
these groups provide. Moreover, as can be seen by the behaviour of Nomura 
Securities, these firms may be willing accomplices in the questionable business 
practices of böryokudan groups. 
Most significantly (and disturbingly) for the purposes of this research is, however, 
the glimpse allowed by the Kbmintb incident into the relationship between the elite 
power-brokers of the Liberal Democratic Party and Ishii, then head of one of 
Japan's largest criminal syndicates. In a world where such individuals are disputing 
over who should occupy the seat of honour at banquets in high class restaurants, the 
sincerity of the political establishment in its avowed commitment to eradicate the 
böryokudan must be viewed with suspicion. This must be borne in mind whilst we 
look at the introduction and implementation of the botaihö. 
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There are further grounds for scepticism as to the likely effectiveness of the bötaihö, 
in the light of what these three scandals show us about the nature of böryokudan in 
the Heisei period. In particular the use of front companies and business associates, 
such as kigyö shatei, meant that such activities are not only harder to identify, but, 
until the second revision of the bötaihö in 1997, fell outside the provisions of the 
new law altogether. 
BURSTING OF THE BUBBLE 
The analysis provided in chapter three of the various ways in which böryokudan 
make money shows clearly that, by the end of the 1980s, they were actively 
involved in many areas of the legitimate economy. Therefore, as mentioned above, 
an appraisal of the bötaihö's impact on the böryokudan is made problematic by the 
effect of economic changes occurring around the time that the law was 
implemented. The most significant of these was the collapse of Japan's speculative 
bubble. From its peak in February 1989, the Nikkei index fell by 63% in just 
eighteen months whilst, between 1990 and 1994, the total market value of Japan's 
land dropped from ¥2,389 to ¥1,823 trillion. It has since been estimated that, in 
sum, this crash resulted in a total theoretical loss in value of ¥800 trillion (£3.1 
trillion) (Hartcher 1998,98-100). 
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REAL-ESTATE AND STOCK MARKET SPECULATION 
In chapter three it was claimed that, by the late 1980s, the largest single source of 
revenue for the böryokudan was generated through land-sharking (jiage). With the 
collapse of land prices, this activity dried up, as property developers no longer saw a 
profit in large projects. Chapter three also relates how the more ambitious and 
capable böryokudan members were themselves involved heavily in real-estate and 
stock market speculation. Frequently their investment portfolios had been high risk 
ones, which were entirely dependent on ever-booming stock and real-estate markets: 
money would be borrowed to invest in real-estate; this would then be used as 
collateral for further loans to reinvest in shares or more land. 
When the markets crashed, böryokudan were left holding property which was worth 
a fraction of their total outstanding debt. It should of course be emphasised that this 
investment strategy had not been unique to the böryokudan, and many businesses 
and individual investors were left with debts that they were quite incapable of 
repaying. As we shall see, however, böryokudan debtors represented particular 
problems to their creditors. 
The most spectacular manifestation of the yakuza-related bad debt problem came to 
light with the collapse of the housing and loans companies known as jüsen. Düsen 
first appeared in the early 1970s to fill a gap in the market for housing loans4. As 
4 Japanese banks had traditionally confined themselves to a business clientele and had ignored small 
businesses and individual consumers. 
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non-bank financial institutions, jüsen were unable to take deposits and were 
therefore dependent on other institutions, such as the banks - under which most of 
these companies had been set up - for loans, which could then be re-lent to 
customers. 
During the 1980s, however, the business environment in which the jüsen existed 
underwent a profound change. Businesses no longer relied on banks for finance, 
but started to raise capital by share issues in the buoyant stock market. As a 
consequence the banks were forced to seek other customers for bank loans and they 
came into direct competition with the jüsen companies. This seriously undermined 
the jüsen's market; because the jüsen had been dependent on bank loans to finance 
their lending, the banks were able to offer more competitive rates of interest to the 
final customer. Furthermore, many jüsen had been dependent on their parent banks 
to introduce customers to them. 
The jüsen were therefore obliged to lend to those businesses that failed to raise all 
their capital requirements from banks. Such businesses tended to be those where 
the risk of failure was higher. However, such was the desperation of jüsen 
companies for business, the level of scrutiny of prospective customers was low. In 
financing real-estate investment, however, jassen reasoned that, with land as 
collateral, even if the debtor could not repay the loan, they would be able to recover 
their costs. This was, of course, dependent on continued high land prices. 
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By 1990, the Ministry of Finance (MOF) became worried about the level of land 
prices and, in March that year, it issued administrative guidance to the finance 
industry to restrict the funds made available to real-estate speculators. 
Unfortunately MOF left a loophole in this arrangement by not placing any 
restrictions on jüsen to borrow from agricultural co-operatives (nokyo) and pump 
this money into the real-estate market. The volume of money flowing through this 
route quickly swelled as the agricultural co-operatives had confidence that the jüsen, 
which were subsidiaries of the top banks in the country and headed by former elite 
MOF officials, knew what they were doing (Mabuchi 1997,10-5). 
Unfortunately this was not the case: 
All seven top jüsen commonly made loans against collateral with a value 
lower than that of the loan itself. They made loans to borrowers whom they 
knew to be using false names. They loaned for speculative stock buying, for 
pachinko parlours ... and for sex hotels. Many loans were made to 
companies associated with politicians. Most of the jüsen loans made after 
the 1990 restriction were paid to the companies of criminal syndicates 
(Hartcher 1998,128). 
By January of 1996 the total scale of the bad debt held by the seven jüsen 
companies was estimated at Y6.4 trillion (£38bn). In addition these companies had 
a further ¥2.1 trillion of non-performing but salvageable loans (Australian Financial 
Review 23/01/1996). The proportion of this which was yakuza-related was not 
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clear. One sample of 93 loans made by the Sojo Jükin Company contained 40 
which had been made to böryokudan (National Business Review 15/03/1996). 
Whilst it would be unsound to extrapolate from this small statistical base to 
conclude that 43% of all jüsen bad debt is held by böryokudan members, this sort of 
proportion is in the mid-range of journalistic estimates (generally between one third 
and a half) as to the total scale of the problem. MOF sources cited by the South 
China Morning Post (31/05/1998) admitted that `yakuza gangs and their front 
companies borrowed at least five trillion yen' from the jirsen. 
When the names of the main jüsen debtors were eventually made public, the largest 
single borrower was an Osaka-based property development company called Sueno 
Kösan. Suenö Kbsan had taken ¥186 billion (£1.1 bn) from five jüsen companies as 
well as ¥54 billion from other sources. Such was the strength of suspicion that 
Suenb Kösan's president was himself a böryokudan affiliate that a press conference 
was arranged by him to deny these charges (Los Angeles Times 24/02/1996). 
Whatever the accuracy of these protestations, it was clear that several of the 
company's buildings were occupied by Yamaguchi-gumi sub-group members whilst 
the nominal ownership of many of the most valuable assets had been transferred, 
therefore rendering the loans irrecoverable (Hartcher 1998,128). 
Whilst the jüsen debacle was the most spectacular manifestation of Japan's bad debt 
problem, it was just one aspect of it. Although Japanese accounting practices allow 
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banks and companies to conceal much of their debt5, by July 1998, the official 
figure for bad debts held by Japan's banks and non-bank financial institutions, was 
put by the new Financial Supervisory Agency at ¥35 trillion (£162bn) (Financial 
Times 18/07/1998). Although journalistic estimates vary widely from between 80% 
(Los Angeles Times 14/2/1996) and 5% (Daily Yomiuri 05/08/98), the most 
frequently quoted estimate of the degree of böryokudan involvement with this total 
was 40%. This commonly accepted figure seems to be based on a survey of 49 
loans carried out by an American private security and investigation company, Kroll 
Associates, for a prospective investor client. This survey was cited in an article by 
David Kaplan in US News and World Report in April 1998. This article was then 
picked up by a number of newspapers and magazines, both in Japan and outside, 
and, as a consequence, the 40% figure has acquired a quasi-official status. 
The small statistical base on which this figure is built does not engender confidence. 
However support for this 40% figure comes from Miyawaki Raisuke, formerly of 
the NPA and currently a consultant on baryokudan-related problems, who suggests 
that 10% of bad debt is directly tied to böryokudan groups whilst 30% has some 
probable, indirect, connection (Financial Times 12/12/1995). The differences 
between these two types of involvement will be discussed below. 
In December 1995, Newsweek magazine published an article which effectively 
s Changes in accounting regulations introduced this fiscal year (1999-2000) (requiring Japanese 
companies to consolidate the finances of subsidiary companies in their annual accounts) and the 
following financial year (in which assets must be valued at market value rather than book cost) are 
expected to alleviate these problems (Economist 27/12/99). 
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blamed Japan's bad debt problem and attendant economic woes on the böryokudan. 
This is clearly not the case; the böryokudan were simply part of a wider 
phenomenon of reckless speculation. If blame is to be apportioned, it should by 
directed largely at the banks, non-bank financial institutions and MOF bureaucrats 
for their lamentably poor scrutiny and regulation. Böryokudan involvement does, 
however, make this problem much harder to resolve. 
In August 1993, Koyama Toyosaburb, vice president of Hanwa Bank, was shot 
dead on his way to work. Koyama's duties had included recovering debts and, 
although his assailant was not apprehended, at the time it was widely accepted that 
his death was caused by böryokudan. Several months before his death, Koyama had 
been responsible for approving a ¥590 million loan to a real-estate company run by 
the wife of a Yamaguchi-gumi sub-boss, Nishihata Haruo. This approval had been 
granted because Nishihata's group had been instrumental in silencing a monthly 
political magazine, which had been running a serial campaign exposing various 
scandals associated with the bank. It is possible that his death was related to this 
incident. Mizoguchi (1998,192) however reveals that there were various other 
böryokudan-related problems concerning Hanwa Bank. Most alarming is the 
disclosure that bitterly competing factions within the bank made use of political 
organisations and böryokudan to thwart their rivals. When, in 1996, MOF 
announced that Hanwa must stop trading, a list of `special investments' contained 
categories for böryokudan and political group debts. 
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Also in 1993 a number of fire-bomb attacks on Sumitomo Bank executives' homes 
were recorded. Several branches were disrupted after their locks were filled with 
glue. In September the following year, Hatanaka Kazufumi, the manager of the 
Nagoya branch of the Sumitomo Bank, was shot dead as he opened his front door to 
talk to what he thought was someone apologising for damaging his gate with his 
car. Police investigating this murder, convinced that the bank was not entirely 
forthcoming with relevant information, took the unusual step of impounding 
Hatanaka's desk and filing cabinets. An NPA official, writing under the pseudonym 
of Sakurada Keiji, attributes the bank's reticence to the links Sumitomo had forged 
with böryokudan figures during their highly aggressive business activities in the 
years of the bubble economy. Sakurada further floats the hypothesis that the murder 
relates to Sumitomo's involvement in the Heiwa Sop Bank Scandal (Tokyo 
Business Today 12/1994). 
However, Yamada Hitoshi, head of the Japan Bar Association's anti-böryokudan 
committee, more plausibly identifies the cause of the Hatanaka killing in this way: 
Sumitomo had a policy of collecting collateral no matter what and they 
started using crime syndicates to collect on loans connected to other crime 
syndicates. Sumitomo's loan collection efforts drove the head of the Aizu- 
kotetsu gang into suicide in Kyoto and then another gang leader killed 
himself in Tokyo. At this point, gangsters started to realise they could be 
next so they murdered the Nagoya branch manager who had been most 
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aggressive at trying to collect on such loans (South China Morning Post 
31/05/98). 
As a consequence of this attack, MOF granted Sumitomo Bank permission to write 
off ¥500 billion (£3.2bn) worth of boryokudan-related debts tax-free. The other 
major banks were also all allowed to similarly write off their most problematic 
loans (ibid. ). In total, by 1997,21 major financial institutions had been allowed to 
write off Y20.5 trillion (£103.5 bn) (Konishi 1997,101). 
When attempts were made by the present writer to confirm this analysis of the 
Hatanaka murder at the NPA, one interviewee chuckled that Sumitomo was by no 
means exceptional in its links with böryokudan. 
This type of problem has not been confined to Japanese financial executives. In 
1998, there was a spate of newspaper articles concerning increased interest amongst 
foreign investors in salvaging problem Japanese loans. This was, in part, stimulated 
by an attack on two employees of Kroll Associates who were investigating the 
ownership of various properties in which their clients were interested. In another 
case, in 1997, a fire at the home of an executive of Cargill, a large American 
company which had invested in Japanese bad debt, was widely interpreted as 
böryokudan-related arson though no arrests were made. By May 1998, Ishizawa 
Takashi, of the Long Term Credit Bank's economic research division, was reported 
as claiming that American financial institutions investing in Japanese bad debt were 
subject to five attacks per month (South China Morning Post 31/5/1998). Shükan 
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Jitsuwa (25/6/1998) claimed that two representatives of the American CIA had been 
sent to Japan earlier that year to gather information and liaise with MOF about 
böryokudan involvement in Japan's bad-debt problem. 
The circumstances surrounding the murders of Koyama and Hatanaka illustrate two 
important points. Firstly, that, in the words of lawyer Miyazaki Kenro: 
Generally speaking, if a company has trouble with yakuza, it is fair to 
assume that it had a friendlier relationship with them in the past.. . This 
cynical marriage of convenience is at the root of the troubles besetting the 
Sumitomo group and others... . The rule is: if you hire yakuza for any reason, 
you leave yourself open to attack by them later on (Tokyo Business Today 
12/1994). 
Secondly, that the collapse of the speculative bubble and the consequent economic 
recession generated new business opportunities for the böryokudan, in this case, an 
increased market for debt collection, just as established economic activities, such as 
jiage, lost viability. The rapid adaptation of the boryokudan to the changing 
economic climate illustrates once more the highly flexible and amorphous nature of 
organised crime. These developments will be considered below. 
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BANKRUPTCY MANAGEMENT 
The level of bankruptcies in Japan, always high by international standards, became 
more severe in the 1990s. As can be seen from table 5.1 below, although the 
number of bankruptcies grew only moderately, the total value of liabilities shot up 
dramatically. There was therefore considerably more scope for money to be made 
from this type of activity than had been the case during the 1980s. 
Table 5.1 Bankruptcies in Japan 1987-1997 
Year Number of 
Bankruptcies 
Liabilities (Ybn) Liabilities/GDP (%) 
1987 12,655 2,122 0.6 
1988 10,122 2,001 0.53 
1989 7,234 1,232 0.30 
1990 6,468 1,996 0.46 
1991 10,723 8,149 1.77 
1992 14,069 7,601 1.61 
1993 14,564 6,848 1.44 
1994 14,061 5,629 1.17 
1995 15,108 9,241 1.91 
1996 14,834 8,124 1.62 
1997 16,464 14,054 2.76 
Japan Economic Institute of America, 1998 
Although bankruptcy management is a specialised area of böryokudan business 
dealt with in chapter three, this type of shinogi became potentially more lucrative 
during the 1990s. It also experienced changes since the late 1980s and therefore 
merits revisiting here. Despite the larger pot of money available, in various ways 
bankruptcy management has become harder than in the 1980s (Yamada 1994b, 
300). Mizoguchi (1998,190-1) identifies a number of reasons for this. The first is 
that companies increasingly rely on lawyers to oversee their liquidation. 
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Alternatively, companies may undergo the procedure set up under the provisions of 
the Company Resuscitation Law. In addition, the police böryokudan counter- 
measures sections (bötaishitsu), set up in the early 1990s, are prone to intervene 
quickly when they suspect böryokudan involvement in bankruptcy management. 
Finally, and perhaps most significantly, Mizoguchi claims that people are now less 
afraid of böryokudan. 
As a consequence of these problems, it is easier instead to attach oneself to a 
company before it goes bankrupt and exploit it from the inside. A classic case of 
this was the Roman scandal discussed above. 
AUCTION OBSTRUCTION - KYOBAI BOGAI 
In the light of these problems facing böryokudan should they involve themselves 
with bankruptcy management, other techniques for exploiting bankrupt companies 
have come to prominence. The most significant of these has been böryokudan 
obstruction of property auctions (kyöbai bögai). This type of activity can take many 
forms but effectively kyöbai bögai involves artificially depressing the value of a 
property to be sold. The ability to do this can be profitable to böryokudan in three 
different ways. Firstly, they may continue to use the property as before following 
the auction's collapse. Secondly, they may hope to acquire the property cheaply 
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and then sell it on at its market price. Thirdly, they may be paid money to vacate 
the premises by those wishing to sell it. 
Originally, auction obstruction had been rampant in the real-estate industry, leading 
to the creation of the term kyöbaiya to describe individuals involved in this 
business. These specialists would turn up at auctions and intimidate other potential 
purchasers. If a property had not been sold on the first day of auction, its reserve 
price would drop by 20%. Kyöbaiya would make use of this fact to purchase 
property cheaply. In 1979, in an attempt to clean up this business, a system of 
sealed bids (kikan nyüsatsu) was adopted under which, it was hoped, such 
intimidation would no longer be possible. However, as we have seen before, a 
change in the law does not necessarily eradicate a problem; more frequently it 
causes the form that the crime in question takes to change. In this case, the auction 
specialists evolved into occupation specialists (senyüya). 
There are five main ways in which böryokudan come to occupy property under 
threat of auction. The most direct route is for the böryokudan group or individual 
members themselves to have purchased the property concerned with borrowed 
money that cannot be repaid. The property is then lawfully occupied by the group 
concerned, or let to another group. 
Alternatively, böryokudan might enter premises via the high-interest-rate-lending 
route. As a company's financial position deteriorates, it will often turn in 
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desperation to high-rate money-lenders with böryokudan connections or 
böryokudan themselves. As collateral the lenders will acquire the short-term 
leaseholder's rights to the property. This is the classic mechanism by which 
böryokudan become involved in auction obstruction. 
The third way in which criminal syndicates can occupy threatened property is 
through their involvement in conventional bankruptcy management. Having hi- 
jacked a financially distressed company, the böryokudan `consultant' uses the 
company's seals to dispose of its assets and therefore take control of the property. 
Surprisingly enough, property owners themselves frequently approach böryokudan 
groups, enter into conspiracy with them and grant short-term rights to them. In 
these cases, the objective is to deter the owner's creditors from closing in and 
recovering their debts. In many cases of problem real-estate-related loans, the 
properties in question have multiple mortgages on them. Should the property be 
sold, the first mortgage holder will recover nearly all of the revenue from the sale 
whilst the third and fourth mortgage holders receive little. These lower priority 
mortgage holders may therefore sell their rights to böryokudan. 
The final way in which böryokudan may come to occupy a property is by simply 
pretending to be a legitimate company or ordinary occupants. 
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In order for leaseholders' rights to be effective, they must have been established 
prior to the decision to sell the property in question. Frequently, therefore, the 
contract is forged to predate the announcement of auction. Forged contracts usually 
contain clauses empowering the occupant to sub-lease and alter the building's 
interior. Such forgeries are difficult to detect if the böryokudan group is working in 
conspiracy with the owner or has hijacked the company. 
Once occupation has been achieved, the standard practice is to advertise the fact by 
displaying böryokudan affiliation from windows and on doorplates. Alternatively, 
an armoured public-announcement truck festooned with right-wing paraphernalia 
parked outside the property provides a clear signal to prospective purchasers. A 
name card, showing gang-affiliation, may be inserted in the public notification of 
sale. If these tactics prove insufficient, more direct intimidation remains an option, 
though this runs the risk of criminal prosecution. More sophisticated occupation 
specialists may prefer to entrench their position by establishing a factory on the site 
and claiming special rights due to the scale of capital investment. If the aim is to 
reduce the value of the property this may simply be achieved by damaging it in 
some way or dumping industrial waste around it. 
The increasing number of cases of property subject to civil execution procedure 
shows the potential for this type of activity. During the bubble period there were 
between 1,500 and 2,000 new cases each year dealt with by the Tokyo district court. 
By 1993, this figure had increased to about 6,000 and, in the first eight months of 
1998,5,100 (Ishibashi 1998,119). Moreover, the low economic costs and legal 
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risks, combined with the high potential rewards, of this business make it an 
attractive form of shinogi. 
Like many other areas of böryokudan activity, gangster occupation of buildings can 
be highly difficult to deal with under Japanese law. In particular, the way in which 
Japanese law provides greater protection to tenants than landowners enables this 
type of activity to be profitable to böryokudan. However, under the criminal law, 
cases of forged documents, falsifying official documents and forcibly obstructing 
civil proceedings can be prosecuted. In addition, in recent years the courts have 
become prepared to interpret intimidation more flexibly. This can be seen from the 
1991 Matsuyama district court ruling that the insertion of a böryokudan name card 
into the binding of a report on the particulars of real-estate for sale was intimidation 
(Konishi 1997,110). 
In most cases, however, the onus is on the civil law to deal with cases of 
böryokudan occupation of property. Here also there is perhaps a tendency to a more 
robust application of the available laws by the authorities. This is suggested by the 
first case of forced eviction of böryokudan from an occupied property in July 1997. 
The Housing Loan Administration Corporation (HLAC, Jüsen Kinyü Saiken Kanri 
Kikö or Jükan Kikö)6 successfully persuaded Kumamoto District Court that the 
occupation by böryokudan members of rooms in a mansion block was tantamount to 
6 The quasi-governmental organisation set up in 1996 to dispose of the problem loans of the jüsen 
debacle. 
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auction obstruction as the value of the property had fallen dramatically as a 
consequence. The following month, the HLAC won a case in Kanazawa forcing 
baryokudan to vacate premises used as a gang office (Konishi 1997,99). In 
addition to the more robust stance taken by the courts, credit for these successes 
should be attributed to the HLAC. Under its ex-lawyer president, Nakabo Kohei, 
the HLAC adopts the uncompromising stance vis-ä-vis this problem that has been 
conspicuously lacking in Japanese banks. 
There is also evidence that, in recent years, the police have attached greater priority 
to böryokudan activity of this type. In February 1996, the NPA set up the Kinyü 
Furyö Saiken Kanren Jihan Taisaku Shitsu (Finance and Bad Debt-Related Crimes 
Countermeasures Room) to deal with this problem. Possibly as a consequence of 
this, the number of arrests made by the police for crimes of this type has risen 
dramatically since 1996. This is shown in Table 5.2 below. It is probable that this 
increase reflects this change in priority rather than a change in the level of actual 
crimes of this type. Despite the rise in arrests, it should be noted that the absolute 
numbers are small in proportion to the scale of the problem. 
Table 5.2 Arrests for Böryokudan Finance and Debt Reclamation-Related Crimes 
1994-98 
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Total 8 18 55 79 85 
Debt-Reclamation-Related 6 13 51 77 74 
Finance-Related 2 5 4 2 11 
Keisatsu Hakusho 1999 
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Although the legal climate in which auction obstruction occurs is slowly changing, 
it still remains a significant problem for the resolution of Japan's bad-debt crisis. 
Even if the occupation is clearly illegal, it is difficult to deal with. As will be 
discussed in greater depth in the concluding chapter, this is because the civil law 
procedures to deal with problems of this type function so slowly and expensively, 
that it is frequently more cost-effective either to pay the occupants to leave or to hire 
another böryokudan group to solve the problem. 
Konishi likens the relationship between obstruction and its legal countermeasures to 
that between a virus and its vaccine: the virus quickly evolves immunity to the latest 
vaccine (1997,109). As has been shown in preceding chapters, the same could be 
said for böryokudan countermeasures generally. 
LOSS-CUTTING - SONGIRI 
In addition to auction-obstruction, another development in böryokudan economic 
activity, which can be directly attributed to the economic consequences of the 
bubble bursting, is the appearance of loss-cutting specialists (songiriya). The way 
in which songiri operates is perhaps best illustrated by an example cited during an 
NHK special investigation into böryokudan business associates. During the bubble 
period financial institution `A' lent ¥350 million to company `B' managing a 
mansion block. With the collapse in the bubble economy, the company was unable 
to repay the loan and the collateral became worth a fraction of the outstanding debt. 
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At this stage the songiriya appeared. Having gained the appropriate powers of 
attorney from the financial institution, this individual negotiated with the debtor and 
persuaded it to settle the debt with a payment of Y40 million (merely 11.4% of the 
outstanding debt not including interest payments). The debtor paid a further ¥20 
million to the songiriya as thanks for reducing its debt burden by so much. 
This type of activity is legal. This begs the question, why is it an activity dominated 
by böryokudan and their business associates? The answer to this is that, although it 
is not illegal, to be effective it relies on the implied threat of böryokudan 
association. The further obvious question is why creditor and debtor don't negotiate 
directly. Each would have been better off by ¥1O million if they had cut out the 
middleman and settled the debt with a Y50 million pay-off. It seems likely that the 
reason that this does not happen is the debtor has, in some way, a connection with a 
b6ryokudan. In other negotiations, covertly filmed during the programme, this was 
indeed the case. 
The figures given in the NHK example seem questionable. More plausible are those 
given by Hinago (1998,166) in which his songiriya interviewee suggests a debt of 
Y5 billion might be reduced to ¥3 billion for which the songiriya might receive 3% 
(Y90 million). This seems in line with the 3% commission that böryokudan 
typically received for jiage services or from construction companies. Hinago's 
source also claims that with the exception of Tokyo Mitsubishi Bank, all of the 
large banks are prepared to deal with songiriya. 
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Regardless of which of these two sources is more accurate, it is clear that this 
business is highly lucrative. The songiriya interviewed during the NHK special 
claimed an annual income of over ¥100 million. 
It is important to note that the post-bubble developments in böryokudan economic 
activity require a degree of financial expertise. Though there will always exist a 
niche within the organised criminal economy for those whose skills are confined to 
the deployment of violence, the opportunities for such individuals within this new 
environment are now reduced. Whilst the böryokudan elite may be economically 
secure, what will the implications be for an under-employed mass of unskilled 
böryokudan? This becomes especially pertinent when we consider that the bötaihö 
specifically targets those activities which make use of the implicit threat of these 
thugs being unleashed. The unequal nature and highly divergent levels of ability 
within böryokudan society is a most important consideration in our evaluation of the 
effects of economic and legal changes on it. This should be remembered during the 
following discussion on the implementation of the bötaihö. 
THE BOTAIHO 
Even before the introduction of the new law, the böryokudan were taking measures 
to minimise any adverse impact on their operations. Of the large syndicates, the 
Yamaguchi-gumi took by far the greatest steps to prepare for the new law 
(Mizoguchi 1992b, 246). Towards the close of 1990, at a monthly meeting 
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(teireikai) attended by all direct members of the Yamaguchi-gumi, the executive 
committee (shikkö-bu) warned those assembled, each of whom was a gang boss in 
his own right, that a new law was under consideration. In order to protect the 
headquarters from the threat of RICO-style seizure, it was decided to purchase third- 
generation boss Taoka's house and register it in the names of all direct members. 
To this end, at the beginning of 1991, each member contributed ¥1O million 
(£42,000) (Yamada 1994b, 183-4). 
At the monthly meeting on the 5 March 1991, by which time the `basic 
considerations' had been published, the meeting went on for longer than usual and it 
was reported that the discussion had concentrated on ways in which to deal with the 
proposed new law. The day after the meeting, the executive committee sent fax 
messages to each of the sub-bosses responsible for the regional blocks instructing 
them that gang signs were to be removed from the outside of all gang offices. By 
the tenth of March, roughly half of the 1,500 Yamaguchi-gumi gang offices around 
Japan had complied with this (Yamada 1994b, 183-6). This was clearly to pre-empt 
the provisions of what became Article 29 of the bötaihö which made the display of 
gang paraphernalia susceptible to the threat of a Public Safety Commission 
injunction. 
In addition, each regional block was instructed to set up a study group to examine 
the new law's provisions. This increased the importance of the regional blocks, 
which had hitherto largely existed for the twin purposes of ensuring good 
communications and fostering amicable relations between the various groups within 
a certain geographical area (in much the same way as the Kanto Hatsuka-kai). Just 
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before the implementation of the bötaihö, the monthly meeting of all direct group 
members was also cancelled in favour of block-level meetings. The new law 
therefore stimulated the move to an increasing role for the regional blocks and we 
can therefore say that the law has caused not only operational change, but also 
organisational restructuring within the Yamaguchi-gumi. 
Under the guidance of the criminal defence lawyer Endo Makoto, the headquarters 
also formed an eleven-man study group including the gashira, Takumi Masaru, and 
headquarters' chief, Kishimoto Saizo. 
At the April 1991 general meeting, the direct members were issued with further 
instructions to sever all connections with the police, not to co-operate with them at 
all and not to let them into gang offices without a search warrant. Although the 
Yamaguchi-gumi had long had a far worse relationship with the police of Osaka and 
Hyöga prefecture than that enjoyed between the more politically savvy Tokyo 
syndicates and the MPD, a limited degree of communication and co-operation had 
existed. Following the April directive, all such co-operation officially ceased. 
Whilst it severed its relations with the authorities, the Yamaguchi-gumi put effort 
into establishing better relations with the other major criminal syndicates. During 
May and June, senior executives played golf and had meals with their peers in the 
Inagawa-kai and Sumiyoshi-kai. On 27 September 1991, senior representatives of 
the four largest syndicates, the Yamaguchi-gumi, the Inagawa-kai, the Sumiyoshi- 
kai and the Aizu-kotestu, held a `gokudö summit' at a restaurant in the Asakusa area 
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of Tokyo. At this meeting it was agreed, amongst other things, not to cause 
annoyance to ordinary members of the public, not to invade each other's territory, 
and not to accept as gang members those individuals who had been expelled from 
other groups. It was clear that the böryokudan were, above all else, attempting to 
minimise the risk of inter-syndicate conflict (Yamada 1994b, 406; Japan Access 
13/1/1992; Mizoguchi 1992b, 252). 
The following year, on the 22 February, a larger, secret `gokudö summit' of about 
forty senior boryokudan figures was held somewhere in the Kansai area. As well as 
the bosses of the four syndicates mentioned above, in attendance were the leaders of 
the other three syndicates ear-marked by the police for the first-wave of designation 
under the bOtaihö. These were the Kyösei-kai, the Goda-ikka and the Kudorengo 
Kusano-ikka (based in Hiroshima, Yamaguchi and Fukuoka prefectures 
respectively). Together these syndicates comprised over half of the total 
böryokudan strength as identified by the police. Apart from a general agreement to 
refrain from inter-group conflict and upsetting the ordinary public, it is not clear 
what was discussed at this meeting (Yamada 1994b, 245-6). However, from the 
widely different reactions to the process of designation, it is reasonably clear that no 
workable agreement as to a common front in opposition to the bötaihö was 
achieved. 
In addition to high-level diplomacy within the böryokudan world, the Yamaguchi- 
gumi launched a charm-offensive aimed at affecting public opinion. As part of this 
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strategy, the syndicate donated money, including ¥10 million from Watanabe 
Yoshinori, to various charities and emergency appeals (something that Taoka had 
done in the mid-1960s just after the launch of the first summit strategy but had not 
been carried out since)7. The Yamaguchi-gumi also set up a political organisation 
`The National Purification League' (Zenkoku Kokudo (5ka Domei), supposedly 
having the purpose of eradicating drugs. To establish this league, as well as provide 
a fighting fund to deal with the new law, all direct members were required to pay 
Y20 million in addition to their normal jönökin (Mizoguchi 1997,57). 
In January 1992, Yamaguchi-gumi gashira Takumi Masaru sent a secret fax 
message to each of the 115 direct members instructing them that they were to 
establish a corporate identity with the headquarters sited on the sub-gangs' offices. 
The deadline for this was the end of the month. Although the message ended with 
instructions that it be destroyed once the contents had been confirmed, the full text 
was leaked to the press. As a consequence of this, sensitive messages are no longer 
sent by fax but are transmitted by word of mouth or telephone (Yamada 1994b, 
240). 
The urgency of this message reflects the strong sense of unease at the time that the 
new law would make it impossible to operate gang offices. Under Article 15, in the 
event of an inter-gang conflict, offices could be closed for three months. If the 
office in question also housed a registered business, forced closure of the premises 
' The Yamaguchi-gumi later achieved a notable public relations coup following the catastrophic 
Hanshin earthquake of 1995. Whilst the national government was dithering as to how best to 
respond to this crisis, the Yamaguchi-gumi was distributing free food, disposable babies nappies, 
milk and water from outside its Kobe headquarters (Reuters News Service 22/1/1995). 
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might be opposed on the grounds that it infringed economic freedoms. This unease 
as to the security of offices was matched with widespread pessimism amongst 
böryokudan that a number of their traditional income sources would be completely 
severed under the new law (criminal defence lawyer interview, Kobe, 1998). 
By the beginning of February 1992, over half of the direct Yamaguchi-gumi groups 
had followed these instructions and had registered companies8. Most of these were 
ostensibly involved in finance, construction, real-estate and bar/restaurant 
management (the sectors long-associated with böryokudan front-companies). There 
were however a few exceptions from this pattern including companies managing 
old-folks' homes, ceremonial events halls, a missing persons retrieval agency and 
aerobics classes (Yamada 1994b, 240-1). The organisation's head-quarters had itself 
set up a joint-stock company in March 1991. Under the directorship of direct group 
boss and senior executive Katsuragi Masao, the company (named `Yamaki') was 
involved in leasing reception halls, managing golf practise ranges and dealing in 
men's jewellery (Mizoguchi 1992b, 251). 
Other gangs formed religious groups. An executive from the Yamaguchi-gumi 
direct group Hisshin-kai, for example, made himself a missionary of the `Watoku- 
kyokai' and installed a branch at the gang office. There were also numerous 
articles, later confirmed by interviews with legal experts and police sources, 
8 The fact that not all direct groups had met Takumi's deadline suggests that the nature of control 
within the Yamaguchi-gumi is by no means absolute. Events to occur later show this even more 
clearly. 
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reporting that many böryokudan gangs were forming right-wing political 
organisations. 
In February, the month before the law came into force, the Yamaguchi-gumi 
leadership produced a guide to the bötaihö, `Concerning the New Böryokudan Law' 
(Böryokudan Shinpö ni Tsuite), which was distributed to all sub-groups. This 
document provided the reader with advice as to how to avoid the provisions of the 
law. Within the month, police in the Hybgo area had managed to seize a copy 
(Reuters News Service 18/02/1992). 
These various preparatory measures imposed a certain degree of strain on relations 
within the syndicate. In particular the financial cost of setting up a company 
combined with making payments for the purchase of Taoka's house, the 
establishment of the drug-eradication group and the bötaihö countermeasures fund, 
caused a certain degree of resentment amongst Yamaguchi-gumi direct members 
(interviewees Osaka 1998, Tokyo 1999). Because these changes followed closely 
after the appointment in 1989 of Watanabe Yoshinori (second-generation boss of 
the Yamaken-gumi) as successor to fourth-generation boss Takenaka Masahisa, 
much of this resentment has been directed at the new leadership. Mizoguchi 
(1992b, 253) suggests that the reason for the leak in information concerning the 
Yamaguchi-gumi's preparations for the new law can be explained by this 
unhappiness. 
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The bötaih6 can therefore be said to have had a significant impact on the 
Yamaguchi-gumi. This impact was most immediately visible in terms of changes in 
the syndicate's establishment of various legal fronts but extended to important 
changes in diplomatic relations both with other syndicates and the legitimate world. 
Perhaps of only marginally less importance is the psychological impact wrought by 
the threat of this new law; not only was the organisation put on the back foot but, 
within the syndicate itself, there were rumblings of discontent at the ever-increasing 
demands for money from the head-quarters leadership. 
The two big syndicates on the eastern plain, the Sumiyoshi-kai and the Inagawa-kai 
did not show the same degree of concern as the Yamaguchi-gumi. One Tokyo- 
based gang-leader interviewed on television claimed that "the new law might be a 
nuisance but it won't really have much effect on us yakuza, we'll just take new titles 
like president and manager" (Reuters News Service 2/3/1992). 
This difference in attitude is perhaps due to the less confrontational, more politically 
sensitive, posture adopted by the Kanto syndicates. As mentioned in chapter four, 
the Inagawa-kai leadership blamed the Yamaguchi-gumi for being the cause for the 
introduction of the law so it is possible that they also felt that the main brunt of the 
law would be borne by them as well. It should however be noted that thorough 
structural reorganisation was less necessary for the Tokyo syndicates as many sub- 
groups had operated behind business fronts for some time before 1992. Ishii 
Susumu, to take the most well-known example, had juggled his business affairs 
between numerous front companies. 
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INTRODUCTION OF THE BOTAIHO - DESIGNATION 
The difference between east and west can also be seen in the attitudes taken by the 
big three syndicates towards designation. On the 10th of April 1992, public hearings 
were held in Tokyo and Kobe under the provisions of the bötaihö. At the Tokyo 
hearings Tanaka Keizö, representing the Inagawa-kai, declared that "we are yakuza, 
not crime organisations. Ours is a chivalrous group that dates back through 
history". Nishiguchi Shigeo, head of the Sumiyoshi-kai, urged for caution in the 
application of the law, arguing that foreign crime syndicates might displace the 
yakuza were they to be undermined. He further asserted that "if you disturb the 
balance the drug problem will increase". Inagawa-kai executive, Mori Izumi, took a 
more legalistic approach arguing that the law infringed constitutionally guaranteed 
human rights (Yamada 1994b, 247; Reuters News Service 10/4/1992). However, the 
Tokyo syndicates' more politically accommodating attitude is reflected by Tanaka's 
statement that "whatever the law might be, the laws decided on by the state are 
humbly and solemnly accepted". Once they had been designated as böryokudan, 
the Tokyo syndicates accepted the fact. 
In contrast, the Yamaguchi-gumi adopted a more aggressive stance. In a thirty- 
minute presentation to the Hyogo Prefectural Public Safety Commission, 
Yamaguchi-gumi gashira, Takumi Masaru, attacked the new law on three grounds. 
The first of these was to assert that the Yamaguchi-gumi was a chivalrous 
organisation imbued with the spirit of helping the weak and crushing the strong. In 
support of this line he mentioned the gang's re-assertion of public safety on the 
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streets of Kobe straight after the war, as well as the more recent efforts to eradicate 
drugs and donations to victims of natural disasters. 
The second argument adopted by Takumi was the rejection of the law's validity on 
the grounds that it conflicted with the constitution. These arguments have been 
discussed in detail in chapter four but essentially concern the principles of equality 
before the law and freedom of association. 
The third ground for the syndicate's ineligibility for designation was a more subtle 
organisational point. Takumi asserted that the Yamaguchi-gumi itself only 
consisted of the (at that time) 115 direct members, all of whom had ritually 
exchanged cups with the fifth-generation boss, Watanabe. The Yamaguchi-gumi 
had no direct control over, or responsibility for, the activities of the members of the 
various sub-groups. Consequently, it was inappropriate to simultaneously designate 
the direct Yamaguchi-gumi group and its various sub-groups. 
Although the ninkyö-dantai and unconstitutional defences were essentially the same 
as those adopted by the Inagawa-kai, the Yamaguchi-gumi differed in that they 
refused to accept the legal validity of this designation and launched a suit at Kobe 
District Court to challenge the new law. Similarly, groups in Fukuoka, Naha and 
Kyoto took legal action in an attempt to overturn the law. This is illustrative of the 
difference in general cultural characteristics of the böryokudan in the west and east 
of Japan. 
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One notable exception to this pattern is the behaviour of small Osaka-based 
gambling organisation, the Sakaume-gumi. This group, which numerous 
interviewees from both sides of the law asserted had very good diplomatic relations 
with the authorities, adopted the same acquiescent stance exhibited by the Kanto 
groups. At the public hearing concerning the group's designation, the top executive 
representing the Sakaume-gumi stated that "it is the duty of the people to obey the 
laws decided on by the state. If the Sakaume-gumi fulfils the conditions for 
designation, then we will have no option but to accept it" (Shükan Jitsuwa 
14/10/1999). 
On 4t' March, the NPSC confirmed that all of the big three syndicates satisfied the 
criteria for designation and on the 23rd their designation as böryokudan was 
published in the Official Gazette. The following month, the Yamaguchi-gumi 
appealed to the NPSC to review its decision. After this appeal was rejected in 
October, the Yamaguchi-gumi met with its legal team and the case was submitted to 
Köbe District Court on 26th November. After nine hearings, spread out over more 
than two years, it was finally decided to drop the case at the Yamaguchi-gumi top 
executives meeting in January 1995. Three months later, the Hyögo prefectural 
Public Safety Commission held public hearings on the re-designation of the 
Yamaguchi-gumi; the syndicate did not send a representative to argue its case. 
Those gangs which did pursue their legal challenges of the bötaihö to a final verdict 
all met without success. Whilst the plaintiffs had argued that the rights guaranteed 
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by the constitution were absolute, the defendants argued that they were conditional. 
In the rulings given by all the courts concerned, the judges, whilst recognising the 
rights of the various plaintiffs, stressed that these rights were circumscribed by the 
rights of others: 
It is difficult to deny that böryokudan rely on violent activities and, 
accordingly it is clear that they exist by violating the basic human rights of 
individuals. To externally manifest this philosophy is unpardonable. Even 
though there is the basic human right of freedom of expression, which is 
guaranteed by the constitution, it is only proper that this be intrinsically 
limited to accord with other human rights. Moreover, it is understood that, 
for the general welfare of society, i. e. `to preserve the safety and peace of 
civic life', it is permitted to have reasonable limitations on the smallest scale 
necessary (Fukuoka District Court 28th March, 1995 ex Yamaguchi 1997a, 
70). 
Because the b6taih6's system of administrative regulation imposed only light 
penalties for violations, and the freedom to be member of a böryokudan group itself 
was not denied, the restrictions were seen as limited, reasonable and necessary. The 
argument that legal rights and freedoms can be reasonably limited in order `to 
preserve peace and social welfare' was based on a Supreme Court ruling of 22 "d 
June 1983: 
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What it is that makes this limitation accepted as necessary and reasonable, 
should be decided on the degree to which the limitation is necessary for the 
public good, the quality and contents of the restricted freedoms, the real 
nature of the restrictions and their comparative weights (ibid. ). 
Naha and Kyoto District Courts' rulings, of 17 `h May and 29th September 
respectively, both concurred with the decision of Fukuoka. 
The Aizu-kotetsu group in Kyoto also attempted to have its designation overturned 
on technical grounds. In February 1997, following the retirement of Takayama 
Tokutarö and the succession of Zugoshi Toshitsugu, the syndicate officially 
changed its name from Yondaime (fourth-generation) Aizu-kotetsu to Godaime 
Aizu-kotestu. Because of this change in name, the group appealed to Kyoto District 
Court that the designation was no longer valid. This was rejected by the District 
Court in July and, after the syndicate had appealed, by the Kyoto High Court in 
September. On October the Aizu-kotetsu abandoned its attempt to overturn its re- 
designation as a böryokudan (Keisatsu Hakusho 1999,185-6). 
By March 1993,18 groups had successfully been designated as böryokudan. 
According to police statistics, these groups accounted for 44,340 full members 
(kösei-in). Of this total, the big three syndicates comprised 38,500 men (87%). 
The latest figures available (Keisastu Hakusho 1999) show that the number of 
designated böryokudan groups currently stands at 23 comprising 38,350 members 
(of which 28,800 men were big three syndicate-members). The police statistics now 
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only deal with designated böryokudan; consequently it is not clear what proportion 
of yakuza-style groups remain undesignated. The designated böryokudan, as of 
March 1999, are shown in the appendix. 
EFFECTS OF THE BOTAIHO 
IMMEDIATE IMPACT OF THE BOTAIHO 
Between January and February 1993, just eight months after the law's introduction, 
the National Research Institute of Police Science (NRIPS) conducted interviews of 
1,440 böryokudan arrestees throughout Japan to evaluate the impact of the bötaihö 
(Tamura et al. 1993). Although the study had various research aims, the findings of 
particular interest to us here are those concerning böryokudan perceptions of the 
new law and their reactions, both individual and collective, to it. 
The data were broken down into the three large syndicates, other designated 
böryokudan, non-designated böryokudan and all böryokudan. It would have also 
been interesting to see a break down by hierarchical status (boss, executive and 
kumi-in) though, where it was deemed relevant, NRIPS provided such figures 
elsewhere in their paper. All figures show the percentage of interviewees 
expressing agreement with the statement in the left-hand column (the three possible 
responses were `agree/yes', `disagree/no', `don't know'). 
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The views of the arrestees concerning their perceptions of the changes in their 
operating environment following the bötaihö's introduction are given in the table 
below. 
Table 5.3 Böryokudan perceptions of the bötaihö 
Yama lnagawa Sumi Other Des Non-Des All BRD 
Police controls have become harsher 82 81 78.9 86.2 80.4 81.7 
Public criticism is severe 73.1 73.5 67.1 72.5 72.5 72.4 
Citizens have lost their fear 41.2 41.8 40.8 34.8 44.2 41.2 
Reduction in citizens asking for help 45.1 46.6 42.8 30.4 35.1 41.7 
Business has become stingy 39.0 386 45.4 37.7 35.1 38.8 
Shinogi has become harder 63.5 63.5 66.4 66.7 57.2 62.9 
Struggling to pay jdnbkin 33.7 39.2 39.5 29.0 27.2 33.3 
Number of new recruits has decreased 55.6 55.6 52.6 53.6 48.6 53.8 
Number of those wanting to leave has 
increased 
57.5 53.4 40.8 54.3 45.3 52.6 
Reduction conflict 62.6 48.1 45.4 53.6 43.5 54.4 
Members have become careful about 
behaviour 
70.2 63.0 62.5 71.7 65.9 67.8 
Gang punishments have become severe 35.9 22.8 27.6 26.1 24.6 30.2 
NRIYS (Tamura et al) 1993 
The NRIPS data in Table 5.3 shows that since the introduction of the bötaihö, there 
has been a perceptible change in the operating environment of böryokudan. At the 
most basic level, 80% of members from all groups felt that police controls had 
become harsher following the law's introduction. On a social level, 70% of 
böryokudan felt that public criticism of them had become more severe. This can be 
seen in the rash of anti-böryokudan resolutions passed by all prefectural assemblies 
and the increase in community action, to drive böryokudan out of towns, that the 
bötaihö encouraged. 
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In terms of the effect this has had on income-generating activity the numbers do not 
appear so convincing. Though only 40% felt that the incidence of people asking 
them for help had declined, this is twice as many as the 20% who thought that there 
had been no change. Members of the big three syndicates were more likely to 
agree, which is probably due to their greater reliance on debt-collection. 40% of 
respondents thought that business had become tighter with their money following 
the new law against only 10% who felt that it had not (50% don't know). It is not 
clear, however, to what extent this is due to the collapse of the bubble economy 
rather than the bötaihö. 
There is a reasonably clear level of agreement however that, following the new law, 
it has become harder to make money (60%) but, at this stage, only 30% have found 
it harder to pay jönökin (nearer 40% for the two big Tokyo syndicates). This 
decline in economic fortunes is reflected in perceptions concerning recruitment and 
retention. 50% felt that new entrants had declined (20% disagree) and similarly 
50% felt that the number of members leaving the organisation had increased (under 
30% felt that there had been no change). Perceptions of retention levels were 
particularly gloomy for Yamaguchi-gumi members (nearly 60%) especially when 
compared to the Sumiyoshi-kai (40%). 
The pessimism of the Yamaguchi-gumi interviewees is interpreted by NRIPS as 
being due to that group's status as the main focus of the police's anti-böryokudan 
efforts. This suggests that the greater sense of crisis felt by the Yamaguchi-gumi 
before the law's introduction was justified. 
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This is also shown in the significantly greater perception of reduced conflict among 
Yamaguchi-gumi interviewees (20% points clear of their competitors in the 
Sumiyoshi-kai). This is largely due to the Kobe syndicate's more aggressive 
behaviour in the recent past leading to greater room for improvement than their 
more diplomatically-accomplished rivals. All groups share an encouragingly high 
perception that, following the bötaih6, there has been a reduction in inter-group 
conflict. 
The responses from all categories also indicate much greater concern for their 
behaviour following the introduction of the law. This ran at nearly 70% overall, 
though noticeably less for the two big Tokyo syndicates. This difference also 
perhaps indicates the greater political sensitivity, long preceding 1992, of these two 
groups. 
We can also see the concrete effects of the new law in changes in böryokudan 
behaviour. These changes are given in Table 5.4 below. Here again we see that the 
Yamaguchi-gumi took significantly more proactive steps to avoid the provisions of 
the law. This is to be expected given the number of directives issued by the 
Yamaguchi-gumi's executive committee prior to the law coming into force. 
The most noticeable changes were the removal of gang paraphernalia from the 
outside of gang offices (to avoid the provisions of Article 29) and members' name- 
tags from office interiors (to thwart easy police identification of membership 
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changes). In both these actions, Yamaguchi-gumi levels were 10% higher than 
those of the Inagawa-kai and 20% more than the Sumiyoshi-kai. 
Table 5.4 Böryokudan reactions to the botaihö 
Yama Ina Sumi Other Non Total 
Des Des 
Bötaihö study 42.0 36.0 39.5 40.6 31.5 38.8 
group/lecture 
Removed gang crest and 78.7 66.7 58.6 68.8 68.5 72.1 
sign 
Removed kumi-in name- 73.0 65.1 54.6 63.8 58.7 66.4 
tags 
Reorganise Kumi-in 29.1 19.6 19.1 16.7 16.3 23.1 
Prohibit mention gang- 62.2 40.7 44.7 44.9 43.5 52.3 
name 
Prohibit trouble with 67.0 55.6 62.5 60.1 62.0 63.4 
public 
Prohibit conflict with other 72.1 53.4 63.2 55.1 50.4 62.9 
böryokudan 
Create corporate identity 34.7 21.2 18.4 21.7 23.2 27.6 
Create Political identity 6.4 5.3 4.6 1.4 4.0 5.1 
NRIPS (Tamura et al) 1993 
In terms of restructuring their organisations by reorganising kumi-in and adopting 
business or political identities, the Yamaguchi-gumi also clearly outstripped the 
other groups. This clearly corroborates the widespread perception in 1991 that the 
Tokyo syndicates were considerably more relaxed vis-ä-vis the new law. Note that 
comparatively few individuals admitted that their groups had actually formed 
political organisations. 
NRIPS argues that there are clear limits to the extent to which böryokudan groups 
are able to reorganise their membership. If they were to get rid of all the members 
who meet the criteria for designation, they would be left with so few members as to 
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be ineffective. This however ignores the prospect of mock expulsion (mogi-zetsuen, 
mogi-hamon) and the establishment of business-brother (kigyö-shatei) relationships 
with former members. As it happened, none of the major groups managed to avoid 
designation. 
Given the high level of directives issued by the Yamaguchi-gumi, it is surprising 
that the level of compliance with these demands is not higher. This shows that, as 
we look down the hierarchy from direct group to second-level group to third and so 
on, control is not directly wielded from the top over grass-roots sub-groups. This is 
an important clue to the nature of the present Yamaguchi-gumi, which will be 
explored more fully later. 
Incomplete control can also be seen in the individual reactions of gang-members to 
the bötaihö given in table 5.5. These generally show that the individual-level 
reactions to the new law, though still significant, were not as thorough as those 
taken at an organisational level. 
Generally speaking gang-members are trying to have shinogi that doesn't involve 
them with the new law (only 30% said no). Although there was no big difference 
between ranks with respect to this, in response to all other questions bosses tended 
to show a greater degree of responsibility with more of them studying the law, using 
non-yakuza name-cards and taking care not to use their gang's name, than their 
subordinates. Similarly, more gang-bosses experienced a decline in income (60%) 
than kumi-in (40%). 
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Table 5.5 Individual gang-members' reactions to the bötaiho 
Yama Ina Sumi Other 
Des 
Non 
Des 
All 
Gangs 
Studied bötaihö 30.8 26.5 27.0 34.1 23.6 28.8 
Use non-yakuza name-card 28.3 18.5 27.6 18.8 23.6 25.1 
Avoid trouble with other 
BRD 
53.6 41.3 49.3 47.8 46.4 49.6 
Shinogi without using gang 
name 
52.0 42.9 49.3 46.4 43.1 48.3 
Try hard to have legitimate 
business 
42.6 32.3 43.4 41.3 42.0 41.1 
Try to have shinogi that 
doesn't violate bötaihö 
62.0 51.9 61.2 63.0 58.3 60.0 
Income has declined 50.2 45.5 52.0 50.0 42.0 48.5 
Family advise that quit 39.0 34.9 34.9 37.7 35.9 37.3 
NRIPS (Tamura et al) 1993 
There was also a rank/age difference in the responses concerning family pressure on 
the interviewees to leave the organisation. 40% of kumi-in experienced such 
pressure as opposed to 20% for bosses. For those kumi-in under twenty the figure 
rose to 50%. NRIPS suggest that declining economic rewards from böryokudan 
membership and increased familial pressure to secede provide fertile ground in 
which the Centres for the Eradication of Böryokudan may actively pursue measures 
for the secession and rehabilitation of gang-members. Whether or not this 
opportunity has actually been realised will be discussed later. 
The above data show that in the first year of its operation, the bötaihö had had a 
significant impact on the operation of böryokudan and the perceptions of their 
members. Did böryokudan members feel that this impact would continue in the 
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medium and long term? Forecasts of the effect the botaiho will have on the 
böryokudan are given in Table 5.6 below. 
Table 5.6 Böryokudan forecasts of the botaihö's impact 
Yama Ina Sumi Other 
Des 
Non- 
Des 
Total 
Decline of new members 75.6 72.0 82.9 76.1 77.9 76.4 
Increase in seceders 76.1 75.7 73.7 76.1 74.3 75.4 
Shinogi will become 
impossible 
73.7 68.8 77.0 75.4 76.8 74.2 
Increase of straight 
business 
74.0 61.9 77.0 76.1 77.2 73.5 
Decline inter-gang 81.5 68.3 67.1 73.9 71.4 75.6 
Increase in front companies 74.3 73.0 76.3 75.4 71.7 74.0 
Increase in political groups 50.4 49.7 55.9 42.0 50.4 50.1 
Become invisible secret- 
societies 
54.6 49.2 53.9 51.4 55.4 53.7 
Böryokudan will become 
extinct 
4.8 4.2 5.9 4.3 6.2 5.1 
NRIPS (Tamura et al) 1993 
This set of data suggests that most of the interviewees held a generally pessimistic 
view of the medium term prospects of their industry. There was a strong degree of 
agreement that the number of those wanting to join will decline whilst that of those 
wishing to leave will increase. Perhaps a major causal factor underlying this was 
the widely-held view that in the ensuing five years it would become impossible to 
earn shinogi. In the light of this lack of shinogi, böryokudan members see 
themselves becoming increasingly reliant on straight business as a source of 
income. Interestingly, NRIPS do not ask whether their interviewees predict an 
increase in other anti-social activity such as amphetamine-trading and theft (as 
various commentators, including various high-ranking gang-leaders, had done). 
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Many subjects also predicted that their organisations would become less visible 
through the increased use of front companies (74%) and political organisations 
(50%). Over half of the respondents felt that the böryokudan would become 
underground secret-societies. Practically none of those questioned, however, 
thought that the böryokudan would disappear. This last view seems to be 
inconsistent with the perception that shinogi will become impossible. The 
boryokudan cannot exist without some economic rationale. If members are purely 
involved in legitimate industry then the only advantage for them in remaining 
böryokudan members will be if such membership confers a comparative advantage 
over purely legitimate competitors i. e. some protective function, which is one of the 
characteristics of shinogi. 
Table 5.7 Evaluations of the strength of the bötaihö's impact 
Yama Ina Sumi Other Non- Total 
des des 
Will have a long term 48.5 42.3 51.3 47.8 48.9 48.0 
effect 
Only have a temporary 33.4 35.4 31.6 32.6 30.1 32.8 
effect 
An extremely insignificant 14.3 16.9 12.5 15.2 15.6 14.8 
effect 
No answer 3.8 5.3 4.6 4.3 5.4 4.4 
NRIPS (Tamura et al) 1993 
Somewhat at odds with this generally pessimistic medium-term view, the long-term 
predictions of the arrestees was less clear. Whilst 50% felt that the bötaihb would 
have a long-term effect on the böryokudan, 30% held a more optimistic view that 
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any effect would be temporary with the situation eventually returning to the status 
quo ante. The yet more optimistic view that, even if the bötaihö has an effect, it 
would only be a small one, was held by 15% of respondents. If we combine both 
these optimistic categories, there is very little difference in the levels of support for 
pessimistic and optimistic views of the long-term prospects for this law. 
At this stage we are still not able to evaluate the long-term impact of the bötaihb, 
but sufficient time has elapsed to see what the medium-term effect of the bötaiha 
has been. Let us begin our examination by looking at the available police statistics. 
BORYOKUDAN STRENGTH 
If we look at the police statistics for böryokudan numbers over the period (see Table 
5.8) we can see that the bötaihö has had a clear impact on the composition of these 
groups. Until 1990 there had been a trend for the numbers of böryokudan to grow 
(undermining the thesis put forward by the 1988 Hanzai Hakusho that the 
böryokudan were facing a recruitment crisis). From 1991 onwards (the year the law 
was passed), this trend is reversed. Although this drop is not enormous, the fall in 
full members (kösei-in) is more pronounced, which might be interpreted as evidence 
of the law's success. 
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Table 5.8 Böryokudan Strength 1989-1998 
1 
I  Total Boryokudan Q Kosei-in   Jun-kosei-in 
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
All 87,300 88,300 91,000 90,600 86,700 81,000 79,300 79,900 80,100 81,300 
Full 66,700 68,800 63,800 56,600 52,900 48,000 46,600 46,000 44,700 43,500 
Jun 20,600 19,400 27,200 34,000 33,800 33,000 32,700 33,900 35,400 37,800 
Hanzai Hakusho 1999 
However, this decline is partly explained by the restructuring that böryokudan 
groups undertook to evade the provisions of the law. Many full members officially 
retired, or were `expelled' from their gangs only to continue operations as before 
under the guise of a political organisation or as a `business-brother' (kigyö-shatei). 
It is significant that over the same period the total value of böryokudan strength, as 
recognised by the police (jun-k6sei-in and kösei-in), did not decline by nearly as 
much. Clear evidence for this is shown by the significant increase in jun-kösei-in, 
or peripheral members over the same period (25% between 1991 and 1996). Rather 
than this increase reflecting a jump in the number of apprentices, these `new' jun- 
kösei-in were full gang-members seeking to evade the provisions of the new law by 
relinquishing formal membership. 
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
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Some experts, such as Yamanouchi and Mizoguchi, question the figures provided 
by the police as to trends in böryokudan numbers since the introduction in the law. 
The argument they present is that the real level of gang-membership is lower than 
that suggested by the police statistics which are massaged upwards to justify 
existing budgetary allocations. Given that there are no independent data to back up 
this theory it is difficult to know the extent to which it is correct. Informal 
interviews with individuals from places as diverse as Roppongi and San'ya suggest 
big drops in the numbers of böryokudan visible on the streets over the last decade. 
This need not necessarily mean a decline in actual numbers; it might alternatively be 
that böryokudan are adopting a lower profile in a changed legal and economic 
environment. As will be shown later, this is undoubtedly a factor. 
DISBANDMENT 
Alongside the fall in böryokudan numbers, since 1991 there has been a rise in the 
number of groups disbanding. Whilst some of these cases were merely due to 
bötaihö-avoidance tactics as groups re-formed as political or social movements, 
many are genuine and directly attributable to problems in maintaining financial 
viability under the bötaihö. Whilst the numbers of böryokudan members involved 
has been between 1400-2600 per year, many of these individuals are reabsorbed by 
other gangs, form loose criminal associations or become lone-wolves (ippiki- 
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-ökami). Consequently the declining number of groups has not yielded a 
corresponding decline in the total criminal workforce. 
Table 5.9 Böryokudan Disbandment 
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Groups Disbanding 131 158 222 211 234 218 220 192 
Kösei-in Displaced 1,430 2,050 2,600 1,940 1,440 1,590 1,390 1,390 
Keisatsu Hakusho 1999 
In figure 5.1 we see that the process of oligopolisation by the three big syndicates has 
been slowed, but not completely stopped, following the introduction of the bötaih6. 
This contrasts with the effects of the summit strategies of the 1960s and 70s, which, 
by having a disproportionately heavy effect on smaller gangs, ultimately encouraged 
big-syndicate expansion. Aggressive Yamaguchi-gumi expansion into such areas as 
north-east Japan during the late 1980s was largely quelled, at least for the time being, 
by the introduction of the bötaihö. 
Figure 5.1 Oligopolisation by Big Three Syndicates 
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INTER-GANG CONFLICT 
The suggestion that the böryokudan have adopted a lower profile since the 
introduction of the new law has already been prompted by the pre-implementation 
diplomatic measures taken by the main groups to limit inter-gang conflict. To what 
extent have such conflicts actually been affected since the introduction of the 
bötaihö? The NPA data show that there has been a general declining trend in the 
number of inter-gang conflicts since the end of the 1980s with the most significant 
drop occurring in 1991. 
Table 5.10 Inter-Gang Conflicts 1988-1998 
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Inter-gang Conflicts 32 30 27 12 12 12 11 4 9 6 11 
Number 
of 
Total 128 156 146 47 39 77 44 28 29 53 48 
Incidents Firearms 
Used 
112 142 118 47 29 75 38 28 25 40 39 
Incidents/Conflicts 4 5.2 5.4 3.9 3.3 6.4 4 7 3.2 8.8 4.4 
Fatalities 3 4 16 5 5 4 4 1 2 3 13 
Injuries 12 40 29 10 9 11 10 1 8 20 28 
Keisatsu Hakusho 1999 
In addition, there is universal belief amongst interviewees and commentators, on 
both sides of the law, that once conflicts arise they are resolved much more quickly 
than before. Frequently resolution is achieved through arbitration, and the payment 
of money by the party judged to be in the wrong. Although there are no clear data 
available on the average length of inter-böryokudan conflict, a proxy for this might 
be derived by dividing the total number of violent incidents by the number of 
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conflicts. This suggests a more confusing picture with a drop in incidents per 
conflict over the 1991-1992 period followed by erratic swings. This is probably due 
to the small statistical base which makes the figures easily swung by one 
particularly long-running conflict as in the case for 1997. 
Although there has not been a clean linear decline in the number of firearms 
incidents over the 1990s (5.12), from 1991 on the figures remain considerably 
below those of 1988-90. The significant drop in 1991 is thought here to be due to 
the gangs' efforts to restrict conflict in anticipation of a new legal onslaught. 
Table 5.11 Number of Firearms Incidents 1988-98 
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Firearms 
Incidents 
249 268 255 182 174 178 210 128 108 124 134 
Fatalities 28 19 35 23 17 16 29 21 14 16 13 
Injuries 60 75 65 45 32 34 24 21 27 21 28 
Keisatsu Hakusho 1999 
One point of interest illustrated by the data in table 5.11 is the low level of fatalities 
and injuries, measured as a proportion of total incidents, that `inter-gang conflicts' 
actually involve. In the bloodiest year, of 1990, only one incident in nine led to a 
death whilst in the previous year the ratio was as low as one fatality per thirty-nine 
attacks. Rather than indicating poor weapon-handling skills, this reflects the ritual 
nature of much böryokudan conflict. For the most part such warfare is limited to 
the symbolic firing of shots at the office exterior or gang crest, followed by a similar 
retaliation. Only in the minority of cases does the level of hostility increase beyond 
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this. Even during the exceptional conflict of the Yamaguchi-gumi and Ichiwa-kai, 
only 25 fatalities and 70 injuries occurred in the course of three hundred incidents, 
spread out over five years. By the standards of organised crime in Colombia or 
Russia, such stuff must seem tame indeed. 
It is probable that this comparative pacificity is a product of the settled, mature state 
of organised-crime in Japan. The period of rapid expansion of yakuza groups in the 
period up to 1963 was characterised by much greater violence between competing 
groups. Once groups have established their reputation for violence, it becomes 
paradoxically less necessary to deploy actual violence on a routine basis. At the 
same time the costs of all-out warfare, in the current context of more potent law- 
enforcement and well-established rivals, means that ritual displays of non-lethal 
conflict allowing each side to evaluate who roars the loudest, have become the 
norm. 
In contrast, in such countries as those of the former Soviet Union, where organised 
crime has mushroomed in the fertile conditions of ineffective policing and abundant 
market opportunities, and where a stable equilibrium has not become established, 
the opposite will be true. 
The imperative to reduce violent conflict between the various böryokudan 
syndicates, and thereby avoid the compulsory closure of gang-offices, also 
encouraged further diplomatic efforts following the introduction of the bbtaihö. 
The most visible manifestation of this was the cementing of friendly relations 
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through the creation of brotherhood bonds (through the ritual of sakazuki discussed 
in chapter two) between high-ranking personnel of different groups. 
In June 1993, a relationship-group (shinseki-engumi) was formed between 
Watanabe, Takayama Tokutaro (fouth-generation boss of the Aizu-kotetsu) and 
their top executives in order to stop conflict between the two groups. Despite their 
best efforts however, conflict was not eradicated. In February 1996, a three-way 
brotherhood sakazuki took place between Kuwata Kanekichi, assistant Yamaguchi- 
gumi gashira and head of the Yamaken-gumi, Okimoto Tsutomu, leader of the 
Hiroshima-based Kyosei-kai (with which the Yamaguchi-gumi had fought the 
infamous jinginaki tatakai in the 1960s), and Zugoshi Toshitsugu, fifth-generation 
boss of the Aizu-kotetsu. Officiating in the capacity of guardian (kökennin) was 
Watanabe Yoshinori. 
In much the same way that the brotherhood relationship between Yamaken (then 
Yamaguchi-gumi gashira) and Ishii Susumu in 1972 had cemented relations and 
prevented conflict between the Yamaguchi-gumi and Inagawa-kai, the triple 
sakazuki of Kuwata, Zukoshi and Okimoto was seen as stabilising relations amongst 
the western syndicates (Yamada 1998,228). 
In September 1996, a brotherhood sakazuki took place between the two most high- 
ranking gang-leaders in Japan, Watanabe Yoshinori and Inagawa Chihiro, third- 
generation boss of the Inagawa-kai. Although in many ways, this exchange was 
less important than the triple sakazuki in that it was re-affirming a pre-existing 
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relationship, the fact that it was between the two most important yakuza in Japan 
gave it greater weight. An attack by a Yamaguchi-gumi member on an Inagawa-kai 
interest would become an affront to the dignity of Watanabe demanding 
recompense. This is reflected in the Yamaguchi-gumi executive committee's 
directive to direct members following the brotherhood ceremony instructing them to 
respect the Inagawa-kai's territorial integrity. 
This policy of `sakazuki diplomacy' shows a clear contrast to the strategy of 
aggressive expansion adopted primarily by the Yamaguchi-gumi (though also 
shown by the other two big syndicates) up to the time of the bötaihö. The attempt 
by the Yamaguchi-gumi and the other western syndicates to achieve peaceful co- 
existence can be seen as the adoption of the diplomatic norms of the Kanto 
syndicates exemplified by the Kanto Hatsuka-kai. 
The main inter-group relations amongst the major designated böryokudan groups 
are shown in Appendix 4. 
BOTAIHO INJUNCTIONS 
Since the introduction of the bötaihö, the number of administrative orders (chüshi 
meirei and saihatsu böshi meirei) issued by the Public Safety Commissions has 
increased dramatically each year. Rather than suggesting that the böryokudan have 
shown an increasing propensity to flout the provisions of Article 9 of the new law, 
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the obvious reason for this is that it has taken time for victims of unfair böryokudan 
demands to understand how the law applies to their own personal circumstances. 
The apparent levelling off of this increase suggests either that the process of 
dissemination is approaching its upper limits (given the existing level of public 
awareness and educational activity by the regional Centres for the Elimination of 
Böryokudan) or, alternatively that boryokudan are becoming less prone to make 
violent demands. 
It is argued here that this former factor is more likely to be the dominant one. 
Under the bötaihö, an administrative order merely tells the individual infringing the 
provisions of the law to desist from the relevant activity. Provided that the 
individual then complies with the order, then no further penalties are incurred. 
Apart from the intangible costs to reputation, infringing the provisions of the 
bötaihö therefore carries no loss, and potential gains. To böryokudan constantly 
under pressure to raise money, it is likely to be a chance well worth taking. 
Table 5.12a Bötaihö injunctions 1992-98 
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Stoppage Order (chüshi 241 610 1,057 1,321 1,456 1,737 1,900 
meirei) 
Repetition Prevention 7 35 37 33 43 60 43 
Order (saihatsu böshi 
meirei) 
Total 248 645 1,094 1,354 1,499 1,797 1,943 
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Table 5.12b Injunctions by category 1994-98 
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Total 1057 1321 1456 1737 1900 
(37) (33) (43) (60) (43) 
Unfair demands for gifts/donations 117 197 224 347 483 
Demands for protection money 73 120 127 150 147 
3 (5) (4) (90) (3) 
Demands for bodyguard fees 175 256 267 290 244 
25 (22) (36) 40 24 
Article 9 High interest rate debt-collection 8 10 7 10 16 
demands 
Unfair debt-collection demands - - - 2 12 
Unfair demands for written waivers of 116 146 165 193 243 
existing obligations (1) 
Unfair demands for loans 20 19 15 18 27 
Auction-obstruction 2 1 1 1 - 
Unfair intervention in discussions 10 4 - 1 1 
Using pretext for unfair demands for 65 34 66 76 39 
goods/money 
Other 27(2) 27 21 37(l) 23 
Demanding that others make violent (2) (2) (2) (2) (2) 
Article demands 
10 Assisting at the scene of violent 36 66 90 148 178 
demands 
Article Demands concerning the business of - - - (2) (3) 
12-2 böryokudan 
Demanding that juveniles join 50 58 58 35 43 
böryokudan or obstructing secession (2) (3) 
Demanding with menace that join 296 302 344 366 377 Article böryokudan or obstruct secession (2) (2) (5) (5) 16 
Using closely related person to demand 59 77 71 61 64 
that join böryokudan or obstruct 
secession 
Article Ordering others to demand joining of (1) - - - - 
17 bOryokudan or obstruction of secession 
Article Demanding finger amputation etc. 1 2 - 1 - 
20 
Article Demanding juveniles to have tattoos - 1 - - - 
24 
Article Activities forbidden at gang offices etc. 2 1 - 1 - 
29 
() Repetition prevention order (saihatsu böshi meirei) 
Keisatsu Hakusho 1999 
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Taken together, the various categories covered by Article 9 account for the bulk of 
injunctions issued under the provisions of the bötaihö. Of these, the most 
prominent are the demands for protection money/bodyguard fees, demands for 
gifts/donations and demands for written waivers from existing obligations. 
Surprisingly, given the level of attention to auction-obstruction in recent years, this 
type of activity has received a negligible number of injunctions. Perhaps this is 
because cases of auction obstruction tend to be dealt with primarily by the existing 
commercial and criminal codes. 
The other class of bötaihö injunctions which feature heavily in the statistics is that 
dealing with forcible recruitment and the obstruction of gang-members wishing to 
leave the organisation. Unfortunately the statistics do not reveal whether 
recruitment or secession is the larger; it seems probable that it will be the latter. 
The statistics provided by the regional Centres for the Eradication of Böryokudan 
(discussed later) show that more inquiries and discussions deal with secession- 
obstruction than forcible-recruitment. This suggests a high level of dissatisfaction 
amongst the böryokudan workforce and a severe pressure on gang-leaders to 
maintain manning-levels. 
Demands by leaders that subordinates amputate fingers or have tattoos are so low as 
to be negligible. This seems to be indicative of the trend away from the use of 
yubitsume amongst groups, in preference for fines, as a form of punishment. It is 
questionable whether tattoos have ever been systematically demanded by bosses. 
Horishi, an Osaka-based tattoo master (and, to one who has seen his work, no other 
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title seems appropriate), argues that many modern-minded bosses actually 
encourage their subordinates not to have tattoos so that their future may not be 
confined to traditional yakuza activities. Apparently some even mention to their 
minions that the time may come when they wish to leave the yakuza and a tattoo 
would present a major barrier to employment in a legitimate business. 
However, the overwhelming majority of yakuza met during the course of the 
fieldwork were extremely proud of their tattoos and insisted in showing them off. 
The Yamaguchi-gumi sub-group visited in Osaka had gone to the trouble of 
purchasing a disposable camera precisely for this purpose. In another case an 
Inagawa-kai sub-group leader even removed his shirt in a busy hostess-bar near 
Nagoya so that the researcher could admire the art-work. The idea that yakuza 
members are dragged kicking and screaming into the tattoo studio is not credible. 
It is also noteworthy that the number of injunctions concerned with gang-offices is 
also extremely low. This would seem to suggest that boryokudan groups have, like 
the Yamaguchi-gumi, instructed all gang-offices to remove offending paraphernalia. 
Not all gang offices have done so. This researcher has seen the emblems of 
designated böryokudan outside at least two gang offices whilst Yamanouchi asserts 
that various sub-group offices similarly run the risk of injunctions (interview, 
Osaka, July 1998). 
If we look at the number of injunctions by böryokudan group (Table 5.13), we see 
that the vast majority of them are issued to Yamaguchi-gumi groups, with the other 
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two large syndicates also having significantly higher numbers than smaller groups. 
This is only to be expected given their vastly superior size. In order to get a clearer 
idea of the relative propensity of the different groups to infringe the botaihö, it is 
necessary to convert the data to show the number of injunctions per thousand 
members (Table 5.14). 
These figures show the big three syndicates to have slightly higher number of 
injunctions per member than the average. Interestingly, the Aizu-kotetsu, which has 
a violent reputation, had a surprisingly low number, little more than half the average 
for all böryokudan groups. It is also interesting to observe that the Sakaume-gumi, 
which is usually characterised as an inoffensive group involved primarily in 
gambling, received, proportionately, almost an equal number of injunctions, as the 
Yamaguchi-gumi. Relative to its small size, the group by far the most heavily 
burdened with injunctions is the Kumamoto-based Yamano-kai. This group 
achieved an average of 0.171 injunctions per member in 1999, which is over four 
times the average. 
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Table 5.13 Administrative Orders by Boryokudan Group 1994-98 
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Godaime Yamaguchi-gumi 469 
15 
536 
13 
577 
(17) 
740 
(19) 
846 
(16) 
Inagawa-kai 169 (5) 237 (3) 268 
(13) 
278 (9) 347 
(10) 
Sumiyoshi-kai 149 (7) 189 (5) 244 (5) 291 
(10) 
243 
(10) 
Nidaime Kudorengo Kusano-ikka 19 18 (1) 22 13 (1) 9 
Rokudaime Goda-ikka 2 1 5 4 3 
Godaime Aizu Kotetsu 34 29(2) 25(2) 26 33(l) 
Yondaime Kybsei-kai 10 5 5 4 11 
Yondaime Kozakura-ikka 7 4 4 3 3 
Nidaime Dojin-kai 24 12 17 18 25 
Sandaime Kyokuryü-kai 7 2 1 7 1 
Okinawa Kyokuryü-kai 7 8 4 6 6 
Sandaime Asano- umi 1 (1) 10 2 7 1 
Shinwa-kai 4 2 2 3 4 
SOai-kai 20(4) 19(l) 29(l) 19(4) 29(2) 
Sandaime Yamano-kai 1 3 1 5 12 
Ishikawa-ikka* 5 2 - - - 
Nidaime Kyodö-kai 7 (1) 14 (1) 4 5 4 
Sandaime Taishü-kai 5 4 4 11(2) - 
Rokudaime Sakaume- umi 6 17(l) 20(l) 13(l) 14 
Kyokuto Sakurai Söke Rengo-kai 4 12 19 (1) 3 (2) 18 (1) 
Kyokutb-kai 27 (2) 64 53 55 66 
Azuma- umi 11 6(3) 9(l) 10 9 
Matsuba-kai 22(l) 50(3) 50(l) 76(7) 62 2 
Nidaime Dainippon Heiwa-kai** 11 1 0 - - 
Kokusui-kai 9 15 29(l) 22(5) 29(l) 
All Small Groups (members<1,000) 166 162 182 168 182 
Ishikawa-ikka designation removed in October 1995 
** Nidaime Dainihon Heiwa-kai not re-designated and designation therefore 
lost effect in April 1997 
Keisatsu Hakusho 1999 
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Table 5.14 Injunctions per 1,000 Members (1997-98) 
Injunctions/1 000 members 
1997 1998 
Average 38.2 38.9 
Godaime Yama uchi- umi 41.5 49.3 
Inagawa-kai 51.3 70.0 
Sumiyoshi-kai 45 40.8 
Nidaime Kudörengo Kusanb-ikka 26.4 17.3 
Rokudaime Gbda-ikka 19 3.7 
Godaime Aizu Kotetsu 20 16.2 
Yondaime Kybsei-kai 13.3 28.3 
Yondaime Kozakura-ikka 21.4 39.3 
Nidaime Dojin-kai 36 15.8 
Sandaime Kyokuryü-kai 22.6 25.0 
Okinawa Kyokuryü-kai 12.8 8.3 
Sandaime Asano-gumi 53.8 47.2 
Shinwa-kai 37.5 23.5 
Söai-kai 57.5 67.4 
Sandaime Yamano-kai 50 171.4 
Nidaime Kyodo-kai 25 2.0 
Sandaime Taishü-kai 108 - 
Rokudaime Sakaume-gumi 41.2 41.2 
Kyokuto Sakurai Soke Rengo-kai 13.5 51.4 
Kyokuto-kai 27.5 33.0 
Azuma-gumi 55.6 50.0 
Matsuba-kai 48.8 37.6 
Kokusui-kai 50 55.6 
There does not seem to be any significant correlation between size of group and 
number of injunctions per thousand members. There is however a noticeable 
difference between the smaller groups (here defined as those with membership 
under one thousand) and the larger syndicates in terms of year on year trend. For 
the small groups (which collectively had a total strength of 4,540) there was an 
underlying stability to the number of injunctions received in each year. In contrast 
to this, the three big syndicates showed substantial increases each year (with the 
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Sumiyoshi-kai breaking this pattern in 1998). This is shown by indexing the figures 
for the big three syndicates and all small groups against the base year of 1994 as 
shown in table 5.15. 
Table 5.15 Trends in injunctions by group 1994-98 
Group 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Yamaguchi-gumi 100 113 128 157 178 
Inagawa-kai 100 138 161 165 205 
Sumiyoshi-kai 100 124 160 193 162 
All Small Groups 100 98 110 101 110 
Ceteris paribus (especially assuming that increased public awareness of the law 
affects all böryokudan equally), this suggests that the small groups have, on the 
whole, tended to be more sensitive to the new legal environment. This would seem 
to bear some similarity to the experience of previous anti-böryokudan efforts which 
disproportionately affected the smaller groups. 
INJUNCTION VIOLATIONS 
From 1992 up to the end of 1998, a total of 8,580 injunctions (8,322 chüshi meirei, 
258 saihatsu böshi meirei) had been issued under the provisions of the botaiho. 
Despite this high number, the incidence of injunctions being violated is very low. 
Up to June 1997, there had been a total of 20 injunction violations, only three of 
which were stoppage orders and the rest repetition prevention orders. This low 
number is to be expected in that, once an injunction has been issued, it should be 
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clear to the perpetrator that the game is up and continuation of the proscribed 
activity is highly likely to result in a penalty. 
This is less likely to be the case for repetition prevention orders (saihatsu böshi 
meirei) than stoppage orders (chüshi meirei). This is because the former category of 
injunctions applies to an ongoing activity with multiple potential victims (such as 
selling spurious `economic research papers') whereas a stoppage order applies to a 
specific incident which has been brought to the attention of the relevant Public 
Safety Commission by the intended victim. There is therefore a greater chance of 
success in violating the former type of injunction than the latter. 
Whilst the low number of violations suggests that the system of injunctions imposed 
by the bötaihö has been broadly effective, recent trends suggest that this 
effectiveness is declining. Until 1995 there had only been one case of a repetition 
prevention order being violated. The following year this jumped to six and in the 
first half of 1997 another three such injunctions were ignored. Until 1997 no 
stoppage orders had been violated but, in that year, two such cases occurred as well 
as seven repetition order violations. In 1998, one further stoppage order and seven 
repetition orders were broken. Although the numbers are too small to draw firm 
conclusions, it seems likely that the bötaihö's injunctions are starting to lose the 
respect of the böryokudan. 
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ARRESTS 
As was mentioned in chapter four, the bötaihö was significant not merely for the 
administrative regulations it imposed on the böryokudan but had a wider symbolic 
importance in that, for the first time, a law explicitly identified the böryokudan as a 
social evil to be eradicated. Police White Papers since 1992 routinely identify the 
introduction of the law as a turning point stimulating the police to renew their 
böryokudan-eradication efforts. This is to be achieved through a coherent three- 
pillared strategy (sanbonbashira) making proactive and aggressive use of the 
existing criminal law and the bötaihö combined with the broader social approach of 
the regional Centres for the Eradication of Böryokudan. 
This being the case we should expect to be able to see this reflected in the 
böryokudan arrest statistics. These however show that following the introduction of 
the bötaihö, arrests of böryokudan members actually declined in line with a general 
trend since 1988. The only significant exception to this pattern was the Yamaguchi- 
gumi which saw a 10% rise in arrests for 1992, followed by a decline. 
Table 5.16 Arrests by group 1988-98 
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
All 
B6ryokudan 
22,113 18,627 17,028 16,188 16,306 14,648 12,922 11,699 11,808 10,746 10,615 
Yamaguchi- 
gumi 
6,365 6,124 6,297 6,619 7,316 6,017 5,425 5,120 5,314 4,879 4,913 
Inagawa-kai 2,596 2,210 2,290 2,130 2,112 2,151 1,804 1 480 1,629 2,454 1,504 
Sumiyoshi- 
kai 
2,804 2,553 2,208 2,106 2,219 2,143 1,984 1,707 1,754 1,588 1,503 
Keisastu Hakusho 1999 
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The noticeable rise in Yamaguchi-gumi arrests in 1992, whilst the figures for all 
other böryokudan and for the two big Tokyo syndicates remained stable, suggests 
that the bötaiha was largely seen by the police as a specifically anti-Yamaguchi- 
gumi law. As if to make the point, the day the law came into effect Osaka police 
made a high-profile search of the gang's Kobe headquarters. 
One Yamaguchi-gumi third-level boss interviewee did not identify the botaihö as 
marking a sea change in police attitudes towards his group which had been 
`extremely bad' for many years. In a limited sense, he said, the new law actually 
ameliorated operating conditions for him in that some activities that would formerly 
have resulted in an arrest, now merely become subject to an injunction. This may 
go some way to explaining why the arrest rate has declined since the introduction of 
the bötaiho (but probably not by much given that the trend precedes 1992 by several 
years). This interviewee's assertion seems at odds with the fact that the bötaihö was 
supposedly introduced to deal with böryokudan activities that could not be dealt 
with by the existing body of laws. Assuming he was telling the truth here, it 
remains puzzling why this should be the case. 
CRIME LEVELS 
As has been discussed in chapter three, legal changes concerning böryokudan 
activity tend to have been the major spur to böryokudan evolution; rather than 
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eliminating the böryokudan problem, these laws have pushed crime syndicates into 
alternative areas of criminal activity. To what extent can the same be said for the 
bötaihö? 
Firstly, what impact has there been on the bötaiho's main areas of concern, the 
violent intervention on civil disputes and protection-type activities? Because the 
bötaihö was introduced to plug the gap in pre-existing law, there are no satisfactory 
police statistics on the levels of minbö-type activities before the bötaihö came into 
effect. Examining the data on bötaihö injunctions does not help us greatly as we 
have no idea as to the level of reporting rates. The information provided by NRIPS' 
investigation of böryokudan arrestees does suggest a broadly positive impact in that 
gang-members are trying to avoid trouble with ordinary members of the public. 
Assuming that purely predatory bbryokudan minb6 has broadly declined as a 
consequence of the bötaihö, what is the situation for protection-type activities in 
which the böryokudan are providing a service to a consumer? 
The most obvious sub-category of this type is the traditional böryokudan shinogi of 
taking protection money from Japan's enormous bar, club and restaurant industry 
collectively known as mizushöbai9. In an attempt to ascertain the post-bötaiho level 
9 Despite declining by 14% from its 1992 peak, corporate entertainment expenses in Japan during 
1997 totalled ¥5.3 trillion (£27 billion). 
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of böryokudan protection of this industry, the NPA commissioned the Social Safety 
Research Foundation (Shakai Anzen Kenkyü Zaidan) to conduct a study of the 
industry. The research project was carried out between January and February 1998 
and consisted of a postal survey of 5,000 eating and drinking establishments 
throughout Japan. 
The main findings of this survey were that 12.4% of respondents had experience of 
violent demands from böryokudan (84% had not, 3.6% no answer). Of these 
demands, 86.1 % included demands that various products be bought, 13.5% involved 
demands for shobadai (a charge for the use of space), 3.1% were demands that 
people be employed and 7% covered miscellaneous demands. 
In 37.1% of cases of violent demands the premises in question acceded to these 
demands. This suggests that only 4.6% (12.4 x 0.371) of respondents were paying 
protection money etc. to böryokudan. However, as Mugishima Fumib, the director 
of this research project and formerly of NRIPS, stressed when he provided the 
researcher with a copy of the report, the worth of these findings was severely 
undermined by the very poor response rate of 17.5%10. Mugishima himself was 
inclined to believe that the true rate of protection payment money in this industry 
was considerably higher notwithstanding the effects of the bötaihö. 
Worryingly, 10.3% of respondents (who might be expected to represent the more 
10 Postal surveys have a notoriously low response rate (Gilbert 1993: 96). 
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responsible part of the wider survey population) subscribed to the view that the 
baryokudan are `a necessary evil and (I) would not like them to disappear'. As one 
former bar-owner (and later Yamaguchi-gumi third-level boss) stated in interview, 
were he to have telephoned the police requesting help with difficult customers, he 
would not have expected a positive reaction (interview, Osaka, August 1998). In 
this situation there is a clear market opportunity for alternative sources of protection 
and the existence of this market has not itself been affected by the appearance of the 
new law. 
Ujihara, a bar-owner and Yamaguchi-gumi business-brother from a provincial city 
near Nagoya, also corroborated this analysis. As a böryokudan-associate (he 
described himself as `half-yakuza') he had no requirement to pay protection money 
but during a 1998 interview claimed that, of the 2,500 eating/drinking 
establishments in the entertainment area of his city, 30% were currently paying 
protection money of between ¥20-50,000 per month to the yakuza. Assuming an 
average of ¥30,000, this yields a total annual income to the local böryokudan of 
¥270m. Although this income had been affected by the introduction of the bötaihö, 
Ujihara suggested that economic factors were of greater significance. During the 
years of the bubble economy, there had been 4,000 hostess-clubs and snack-bars in 
this entertainment district. Revenue for Ujihara himself was down 25% on the 
previous year. 
Ujihara claimed that following the introduction of the bötaiho some clubs had 
attempted to sever relations with b6ryokudan. In order to maintain a protective 
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umbrella in case of trouble these establishments had encouraged off-duty policemen 
to frequent their premises with the enticement of free or cheap drinks. Ujihara 
asserted that this cure was worse than the disease as, in his experience, policemen 
ranked alongside teachers and doctors as the worst behaved customers and the ones 
most likely to cause trouble with his girls. 
Ujihara escorted the researcher round various clubs at one of which he was fortunate 
enough to see some trouble-resolution in operation. In response to a call from the 
club's mama-san, Tsura, the boss from the protecting Inagawa-kai sub-group, 
arrived to pacify a drunken and unruly customer. Although the vigorous tongue- 
lashing this boss dealt out was hardly the most discreet means of resolving the 
situation, it was not more intrusive than police intervention would have been. In 
terms of response time, it is highly unlikely that the police would have matched 
Tsura. More importantly, given that the incident itself was a relatively minor 
altercation, it is not clear that the police would have involved themselves anyway. 
When the researcher returned the following year (1999), Ujihara explained that the 
situation had changed out of all recognition. Due to a concentrated police drive on 
excluding böryokudan from the prefecture's hospitality industry, many bars in the 
area had cut all links with their former protectors" I. Through their exercise of the 
Public Morals Law (füeiho) police are able to exert considerable influence over 
these businesses. It seemed from Ujihara's description that this drive had had a far 
It is probable that this crack-down was triggered by the amendment of the Public Morals Law in 
1998. 
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greater impact on the `water trades' than the bötaihö seven years earlier. It is not 
clear how drinking establishments maintain their security in this new environment. 
As has been described above, following the collapse of the bubble some financial 
institutions have made use of böryokudan loss-cutting services whilst others have 
attempted to use böryokudan to recover outstanding debts (though in the case of 
Sumitomo bank, with a less than satisfactory outcome). The succession of large- 
scale sökaiya scandals that have been brought to light in recent years shows that 
business has found it very difficult to free itself from the protection/predation of 
Japanese organised crime. 
Just how hard was illustrated by an incident in February 1994 in which Suzuki 
Juntas, the head of Fuji Film Corporation's `General Affairs Department', was 
stabbed to death. It was widely speculated at the time that the company had been 
attempting to cut links with sökaiya extortionists and Suzuki's death had been the 
result. 
Although the police have recently had periodic campaigns putting pressure on 
Japanese companies to rid themselves of sökaiya, and many claim to have done so, 
as Nomura did in 1991, this has been easier said than done. Between 1996-7 
several high-profile incidents, involving such major firms as Ajinomoto, Nomura 
Securities, Takashimaya and Mitsubishi Cars, occurred to demonstrate this. In the 
Takashimaya case, the large retailing company was found to have paid out ¥160m 
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to a group of böryokudan/sökaiya in order to maintain quiet shareholders' meetings 
between 1994 and 1995. It was further revealed that, in the seven years up to 1996, 
the chain had made a total of ¥700m in illegal payments to yakuza (originally to 
quell fake social-movements) and partners in a price-fixing (dango) ring (Jyi Press 
Newswire 22/5/1997,6/6/1997, Iwahashi 1998,6). 
The Nomura scandal was on a far larger scale. Between 1994 and 1996 Dai-ichi 
Kangyo Bank (DKB) lent Y26 billion to Koike Ryüichi, a well-known sökaiya since 
the 1970s, with practically no collateral. With some of this money Koike purchased 
300,000 shares of Nomura Securities. From this position as a significant 
shareholder, Koike was able to extort ¥320m from Nomura. As well as several 
arrests and indictments of senior DKB and Nomura executives, this incident 
resulted in the suicide of one DKB man involved in initially arranging the loan. The 
plot became yet thicker when Koike admitted to investigating prosecutors that three 
other major securities companies had also given him money (Reuters News Service 
04-10/7/1997). Coming, as it did, on the eve of Japan's financial `big bang', this 
scandal, showing persistent organised crime penetration of the mightiest financial 
institutions in the land, did not bode well for Japan's bid for a transparent and 
globally-competitive financial system. 
Why did DKB provide Koike with such an enormous uncovered loan? A possible 
explanation may be found by looking at Koike's background. Koike inherited his 
power from a right-wing extortionist and publisher, Kijima Rikiya, who in turn was 
a protege of the infamous Kodama Yoshio. Koike's ascendancy was apparently 
telegraphed to the business community at the wedding of Kijima's son. At the 
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reception, attended by a mixture of sökaiya, top böryokudan bosses and big business 
executives, Koike was placed at a special table for the most important gang-leaders 
and famous singers. Backing up Koike is a böryokudan group who provide him 
with credibility but who also make use of him (Shükan Gendai 23/8/97). It seems 
probable that it was the existence of Koike's backers that made it possible for him 
to `borrow' the initial money from DKB. Koike was eventually sentenced to nine 
months in prison and a Y690m fine (Kyödo News Agency 21/4/1999). 
The following year Japan Airlines (JAL) was involved in a sökaiya-related incident. 
Despite claiming to have cancelled all subscriptions to sökaiya publications, they 
had overlooked one contract they had with a plant-leasing company. This was in 
fact a cover for sokaiya payments mounting to Y23 million (£105m) over a three- 
year period (Keisatsu Hakusho 1999,155). Geoffrey Tudor, a spokesman for JAL, 
claims that the police now are serious about sökaiya and have recently put more 
pressure on companies to cut their links with these people (interview Tokyo 1998). 
Alongside this stern police guidance to company General Affairs Departments, the 
more aggressive attitude can also be seen by the heavy police presence at the 
company annual general meetings which are increasingly being held on the same 
day. At the 1998 round of AGMs the Tokyo police deployed 5,000 officers to deal 
with only around 100 sökaiya actively participating in the meetings (Shükan Jitsuwa 
2/7/1998). The overall numbers of sökaiya have, according to police statistics, also 
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fallen in recent years and by 1997 stood at 900 members and thirty groups. Only 
half of these identified individuals attended company AGMs in 1997 (Yokouchi 
1998,38). 
In a 1999 survey of large businesses carried out by the National Centre for the 
Eradication of Böryokudan, an attempt was made to evaluate the current levels of 
böryokudan/sökaiya activity in this area. Of the 3,191 companies surveyed, 2,326 
replied (giving a surprisingly high response rate of 73%). Of these respondents, 
1,031 claimed that, in the past, they had received demands for money from 
böryokudan/sökaiya. Sixty-seven firms admitted that they had given money to such 
groups. Perhaps more significantly are the figures for the previous year (1998) 
during which 706 companies had received demands and fifty-nine had acceded. 
Whilst most (53) of these companies had paid out less than ¥lm, two had given out 
more than ¥100m (one of which apparently exceeded this sum by a factor of ten) 
(Asahi Shinbun 19/5/1999). If we make the assumptions that non-respondents are 
more likely to retain links with böryokudan/sökaiya groups, and that some 
respondents may not be entirely truthful 12, the situation is worse than the survey 
immediately suggests. 
It seems, therefore, that the less proficient sökaiya are being squeezed out of the 
industry but a hard core remain; even after they have formally announced that all 
links have been cut and subscriptions to spurious information sheets cancelled, 
12 Senior company management may deliberately adopt a policy of ignorance by giving broad 
discretionary powers to its General Affairs department and not asking too many questions. 
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some individuals are `overlooked' and new ways found to pay them. As these 
individuals become increasingly hard to spot, there is likely to be a corresponding 
increase in the uncertainty as to the accuracy of the police figures. 
Whilst the sophisticated böryokudan aristocracy may continue to find a niche in 
offering protective services to Japan's companies, what has happened at the other 
end of the yakuza hierarchy? It seems clear that the bötaihö has been broadly 
effective in removing boryokudan from purely exploitative minbo-type shinogi 
targeting those engaged in legitimate activities. Of course, those operating outside 
of the law remain highly vulnerable to böryokudan predation. In the light of this 
reduced market, how have böryokudan members tried to maintain their income 
levels? 
Since the introduction of the bötaihö, two disturbing trends have appeared in the 
crime statistics that suggest that böryokudan members displaced by the new law 
have become reliant on income generated from activities that present social 
problems equal, or greater, than the ones they replace: drugs and robbery. 
If we look at the police statistics for drugs offences since the beginning of the 
Heisei period, we see that from 1995 there has been a significant rise in the number 
of arrests for amphetamine law violations. Since 1996, with the figure standing 
close to 20,000, the police consider that Japan is currently experiencing the third 
post-war period of epidemic amphetamine abuse (Higuchi 1998, Keisatsu Hakusho 
-369- 
1998,131). Although the number of arrests in 1998 dropped below the 1996 level, 
the police still view the current situation as severe. From the fact that over half of 
the arrestees are first time offenders, the police infer that the market is still growing 
(Keisastu Hakusho 1999,96). 
Table 5.17 Amphetamine-related arrests and seizures 1988-98 
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Arrests 20,399 16,613 15,038 16,093 15,062 15,252 14,655 17,101 19,420 19,722 16,888 
Seizures 
K 
214.1 217.6 275.8 121.0 163.7 96.2 313.3 85.1 650.8 171.9 549.0 
Keisatsu Hakusho 1999 
The figures for amphetamine seizures do not follow such a simple pattern reflecting 
the importance of serendipity in uncovering large shipments, but if we compare the 
average level of seizures for 1988-92 with that for 1993-98, we see a clear 
difference. Between 1988 and 1992 an average of 174.9 kg was seized each year; 
the corresponding figure for the following five years was 354.0 (Keisatsu Hakusho 
1999,95). In 1999, the police seized a staggering 1.98 tons - more than the total 
seizures of the preceding five years (Kyödo News 2/4/2000). As we would expect, 
increase in supply has been matched by a major drop in street-prices from ¥10,000 
per shot in the 1980s to current levels of Y2,000. This price-drop supports the 
contention that this third period of amphetamine abuse is supply-pushed rather than 
demand-led. 
Independent estimates of current levels of consumption suggest a market of as many 
as 1.2m users, and police from the NPA drugs countermeasures section do not feel 
this to be an exaggeration (bhashi 1998,16). There are several special 
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characteristics of this new period but perhaps the most significant is the alarming 
proportion of first-time offenders, and in particular youngsters, amongst the 
arrestees. This is seen as being due to greater preparedness amongst dealers to sell 
indiscriminately to junior and high school students (of which 60% of customers are 
girls). The rapid increase in consumption amongst this group is illustrated by a 
five-fold jump in arrests of high school students between 1994 (41) and 1996 (214). 
Because of this younger, less-experienced, market, since 1998 purity levels have 
started to drop (Mizoguchi interview 1999). This development of a younger 
clientele has also led to a move away from intravenous injection as the main form of 
taking the drug. Currently amphetamines may be drunk mixed with juice, inhaled 
as a vapour or ingested as a lozenge. Although the main source of supply is now 
China, recently the Golden Triangle has started producing amphetamine lozenges 
called `yäbä', which may also contain heroin or LSD (Higuchi, 1998). 
Recently North Korea has also become a major source of amphetamines. In January 
1998, Thai officials seized 2.5 tons of ephedrine destined for North Korea. Furious 
North Korean diplomats argued that the shipment was wanted for the legitimate 
purpose of making cough medicine (2.5 tons of ephedrine is almost sufficient to 
meet the world demand for cough syrup). The following August a shipment of 
100kg of amphetamine from North Korea was seized by Japanese police in Sakai 
and two böryokudan members and a Korean arrested (Bangkok Post 13/05/1999, 
Korean Herald 12/05/1999). The NPA estimates that 43.7% of total amphetamine 
seizures in 1999 originated from North Korea (Kyodo News 2/4/2000). 
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In the media and also the police literature, much is made of the importance of 
Iranian drug-peddling organisations in this third epidemic period. It is these groups 
which are held to be responsible for the indiscriminate sale of drugs to minors. If 
we look at the statistics for arrests of Iranian dealers compared to böryokudan 
dealers, the relative importance of the two becomes apparent. 
Table 5.18 Drug arrests for Iranians and böryokudan 1993-8 
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Drug-related arrests of 195 270 253 294 328 289 
Iranians 
Of which 5 85 120 218 220 217 
related to 
amphetamines 
Böryokudan 6,401 6,329 7,377 7,912 7,817 7,204 
amphetamine-related 
arrests 
Keisatsu Hakusho 1998-9 
These figures clearly show that, in terms of numbers, the Iranians account for a very 
small proportion of total arrests. If these Iranians occupied the apex of the 
distribution pyramid then indeed they might be appropriately apportioned a greater 
level of significance than the low numbers would otherwise warrant. However, as 
bhashi admits, they generally operate as street-level traders receiving their supplies 
from boryokudan wholesalers (1998,22). The dominant position occupied by the 
böryokudan at the upper levels of the supply chain can be shown by the fact that of 
the 549.0 kg of amphetamines seized by the police in 1998,466.0 kg (85%) was 
seized from böryokudan (Keisatsu Hakusho 1999,98). 
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Although the general contempt among böryokudan for drug-dealing yakuza as 
weaklings lacking the ability and courage to earn money in more manly ways 
remains, the removal of alternative opportunities has meant that many böryokudan 
have latched on to this business as a means of survival. Even the large syndicates, 
which formally prohibit their members from participation, have found themselves 
unable to prevent this. We can see this from the periodic directives from the 
Yamaguchi-gumi's executive committee instructing members not to have anything 
to do with drugs. 
During the course of one of the researcher's earliest interviews, he proposed to a 
career NPA officer that one side-effect of the bötaihö might have been to exacerbate 
the amphetamine problem. The interviewee showed a mild degree of irritation at 
this suggestion and advised the researcher not to spend too much time worrying 
about such journalistic interpretations. It is however hard to believe that the 
increase in amphetamine-dealing is not connected to the closure of other sources of 
revenue. The journalistic sources, so decried by the NPA interviewee, regularly 
make this connection. 
The other noticeable trend in the crime statistics in recent years is the increase in 
thefts by organised gangs. The incidence of arrests of böryokudan members for 
theft has jumped by almost 100% from 13,016 in 1991 to 24,838 in 1997 and this 
the police do accept is a side-effect of the b6taihö (Yasuda 1998,27-8). In 
particular the number of such cases involving ten or more individuals has shown a 
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massive jump from below ten in the preceding years to 60 in 1997 (Jitsuwa Jidai 
12/1998). 
During 1997 the NPA identified 11 theft rings composed of böryokudan members. 
One arrested member admitted to the police that "katagi (non-yakuza citizens) have 
started issuing victims' reports so we can't make money as we used to". This 
individual also claimed that to quickly raise the money required for monthly jönokin 
payments in the harsh environment of the depressed economy and the bötaiho, 
many gang members were resorting to drug-dealing (Yomiuri Shinbun 20/4/1998). 
Of particular concern is the increase in the sort of violent, professional robbery 
which had hitherto been practically unheard of in modem Japan. In 1993 there were 
six robberies of armoured delivery cars compared to a total of five in the preceding 
three years. In 1994, there were nine, including one in Hyago prefecture in which 
two robbers made off with ¥541m in cash (Keisatsu Hakusho 1995,153). Three 
years later the number of such raids had risen to 24. In 17 of these cases firearms 
had been discharged. In 1998 the number of delivery-car robberies was eleven (in 
three of which guns were fired) (Keisatsu Hakusho 1998,154-5; 1999,123). 
Böryokudan groups are also establishing specialist groups stealing luxury cars to 
order and providing them with fresh key cylinders, plates and papers before selling 
them on for 15-20% of show-room price. One 23-man group (Yamaguchi-gumi 
related) processed over 80 cars in this way before being arrested. Other groups 
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specialise in diggers and trucks for the market in China and Russia where a truck 
can fetch as much as ¥3m (Jitsuwa Jidai 12/1998, Iwate police, 1998). 
Some böryokudan have themselves become victims of theft-gangs. One group, 
which operated in the Tokyo area, specialised in targeting the homes of gang 
bosses. It is not clear how many fell victim to this group, as to have reported to the 
police would have resulted in a loss of face. Eventually the group's leader, who had 
been expelled from a syndicate, committed suicide and his followers gave 
themselves up to the police. Other such groups, composed of former böryokudan, 
are still said to exist (Jitsuwa Jidai 12/1998). One defence lawyer remarked that 
many of his gang-boss clients admit to now feeling unsafe on the streets (interview, 
Osaka, June 1998). When the researcher met some of the same individuals, they 
were quick to blame the increase in robbery on expelled yakuza but claimed that 
these renegades were no match for the strength of the yakuza13 
Ironically, the self-restraint on inter-group conflicts that the large böryokudan 
syndicates had exercised as a response to the bötaihö, in certain respects made the 
streets less safe. Because firearms were no longer as essential, financially 
embarrassed böryokudan members started selling their handguns to ordinary 
members of the public including, according to a police spokesman, professors, 
office-workers and students. In one case in November 1994, a patient used such a 
13 In discussions with criminal defence lawyers it became clear that the way in which boryokudan 
presented themselves to their lawyer was very different from the way in which they portrayed 
themselves to the researcher. To the former they stressed that they were essentially legitimate 
businessmen trying to get by in a hostile environment, whilst to the researcher there seemed greater 
emphasis on projecting an impressive yakuza image. 
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weapon to shoot his surgeon due to dissatisfaction with a hernia operation (Reuters 
News Service 25/10/1994,10/11/1994). 
Traditionally the yakuza had involved themselves in illegal activity but had a code 
of morality. In this code, theft was seen as something shameful. To what extent 
this traditional code was actually adhered to is debatable but it is a fact that in 
earlier times theft was not a recognised source of yakuza income. This development 
is another major step in the evolution of organised crime in Japan of similar 
magnitude to the shift from traditional yakuza shinogi to minbö. 
CUT-BACKS 
It should be clear from the above that many böryokudan groups are currently 
suffering considerable financial hardship. In recognition of this fact, at the 
Yamaguchi-gumi direct-members' meeting (teireikai) on the fifth of April, 1994, 
the attendees were instructed to show restraint in holding the traditional yakuza 
ceremonies, collectively known as girikake, at which the participants are expected 
to make large cash donations. The following July, the monthly jönökin dues paid by 
direct members to the organisation were dropped by Y200,000 to Y650,000. This 
cut did not apply to the top-level executives, who were deemed to still have a stable 
income (Yamada 1994b, 306). 
Yamada, broadly sympathetic to the Yamaguchi-gumi, reports that many sub- 
groups slashed jönökin payments by as much as fifty percent (ibid, 293). News 
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reports however indicate that other sub-group bosses responded to their own 
financial hardship by raising the jönökin burden of their subordinates (Asia 
Intelligence Wire 22/10/1999). This is putting a lot of strain on the various 
organisations and encouraging the sort of desperate measures outlined above. 
It is also clear that the böryokudan are trying to curb excessive expenses. Some 
groups have given up manning their offices round the clock under the töban system. 
Others have started employing non-yakuza to man their telephones therefore freeing 
kumi-in to concentrate on finding money. In common with the rest of Japanese 
society, the böryokudan have felt the need to rein in their entertainment expenses. 
Most severely hit are those at the bottom, over half of whom are currently 
dependent on the earnings of others (Yamada 1994b, 293). 
Ujihara notes that those baryokudan members with stable and high incomes are 
increasing the wealth disparity within syndicates by lending money to their less- 
fortunate colleagues (interview 1999). This causes problems of intra-organisational 
harmony, especially in cases of default, which, it appears, frequently occur when 
there is a significant difference in power between lender and borrower. Since 
September 1994, the Yamaguchi-gumi executive committee has forbidden intra- 
syndicate money lending. 
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BOR YOKUDAN ERADICATION CENTRES 
As well as increasing the scope of controls on böryokudan activity, the bötaihö also 
made provisions for the establishment of centres promoting the eradication of 
böryokudan (bötsusen). The main functions of these centres are to provide the 
following: counselling on böryokudan-related problems, training for company 
employees particularly susceptible to violent böryokudan demands, literature and 
posters increasing public-awareness of the threat of böryokudan and the available 
countermeasures, advice and assistance for böryokudan members wishing to leave 
their gang and return to straight society. 
The first of these centres actually predates the bötaihö by several years as 
Hiroshima prefecture had created the Böryoku Tsuihö Hiroshima Kenmin Kaigi in 
1987. By the time the new law was passed, eight other prefectures had followed 
suit due to the favourable evaluation of Hiroshima's centre. With the 
implementation of the bötaihö, the remaining administrative areas quickly created 
their own centres with Niigata being the last to do so in July 1992 (Sumida 1997, 
207). 
All of these centres enjoy the legal status of foundations (zaidan höjin) and receive 
no central government funding. Sumida (1997,208) suggests that they are largely 
dependent on donations (tax-deductible) from private business. However, in the 
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case of the two centres visited by the researcher (Kanagawa and Iwate) the vast bulk 
of their endowments came from local government. Half of Kanagawa's ¥500 
million fund came from the prefectural government, 40% from the city, town and 
village assemblies and only ten percent came from business. In Iwate just under a 
quarter of the Y632 million fund was derived from business. 
Although the researcher was not shown a breakdown for the figures in Kanagawa, 
in Iwate by far the biggest single private contributor was the local pachinko industry 
(nearly 5% of the total fund). This seems natural in the light of the historical 
relationship between this business and the yakuza. However, it is hard to avoid the 
conclusion that the control that the police wield over pachinko through the Public 
Morals Law (füeihö) also encourages generosity on the part of the pachinko 
association. 
The formal organisation of these centres is closely wedded to the prefectural and 
police hierarchies with the posts of president and vice president being held by the 
governor and director general of the prefectural police respectively. At the 
operational level, however, the centres are effectively police concerns being situated 
in the regional police headquarters and staffed by retired police officers. In this 
respect it is impossible to ignore the observation made by several academic 
interviewees (Kato, Nishimura et al. ) that one of the underlying motives behind the 
establishment of these centres was to provide amakudari (post-retirement job) 
positions for retired police officers. 
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No doubt the police can defend their close association with the regional centres in 
that they have the requisite experience to most effectively fulfil the duties of the 
bötsusen. In addition, they have the advantage of being the one organisation 
impervious to böryokudan intimidation. These justifications notwithstanding, the 
researcher finds it hard to reject the cynical institutional empire-building 
interpretation. 
Alongside the full-time staff (four in Kanagawa, three in Iwate) there is a team of 
part-time counsellors (södan yakuin) (totalling eleven in Kanagawa and nine in 
Iwate) composed of lawyers, probation officers, youth guidance officers and retired 
policemen. Nationally there were a total of 680 such counsellors by 1997 (Sumida 
1997,214). As shown in table 5.19 below, in 1998 counsellors from the regional 
centres conducted 12,450 separate discussions with members of the public. 
As we can see from these figures, two-thirds of all böryokudan-related discussions 
are actually conducted by the police. If we remove general discussions concerning 
the bötaihö and the work of the centres themselves, and confine ourselves to 
discussions concerning concrete problems, this proportion rises to over three- 
quarters. This might suggest that, at least in terms of counselling activity, these 
centres are of only marginal importance. The potential argument that some 
individuals may be unwilling to talk to police officers is weakened by the close 
police-links enjoyed by the centres both in terms of facilities and personnel. 
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Table 5.19 Böryokudan-Related Discussions (Police and Centres) 1998 
Police Centres Total 
1. Discussions concerning Article 9 of the bötaihö 7,636 3,056 10,692 
1) Demands for money taking advantage of 
weakness 
672 218 890 
2) Unfair demands for contributions 1,322 794 2,116 
3) Unfair demands for subcontracting work 238 63 301 
4) Unfair demands for protection money 493 82 575 
5) Unfair demands for bodyguard fees 336 21 357 
6) High interest rate debt-collection 225 183 480 
7) Unfair debt-collection 802 346 1,148 
8) Unfair demands for exemption of liabilities 833 279 1,112 
9) Unfair demands for loans 162 27 189 
10) Unfair demands for trading on credit 82 7 89 
11) Unfair demands to purchase shares 11 1 12 
12) Unfair land-sharking (iiage) 26 20 46 
13 Auction obstruction 89 _ 61 150 
14) Unfair intervention on negotiations 337 215 552 
15) Unfair demands for money on some pretext 2,008 739 2,747 
2. Discussions concerning `semi-violent demands' 3 - 3 
3. Discussions concerning secession & forced- 
recruitment 
1,269 532 1,801 
1) Secession 856 472 1,328 
2) Demands/enticements to join böryokudan 413 60 473 
3. Discussions concerning gang offices 901 409 1,310 
1) Forbidden activities 25 16 41 
2) Grievances/requests for crackdowns etc. 555 75 630 
3) Prevent arrival/force withdrawal of gang office 102 86 188 
4) Eviction 219 232 451 
4. Discussions concerning other unfair böryokudan 
acts 
11,649 2,161 13,810 
1) Acts covered by criminal law 3,691 868 4,559 
Acts covered by special laws 1,435 171 1,606 
2) Other activities 6,523 1,122 7,645 
5. Discussions concerning the bötaihö 2,587 6,292 8,879 
1) Concerning the Böryokudan Eradication Centres 204 3,134 3,338 
2) Other 2,383 3,158 5,541 
TOTAL 24,045 12,450 36,495 
Keisatsu Hakusho 1999 
Another of the key responsibilities of the centres is to provide training in 
appropriate techniques for responding to böryokudan demands. Up to April 1999, 
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331,800 individuals had received such training (Keisatsu Hakusho 1998,188; 1999, 
161; Sumida 1997,220). According to the police white papers, most of these 
trainees were employed in the standard böryokudan victims: finance/insurance, 
construction, real-estate and game-centres (pachinko). In Iwate there were also a 
high number of taxi-drivers, parcel-delivery company employees, car salesmen and 
petrol-pump attendants, trained in 199714. 
Training consists of an afternoon's package of lectures introducing the trainees to 
the current state of the böryokudan and the provisions of the bötaihö. This is 
followed by a video portraying various (quite convincing) scenarios involving 
violent böryokudan demands. In conclusion there is a forty-five minute lecture on 
mental preparation, reaction to böryokudan demands and the availability of the 
centres and police for discussion (training program Kanagawa centre). Trainees are 
also presented with manuals to take away for further study and phone numbers for 
the centre and police. The police white papers state that role-playing exercises are 
also part of the training but this did not appear on the Kanagawa program, and the 
Iwate centre claimed that this was only available for those attending the refresher 
course (three years after the initial one). 
Although the reality of the training does not seem to quite match the expectations 
raised by the description of this aspect of the centres' work in the police/centre 
literature, it is evidently a useful exercise. The police white papers routinely give 
14 Given that these courses have been running for several years, it is probable that those in the highest 
risk categories had already received training and the police were widening the catchment area for 
potential trainees. 
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examples of employees making use of their training (1999,161). It is however 
questionable to what extent the trainees' employers themselves were actually taking 
böryokudan countermeasures seriously. In February 1993, the police surveyed 
3,061 big businesses with a response rate of 77%. Of the respondents, only 25% 
claimed that they were taking steps to prevent falling victim to böryokudan 
demands (Sumida 1997,220). It is to be expected that the non-respondents were 
even less scrupulous. 
More importantly, training company employees in how to deal with böryokudan 
demands is of dubious worth if the same companies are themselves making use of 
these groups. As we have seen, in the past businesses and politicians have 
frequently dealt with böryokudan demands by calling on the services of other 
similar groups. Recent incidents suggest no great grounds for optimism that this 
practice is in significant decline. 
REHABILITATION 
The other major duty of the regional centres is to promote the secession and 
rehabilitation of böryokudan members. Given the current financial hardship 
experienced by many böryokudan members, this would appear to be an ideal 
opportunity to persuade them to leave. However, in so far as this hardship is 
economically determined (rather than due to the bötaihö), the centres are faced with 
a catch-22 problem: because of the recession, seceders have little hope of alternative 
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employment; if the economy were booming, shinogi would be better and there 
would be little incentive to leave. 
As of mid-1998 the police and centres had managed to persuade approximately 
4,250 gang-members to leave their groups since the introduction of the bötaihö 
(Keisatsu Hakusho 1999,159). The most important factor contributing to the 
successful rehabilitation to society of these individuals is their ability to find 
legitimate employment. To this end, each prefecture has a Social Rehabilitation 
Strategy Council (Shakai Fukki Taisaku Kyogikai) composed of representatives of 
the centres, police, prison service, probation service and the local employment 
security office. 
In addition, a number of industries co-operate with these councils by offering 
assistance in providing employment to böryokudan-seceders. By 1996, an 
impressive total of 5,190 companies were helping in this way (Sumida 1997,217). 
However of the 4,250 gang-leavers, only 540 (13%) have found work through the 
good offices of the councils and the co-operating companies (Keisatsu Hakusho 
1999,159-61). These dismal figures may not reflect the entire situation. A follow 
up survey conducted in 1993 showed that, of the 1,064 individuals persuaded to 
leave gangs by the police or centres in the first year of the bötaihö, 621 (58%) had 
found work within three months. A further 7.5% were actively looking for work 
whilst the same proportion had no strong motivation to find work or were doing 
nothing. The fate of another 10% was unclear (Sumida 1997,217). 
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Given the current state of the Japanese economy, it is highly unlikely that, were a 
similar survey to be conducted now (2000) it would yield results as favourable to 
the centres. In both Iwate and Kanagawa, the researcher found rehabilitation rates 
even lower than those of the 1998 police white paper. At the Kanagawa centre 
during 1997 about 400 separate discussions were held with böryokudan members 
about leaving their group. Of these, only ten members actually left. 
Over the same period the Kanagawa police managed to persuade 34 boryokudan 
members to leave. The greater effectiveness of the police is due to the fact that 
most of these leavers are in prison and will receive shorter sentences if they agree to 
leave their gangs. Because of the high likelihood of deception there is a need to 
check up on gang-leavers. Unfortunately the Kanagawa police can only conduct 
surveys within their own prefecture and consequently it was not clear what 
happened to many of these individuals though the interviewees suggested that many 
of them returned home or possibly joined gangs in other areas. 
Since the introduction of the bötaihö, nine böryokudan members had left gangs in 
Kanagawa and had found work. Of this total four had quit; so only five were still 
known to be in gainful employment, most of them in the construction industry. In 
Iwate only two former yakuza had found work through the social-rehabilitation 
council and one had since rejoined his gang. 
Iwate also runs a more specialised scheme for former tekiya (outdoor stall-holder) 
yakuza. Up until the end of the Shawa period, the yakuza in Iwate had been 
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overwhelmingly involved in tekiya activities and had been broadly tolerated by the 
police. In 1991 Kuwata of the Yamaken-gumi arrived in Iwate and `invited' the 
most prominent gang to join his group. Once this had happened, the other yakuza 
groups in Iwate felt compelled to join one of the large syndicates for their own 
protection. 
Alarmed at this development, the police started to take more aggressive measures 
against the böryokudan. One of these steps was to prevent böryokudan participation 
in festivals - hitherto the traditional economic bedrock of the tekiya. To help those 
that agreed to leave their gangs, three stall-holders' unions (essentially legitimised 
tekiya groups) were set up under police guidance. The impact of this change has 
been mixed. Under this new system, the allocation of stall sites is no longer 
determined by seniority within the yakuza world. Allocation by drawing lots, 
though fair, introduces an element of uncertainty as traders cannot gauge in advance 
how much stock they require. Consequently place-allocation is now determined 
through negotiations with the police and festival organiser (interview Morioka 
1998). 
Because now non-yakuza stall-holders are able to participate in festivals, an element 
of competition has been introduced which has reduced profits. Harada, the director 
of one of the unions and former Sumiyoshi-kai man, claimed that his sales had 
dropped by 30% since 1992 though he accepted that the bubble had been the largest 
factor behind this. 
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Income has also been affected by the recent trend for some festivals to restrict 
participation to local inhabitants in order to keep things clean. Interestingly, the 
fees for cleaning and electricity have also increased now that they are no longer set 
by the yakuza. Whereas they would formerly range from ¥2,000 to ¥10,000 per 
day, currently they may be as much as ¥30,000. On the other hand, now that he has 
left the Sumiyoshi-kai, Harada no longer has the financial burden of paying jonökin, 
taking his turn at the office-manning (töban) rota and attending various yakuza 
ceremonies. Harada estimates that this cost him a total of ¥2 million per year. 
Although the net effect of these changes means that Harada is no better off 
materially, he was keen to stress that the current situation was preferable and that 
his wife and children were much happier now he had left the Sumiyoshi-kai. He 
also praised the police for the help they had given him in going straight. Because 
the interview was conducted with two policemen sitting close by, it is not clear to 
what extent credence can be given for this last affirmation. It is however clear that 
this is one area in which rehabilitation is likely to be successful as there is no 
change in the individual's basic business. 
The problem with rehabilitation of retired böryokudan is that many of them are 
practically unemployable. In general, they possess extremely low educational 
qualifications and, according to most police interviewees, are lazy with little 
willpower. The additional stigma of a criminal record, tattoo and amputated 
fingers, mean that the employment available to them tends to be confined to 
construction type work. Given the depressed state of the construction industry this 
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sort of employment is currently very uncertain and many former böryokudan have 
ended up living rough on the streets of San'ya and Kamagasaki (interviews, San'ya, 
1998, corroborated by observation of half-finished tattoos and truncated fingers 
amongst the inhabitants). 
In a 1994 NRIPS investigation (Yonezato et al 1994) into the factors promoting 
secession and rehabilitation, it was found that essentially those factors encouraging 
the former also assisted the latter. In particular they drew attention to a negative 
correlation between age and successful rehabilitation; younger members are far 
better able to leave and adapt to legitimate employment. They are also less likely to 
bear tattoos and amputated fingers. The findings noted that counselling and a 
supportive environment were also highly important both to secession and 
rehabilitation; so in this respect there is clearly a role for the centres to perform. 
In order to remove the stigma of tattoos and missing fingers, it is now surgically 
possible to remove the former and replace the latter. This is however highly 
expensive. A fake finger typically costs ¥50,000, transplanting a toe Y100,000 and 
tattoo removal ¥20,000 per square centimetre. Neither the police nor the centres can 
help böryokudan-leavers with these expenses; the most they can do is provide living 
expenses for a couple of days (¥10-20,000) whilst the seceder finds his feet 
(Kanagawa centre). 
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INTERNAL CONFLICT 
The considerably reduced opportunities to make money in the current climate have 
also resulted in increased competition over shinogi between members of the same 
syndicate. Although same-syndicate membership might be thought to prevent this, 
the main focus of loyalty is to one's immediate gang rather than to the wider 
syndicate. It does, however, provide a mechanism for the rapid resolution of 
conflicts of this type (Yamaguchi-gumi sub-bosses interviews Osaka, 1998). 
When such trouble does occur, as far as the Yamaguch-gumi is concerned, 
settlement is currently determined according not to the merits of the case but to the 
relative strength of the disputants. In this sense intra-group conflicts are essentially 
the same as inter-group ones. Within the Yamaguchi-gumi the strongest 
organisations are the Yamaken-gumi and, until 1997, the Nakano-kai. The 
ascendancy of the Yamaken-gumi, combined with the constant demands for money 
from the fifth-generation leadership, itself drawn from the Yamaken-gumi, has 
caused discontent amongst the other groups within the syndicate (Fujimura 
interview Osaka 1998, Mizoguchi interviews 1998,1999). 
Some illustration of this discontent is given in the interview of an unidentified 
former Yamaguchi-gumi senior executive interviewee of Mizoguchi (1997,258): 
If we talk about the Yamaguchi-gumi, Watanabe san just shows favouritism 
to his allies and the view has taken hold that he is trying to make the 
Yamaguchi-gumi into a Yamaken-gumi chain. At the moment Takumi 
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(gashira) is around so somehow or other it keeps going without splitting up. 
But Takumi is sick15 so it is a question of what happens if he dies. There is 
a real possibility that it will break up. 
On 28 August 1997, Takumi was shot dead in the coffee shop of a Kobe Hotel, 
where he had been discussing the proposed new organised-crime counter-measures 
law (soshiki hanzai taisaku ho) with headquarters chief Kishimoto Saizo (who had 
been unharmed in the attack). No other recent incident within the yakuza world 
more clearly illustrates the way in which political, economic and personal rivalries 
within large syndicates stress the bonds holding these groups together. Given the 
types of people who rise within such organisations, this is perhaps inevitable within 
a large syndicate such as the Yamaguchi-gumi. 
Suspicion for Takumi's shooting quickly fell on the Nakano-kai when the get-away 
car was traced to a member of one of its sub-groups. The reaction of Yamaguchi- 
gumi leadership however, showed confusion and indecision. After weighing up the 
available evidence, three days after the incident Watanabe punished Nakano Tara, 
the 1,700 man-strong Nakano-kai's leader, with expulsion (hamon). 
The following day police from Hyogo, Kyoto and Osaka police forces launched co- 
ordinated searches of Yamaguchi-gumi and Nakano-kai offices. The NPA also 
assembled böryokudan specialists from police forces throughout Japan for an 
emergency meeting in Hyögo prefecture. Given that it was widely felt that this 
15 Diabetes and liver disease. 
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event could trigger off another internal war of the magnitude of the Yama-ichi war 
of the 1980s, the police were evidently keen to prevent the conflict escalating. 
Nakano apparently met his expulsion with equanimity and reportedly told his top 
executives that he would probably be reinstated within two to three years. At the 
same time, many other groups within the syndicate felt that this punishment was 
insufficiently severe and on the third of September, Watanabe felt compelled to 
completely sever all relations (zetsuen) with Nakano. Even before this change, 
revenge attacks on Nakano-kai offices had started but, from the fourth onwards, 
these increased, causing the Yamaguchi-gumi headquarters to contact all block 
chiefs with orders to prevent such attacks. This order had little effect and the 
attacks continued. On the 30th September the headquarters issued a second, sterner, 
warning that `if groups attack Nakano-kai-related buildings, we will deal with the 
leaders of superior groups'. This directive also failed to prevent retaliatory action. 
In response to these attacks, the police took vigorous measures with frequent and 
widespread searches of both Yamaguchi-gumi and Nakano-kai offices and houses. 
Between Takumi's shooting and the 17`x' of October, the police made at least 910 
separate searches and 87 arrests directly related to the vendetta shootings (Yamada 
1998,453-463). An Osaka-based delivery driver friend of the researcher also 
recalled massive police security around prime targets during this period. 
Perhaps the most significant police action of this time was the arrest of Kuwata 
Kanekichi, head of the powerful Yamaken-gumi, on 26th December for violation of 
the firearms and sword regulation law (jütOhö). This was important because, at the 
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time of arrest, Kuwata was not himself armed but subordinates travelling in a 
separate vehicle were. The police argued that, as their superior, Kuwata shared 
criminal liability. A month before, the police had tried to arrest two other top 
executives, Tsukasa Shinobu and Takizawa Takashi, on similar legal grounds, but 
they had managed to escape, though several kumi-in were arrested and found to be 
armed. Following this, Tsukasa and Takizawa were on the run for several months 
before finally giving themselves up. 
This more flexible interpretation of the law is a major blow to the böryokudan and 
is indicative of a shift to a more aggressive style of law-enforcement vis-ä-vis these 
syndicates. At the time of writing, these cases are still being tried so it remains 
unclear whether the courts will uphold the police interpretation of the law. 
It is worth noting that despite the provisions of the bötaihö allowing for the closure 
of gang offices at times when they present a threat to the safety of the general 
public, during this period only one gang office was subject to such an order when, 
on the 1 S` December, the Nakano-kai headquarters was closed. Perhaps this was due 
to confusion as to the status of the Nakano-kai as it was not a designated 
böryokudan in its own right. 
As we can see, the killing of Takumi has therefore had a profound impact on the 
leadership of the Yamaguchi-gumi, which the weekly press still refer to as in a 
`state of paralysis'. We can see this from the chart in Appendix 3 showing the top 
executives of the organisation. Takumi, the man who had been responsible for the 
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day-to-day running of the organisation, was dead. His role was temporarily filled 
by headquarters chief Kishimoto Saizb. Nakano was expelled; Kuwata was under 
arrest; Takizawa and Tsukasa were wanted by the police. In addition, Hanabusa and 
Kuramoto were both ill (Kuramoto died the following year on 4t' December). 
Kuwata had been Takumi's chosen successor as gashira, but later refused the post. 
At the time of writing (January 2000) this all-important post remains unfilled, with 
Kishimoto operating as `gashira representative'. According to the strict hierarchy 
consciousness of the yakuza world, Kishimoto is ineligible for the role of gashira as 
he has a brother relationship with Watanabe whilst a prerequisite is that he should 
be a kobun (fictive son). Given the current state of the top executives, it is not 
envisaged that this situation will change in the foreseeable future. 
Why did Nakano kill Takumi? The weekly press abound with theories, some of 
them suggesting that Watanabe himself had a hand in the affair. What is clear 
however is that there was personal enmity between the two men. Nakano is a 
highly aggressive, argumentative man (known as `kenka Taro' - literally `quarrel 
Taro') whilst Takumi was a much smarter, politically adept `economic yakuza'. For 
some years Nakano had been busily expanding into Kyoto in order to take 
advantage of the massive public-works projects, such as the reconstruction of 
Kyoto's railway station, then underway. This had inevitably brought him into 
conflict with the local Aizu-kotetsu, and, in July 1996, Nakano was attacked by a 
squad of Aizu-kotetsu hit-men. Nakano's bodyguard shot and killed two of the 
assailants, successfully foiling the attack. 
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A peaceful reconciliation was quickly brokered between the two groups by Takumi 
and Zugoshi (then the gashira of the Aizu-kotetsu) with one of Zugoshi's 
subordinates offering an amputated finger by way of apology. Nakano, still helping 
the police with their enquiries, was not involved with this settlement and, once 
released, wanted revenge not amicable settlements. Takumi however forced him to 
accept this situation despite the massive slight to the dignity and reputation Nakano 
felt this represented to both himself personally and the syndicate as a whole. 
This personal animosity is not however sufficient reason for the killing. The most 
plausible theory, and the one widely held by informed interviewees, as to why 
Takumi actually was killed is that he had become too powerful within the 
organisation. One interviewee close to the Yamaguchi-gumi believes that Nakano 
operated on his own initiative but was convinced that he was doing a favour for 
Watanabe. This would explain both the confused reaction of the leadership and 
Nakano's conviction that he would shortly be readmitted to the Yamaguchi-gumi. 
The circumstances surrounding the death of Takumi and its aftermath are 
enlightening for a number of reasons. Firstly the incident illustrates the tensions 
currently within the Yamaguchi-gumi leadership. This is an almost inevitable 
consequence of the size and composition of the syndicate; all of the top executives 
are leaders of their own power groups. In this respect the Yamaguchi-gumi 
resembles a feudal monarchy with powerful barons to whom the king is in thrall. 
This is in marked contrast to the strong central leadership of third-generation boss 
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Taoka, who had single-handedly created the modern Yamaguchi-gumi through 
military conquest. 
This incident is also important because it helps explode another yakuza myth 
concerning loyalty and the sanctity of the oyabun-kobun relationship. Once it 
became clear that the Nakano-kai was not going to be readmitted to the Yamaguchi- 
gumi, and with the pressure of police searches and Takumi-gumi retaliation making 
it practically impossible to earn money, it became clear to many in the Nakano-kai 
that their group had no future. By the 10th October, of the sixty-four sub-groups 
comprising the Nakano-kai, only fifteen remained. These groups expressed the 
wish that they realign themselves with other groups within their former syndicate. 
When, later that month, the top executive committee lifted its ban on readmission of 
Nakano-kai sub-groups, many of them flocked to the Yamaken-gumi headquarters. 
The Nakano-kai itself has since shrunk to a tiny rump group of Nakano's closest 
associates. 
Although this behaviour is perfectly rational, both economically and in terms of 
self-preservation, in terms of traditional yakuza ethics of unquestioning obedience 
to one's boss and endurance, the Nakano-kai falls short of the ideal. During the 
early stages of this incident, the popular press had made much of the Nakano-kai's 
reputation as being a heavily-armed, hard-fighting group with plenty of teppödama 
(literally `bullets' - members ready to risk their lives for the cause). When put to 
the test, however, the sub-groups quickly fled to the security of the main syndicate. 
- 395 - 
Takumi's death also throws into relief the limits of control that the central executive 
exercises over the rank-and-file membership. Despite the repeated instructions not 
to commit revenge attacks on Nakano-kai facilities, they continued unabated. The 
fact that other executive committee instructions have to be repeated suggests that 
lack of control is not confined to this particular event. If we look at the repeated 
demands from the top executives/executive committee not to have anything to do 
with drugs, not to have anything to do with jüsen, not to have anything to do with 
`business terrorism', the picture of an organisation which is constantly struggling to 
keep control over its members emerges. 
In chapter two we noted Schelling's observation that one possible advantage of 
organised crime over disorganised crime is that the organisation internalises the 
costs of increased law-enforcement that would otherwise be externalities to the 
individual perpetrator. It is argued here that the Yamaguchi-gumi leadership is 
trying to square the circle in that it makes these demands on its members whilst 
continuing to place unrealistic financial burdens on them. In the current hostile 
legal and economic environment, the imperative to make money transcends all other 
considerations including the prohibitions of both the legal and under-worlds. 
CONTINUED EASTWARDS EXPANSION 
If we look at Nakano's behaviour in moving into Kyoto, we can see that the 
tendency to ignore directives extends to the highest reaches of the Yamaguchi- 
gumi; Kuwata had become a brother of Zugoshi, and Yamaguchi-gumi members 
were consequently instructed to avoid causing trouble with the Aizu-kotetsu. 
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Similarly, the brotherhood exchange between Watanabe and Inagawa carried the 
understanding that the Yamaguchi-gumi would keep out of Tokyo. 
Though the Yamaguchi-gumi maintained this fiction by not opening gang offices, 
many subgroups operate in the Tokyo area through business fronts. In addition 
many Yamaguchi-gumi groups have established offices in the surrounding 
prefectures. Tokyo police estimated in 1999 that 500 Yamaguchi-gumi men (in 
seventeen groups) were operating in the capital. 
The syndicate has been actively trying to expand into Tokyo since the end of the 
1980s but the pace of this process is said to have slowed slightly since the death of 
Takumi16. The forces causing this expansion however are still present. Most 
important of these is the fact that the Kansai area is so heavily populated with 
Yamaguchi-gumi men chasing limited opportunities that those not belonging to one 
of the reputed groups have little chance to progress as they are unable to deploy 
violence against fellow syndicate members. The other reason is that there is five 
times more money available to the böryokudan in Tokyo than in the Osaka-Kobe 
area (criminal defence lawyer interview, Osaka, August 1998). 
Consequently, in recent years there have been a number of small conflicts between 
Yamaguchi-gumi sub-groups and Kanto gangs. In the first half of 1998 there was a 
running spat between the Matsuba-kai and a Yamaguchi-gumi group following the 
shooting of a Matsuba-kai advisor in Tsukuba city. This was followed in October 
16 This is more likely to be due to the increased police pressure on the syndicate and the executive- 
level confusion rather than a deliberate change of policy. 
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of the same year by a conflict between the Sumiyoshi-kai and Yamaguchi-gumi 
Konishi-ikka (Shükan Taishu 16/11/98, Shükan Jitsuwa 12/11/98). In June 1999, in 
a two day-long flash-fire of retaliatory attacks, the Konishi-ikka clashed with the 
Kokusui-kai in 16 separate incidents in Tokyo and adjacent prefectures. This last 
conflict is of interest as it was the first time in which the police made use of 
provisional injunctions (kari meirei) prohibiting the use of five separate gang 
offices. The police, fearing widespread escalation of this conflict, also sent 
warnings to all prefectural police headquarters and mobilised 600 men to stand 
watch over 260 separate gang-related facilities (Shükan Jitsuwa 24/6/99). 
Although these conflicts are generally resolved very quickly through the mediation 
of the Kantö Hatsuka-kai and the Yamaguchi-gumi representative responsible for 
the Kanto block (block-sekininsha), it is easy to understand the police reaction. The 
movement of Yamaguchi-gumi groups into Tokyo can only upset the balance 
maintained by the Kanto Hatsuka-kai. It is not clear what the initial causes of these 
various conflicts were but there have been several cases in which Kanto böryokudan 
groups have occupied buildings and the owners have brought in Yamaguchi-gumi 
groups to remove them. More recently, an article in Asahi Evening News (21/8/99) 
reported that the Yamaguchi-gumi Asakawa-kai was attempting to take over the 
illegal pornographic video market in Tokyo's Kabuki-cho entertainment district. 
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CONCLUSION 
Given the enormous impact of the bubble's collapse on böryokudan finances, it is 
extremely difficult to quantify with any degree of precision, the impact of the 
bötaih6 on Japan's organised crime syndicates. Although the bursting of the bubble 
economy has seriously undermined many, formerly profitable, areas of böryokudan 
activity, the rapid evolution of new types of business to take advantage of this 
changed environment clearly illustrates the highly fluid nature of organised crime. 
Despite the problems of disentangling the effects of these two events, it is clear that 
the bötaihö has had significant effects on the böryokudan. 
Perhaps most encouraging of these is that, to the extent that a formerly grey-area has 
become subject to controls, the bötaihö has been effective. In cases of purely 
predatory böryokudan `violent demands' in which no service is provided to the 
victim, the bötaihö now provides a legal remedy. The increase in numbers of 
injunctions issued under the provisions of the bötaihö, combined with the extremely 
low rate of injunction-violation, shows that within these limited parameters, the 
bötaihö may be positively evaluated. 
However, for cases in which the victims of böryokudan violent demands are 
themselves operating outside, or at the margins of, the law, recourse to the bötaihö 
is not an option. For such individuals as illegal foreign workers and street 
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prostitutes, böryokudan predation therefore continues as before. Perhaps more 
significantly, is the continued existence of an active demand for the boryokudan's 
protective services from various sectors of the legitimate world (as the succession of 
bbryokudan related scandals unfolding at the time of the bötaihö's introduction and 
after illustrates). Given the existence of this demand, it is highly unlikely that 
böryokudan interaction with the legitimate world will ever entirely disappear 
regardless of administrative orders or other legal prohibitions. 
In many cases the main protective function provided by these groups is to squash 
other böryokudan or right wing groups. This immediately begs the question why 
the consumers of böryokudan protection don't instead make use of the law to 
resolve their initial problem. The answer to this is that these individuals themselves 
are frequently tainted by scandal, criminal involvement or earlier böryokudan 
connection, making them reluctant to seek legal, and public, redress. The 
researcher's discussion with the public relations chief of the large religious 
organisation mentioned in chapter two, provides a classic illustration of this 
phenomenon. 
As we saw from the immediate reaction of the various böryokudan syndicates to the 
law, the threat of gang-office closure at times of inter-syndicate conflict has been a 
broadly effective inducement for these groups to quickly resolve their differences 
peacefully when conflict arises. The two böryokudan `summits' of 1991 and the 
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subsequent `sakazuki diplomacy' suggests a trend for the western syndicates to 
adopt the less confrontational norms of the Tokyo-based groups. This is a direct 
consequence of the bötaihö. 
Despite the pacifying effects of the botaihö, there are limits to which this control 
function can remain viable, as the reaction to Takumi's murder in 1997 shows. The 
apparent inability of the Yamaguchi-gumi's leadership to exercise total control over 
sub-groups can also be seen from the strident directives repeatedly issued by the 
executive committee. This has become increasingly significant as sub-groups, 
suffering from the combined effects of the botaihö and economic recession, become 
more dependent on proscribed, and hitherto disparaged, sources of income such as 
amphetamine trading and organised theft despite instructions to the contrary from 
their superiors. 
This increase in drugs and theft crimes, in addition to the disorganised activities of 
former böryokudan members, is a partial vindication of the thesis put forward by 
Ino Kenji and others that the bötaihö will exacerbate the crime situation in Japan. 
Given that we have seen that previous organised crime countermeasures have 
pushed böryokudan members out of certain activities into others, this is not entirely 
surprising. However, Ino's thesis can be no more than only partially vindicated. 
This is due to two separate considerations. Firstly, we lack an acceptable calculus 
to determine whether the drop in one category of crime accompanied by a rise in 
another represents a net gain or loss to society; secondly, we can not exclude the 
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contributory role of extraneous economic factors to the recent evolution of the 
böryokudan. 
It is also highly likely that Yamaguchi-gumi headquarters' control will be subject to 
further strain in the near term, as Yamaguchi-gumi subgroups, frozen out of the 
crowded economic niches available in the Kansai area, turn to the capital in greater 
numbers in search of new sources of income. This will in all probability test the 
`peaceful coexistence' and conflict resolution mechanisms of the modem 
böryokudan to breaking point. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
LAW, LAW-ENFORCEMENT AND 
CRIME-CONTROL IN JAPAN 
In chapter four it was shown that whilst the debate concerning legal 
countermeasures to the böryokudan was framed within the structures of the RICO 
statutes and European OC laws, the final draft of the bötaihö took a radically 
different shape. This disparity raises the question: why did the Japanese opt for this 
highly limited approach to OC control when they were so clearly aware of more 
potent alternatives? In order to answer this question it is necessary to look at 
Japanese legal and law-enforcement norms and the way in which they have evolved. 
These norms show that, although the formal structures of modem Japanese law have 
been derived from French, German and, later, American models, the way in which 
these have been implemented and enforced has been very different. In particular 
Japan has historically shown a marked preference for informal, extra-legal 
procedures, over recourse to formal legal mechanisms, for exercising social control 
and resolving disputes. This has been combined with a remarkably high degree of 
leniency in the treatment of offenders. 
This analysis will therefore begin with a brief examination of the historical 
development of law and law-enforcement in Japan. It will be argued that the 
Japanese police deliberately chose an administrative, rather than criminal-law- 
centred, approach to controlling böryokudan groups, as this not only fitted most 
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comfortably within Japanese policing and legal norms but also provided them with 
control over the law's operation with no external interference from the Ministry of 
Justice. 
Having examined these legal and policing norms, we will return to the Japan-as-a- 
crime-free-society debate with which this thesis began. It will be argued that 
neither the legal system nor Japanese policing is the prime factor governing Japan's 
low post-war criminality. This has rather been achieved through informal social 
processes. The current rise in Japanese criminality is to be attributed to the 
breakdown in social control in an increasingly atomistic Japanese society. Due to 
this development there is now a trend towards more formal use of both criminal and 
civil law. Declining social control and a greater use of law both have profound 
implications for the böryokudan. 
THE EVOLUTION OF LAW IN JAPAN 
As every Japanese schoolchild can tell you, Japan's first constitution was introduced 
by Prince Shbtoku in AD 604. However, it was not until the second half of the 
seventh century that recognisable legal codes, known as ritsuryö, appeared in Japan. 
The first of these codes, the Ömi-ryö, was introduced in 664. This was succeeded 
by the Tenmu ryö (689), the Taihö ritsuryö (701) and finally the Yörb ritsuryö 
(718). Like so much of Japan's culture, the ritsuryo were imported from China and 
adapted to native conditions. The ritsu, or penal aspect of the codes, was only 
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modified to reduce the severity of its penalties whilst the ryö, or administrative 
code, was more heavily adapted to Japanese political realities (Oda 1992,15; Noda 
1976a, 23). 
The importance of the ritsuryö as a system of laws was significantly undermined as 
centralised imperial rule (which had never been completely achieved) was 
superseded by a feudal system based on powerful warrior clans with considerable 
regional autonomy. The disparity between the nominal laws of the ritsuryö and the 
requirements for effective administration and social control was resolved by the 
development of customary law supplemented by the introduction of new laws on an 
ad hoc basis and a flexible interpretation of the ritsuryo as circumstances required 
(Oda 1992,16). However the ritsuryö were never abrogated and, until the adoption 
of European-based laws during the early Meiji period (1866-1912), the ritsuryö held 
a symbolic role conferring legitimacy on those who held power despite the fact that 
this power was largely wielded arbitrarily by regional warlords (Haley 1991,33-5). 
With the unification of Japan in 1587 by Hideyoshi Toyotomi and the subsequent 
establishment of the Tokugawa Shogunate in 1600, regional lords came under the 
direct control of a highly centralised political system. Under this system regional 
lords were required to spend alternate years living in the capital whilst their families 
were kept there permanently as hostages. Similarly, samurai warriors were required 
to leave their villages and live in castle towns. One result of this control strategy 
was to leave villages without direct rule and they developed a high degree of 
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autonomy over their internal affairs provided that they fulfilled their legal 
obligations vis-a-vis the outside world. Because of the system of vicarious 
responsibility in which the village as a whole would be punished for the violation of 
these legal obligations by individual members, coupled with a desire not to attract 
unwanted attention from officialdom, villages developed informal mechanisms for 
managing internal control and the resolution of disputes. These mechanisms were 
backed by social sanctions such as ostracism and the withdrawal of co-operation, 
which were highly potent in the context of the mutual dependence of village society. 
Despite the higher degree of official surveillance, towns also had a degree of 
autonomy combined with a collective liability for the behaviour of individual 
members. Consequently they too developed patterns of informal social control 
combined with external shows of deference to authority. We therefore see a two- 
tier system of governance. On the first tier there was a highly regulated hierarchical 
system maintained by rigidly enforced rules governing those areas directly 
concerned with the security and maintenance of the state, as well as the state's 
relations with groups under its jurisdiction. On the second tier there was a system 
of extra-legal controls exercised at a local, intra-group level. Notwithstanding the 
great changes wrought by the introduction of European-based laws early in the 
Meiji period, aspects of this dual system remain in Japan's contemporary legal 
order. 
The second infusion of foreign legal ideas to Japan came with the end of the 
isolationist policy of the Tokugawa period and the opening-up of the country to 
foreigners following the Meiji restoration of 1868. There were two crucial reasons 
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why legal reform was imperative for Japan at this time. The first of these was that 
the desire to create a modern state, based on direct government by the emperor 
necessitated the replacement of the existing feudal system of regionally-varying 
customary laws with a coherent, unified legal code. Secondly, under the treaties 
Japan had signed with more technologically advanced (and militarily powerful) 
powers, foreign citizens were immune from prosecution under Japanese law. This 
immunity was predicated on notions of Western superiority and disdain for 
backward, non-Western law. Legal reform was therefore not merely a political 
imperative, but a matter of national pride. 
After a failed attempt to introduce a code based on modified ritsuryo, attention was 
turned to European models. In particular the Napoleonic codes of France, which 
had been the basis of many other countries' legal systems, were admired by Japan's 
first minister of justice, Eto Shimpei. He consequently ordered the rapid translation 
of these codes with the idea of their being directly implemented as law. Mitsukuri 
Rinsho, the academic charged with this job, completed it in under five years despite 
having no specialist legal training or access to French experts. The radical nature of 
this break with past practice is illustrated by the fact that Mitsukuri had to invent 
many of the Japanese legal terms such as `right' (kenri) and `obligation' (gimu) that 
are still used today (Noda 1976a, 43-4). As pointed out by Haley (1991,83) until 
then, the idea of rights, for example, had been totally alien to Japanese legal 
thought: 
Neo-Confucian imperatives of loyalty and filial piety precluded any 
conception of a litigant's assertion of a claim as a legal right to be enforced 
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by a neutral arbiter. Judicial governance in Japan represented an assertion of 
political power to maintain a stable order and to enforce only those legal 
rules of value or important to those who ruled, or an accommodation out of 
commercial necessity. 
Although the translated codes were not adopted in toto as Japanese law, the first 
criminal and criminal-procedure codes (1880), which had been drawn up largely by 
the French law professor Gustave Boissonade, closely followed the French model. 
Boissonade's subsequent draft for a civil code was not however adopted as it was 
felt that it was incompatible with Japan's established legal customs and mores 
(especially the status of the family, rather than the individual, as the basic unit of 
social organisation). Both Oda (1992,27) and Noda (1976a, 48) identify however a 
more important, political, reason for the rejection of French-inspired law and a 
move towards the Prussian model. 
Increased exposure to European legal and political thought had led to the 
development of a Popular Rights Movement (Jiyü Minken Undo) and calls for a 
parliamentary system of government. Although the figures behind the Meiji 
restoration desired the establishment of a modern state, this was to be based on 
absolutist, rather than bourgeois-democratic, lines. There was therefore a shift from 
the French pattern of law in favour of one based on the more authoritarian, 
monarchical Prussian state which seemed to be in greater accordance with the 
aspirations of the Japanese modernisers. This shift was completed with the 
establishment of the 1889 Meiji Constitution, which had been heavily influenced by 
the 1850 Prussian Constitution. The legal codes finally adopted in 1890 were also 
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largely modelled on Prussian law, though they also contained French influences as 
well as modifications to allow for local practice. 
The third major phase of legal change came just over half a century later with 
Japan's military defeat in 1945. The most significant of these changes was the 
replacement of the emperor-centred 1889 Meiji Constitution with the liberal and 
democratic 1947 constitution. In order that they comply with this document, the 
legal codes of the Meiji period were also subject to partial amendment. Despite 
this, the declared aim of the occupying authorities was to "bring about the minimum 
of political and legal changes" consistent with eliminating militarism, feudalism and 
the police state (Oppler 1976,1). Consequently the essential character of Japanese 
law remains European with American influences. However, as we have seen, this 
has been adapted and interpreted within the very different context of native custom 
and tradition. Consequently law, and more importantly the way in which it is 
exercised, differs significantly from that of either Europe or America. 
In Japan today, the law is laid out in six distinct codes (ropp6). The most important 
of these is the 1947 Constitution and all other laws must conform to the constitution 
to have validity. Subordinate to the Constitution are the civil code, the code of civil 
procedure, the criminal code, the Code of Criminal Procedure and the commercial 
code. In addition to the six codes, there are a large number of statutes, Cabinet 
orders, local ordinances and administrative regulations, all of which carry the 
weight of law. It is important to remember that the botaihö falls into this latter 
category rather than being part of the criminal law. 
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THE STATUS OF LAW IN MODERN JAPAN 
Although the structure of law in Japan is based on German, French, and to a lesser 
extent American, models, the way in which the law is actually employed in Japan 
appears very different from any of these three countries. In particular, Japan is 
usually characterised as showing an extreme reluctance to make use of formal legal 
procedures, and this tendency can be seen in both criminal and civil law. Tanaka 
(1976,255) for example, asserts that "the number of civil suits per capita brought 
before the courts in Japan is roughly between one twentieth and one tenth of the 
figures for the common law countries of the United States and Great Britain. " 
Although a quarter-century has elapsed since Tanaka's observation, Japanese use of 
law remains lower than in European countries and, a fortiori, the United States. For 
example, compared to other countries the number of legal professionals (judges, 
prosecutors and lawyers) in Japan is tiny. In 1998 Japan had one legal professional 
for every 5,995 head of population. This compares to ratios of 1: 1,641 for France, 
1: 724 for Germany, 1: 656 for Great Britain and 1: 285 for the United States 
(Yomiuri Shinbun 3/8/1998). This phenomenon is often explained as being due to 
cultural factors, which cause the Japanese to be a highly non-litigious people. This 
attitude is even to be seen amongst Japanese legal scholars such as Noda (1976b, 
307): 
We Japanese tend to feel uncomfortable with a black-or-white type of 
adjudication, if a Japanese loses in a lawsuit, being of emotional inclination, 
he is bound to be embittered against the winner, and even against the judge. 
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We do not want to leave the embers of a grudge smouldering. We would 
rather pay a small price, if such a price rounds off the sharp edges and lets 
bygones be bygones. This explains why a large majority of cases that are 
brought to court are settled through compromise. This is very indicative of 
the peculiar character of the Japanese. 
Elsewhere Noda (1976a, 160-74), who as a former teacher at Tokyo University's 
prestigious faculty of law cannot be dismissed as a marginal eccentric, further 
deploys nihonjinron, or theories of Japanese uniqueness, to more fully explain 
Japanese aversion to law. Essentially, according to Noda, the Japanese are an 
emotional, intuitive and subjective people characterised by a preference for non- 
rational patterns of thought. This `Oriental spirit' is the antithesis of the dry, 
analytical reasoning, which Noda sees as characterising European law. Because of 
this "even after the reception of European law, the logical conception of law did not 
take root easily in their mentality" (ibid, 165). 
Rather than looking to law for the adjudication of conflicts, nihonjinron, or 
Japanese culturalist interpretations, see conciliation, rooted in traditional social 
values and customs, as being the main engine of resolving such disputes. In 
particular, a preference for harmony (wa) and a reluctance to jeopardise existing 
social-relations, encourages a spirit of compromise in which the enforcement of 
one's own individual rights is seen as a selfish lack of consideration of the other 
disputant's position (Tanaka 1988,195; Noda 1976a, 181). 
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However, as John Owen Haley argues in his superb 1991 work "Authority Without 
Power: Law and the Japanese Paradox", the idea that the Japanese are not by nature 
litigious is not upheld by the empirical evidence. Historically the Japanese have not 
been at all reluctant to exercise their legal rights and during the 1920s there was a 
sharp rise in the number of lawsuits under the Civil Code (Haley 1991,96). This 
process was not, however, universally welcomed. In particular the suits launched by 
both rural tenants and industrial workers, to secure the rights that these new codes 
provided them, caused unease among the framers of the Meiji Constitution, who 
saw this phenomenon as endangering social stability: 
The primacy of private law in nineteenth-century Western legal systems and 
the consequent emphasis on justiciable rights meant that intrinsic to the new 
Japanese legal order were a set of premises quite antithetical to fundamental 
precepts shared by Japan's social and political elites. As lifeless 
abstractions, legal rights would have perhaps caused little concern, but their 
exercise in court could only be perceived as a threat to Japan's social and 
political order. (ibid, 84) 
Increasing unease following the rice riots of 1918, the Russian revolution and 
anxiety concerning the social consequences of rapid industrialisation, combined 
with this sense of threat as well as the growing power of traditionalist political 
forces, led to a gradual process of forcing the public away from litigation. This was 
effected by the introduction of laws forcing potential litigants to resolve conflicts by 
formal conciliation rather than through the courts. 
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This process first became apparent in 1919 with the instigation of the Ad Hoc 
Commission for the Study of Legal Institutions (Rinji Hosei Shingikai), which was 
specifically tasked with finding means by which the Civil Code could be reformed 
in ways that brought it more in line with traditional morality. Three years later this 
commission recommended that disputes concerning family matters be settled by 
conciliation under separate Family Courts. Although this measure was not passed 
by the Diet, in the same year the Land Lease and House Lease Conciliation Law 
was passed. This was followed by the Farm Tenancy Conciliation Law in 1924 and 
the Labour Disputes Conciliation Law in 1926. Finally, in 1942, the Special 
Wartime Civil Affairs Law made all settlements reached by this conciliation 
binding. As a consequence of this process, by the late 1930s nearly all civil 
disputes were settled by conciliation (ibid. 90-1). 
It is clear therefore that, as far as the civil law goes, Japan's aversion to law is one 
that has been imposed from above rather than being a feature of some Japanese or 
Oriental cultural characteristic. This process of squeezing litigation out of Japan's 
justice system was reinforced by a change brought about during the occupation 
period. At the instigation of the Federation of Japanese Bar Associations the 
occupation authorities responsible for legal reform supported the 1949 Lawyers law 
(bengoshi ho). Although this law is to be commended for its provision of 
independence from the Ministry of Justice for the legal profession, the 1949 
bengoshi ha also ensured that entry into the profession was severely limited. This 
was achieved by making entry dependent on graduation from the Legal Research 
and Training Institute (shihö kenshü sho or LRTI). 
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Graduation from this institution is a prerequisite not only for lawyers but also for 
judges and prosecutors. Because the LRTI comes within the budget of the Ministry 
of Justice (which is famously weak in extracting funds from the Ministry of 
Finance), there is little incentive for the Ministry of Justice to expand the numbers 
attending this institute. Currently around five hundred trainees are admitted to the 
LRTI each year although many thousands apply (with a success rate of around two 
percent) (van Wolferen 1989,214). The effect of the 1949 bengoshi hö was 
therefore to dramatically limit the supply of these professionals, the results of which 
can be seen in the figures given above showing the very low per capita population 
of judges in Japan vis-a-vis Europe and America. 
The result of this has been to severely clog Japan's courts with a massive backlog of 
suits leading to a judicial system which is both extremely slow and expensive to 
use. In 1990 the average civil case in a district court took 11.9 months for 
completion; a typical first appeal in the appellate court took a further 13.2 months. 
Appeals to the Supreme Court take even longer; 211 cases out of the 1,376 under 
consideration by the Supreme Court had been first docketed more than ten years 
ago. In one exceptional case judgement was finally given twenty-five years after 
the initial docketing (Oda 1992,79-81). 
This chronic delay presents a significant deterrent to a potential litigant. Further 
obstacles are presented by the financial costs of bringing a case to court. Given the 
strictly controlled supply of lawyers, their services do not come cheap. Moreover, 
when awarding legal costs to the victor, judges include only witness costs and the 
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costs of the various legal stamps, not lawyers' fees. Since lawyers' fees usually 
account for 80% of the total costs even if a case is won, the burden of legal fees may 
offset any benefit gained (Yamaguchi and Soejima 1997,72-3). Access to a lawyer 
becomes even harder in outlying rural areas because the overwhelming majority of 
practising lawyers are registered in Tokyo and Osaka. 
Even for those individuals who do try to launch a suit, Japanese judges pressure 
litigants to resolve disputes via out-of-court settlement (wakaf). According to van 
Wolferen this pressure may be enforced by veiled threats that their lack of co- 
operation may jeopardise their chances of a favourable outcome should they persist 
with the case (1989,215). The reason for this is that judges are themselves judged 
by the administrative office of the Supreme Court as to the number of cases they get 
through in a year. It is said that those judges with the best clearance rates advance 
most quickly within the profession (Yamaguchi and Soejima 1997,28). 
As a consequence of these barriers, there is a marked tendency for disputes in Japan 
to be settled by conciliation. Although this had been imposed initially by the 
authorities in pre-war Japan fearful of the social effects of newly-granted legal 
rights being exercised, it has persisted due to the massive congestion caused by 
limited numbers of legal professionals. Van Wolferen, in characteristically 
polemical style, argues that the severe restriction on the supply of judges was a 
conscious decision by the authorities as a control strategy to uphold what he calls 
`the System' of existing power relations (1989,213). However, as mentioned 
above, this state of affairs stems from the 1949 Bengoshi ho. This law appeared 
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during the occupation period at the instigation of the Japanese Bar, who were 
working purely in their own professional self-interest by imposing barriers to entry. 
However, it is also clear that there is little pressure from within the MOJ for a 
change to the existing system, and Japan's low rate of litigation is a phenomenon 
which the government is in no hurry to alter. The official reasons given for this are 
that the Supreme Court does not want to reduce the quality of judges and the 
limitations imposed by the size of the LRTI (Oda 1992,80). In addition cultural 
arguments are deployed with the circular reasoning that more judges are not 
required because Japan is a highly non-litigious society! An Ad Hoc Commission 
(shingikai) is currently being proposed to consider legal reform, but, as one senior 
officer of the National Research Institute for Police Science commented with a 
cynical laugh, whilst a court case might take a couple of years, legal reform "will 
take a hundred years" (interview Tokyo, 1998). 
The absence of an efficiently functioning system for legal redress in Japan is of 
enormous importance to a study of the böryokudan for two main reasons. Firstly, 
this deficiency encourages injured parties to seek alternative means for solving their 
problems. This has led to a market for extra-legal dispute resolution which has been 
partially met by criminal groups. We therefore see how the böryokudan have 
managed to make money out of such techniques as intervening in traffic accident- 
related, and other civil, disputes. No equivalent exists in the more highly litigious 
United States. We can also see here empirical corroboration for our theoretical 
observation that the state and OC can be competing providers of protection. 
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Secondly, the lack of effective legal remedy in civil disputes also enables the yakuza 
to operate more freely than would otherwise be the case; quite simply it may be 
cheaper to pay gang members to go away than to embark on a lengthy and 
expensive civil case. Japan's legal system can be identified therefore as playing a 
significant contributory role in the development of minbö as a significant source of 
böryokudan income. 
The reliance on the yakuza for out-of-court settlements and a resigned acceptance of 
yakuza predation due to the lack of judicial remedies is not, however, the only way 
in which Japan's preference for informal, extra-legal strategies is of relevance to 
this thesis. To see how this difference between the formal letter of the law, and how 
the law is actually used, impacts on the yakuza, we must transfer our attention from 
the civil to the criminal law. 
Just as in the civil law there is a preference for extra judicial processes for resolving 
cases, within the criminal law there is a clear tendency to dispense with formal 
institutional mechanisms in dealing with criminal-law violations (Johnson 1997, 
17). Here again we can find institutional factors encouraging this phenomenon. As 
is the situation for civil law, criminal cases suffer from a shortage of judges, and 
also of prosecutors. 
Although delay in criminal prosecution is ostensibly much shorter than is the case 
for civil cases, in international terms Japanese criminal justice is slow. In 1990, the 
average length of a case in district courts was 2.6 months, whilst that of the 
summary courts (dealing with lesser offences) was 3.5 months. First appeals lasted, 
-417- 
on average, for 13.2 months, and second appeals to the Supreme Court took a 
further 23.3 months (Oda 1992,79). Under the 1947 Constitution, criminal suspects 
are guaranteed a quick trial. However, as will be seen, in practice suspects may be 
incarcerated before trial for considerable periods whilst the case is still being 
investigated. 
The delay is not entirely due to excessive caseloads on prosecutors and judges. 
Japanese criminal procedure usually requires that even simple, uncontested cases 
require several hearings, which tend to be separated by an interval of up to a month. 
Unlike in English or Scots law, under Japanese law even when guilt is admitted, the 
judge must evaluate all the evidence presented before convicting the defendant. In 
the minority of cases when the defendant maintains his or her innocence (for 90% of 
cases dealt with by the district courts the defendant has admitted guilt), it may take 
more than a year for a verdict to be given. 
Attempts have been made to reduce this delay by a number of different strategies. 
One way of speeding up the procedure is for the prosecution and defence to agree, 
before the trial begins, as to what prosecution evidence will not be challenged in 
court. Under this system an uncontested case can be tried in a single hearing of less 
than one hour (Haley 1991,125). 
Another means of accelerating the passage of justice is to encourage single, multi- 
indictment trials for defendants facing more than one charge. As will be shown 
later, the Japanese police often adopt the strategy of arresting a suspect for one 
crime on charges relating to another, usually much less significant, crime. This 
-418- 
pretext enables them to hold the suspect whilst gathering evidence on the main 
crime. As a consequence, a criminal suspect may not infrequently face many 
different charges. Unfortunately, the backlog of work faced by prosecutors and 
defence lawyers alike forces much work to be carried out between hearings. 
Consequently, despite official pressure on prosecutors, the potential benefits of 
multi-indictment trials are not fully exploited (ibid. ). 
The simpler expedient for reducing legal log jam is to remove cases from the 
criminal justice system altogether. In the late 1960s the traffic-infraction-notice 
procedure (kötsü hansoku tsükoku seido) was introduced to deal administratively 
(that is outside of the courts) with traffic offences. Under this system, fines are 
charged by the police. Similarly, offences carried out by juveniles (under Japanese 
law, those under twenty years of age) are referred to the family courts (katei saiban- 
sho). Reform of the juvenile law is proposed periodically, especially with respect to 
lowering the age of criminal responsibility. It seems plausible that at least one 
reason for these proposals not to come to fruition is that this would further burden 
the system with the most criminally active segment of the population. 
In order that the authorities may divert individuals from the criminal justice system, 
the prosecutors and the police have a wide degree of discretion as to how suspects 
are to be treated. In the case of minor infractions, the police are able to close a case, 
releasing suspects without charge. This option, known as bizai shobun, is provided 
for by the 1948 Code of Criminal Procedure. In 1991 22% of all criminal-law 
violations were cleared by the police in this way (Keisatsu-chi 1991b, 160-1) whilst 
Haley asserts that "it is estimated that the police fail to report 40% of all referable 
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cases" (1991,126). This should not necessarily be interpreted as being purely due to 
police lenience; the police refer cases only where they are confident of obtaining a 
conviction. In 1997, only 0.9% of cases passed on to the local prosecutors' offices 
were dismissed due to lack of evidence. 
Even when cases are referred to the prosecutors' office, alternatives to prosecution 
remain available. Of the 2,552,748 cases dealt with by the prosecutors' office in 
1997, prosecution was suspended in 24.1% cases, 11.6% were referred to the family 
court, 17.7% fell into the nebulous category of `other decisions' (for example cases 
in which the victim dropped charges), 0.9% were rejected on insufficient evidence 
and 0.5% were subject to `other dispositions'. In only 45.2% of the total were cases 
prosecuted (MOJ). 
Although the figures for böryokudan cases suggest that they are treated less 
leniently than other offenders, it is surprising that this difference is only marginal. 
Of the 10,916 böryokudan-related cases dealt with by the public prosecutor in 1993, 
52.8% were sent to court whilst 25.0% were not prosecuted and in 15.5% of cases 
prosecution was suspended (Johnson 1997,255). 
Once a case is prosecuted, however, it almost invariably results in a conviction. In 
recent years, over 99% of prosecutions resulted in a conviction. A public 
prosecutor presenting a paper at a 1998 OC conference in Kobe confessed that not 
only is this a source of pride within the prosecutors' office, but that prosecutors are 
constantly under extreme pressure to ensure that this percentage does not drop. 
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Prosecution in Japan is therefore tantamount to conviction. Whilst this might be 
taken as evidence that the prosecutors and police are extremely efficient, a number 
of cases of miscarriage of justice suggest rather a worrying lack of independence of 
the judiciary. Given that within the Ministry of Justice the prosecutors are accorded 
more influence than judges, there are certainly grounds for concern with regard to 
this stage of criminal procedure (van Wolferen 1989,222). 
At the stage of conviction, however, the criminal justice system has also been 
characterised as favouring leniency. Haley, for example, points out that for 
convictions passed by the summary courts in uncontested summary proceedings the 
fines imposed are usually considerably less than the maximum of 200,000 yen 
(£1,000). In 1987, "over 70% of all defendants convicted in summary proceedings 
were fined less than 50,000 yen" (£250) (Haley 1991,128). As the overwhelming 
bulk of prosecuted cases (93%) are dealt with by summary proceedings, this is 
significant. 
More serious offences, dealt with by the district court, are often subject to 
suspended sentence (shikkö yuyo). In 1987 just over 50% of those criminals 
sentenced to imprisonment were granted a suspended sentence (Haley 1991,128). 
The most recent figures available show that in 1997,63% of those sentenced to 
imprisonment or detention by district courts first instance trials were given 
suspended sentences. Of those who are actually incarcerated, less than 2% are 
sentenced to over five years (Saikö Saiban-sho Jimukyoku 1998,218-9). 
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By contrast, in England and Wales sentences can be suspended only if there are 
narrowly defined `exceptional circumstances', and even in these cases the court 
must consider imposing a fine or demanding compensation so that the offender is 
not `let off. Sentencing patterns are also comparatively harsh; in 1991, fines were 
imposed in 39% of sentences (Ashworth 1994,849). Of those who were given 
prison sentences in 1991,8% received over four years (Morgan 1994,904). 
However, there has been a clear pattern of increasing severity in Japanese 
sentencing patterns in the last decade. In 1991, Article 461 of the Code of Criminal 
Procedure was amended, and the maximum fine that the summary courts can 
impose in summary procedures was increased to Y500,000. In 1997,61% of those 
convicted by summary court paid a fine of between ¥100,000 and ¥50,000 whilst 
26% paid ¥50,000 or less (Saikö Saiban-sho Jimukyoku 1998,248-9). 
This tendency can also be seen in the length of sentences imposed in recent years. 
One of the researcher's Osaka-based defence-lawyer interviewees identifies this 
process as becoming increasingly apparent from the end of the 1980s, with a media 
campaign, echoing the sentiments of the police and prosecutors, that sentences were 
too light. In response to this, judges have delivered progressively heavier sentences. 
This informant illustrates this with reference to the punishments received by those 
found in possession of a firearm: 
25 years ago, when I first became a lawyer, this would typically receive a 
fine of about 100,000 yen. Quite soon after that it was increased to 
imprisonment but this would invariably be a suspended sentence. About ten 
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to fifteen years ago the penalty became one year imprisonment and soon 
after that it was increased to one and a half years. The Sword and Firearms 
Control Law was changed quite soon after that and the penalty for 
possession of one handgun became three years (five if found with 
ammunition). If we look at the cases of Tsukasa and Kuwatal, where one of 
Kuwata's kobun was found in possession, the prosecutor is recommending 
ten years (interview Kobe, July 1999). 
Despite this tendency to greater penal sanctions, by international standards Japan 
still remains very indulgent of its convicted criminals. Those found guilty of 
murder are usually sentenced to ten years (which means they are typically out on 
parole after seven), whilst forcible rape usually carries a sentence of three to four 
years (ibid. ). 
Partly as a consequence of these light sentencing patterns Japan has one of the 
lowest prison populations in the industrialised world. In 1994 Japan had 37,425 
inmates, which translates to a rate of just 29.9 per 100,000 of the total population. 
The comparable rates for England and Wales and the USA are 49,393 (96 per 
100,000) and 1,004,608 (401 per 100,000) respectively (Johnson 1997,6; Home 
1 Top executives of the Yamaguchi-gumi arrested in 1998 for violating the Sword and Firearms 
Control Law (see chapter five). 
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Office 1996,25). Although it must be admitted that the United States is as much an 
extreme anomaly as Japan, the comparison is worth making because it is the one 
which the Japanese themselves automatically make. Perhaps Holland's rate of 
around 40 per 100,000 offers a more balanced comparison (Ashworth 1994,841). 
It should also be recognised that lenience is not the only factor behind Japan's low 
prison population; ceteris paribus a country with lower levels of criminality will 
necessarily have a lower population of potential inmates to begin with. The low 
prison population also explains the apparent anomaly that Japanese rates of post- 
incarceration recidivism tend to be higher than those of comparable countries. This 
is to be expected, as the minority of offenders who are imprisoned in Japan tend to 
be hard core-criminals, whilst more punitive systems also incarcerate those who are 
less likely to repeat their offences. 
The leniency of the Japanese criminal justice system however, involves an implicit 
bargain. When deciding between a punitive and an indulgent attitude vis-ä-vis a 
particular offender, the authorities consider not only the nature of the offence, the 
likely effect of criminal conviction and the previous conduct of the offender, but 
also the attitude of both the offender and the victim and the former's willingness to 
admit guilt. Most important of these is the degree of contrition shown by the 
miscreant. Forgiveness of repentant transgressors is therefore a way of encouraging 
submission before authority (Bayley 1976,134-59, van Wolferen 1989,187-8, 
Haley 1991,129-31). This provides clues that social controls, rather than formal 
judicial processes, are the most significant factor contributing to the maintenance of 
law and order in Japan. This will be discussed in greater depth below. 
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Bayley (ibid. 139) points out that Japanese fairy stories and Japanese adaptations of 
Western ones, such as Little Red Riding-Hood and Goldilocks and the three bears, 
allow for the successful rehabilitation of the repentant transgressor. This he 
contrasts with the grisly fate which befalls the big bad wolf and other villains in the 
occidental versions of these tales. Although Bayley clearly identifies cultural values 
as the root cause of Japan's forgiving attitude towards law-breakers, Haley (ibid. 
134) suggests that there is no real evidence to support this argument with respect to 
the period following the introduction of European-based legal codes. Rather, it was 
not until the introduction of the 1925 Peace Preservation Law (chian iji hö) that a 
systematic pattern of forgiveness and rehabilitation can be seen. Under this law it 
became deliberate policy that communists, anarchists and liberals who had been 
arrested under the provisions of this thought-control law were able to achieve 
favourable treatment in return for renunciation (tenkö). 
Initially the vaguely-worded Peace Preservation Law had been concerned with the 
punishment of those who had committed ideologically-inspired acts. By 1934, 
however, the emphasis had shifted to the conversion of those holding subversive 
ideas. This switch in approach was largely due to the successes the authorities had 
following the public recantation by senior members of the Japan Communist Party. 
Another significant factor was the attempt to ease the pressure on the judicial and 
penal systems imposed by the mass-arrests of radicals. The law was primarily used 
in an administrative, rather than a judicial, manner, in which the police held the 
threat of full implementation over radicals to encourage renunciation of subversive 
ideology (Mitchell 1976,97-147). 
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Haley (1991,135) argues that contemporary Japan's preference for judicial lenience 
is a "natural response" to an overloaded criminal justice system in the postwar 
period and a continuation of the approach that had been so successful in dealing 
with thought-crime during the 1930s: 
Thus, like the myth of the reluctant litigant, the origins of Japan's postwar 
emphasis on confession, repentance and absolution in criminal justice may 
lie in the redefinition of traditionalist values of the 1930s. 
The above discussion suggests an explanation for Japan's idiosyncratic choice of 
the botaihö over more robust alternatives on the lines of the RICO statutes of the 
United States. As we have seen, the Japanese legal system goes out of its way to 
divert as many cases as possible from formal legal procedure: traffic offences are 
dealt with administratively by the police; those under twenty are dealt with by the 
juvenile justice system administered by the family courts; many minor criminal-law 
violations are dealt with by releasing the perpetrator without charge. The bötaihb is 
another example of a means by which the authorities can deal with wrong-doers 
without burdening an already-overloaded criminal justice system with new cases. 
However, in order to gain a more profound appreciation of the way in which the 
bötaihö fits into the rubric of Japanese law and crime-control patterns, we must 
examine the way in which the Japanese police operate. 
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POLICING IN JAPAN 
Just as had been the case for Japan's legal evolution, when, at the beginning of the 
Meiji period, it had been seen necessary to form a police force, the Japanese 
modernisers were presented with a choice between Anglo-Saxon and European 
models. The British model of policing was rooted in liberal conceptions of the state 
and, hence, police powers were circumscribed by legal restrictions. To reduce the 
risk of an over-mighty police, forces were organised on a decentralised, regional 
basis and had limited areas of responsibility. 
The European alternative to this was based on a fundamentally different 
interpretation of the state, in which the police were seen as an essential component 
in control of the masses and the exercise of state power in an authoritarian political 
system. Consequently the police in this system were highly centralised and in 
possession of powers far superior to those of the ordinary citizenry. Moreover, their 
area of jurisdiction was not confined to the maintenance of law and order and the 
apprehension of criminals but included a wide range of administrative 
responsibilities. 
Given that the imperatives for the engineers behind the Meiji restoration were the 
creation of a modern, authoritarian state under the autocratic rule of the emperor, it 
is hardly surprising that they opted for the continental European model of policing 
(just as their early flirtation with English law had quickly been discarded in 
preference for French and Prussian law). In particular the creation of internal 
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control in the face of a rapid catching-up with the great powers made the 
establishment of a strong, centralised police force a matter of great importance. 
Consequently, in 1871, a force of 3,000 men was created to police the capital. This 
was the birth of the modern Japanese police. In 1874 this force was transferred 
from the Ministry of Justice (Shihö-sho) to the newly-created Interior Ministry 
(Naimu-shö) and placed under the leadership of Kawaji Toshiyoshi, the "father of 
the Japanese police" who had just returned from a study of European policing 
systems. Kawaji's ideas were set out in his "Kengisho" (proposal document). In 
this document he argued that the people were not to be allowed freedom. Within 
the national family the people were the children, the government was the parent. 
Regardless of the children's preferences, it was the duty of the parent to teach the 
child. Extending this analogy, Kawaji identified the role of the police as nursing the 
children on behalf of the parents. 
On a more concrete level Kawaji's proposals were also strongly represented in the 
Administrative Police Regulations (gyösei keisatsu kisoku) of 1875 which, with 
minor alterations, remained in force until 1945. Under these regulations, the police 
not only held power for the prevention of crime and the arrest of offenders but also 
held administrative jurisdiction over nearly every aspect of economic and social life. 
The police were responsible for the licensing of bars, restaurants and brothels, 
ensuring that regulations concerning health, sanitation, religion, agriculture, 
construction and forestry were adhered to, regulating trade union organisations and 
labour disputes and keeping the population under surveillance through a process of 
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regular surveys. Later, due to the demands of total war on Japan's industrial base, 
the police also acquired responsibility for administering the allocation of economic 
resources and rationing food. 
Although the Administrative Police Regulations formally separated the police from 
the judiciary, they kept the power to promulgate ordinances as well as a number of 
quasi-judicial powers. The 1885 Law of Summary Procedure for Police Offences 
(ikeizai sokketsu rei) empowered police station chiefs to act as prosecutor and judge 
for minor offences carrying penalties of up to thirty days' imprisonment or a twenty 
yen fine (Nichibenren 1995,2-3; Aldous 1997,22-7; Ames 1981,9-10). 
Not only did the police in Meiji Japan have the ability to operate in a semi judicial 
capacity; they were also able to make law. Under Article 9 of the 1889 Meiji 
Constitution, the police were empowered to issue "ordinances necessary for the 
carrying out of the laws, or for the maintenance of the public peace and order, and 
for the promotion of the welfare of the subjects" (Bayley 1976,36). This was 
supposedly circumscribed by the provision that executive-derived administrative 
law could not contravene statute law (produced by the Diet). However, this did not 
in fact present an obstacle to the expansion of administrative law as statute law 
tended to be vaguely-worded (Aldous 1997,27). 
The surveillance aspect of Japanese police work was enhanced by the introduction 
in 1886 of the famous, and much admired, system of neighbourhood and residential 
police boxes (köban and chüzaisho respectively). Although this is now seen as a 
peculiarly Japanese aspect of the modem police system it was first introduced at the 
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suggestion of a German police officer, Captain Willhelm Höhn, and was indicative 
of the shift in influence from the French to German policing systems (Aldous 1997, 
24). Whilst the köban came to be widely praised for their role in community 
policing, their main role as surveillance organs is clearly identified by the 1888 
General Rules on Police Administration Placement and Duties. This document 
justified the creation of roughly 10,000 residential boxes on the grounds that "there 
is no place where the eyes of the police are not watching, no place where the ears of 
the police are not listening, police observation extends in all directions" (cited in 
Nichibenren 1995,3). 
At around the same time the police started the procedure of neighbourhood surveys 
in which each household would be visited on a regular basis and the names, ages, 
occupations and status of all inhabitants recorded (as well as any other points of 
interest such as signs of subversive activity). Those of high social standing would 
be visited once a year, those of lower status twice, whilst the unemployed and those 
with criminal records would receive three police visits each year. Through both the 
köban system and their regular home-visits, the police therefore maintained a high 
degree of surveillance over the population. Both these systems remain in place in 
modem Japan. 
In the intellectual ferment of Meiji Japan, with the rapid importation of foreign 
political doctrines, surveillance was particularly important in the field of political 
unorthodoxy. As early as 1875 the Police Bureau of the Interior Ministry was 
empowered to censor newspapers and books. Under the Public Peace Police Law 
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(chian keisatsu hö) of 1900 it became mandatory for political organisations to 
register with the police, and they required police permission to meet. Furthermore, 
the police were empowered to dissolve meetings and force the dissolution of 
political associations. As Mitchell (1976,24) points out, it is important to note that 
the exercise of political-control laws in Japan was essentially carried out by 
administrative rather than judicial means. Whilst Mitchell sees this as significant to 
later thought-control practices, it also has clear relevance to explaining 
developments in Japanese organised-crime control measures. 
Political control and surveillance by the police was strengthened by the creation of 
the Higher Police (kötö keisatsu) and the establishment of the Special Higher Police 
(tokubetsu kötö keisatsu or tokkö) in 1911. This latter group was to play the central 
role in enforcing thought control under the 1925 Peace Preservation Law (chian iji 
ho). The distinct dichotomy between political and criminal-investigation police 
continues today in the shape of the security police (köan keisastu), and their 
significance to post-war policing vis-ä-vis the yakuza will become apparent below. 
The personnel of the early Meiji police force were largely drawn from the ranks of 
former samurai. Whilst this encouraged a police culture in which corruption was 
perceived to be rare, it also engendered a police contempt for the common people 
and a closed, exclusive police identity far removed from the idealised picture of 
community policing that characterises much of the post-war literature on the 
Japanese police. This attitude manifested itself in poor treatment of suspects. 
Although torture as a means of extracting a confession had been abolished as part of 
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the legal reforms inspired by Boissonade, in practice its use remained an acceptable 
police practice perceived as contributing to the efficient clearance of criminal cases. 
Similarly the law placed limits on the length of an arrestee's detention prior to 
formal charges' being made, only for these limits to be exceeded by officers' 
issuing successive detention orders (Aldous 1997,31-2). 
In summary then, the pre-war police were the powerful, centralised pillar of the 
naimu-shö, a super-ministry with a vast area of jurisdiction. The police therefore 
had a correspondingly wide range of responsibilities and held considerable 
administrative powers in addition to their law-enforcement function. Even when 
exercising this law-enforcement role, the police showed a distinct preference for 
using the law in an administrative fashion. This can be seen from the way in which 
they made use of the 1925 Peace Preservation Law. Moreover, the police held 
considerable powers to prosecute, and adjudicate on offenders independently of the 
Ministry of Justice. Under the Meiji Constitution there were no provisions for 
accountability, democratic or otherwise, for the police, and this was reflected in 
police attitudes towards the people that can best be summarised by the oft-used 
expression kanson-minpi (respect the authorities and despise the people). 
Consequently, with the defeat of Japan in 1945, the police, alongside the military 
and the zaibatsu (industrial conglomerates), were seen by the SCAP authorities as 
one of the main targets of reform necessary for the democratisation of Japan. There 
was however an inherent strain within the occupation authority's policies towards 
Japan in that SCAP administration was to be conducted indirectly, that is via the 
existing governmental apparatus including the police force. This presented SCAP 
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with a problem; "by administering change through the prewar governmental 
structure, the Americans, whether they liked it or not, were legitimising that very 
structure" (Aldous 1997,46). There was the additional problem of combining the 
demands of democratic reform with efficient administration and social stability in 
conditions of near total economic collapse and political dislocation. 
The American ideal of democratic policing, based on liberal conceptions similar to 
those of the British model, were very different from the continental European 
patterns on which the Japanese police had been based. Central to this ideal were a 
decentralised structure, the limitation of police responsibilities to crime-prevention 
and law-enforcement, safeguards against police abuse of power by the requirement 
to adhere to due process, democratic accountability and political neutrality. 
Consequently, the naimu-shö was disbanded and split up into a number of separate 
ministries, and the Police Bureau was replaced with a separate organisation, the 
National Police Agency (keisatsu-chö). In 1947, the Police Law was passed. Under 
this law the police were decentralised, and towns of over 5,000 people were 
required to set up their own police force, whilst the NPA provided a small national 
force to police the remaining rural areas. To provide oversight and accountability 
over the police, a system of Public Safety Commissions (köan iinkai) was set up at 
national, prefectural and local levels. 
At the time, this measure was opposed not just by members of the Japanese 
government itself, but by members of the SCAP administration who saw political 
instability, rather than a democratic deficit, as the greatest threat to Japan's post-war 
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reconstruction. Even those, like Oppler, who supported the ethos on which police 
decentralisation rested, questioned whether it would be realistic. Given the extreme 
economic scarcity of this period, "the financial resources of local entities (were) too 
inadequate to allow every small town to have its own police administration" (Oppler 
1976,171). 
As Oppler predicted, small towns were unable to adequately fund their local forces. 
A lack of equipment, training and resources, not to mention pay, led to poor 
standards of law-enforcement and low morale in these areas. This situation was 
exacerbated by a rampant black-market which had been engendered by widespread 
economic scarcity. Corruption of the police in these circumstances was almost 
inevitable, and there were not only cases of straightforward bribery for personal 
gain, but also of the police relying on black-marketeers for funding essential police 
facilities. The Nippon Times in March 1949 identified the "danger of the police 
being made tools of local bosses" and "men of questionable character on the (Public 
Safety Commissions)". Similarly, in the same month, the Jiji Shinpö identified a 
"conspiracy between local bosses and police officials since the police must depend 
on local citizens for funds" (Aldous and Leishman 1997,138). As mentioned in 
chapter three, at the extreme was the case of the boss of the Hakuryusha who also 
held the position of chief of police in Nagahama city in Shiga prefecture. 
In addition, the clear division between adjacent local forces resulted in poor 
communications and co-operation. At the other extreme, it was practically 
impossible to clearly separate Municipal Police personnel from National Rural 
Police force officers operating in the same area. This was due to the fact that a lack 
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of funds ensured that these formally distinct organisations were obliged to share the 
same facilities. Sometimes only a red line, painted on the floor, dividing a room in 
two, separated rural from local police officers (Aldous 1997,182-3). Aldous and 
Leishman (1997,139) suggest that failure had been purposely engineered into the 
system by the Japanese government through inadequate funding provisions; taxes 
on theatre admissions and alcohol sales were to be the source of local police finance 
when many of the towns in question lacked theatres and non-black-market alcohol 
sales! 
Due to these failures, it was very quickly realised that such radical decentralisation 
had been a mistake, and, within eighteen months of introducing these changes, the 
authorities had started planning a return to a national service. Police recentralisation 
was given greater priority in 1950 with the combination of communist victory in 
China followed by the outbreak of the Korean War. It was the threat of political 
radicalism, rather than the symbiotic relationship between criminal gangs and the 
police or chronic police inefficiency, that finally stimulated police reorganisation. 
The need for a centralised security apparatus was first recognised with the creation 
of a military force, the National Police Reserve (later to be renamed the Japan Self- 
Defence Force), in 1950. The following year towns and villages were allowed to 
surrender their municipal forces to the National Rural Police. Re-centralisation was 
not however completed until 1954 with the new Police Law, which laid out the 
structure of the Japanese police today. Under the 1954 Police Law, a system of 
prefectural police forces was instituted. Each of these prefectural forces was to be 
under the supervision of a prefectural Public Safety Commission. Central co- 
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ordination was to be conducted by the National Police Agency (NPA or Keisatsu- 
chö), which was itself under the supervision of the National Public Safety 
Commission. 
Although the letter of the 1954 law suggests a reasonably high degree of 
decentralisation, Ames (1981,216-7) points out that, in reality, the NPA retains 
control over the prefectural police; senior personnel within the regional forces are 
appointed, paid and controlled by the NPA and key areas of police financing are 
covered by the NPA. The Security Police (koan keisatsu), who are responsible for 
counter-intelligence, the surveillance of political extremists, the riot police (more 
politely known as rapid mobilisation troop or kidötai) and all other matters 
concerning internal national security, are also controlled directly from Tokyo. 
It could therefore be argued that the Japanese police reverted to their pre-war 
centralised structure. Indeed one could say that, because they are no longer under 
external bureaucratic control, as a bureau of the naimu-shö, but an independent 
agency in their own right, they have acquired even greater levels of autonomy. The 
1954 Police Law provides for democratic accountability for the police through the 
system of Public Safety Commissions, but this will be shown to be a largely illusory 
safeguard. To what extent have the police matched re-centralisation with a return to 
the pre-war policing norms of crime-clearing practices, a wide area of responsibility 
and an administrative, quasi-judicial role in addition to their more conventional law- 
enforcement one? 
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As was mentioned in chapter one, a significant section of the literature which 
attempts to explain Japan's low crime rates has credited this success to Japan's 
policing practices. Typical of these are Bayley (1976) and Parker (1984), both of 
whom are unstinting in their admiration for the Japanese police. Essentially these 
authors see good police-community relations, rooted in the köban system of 
neighbourhood police boxes, as the key to low crime rates. In addition, they adopt 
uncritically statistics showing a high rate of crime clearance and an astonishingly 
high proportion of criminal prosecutions yielding a guilty verdict. This emphasis on 
successful community policing would suggest that the contemporary Japanese 
police have a totally different relationship with the people than that of their 
predecessors. 
These hagiographies must however be seen in their historical context. Aldous and 
Leishman (1999) "periodise" the literature dealing with Japan's police. The 
celebratory literature, characterised by Parker and Bayley, belongs within what 
Aldous and Leishman call the period of "reinvention" which spanned the two 
decades of the 1970s and 1980s. This period is sandwiched between two periods in 
which the literature is characteristically less flattering of the Japanese police. The 
first of these - "reversion" - extends over the 1950s and 1960s, during which the 
general perception of the police was steeped in memories of pre-war policing norms 
and forged in the experience of forcible police reaction to left-wing protestors. If 
the period of reinvention can be characterised by the friendly neighbourhood köban 
policeman lending money to a salaryman for his train fare home, then the reversion 
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period would be represented by the granite-faced riot police of the kidötai. The 
modern portrayal of the police is more ambiguous. 
In part the process of reinvention reflects a conscious attempt by the police to 
rebrand themselves in the face of an unfavourable public perception. From a nadir 
of public confidence in 1960, the police have worked hard to improve their public- 
image through an emphasis on their community role. By 1983, public opinion 
surveys showed that the police enjoyed greater popular support than, not only other 
state agencies, but also business and the media (Katzenstein 1996,80-1). 
Aldous and Leishman's periodisation of the literature is not entirely applicable; 
within Japan itself civil-rights-oriented lawyers such as Igarashi Futaba and 
academics such as Miyazawa Setsuo and Watanabe Osamu, provided critical 
accounts of police practice during the 1980s. Writing in English, Ames (1981) 
presents a more balanced analysis than Bayley or Parker, identifying various areas 
of concern, though he too is broadly supportive of the idea of Japan as a 
community-policing exemplar. As a benchmark of the broad trends in the English 
language literature, Aldous and Leishman's periodisation is, however, a useful 
guide. 
The late 1980s and 1990s have seen a great deal of critical questioning of the 
celebratory depiction of the police of the previous two decades and attention has 
been focused on policing norms that seem a direct throwback to pre-war patterns of 
policing. In particular police treatment of suspects has come under heavy criticism. 
As has been mentioned above, the Japanese police have been characterised as highly 
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lenient towards offenders. This leniency is, however, conditional on the suspect's 
confessing, showing contrition and offering submission before authority. For 
suspects who do not do these things, the story is very different. 
Igarashi Futaba, a Japanese lawyer, prepared a report on the treatment of suspects 
for the three Bar Associations in Tokyo. In this report she clearly catalogues 
incidents of mistreatment of suspects in which the police put increasing pressure on 
arrestees to confess. The police have considerable scope to accomplish this due to a 
system of substitute prisons (daiyo kangoku). Under the Code of Criminal 
Procedure, a police cell may be substituted for a jail for the detention of a suspect 
pending investigation. Although this system was initially introduced in 1908 due to 
a lack of space in jails, it has been retained by the police as an expedient device for 
keeping the suspect for up to 23 days after arrest. During that time suspects report 
being subject to round-the-clock interrogations, deprived access to food, sleep and 
toilet facilities and allowed only highly restricted access to legal advice. 
Particularly intransigent suspects may also be subject to physical abuse; of the thirty 
detainees in Igarashi's survey, twenty answered the question `did you experience 
physical violence' in the affirmative (Igarashi 1986,201-2; Herbert 1996,232-4; 
Amnesty International 1998,1). Although the law limits the period of detention 
before charges are issued to 23 days, a system of repeat arrests enables the police to 
hold suspects for much longer. In one case cited by Igarashi the suspect was held 
for 327 days, whilst two others were held for over 100 (Igarashi 1986,211). 
The primary purpose behind these practices is to extract a confession. As pointed 
out by Chalmers Johnson in his excellent description of Japanese criminal 
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procedure (1972), confession is seen by police, prosecutors and judges alike as the 
"king of evidence" (shöko no ö) and, because of this, the police "are much more 
attuned to obtaining them than to building `objective' cases" (Johnson 1972,149). 
More recent work, such as Miyazawa's research on the police in Hokkaido and 
Kaplan and Marshall's description (1997) of the Aum Shinri-kyö investigation, 
suggest that little has changed since Johnson's observations. Eighty-six percent of 
all criminal convictions in Japan are based on confessions, whilst before the war the 
figure was as high as ninety-nine percent (McCormack 1986,187). Not 
infrequently the police arrest a suspect on a lesser charge as a pretext for 
investigating a more serious one (bekken taiho) (Miyazawa 1992,71; Oda 1992, 
400). 
These interrogation practices have led to a number of cases of successful 
convictions based on forced confessions which have later been retracted. In the 
case of Menda Sakae, under sentence of death and in prison for thirty-one years on 
the basis of a forced confession, a retrial found him innocent (McCormack 1986, 
186). 
The police are not insensitive to criticism of these practices and their English 
language website contains many pages explaining the operation of the substitute 
prison system. It stresses that suspects are well looked after and provides 
photographs of smart modern facilities and nutritious meals. One Osaka-based 
defence lawyer interviewee insists that his clients are still regularly subject to 
mistreatment during police interrogation. He does, however, suggest that such 
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practices are much rarer in Tokyo than in Osaka and that conditions in police 
detention centres have improved since Igarashi's report. For example, the police 
running the detention centres now ensure that police interrogators do not continue 
questioning round-the-clock (interviews Kobe, July 1998 & July 1999). 
We can see that the police emphasis on confession still persists from a look at the 
investigation of the sarin gas attacks conducted by the Aum Shinri-kyb religious 
cult in 1994 and 1995. After the first attack in Matsumoto, the police identified a 
machinery salesman, Kono Yoshiyuki, who had himself suffered in the attack 
alongside his wife and children, as the prime suspect. Despite the fact that the 
chemicals kept in his house (for photographic purposes) were not capable of sarin's 
synthesis, he was subject to police pressure to confess, whilst his son was told that 
his father had confessed and that he had better do the same (Kaplan and Marshall 
1997,180-1). 
After the second attack on the Tokyo subway in March 1995, and particularly after 
the attempted assassination of Chief of Police Kunimatsu in the following year, 
when the police finally decided to act against the cult, it arrested members not for 
crimes directly related to the gas attack, but such minor misdemeanours as 
trespassing, adapting a greenhouse without permission, riding an unregistered 
bicycle and performing a massage in contravention of the Massage and Shiatsu 
Practitioners Law. Once arrested these suspects were of course interrogated with 
respect to the cult's more serious crimes (ibid. 336). 
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We can see therefore from contemporary police practice that in terms of an 
emphasis on confessions over police investigation, pretext arrest, police custody and 
sub-optimal treatment of suspects, there are clear signs of continuity with the past. 
"Furthermore, since the early 1970s judicial statistics show a steady decline in the 
proportion of those found innocent in court. Using a broad array of data, former 
High Court Judge Watanabe Yasuo concludes that the number of trumped-up 
charges has probably increased" (Katzenstein 1996,84-5). 
The Aum Shinri-kyo incident has finally destroyed the idea that Japan's police are 
the model of efficiency and competence that the celebratory literature of the 1970s 
and 1980 asserted. In their defence it could be maintained that the Japanese Police 
are hamstrung by their pre-war past. Although we can see a number of ways in 
which they have reverted to pre-war norms, a number of safeguards, both formal, 
legal constraints and normative factors such as public-opinion, exist to obstruct the 
Japanese police should they wish to abuse their powers. 
On purely legal grounds, until now, the Japanese police have theoretically been 
prevented from conducting wire-tapping surveillance (töchö) and sting operations 
(otori sösa) that are taken for granted by other states. Article 21 of the constitution 
guarantees that "the secrecy of any means of communication (shall not) be 
violated". The police might therefore be forgiven for a less than efficient operation 
concerning Aum Shinri-kyo. However, it seems the legal status of wiretapping is 
not quite so clear-cut. According to a retired elite police bureaucrat interviewee, 
police wiretaps can, subject to a court order, be conducted in extraordinary 
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circumstances in which there are no other means to gain evidence. It was stressed 
in the course of the interview that this has only happened in drugs-related cases 
(interview Tokyo, June 1998). 
There is evidence to suggest that the police do not, however, confine electronic 
surveillance to drugs cases. One communist activist interviewee from San'ya 
claimed proudly that his telephone was bugged, whilst a more plausible and 
restrained Christian volunteer, also active in San'ya, gently remarked on the speed 
with which the police reacted to telephone calls made by another left-wing group 
with which he was associated. It is not necessary, however, to build a case on such 
shaky evidence; the police have been found to conduct electronic surveillance. In 
1986, the telephone line of the head of the international section of the Japan 
Communist Party was found to be tapped by a serving officer of Kanagawa 
prefecture's branch of the Security Police. The police, however, denied systematic 
participation (Nichibenren 1995,203-4). Despite the clear illegality of this act, the 
prosecutors' office did not pursue the case following an apology from senior police 
officers (van Wolferen 1989,199). 
Another formal constraint on the police is provided by the 1954 Police Law, in 
which both the prefectural forces and the NPA are subject to democratic 
accountability through oversight by the prefectural Public Safety Commissions and 
the National Public Safety Commission respectively. Here also, however, we find a 
distinction must be made between tatemae (surface appearance) and honne (reality). 
Bayley (1976,192) identifies the tatemae, stating that the Public Safety 
Commissions "have exclusive authority over the discipline and authority and 
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dismissal of all police officers. " Ames (1981,218) takes a more cynical view of the 
commissions: 
In many ways, however, the Public Safety Commission system serves to 
mask the total independence of the police and the almost complete lack of 
formal checks on the power and operation of the police establishment (the 
honne). The prefectural and national Public Safety Commissions ostensibly 
function as buffers between police and politicians to prevent undue bias and 
untoward influence, yet they do not insure public control over, the police 
organisation. 
Part of the problem for this concerns a degree of ambiguity over the wording of the 
1954 Police Law. The English translation of the law states that "the Prefectural 
Public Safety Commission shall supervise the Prefectural Police" (Article 38, 
paragraph 3). The Japanese version uses the term kanri, which can be translated 
variously as "administration; management; control; supervision; superintendence" 
(Kenkyusha's New Japanese English Dictionary). This is interpreted by both the 
police themselves and most academics as no more than setting broad policy: 
The supervision carried out by the commission does not extend to concretely 
impinging on the powers of the police, but, through setting the basic policy 
of management, (the commission) conducts prior and post facto 
oversight.... The direction of police officers is carried out by the chief of 
metropolitan or regional police (Tanoue in Nichibenren 1995,240). 
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However, even within the parameters of this restricted interpretation, the 
commissions fail to carry out their duties. Various laws (such as the traffic laws, 
the sword and firearms control law and the public morals law) empower the 
prefectural Public Safety Commissions to issue and withdraw licences, order 
business closure and, in the case of the bötaihö, designate böryokudan. However, 
the commissions have no offices or powers of investigation, and their members lack 
the expertise to carry out these functions. Consequently the various duties of these 
commissions are delegated to the relevant police department. 
The membership of the commissions is essentially an honorary role for pillars of the 
community. The Nichibenren's 1995 book on the police reveals that commission 
members (excluding Tokyo) are overwhelmingly recruited from the local financial 
and business elites (68%), the second most significant group being medical 
practitioners (14%). Amongst the other members there were two religious figures 
and the head of a tea-ceremony school. Their average age is 67.7, whilst the eldest 
member was 85 (Nichibenren 1995,243-4). Although political neutrality is 
supposedly maintained by ensuring that no two members of any commission belong 
to the same political party, in reality these individuals tend to share a conservative 
world view (Ames 1981,219). 
Perhaps of greater significance than strictly legal limitations on police powers 
(which we see they are quite capable of ignoring or side-stepping anyway) are the 
post-war policing norms by which the police have avoided involving themselves in 
civil disputes and intervening in religious affairs. Although the way in which the 
Public Safety Commissions actually operate means that there are no formal checks 
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on police powers, the police are highly sensitive to media criticism (Miyazawa 
1992,227). Consequently the police take pains to avoid intervening in these areas 
unless they are confident that they have media and popular support behind them. 
This, in part, explains why the police showed such extreme reluctance to deal with 
the Aum Shinri Kyo, which was quite clearly a highly suspect organisation (a 
reluctance the cult skilfully exploited). It also explains why, when the police finally 
did feel confident of popular support, they mobilised a disproportionately massive 
force, including water cannon and armoured personnel carriers, and behaved 
sufficiently heavy-handedly to incur the criticism of civil-rights groups (Kaplan and 
Marshall 1997,337,350). This pattern, of initial police forbearance followed by 
overwhelming force once general acceptance has been gained, can also be seen in 
earlier police reactions to student demonstrations, the Narita airport protest and the 
1972 Red Army siege in Karuizawa (Katzenstein 1996,80). 
The formal legal checks on the police can therefore be said to be of far less 
significance than the intangible constraints of public-opinion. 
With respect to an expanded administrative role for the police, here too' we can see a 
trend towards a return to Meiji policing patterns. A number of laws, notably the 
Law on the Proprietisation and Regulation of Business Affecting Public Morals 
(fuzoku eigyö nado no kisei oyobi gyomu tekiseika nado ni kan suru höritsu, more 
usually known as füeihö or, in English, Public Morals Law) of 1948, provide the 
Public Safety Commissions with authority to issue, and withdraw, licences to a 
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number of businesses. Because the commissions are effectively rubber stamps for 
the various prefectural police forces, this means that effectively the police have 
regulatory power over various areas of the social and economic fabric of Japan. For 
example, the pachinko industry, (which accounts for roughly 4% of Japan's GNP) 
bars, restaurants and massage parlours, come under the provisions of this law. In 
order to reduce congestion in the court system, the police also have administrative 
powers for punishing minor traffic offences. 
Seen within the context of a tradition of wide-ranging administrative powers and a 
desire to recreate them, the rationale behind the structure of the bötaihö makes 
sense. Miyazawa Setsuo, author of the most penetrating study of police 
investigative practices, sees this expansion of administrative police powers as part 
of a conscious policy on the part of the NPA. The "Japanese police have always 
tried to re-establish it(self) as a `seisaku kanchö' or a governmental agency with 
substantive policy mandates like the pre-war `Naimu-sho' or the Ministry of 
Interior. Böryokudan Taisaku Hö can be understood as a step in its continuing 
effort" (private correspondence 15/11/1998). 
The choice of administrative law over criminal law provides the police with total 
control over the exercise of the bötaiho. Although nominally operated "at the 
discretion of' the prefectural Public Safety Commissions, we have seen that this 
effectively means that the law operates totally within the ambit of the police and 
independently of the judiciary. Seen in this way, it becomes immediately apparent 
why the prefectural Centres for the Eradication of Boryokudan have ended up as 
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organisations operating within the existing police structure. The task of designating 
regional centres is at the discretion of the Public Safety Commissions and, 
consequently, the centres have ended up as part of an expanding police empire. 
As was shown in chapter four, there are a number of laws which pre-exist the 
introduction of the botaihö, including provisions for sequestration of the proceeds 
from crime and the punishment of minbö type offences, that could be employed 
more proactively to mount an effective anti-böryokudan campaign. The debate on 
OC countermeasures was also informed by other legal models, in particular the 
potent RICO statutes. However these strategies were rejected. This was not because 
they showed less promise than administrative measures in controlling the 
böryokudan but because the bötaihö provided for greater police autonomy and 
extended their sphere of administrative control. 
The trend of expanding police power can also be seen in its relationship with other 
state agencies. "By virtually all measures police power inside the government has 
been increasing greatly" (Katzenstein 1996,62). Senior NPA bureaucrats have 
attained powerful positions within the Defence Agency (Böei-chö) and the Imperial 
Household Agency (Kunai-chö), and the NPA also successfully posts junior 
bureaucrats to other agencies and ministries whilst remaining relatively closed to 
postings from outside. Within the Cabinet Secretariat (Naikaku Kanbö) the power 
of the police vis-ä-vis other agencies has also grown. More than a quarter of the 
posts within the secretariat were held by NPA personnel by the early 1970s 
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including control over two of the most important posts. Over half of the Cabinet 
Information Research Office posts are held by NPA personnel. Perhaps the most 
striking illustration of the increasing status of the police is the ranking amongst 
Tokyo University graduates applying for elite bureaucratic careers. Since 1965, the 
NPA has risen from bottom of the list to the top alongside the Ministry of Finance 
and the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (ibid. ). 
In many ways therefore we can see that the modem Japanese police shows many 
traits of its predecessors. This is succinctly put by Ames: 
The present police establishment in Japan is an imperfectly blended 
amalgam of the authoritarian, powerful and highly centralised prewar police 
system and the `democratic' and decentralised postwar system. The prewar 
system was based on a Franco-German model of a national police force on a 
level above the people, and the postwar system was patterned after an 
American or British model of small-scale police forces on the same level 
with the people. The former is closer to the honne (reality) of the police 
system, and the latter is ultimately a mere tatemae (facade) (1981,215). 
The botaihö should be seen as part of this process towards police-reclamation of 
their prewar administrative role. Given that the existing system of Public Safety 
Commissions fails to provide adequate control and democratic accountability over 
the police, this trend presents cause for concern. Given that various other police 
practices, such as the continued use of bekken taihö and substitute prisons as well as 
the primacy of confessions in building cases, are at odds with the ideal of policing 
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in a liberal democracy, any move which expands the ability of the Japanese police 
to exercise administrative control independent of judicial oversight is to be 
regretted. 
CRIME-CONTROL IN JAPAN 
In the introductory chapter to this thesis it was observed that Japan was widely 
considered to be a criminological oddity due to its ability to combine a low crime 
rate with increasing urbanisation. It was also remarked that the apparent paradox of 
this low crime rate's coexistence with Japan's numerous and highly visible 
böryokudan groups was one of the factors initially firing the researcher's interest in 
this field. In this concluding chapter then, how can we make sense of crime in 
Japan, and can the paradox of böryokudan in a low-crime society be resolved? 
It has been shown above, with reference to policing norms and some highly visible 
blunders, that the portrayal of the Japanese police as a highly efficient organisation 
is not entirely merited. If the police cannot be credited with Japan's low crime rate 
and the criminal justice system shows a reluctance to use its formal machinery, what 
then is the reason for Japan's low criminality? Whilst most criminologists today 
accept that crime is too complex a phenomenon to succumb to any single 
monocausal explanation, some of the factors cited by Park's survey of the literature 
concerning Japan's crime rates (discussed in the first chapter) must be considered 
with scepticism. 
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In particular, the arguments based on ethnic homogeneity, high literacy, prosperity 
and high social equality must be questioned on the grounds that they are all factors 
which Japan shares with Sweden, which has not successfully controlled crime 
(Haley 1991,137). Similarly, natural barriers or tightly controlled borders do not, 
in themselves, prevent crime, as can be seen by the fact that Japanese criminals 
manage to import large quantities of amphetamines but not heroin or cocaine. 
Perhaps the easiest strand of the literature to deflate is, however, that based on 
notions of some nebulous, uniquely Japanese cultural characteristic. As with the 
arguments that the Japanese have an aversion to the formal use of law, this idea that 
there is something intrinsically different in the Japanese psyche is highly functional 
to the authorities as Richardson and Flanagan (1984,160), in perhaps excessively 
conspiratorial terms, point out: 
Japanese elites have found it advantageous to push the image of Japan's 
uniqueness abroad to ward off Western criticism. The more Japan is viewed 
as different, the less it will have to abide by Western rules of negotiation and 
fair play. At home, the advantages of selling the view that Japanese society 
is an integrated, harmonious whole are obvious for a ruling class bent on 
maintaining its domination. 
Much of the culturalist literature is grounded either on tautological arguments 
running on the lines that the Japanese have a low crime rate because they are an 
unusually law-abiding people or mystification designed to prevent rather than 
facilitate scientific criminological analysis. This is unfortunate because one of the 
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points implicit in the culturalist literature is worthy of more serious attention. This 
is that in some way Japanese society "polices itself' (Ames 1981,228). 
In his influential book "Crime, Shame and Integration", Braithwaite argued that 
Japan succeeds in controlling crime through a process of `reintegrative shaming'. 
Braithwaite makes the distinction between shaming which is "followed by efforts to 
reintegrate the offender back into the community of law-abiding or respectable 
citizens through words or gestures of forgiveness or ceremonies to decertify the 
offender as deviant" (reintegrative shaming) and that which "makes no effort to 
reconcile the offender with the community" (stigmatisation) (Braithwaite 1989, 
100-1). Braithwaite's theory would explain why the Japanese criminal justice 
system makes so little use of the formal sanctions at its disposal. However, the 
rather benevolent image he holds of Japan's law-enforcement agencies seems at 
odds with the more critical findings from research carried out by Miyazawa and 
Igarashi. 
Miyazawa (1997) in particular has criticised Braithwaite's theory. Whilst they 
agree that informal social processes, rather than formal judicial mechanisms or legal 
sanctions are the key to understanding low Japanese criminality, Miyazawa differs 
in that he proposes a much less cosy view of the way in which society treats 
deviants. Miyazawa argues that social control is exerted in Japan through groups 
such as schools and companies. He characterises these organisations by "their 
extremely harsh treatment of members who defy the existing power structure and 
social arrangements" and asserts that "Japanese people conform because they know 
that conformity will be highly rewarded while non-conformity costs enormously" 
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(Miyazawa 1997,7-8). Having seen, during two years working in a junior high 
school in Iwate prefecture, the treatment meted out to children showing such 
dangerous signs of deviancy as the wrong coloured shoe-laces, this researcher feels 
compelled to agree. 
These informal controls are reinforced by peer pressure due to the fact that 
responsibility, and consequent sanctions, are often held at a group, rather than an 
individual level. This shows a clear similarity to the extra-legal controls exercised 
within the mura of Tokugawa Japan. 
Tanioka Ichirö (1997) has attempted to test whether control theory is applicable to 
Japan by adapting American tests of this theory. Tanioka investigates the 
relationship between criminality amongst Osaka juveniles and the attachment of 
these juveniles to normative patterns of social behaviour and role models. Whilst 
his results suggest that control factors are indeed significant, a lack of comparative 
research prevents us from identifying whether these factors are of greater 
significance in Japan than in other countries. 
It is, nevertheless, tempting to see factors of informal social control as explaining 
not only Japan's low criminality over the last four decades, but also the apparent 
paradox of the coexistence of low criminality with a large and conspicuous 
Böryokudan fraternity. Braithwaite argues that Japan controls deviancy by a 
process of reintegrative shaming. He later admits, however, that the prospect of 
reintegration is backed up by enormous informal sanctions against those who do not 
conform (1989,158). In this he comes closer to Miyazawa's less benign view of 
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social control in Japan. It is suggested here that these very pressures making social 
exclusion so expensive to the individual outcast are those that encourage such 
individuals to associate themselves into organised-crime groups. This suggests that 
the factors which have contributed to Japan's low rate of general criminality have 
also encouraged the development of its large organised-crime community. 
There is, however, considerable evidence that this model of social control is 
breaking down, and this is reflected in Japan's rapidly rising crime rate (offences 
per 100,000 population). As mentioned in the first chapter, Japan's crime figures 
have been increasing steadily for the last two decades and in 1998, for the first time 
in Japan's post-war history, the total annual number of known criminal-law 
violations exceeded two million. This trend is illustrated graphically below. 
Figure 6.1 Crime rate and total known criminal-law violations 1945-98 
(excluding traffic offences) 
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DECLINING SOCIAL CONTROL AND THE BORYOKUDAN 
What evidence is there for a decline in social control factors within Japan? An 
attempt to rigorously prove that the declining efficiency of informal social control 
processes is responsible for Japan's increasing criminality is far outside the scope of 
this thesis. Nevertheless, the reader's indulgence is craved whilst hypotheses are 
presented. These half-developed ideas suggest areas for future research rather than 
definitive answers. 
Over recent decades a process of increased tolerance of diversity and individualism 
has slowly appeared in Japan. This can be seen in such phenomena as the `new 
people' (shinjinrui) and their `my home-ism' (mai homushugi). Weakening of 
traditional social bonds can also be seen in the increasing rate of divorce (by a factor 
of 2.32 between 1970 and 1997) and the massive jump in international marriages 
(by a factor of 5.11) over the same period. At the same time, the declining 
importance of the lifetime employment system and greater opportunities for foreign 
travel and study have, respectively, lowered the costs of nonconformity and 
increased exposure to alternative lifestyles. 
Whilst it is argued here that this development is a key factor in explaining Japan's 
growing crime rate, Wolfgang Herbert notes that it also exerts a significant effect on 
böryokudan recruitment. The social pressure on those rebels and misfits, who 
would formerly have ended up in the ranks of the böryokudan "in order to survive 
in a very rigid society, has become considerably lower". Such individuals can now 
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"drift around at society's margin with less problems" (private correspondence 
08/02/2000). 
Growing tolerance of alternative behaviour is not the only factor impacting on 
bbryokudan recruitment. As mentioned in chapter three, due to Japan's enormous 
material wealth, Japanese youths now show an aversion to employment in industries 
seen as difficult, dirty and dangerous (known as 3-ki - kitsui, kitanai, kiken). 
Böryokudan employment fits into this category. Looking at police photographs of 
Yamaguchi-gumi gang members of the 1950s one is struck by the universally 
sunken sockets and prominent cheek bones of a malnourished and desperate group 
of men for whom gang activity is quite simply a means of survival. The faces of 
young böryokudan members today lack this lean and hungry look. 
It seems probable that due to this withering away of a supply of suitable labour for 
the böryokudan, Japanese organised crime is facing a wave of ethnic progression as 
described, with reference to the United States, in chapter two. Certainly since the 
end of the 1980s there has been a gradual increase in the number of criminal groups 
from other Asian countries operating in Japan. The precise relationship between 
these groups and the böryokudan remains unclear. In some cases it is one of 
contractor and subcontractor. In others they are involved in different activities and 
represent no threat to each other. The possibility of rivalry between these groups 
and the böryokudan cannot be discounted. 
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Stories surface occasionally in the weekly shükanshi and jitsuwashi suggesting that 
baryokudan groups make use of foreign hit-men. This suggestion of a lack of 
suitable personnel amongst Japan's incumbent organised-crime groups implies that 
they are vulnerable to attack by groups composed of men reared in countries where 
life is harder and cheaper than it has become in Japan. Moreover in many of 
Japan's neighbours there are systems of national military conscription providing a 
ready pool of men with a comparative advantage in the use of, and greater 
propensity to, violence. It is therefore seen as plausible that ethnic succession 
within Japanese organised crime will occur over the next two to three decades. 
Böryokudan groups will either have to co-opt foreign rivals or engage in outright 
competition with them. Either way, these groups will encounter more aggressive 
countermeasures from the law-enforcement authorities. As we have seen, public 
toleration of OC is adversely affected by high-profile inter-gang conflicts, especially 
when members of the public are caught up in them. Even if the process of ethnic 
succession is a peaceful process of sub-contracting and recruitment, foreign OC 
groups are likely to attract greater public antipathy than native ones, as we have 
seen from the widespread 1960s perception of American OC as an `alien- 
conspiracy'. 
The likely consequences of this are that the böryokudan will be forced to go further 
underground and to adopt increasingly antisocial money-making activities. As we 
have seen historically, when business opportunities are blocked, the böryokudan 
quickly develop new ones. There is however another, theoretical, explanation for 
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the tendency of increased law-enforcement to encourage less socially acceptable 
behaviour by organised crime groups. 
Gambetta (1993,33) argues that a crucial variable governing the behaviour of a 
mafia-type organisation is its time horizon. If a firm providing protection expects to 
enjoy a continued long-term relationship with its customers, that firm is more likely 
to provide a genuine service to them. It also has an interest in maintaining a 
harmonious relationship with the wider society, including the law-enforcement 
community. As a group's time horizon diminishes, it is more likely to accord 
greater priority to short-term profit-maximisation, and `protection' is more likely to 
degenerate into extortion. It will similarly be less concerned with maintaining good 
community relations. "The overall degree of stability of the protection 
industry ....... is, therefore, a crucial variable 
in predicting mafioso behaviour"2 
(ibid. ). As we have seen in preceding chapters, the level of law-enforcement is one 
of the key variables affecting the stability of organised crime/the protection 
industry. Increased competition from foreign groups must also be seen as a 
potentially destabilising factor in the organised crime industry in Japan. 
BORYOKUDANAND LAW-ENFORCEMENT 
In the introductory chapter, the oft-mentioned assertion ofyakuza-police symbiosis 
Z Gambetta's discussion on time horizons adds an extra dimension to the theoretical model of OC- 
authority interaction developed by Celantini, Marrelli and Martina explored in chapter two. In the 
repeated fixed-stage game of this model, OC groups aim to maximise discounted profits (i. e. taking 
into account future, as well as current, profits) and consequently avoid antagonising the law- 
enforcement authorities. If the risk of extermination in the next game-cycle becomes greater, a 
rational profit-maximisation strategy might be to make as much money as possible in the current 
stage. 
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was cited as one of the factors initially arousing the researcher's curiosity in 
Japanese organised crime. As the theoretical exposition in chapter two, and the 
above discussion of time horizons, shows, there are good reasons why such 
symbiosis might exist. However, from the evidence presented in the preceding 
chapters, can we ascertain the validity or otherwise of this assertion? 
If we look at the relationship between the böryokudan and the police over the last 
five decades, a number of conclusions can be drawn. The first of these is that this 
relationship has been dynamic rather than static. Secondly, the böryokudan is not a 
monolithic organisation but is a collective term for a number of different groups, 
and these have developed different strategies vis-ä-vis their relationship with the 
upper world. Thirdly, it is perhaps also a mistake to view the police as a monolithic 
organisation. There are two main dividing lines within the police organisation, one 
vertical, the other, horizontal. The vertical cleavage lies between the security (köan) 
and the criminal-investigation (keiji) police. The horizontal line separates the elite 
bureaucratic `career' police from the rank-and-file police officers responsible for 
carrying out the actual tasks of policing. Let us look at each of these considerations 
in greater detail. 
The yakuza-police relationship prior to the first summit strategy of 1964 most 
closely approximates to an unambiguously symbiotic pattern suggested in much of 
the literature. Lest the reader form too rosy a view of this period, it should also be 
noted that this era was also characterised by intense inter-gang conflict. However, 
within areas of stability, gangs tended to adopt a co-operative attitude towards the 
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police, doing such things as surrendering suspects to the police (migawari), 
providing information to the police and keeping non-gang trouble-makers off the 
street. It should be remembered that these last two `services' were more to remove 
any potential rivals, show their effectiveness as suppliers of protection and keep the 
police from actively policing the group's territory, than a desire to be good citizens. 
After the first summit strategy, the picture becomes much less clear. From the 
empirical observation that the main factor driving the evolution and business 
diversification of the böryokudan has been police action, it must be concluded that a 
simple thesis of symbiosis is untenable. Therefore, it must also be concluded that 
police intervention has been one of the two main destabilising factors in Japan's 
OC. As has been mentioned above, stability and time horizons are a crucial 
consideration affecting gang behaviour. 
As a broad generalisation, since the first summit strategy the relationship between 
the böryokudan and the police has gradually worsened. Not only have police 
countermeasures become stricter but the böryokudan have also diversified into 
progressively less tolerable business activities. Following the introduction of the 
bötaihö, the flows of information and limited co-operation that most böryokudan 
groups had extended to the police essentially dried-up. Over time, therefore, the 
symbiotic thesis has become decreasingly applicable to the general böryokudan- 
police relationship. 
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Within the various böryokudan groups, there has been a wide degree of diversity in 
their relations with the authorities. The commonly accepted wisdom is that the 
groups in western Japan are more combative in their police relations than the groups 
in Tokyo and the rest of eastern Japan. In particular the distinction is made between 
the behaviour of the Yamaguchi-gumi in the Kobe-Osaka area and that of the Tokyo 
syndicates. The most notable exception to this generalisation is the old, Osaka- 
based Sakaume-gumi which has long been seen as having good diplomatic links 
with the police3. 
This difference in behaviour is perhaps best illustrated by contrasting the aggressive 
military expansion of the Yamaguchi-gumi with the Tokyo gangs' creation of the 
conflict-minimising mechanism the Kanto Hatsuka-kai. Whilst the Inagawa-kai and 
Sumiyoshi-kai have also expanded throughout Japan, the Yamaguchi-gumi has been 
far more active in this field. Within Iwate prefecture, many groups joined a Tokyo- 
based syndicate (mostly Sumiyoshi-kai) as a defence against the Yamaguchi-gumi, 
and it is probable that this pattern has occurred elsewhere. Apart from police 
intervention, the expansion of the Yamaguchi-gumi has been the most significant 
destabilising factor within Japanese organised crime over the last fifty years. 
As might be expected, this east-west divide can also be seen in the way that the 
police treat böryokudan arrestees. In the Osaka area this has long been robustly 
3 Despite these amicable relations, this group has been in decline for several decades. Unable to 
compete with the vastly superior brand-recognition of the Yamaguchi-gumi, the Sakaume-gumi has 
failed to attract new recruits. In Autumn of 1999, the sixth-generation leader of this group 
disappeared with debts in excess of ¥1 billion (Shükan Jitsuwa 14/10/1999). 
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physical, making use of jüdö strangulation techniques, punching and kicking. This 
is apparently much rarer in Tokyo (Shükan Jitsuwa 16/4/1998; interviews Osaka 
June 1998). 
Just as it is not always appropriate to treat the böryokudan as a single entity, it is 
important to recognise that the Japanese police force is not a monolithic 
organisation but composed of various constituencies. The first cleavage line we 
should consider is that between the security bureau (köan-kyoku) and the criminal- 
investigation bureau (keiji-kyoku). The security police are primarily concerned with 
counterintelligence, terrorism and political subversion whilst, as their name 
suggests, the criminal-investigation bureau is concerned with more conventional 
policing. 
These different responsibilities are reflected in the different attitudes these two 
bureaux have had to the böryokudan: 
The criminal-investigation bureau of the NPA has long had the desire to 
destroy the boryokudan. The security bureau has felt that it was more 
important to deal with the communists and for that reason there was the 
view that they should make use of the böryokudan (interview Yamada, 
Tokyo June 1998). 
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Anti-böryokudan specialist lawyer Yamada Hitoshi, who first alerted the researcher 
to the importance of this bifurcation, also notes that, following the end of the cold 
war, the consciousness of the senior personnel at the security bureau has changed. 
Yamada notes, however, that the same can not be said to apply universally to 
security bureau officers working at prefectural police headquarters (ibid. ) 
This mirrors the conflicting perspectives and priorities held by the elite NPA 
bureaucrats within the criminal-investigation bureau, and by the operational 
prefectural police officers actually conducting the business of street-level law- 
enforcement and crime detection. Discussions with members of Iwate prefecture's 
böryokudan-countermeasures squad (bötai-shitsu) suggested a nostalgia for the days 
before the bötaihö's introduction when they would enter gang offices and sit down 
for a cup of coffee, a cigarette and the chance to find out what was going on. It is 
easy to see how this flow of information would encourage a quid pro quo attitude at 
the grass-roots level, with officers rewarding co-operative or well-behaved groups 
with less rigorous law-enforcement. 
As has been mentioned in the theoretical chapter, this relationship need not 
necessarily be reinforced by bribery; it is rather a pragmatic realisation that such a 
relationship yields results. Whilst this pragmatism has undoubtedly declined in 
recent years (especially following the severance of diplomatic links with the 
introduction of the botaiho), it is probably at street-level that the vestiges of 
böryokudan-police symbiosis are most enduring. In discussions with communist 
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activists in the slum-areas of San'ya and Kotobuki-chö, these individuals were 
firmly convinced that mutually beneficial police-boryokudan links continue: 
When we are fighting the fascists (böryokudan), the police shields are facing 
towards us! (activist interview San'ya, July 1998). 
In these areas, and in Osaka's Kamagasaki, policing is a highly sensitive affair and 
the possibility of the homeless day-labourers' rioting is ever present4. In such 
conditions it is easy to see how the various resident böryokudan groups may be seen 
as a secondary consideration, or even a useful bulwark against an unpredictable and 
volatile group of men with nothing left to lose. In October 1990, a riot broke out in 
Kamagasaki (Airin) when it was discovered that police were taking money from 
local gangs to provide advance warning of raids on gambling operations. The shiny 
marble and steel fortress, that was built to replace the police station damaged during 
this riot, speaks volumes about the relationship between the police and inhabitants 
of the day-labourers' markets. 
INCREASED USE OF LAW AND THE BORYOKUDAN 
As social links come to play a decreasing part in maintaining law and order, a 
correspondingly growing burden is taken up by formal use of the law. We can see 
this in the gradually increasing severity of sentencing patterns discussed earlier. 
4 Fowler (1996,41-2) reports that over a dozen riots occurred during the 1960s in San'ya alone. 
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Evidence for this tendency can also be identified with reference to the böryokudan, 
both in more combative judicial interpretation of the law and in the introduction of 
new laws dealing with Japanese organised crime. The best example of recent 
judicial flexibility is the prosecution of Tsukasa for violation of the Sword and 
Firearms Control Law as mentioned in the previous chapter. At the time of writing, 
April 2000, Kuwata and Takizawa, Tsukasa's fellow top Yamaguchi-gumi 
executives, face a similar fate. 
In addition to the bötafhö, the last decade has seen the introduction of new laws 
which specifically target organised crime activity. The first of these is the 1991 
Law Controlling the Encouragement of Illegal Acts Relating to Controlled Drugs 
with International Co-operation (kokusai-teki na kyöryoku no moto ni kisei- 
yakubutsu ni kakawarufusei köi o enchö suru köi nado no böshi o hakaru tame no 
mayaku oyobi kö-seishinyaku torishimari hö nado no tokurei nado ni kan suru 
höritsu). This law provides for the sequestration of drug-related assets and also 
obliges financial institutions to report transactions they suspect to be drug-related. 
These reporting requirements are still "extremely limited" by international standards 
(Friman 1994,260). 
The remaining new laws were passed in August 1999 (and are due to come into 
effect on 1St August 2000) as a portfolio of three bills. The Three Organised Crime 
Countermeasures Laws (soshiki-teki hanzai taisaku sanp6) consisted of the 
Interception of Communications Law (tsüshin boju ho), the Organised Crime 
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Punishment and Income from Crime Control Law (soshiki-teki hanzai shobatsu - 
hanzai shüeki kisei ho) and reform of the Code of Criminal Procedure (keiji sosho 
ho). 
Of these three laws, the wiretapping law has attracted the most attraction due to the 
apparent conflict with Article 21 of the constitution (though many legal academic 
interviewees see no problem with this law). Because of this, its passage through the 
Diet met with resistance from both opposition parties and the Japan Bar 
Association. However, in international terms this law is highly limited in scope, in 
terms both of the circumstances in which it may be applied and the maximum length 
of wire-tapping (a period of ten days which may be extended no more than twice). 
There are three main provisions of the Organised Crime Punishment and Income 
from Crime Control Law. The first of these is to increase the penalties for serious 
crimes committed as part of a criminal conspiracy. Secondly, the scope for seizure 
of crime-related assets and the income from crime is expanded. Thirdly, limited 
anti-money-laundering provisions are introduced. The reform of the Code of 
Criminal Procedure allows for greater protection of witnesses. 
Although, as mentioned in chapter four, there is a strong case to be made that the 
introduction of these laws was encouraged by foreign pressures, they can also be 
seen as part of a process of movement to an increased dependence on formal law. 
s In 1998, Japan was due to chair the Financial Action Task Force meeting where progress on anti- 
organised-crime and money-laundering measures was to be reported. Japan therefore had to be seen 
to be doing something (Asahi Shinbun 19/7/1997). 
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Many of the legal academics interviewed by the researcher maintained that Japanese 
law lags behind that of other advanced industrial economies, and the introduction of 
these laws can be seen as part of a process of legal `catch-up'. 
Perhaps a stronger illustration of Japan's increased reliance on formal law can be 
seen by the growth in the use of civil law in recent years (see chart below). For 
example, company shareholders have launched an increasing number of lawsuits 
against company managers for incompetence and failing to act in the best interests 
of shareholders. The Economist newspaper's survey of business in Japan 
(27/11/1999) notes that since 1993 there have been more than 1,000 such cases "and 
the numbers are still rising". Of particular relevance here are lawsuits against failed 
jüsen and companies which have paid out money to sökaiya racketeers. 
Table 6.1 Civil Litigation 1975-1997 
Year I Newly Received Civil Litigation Cases (, 000) 
1975 164 
1980 220 
1985 379 
1990 228 
1995 421 
1996 441 
1997 453 
Tökei Kyoku 2000 
As mentioned above, problems with Japanese civil law have been highly beneficial 
to the böryokudan; the lack of a cheap effective system of civil law provides a niche 
market for alternative sources of protection as well as depriving victims of effective 
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legal remedies. In this respect, an increased willingness to make use of the civil law 
is a highly promising development in terms of squeezing the böryokudan out of 
minbö activities. 
Even more significant is the way in which members of the public are now launching 
civil suits against the böryokudan themselves. Although there had been incidents of 
such lawsuits before the introduction of the bötaihö, the new law has made such 
cases easier. The prefectural boryokudan-eradication centres, set up under the 
bötaihö, can advise potential litigants, introduce them to lawyers and lend them 
money with which to launch a suit. 
Civil suits against boryokudan generally take two broad types: firstly, those 
demanding that a böryokudan group vacate a building or stop using premises as a 
gang-office, and secondly, those seeking compensation for an injury suffered at the 
hands of a boryokudan member or group. This second category is especially potent 
in that it can be used to sue a gang boss for acts committed by one of his 
subordinates. This is made possible by Articles 715 and 719 of the civil law which 
cover employer's responsibility (shiyösha sekinin) and collective-illegal-acts 
responsibility (kyödo fuhö köi sekinin) respectively (Yamaguchi 1997b, 92). 
One example of this type of suit is the case in which the parents of the high-school 
student killed mistakenly during the Okinawa war (mentioned in chapter four) sued 
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the boss of the Okinawa Kyokuryu-kai, as well as the boss of the sub-group 
responsible, under Article 715 of the civil law. In October 1996, after a five year 
legal battle, the parents were successful and the judge ordered that the gang bosses 
pay compensation of Y58m (£340,000) (Keisatsu Hakusho 1997,197). The 
Yamaguchi-gumi top leadership is currently fighting a civil case along similar lines 
due to the murder of a police officer mistakenly identified as an Aizu-kotetsu 
member. 
In another case, in Saga, a married couple involved in the unten daikö6 business 
sued a böryokudan group boss and his brother for compensation totalling 
Y3,575,000 with respect to a succession of incidents, including a slashing attack on 
the woman's face and chest, the death of their cat and intimidation of their drivers. 
The reason for these attacks had been that the couple had opposed moves by the 
gang to organise an association of all the local unten daikö businesses from which it 
planned to extract a managerial fee. Although they were ultimately successful, it 
took ten years from the attacks to the judge's final verdict (Yamaguchi 1997b, 81- 
4). 
Perhaps the most significant böryokudan-related civil case was the Ichiriki-ikka 
incident in Hamamatsu-cha. The Ichiriki-ikka was a sub-group of the Kokuryb-ya, 
an old gambling organisation dating back to the Edo period but which had more 
recently joined the Yamaguchi-gumi. In 1983, this Ichiriki-ikka set up an office in 
6 Unten daikö is the Japanese term for businesses providing a taxi and spare driver to take the 
customer and his/her car home after an evening's drinking. 
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Ebizuka-cho, a residential area of Hamamatsu city in Shizuoka prefecture. This 
office was a black five-storey building equipped with steel plates over the windows, 
observation cameras and the inevitable gang-affiliation plaque featuring the gold 
diamond of the Yamaguchi-gumi. This building loomed menacingly over the 
surrounding area and quickly became known as `the black-building'. 
From August 1985 the local residents launched a movement to drive out this office. 
Frequently gang offices are rented property and it is possible to use legal measures 
to close them for either breach of contract or non-payment of rent. In the case of the 
Ichiriki-ikka, however, the office was owned by the gang boss. Due to the lack of 
effective legal machinery by which they could expel this böryokudan group, the 
movement staged demonstrations and sit-ins outside the gang office and ran a 
campaign of stickers and posters. 
In November the following year the Ichiriki-ikka took the unusual step of initiating 
a suit against nine of the leaders of this movement demanding ¥IOm compensation7. 
A locally recruited team of lawyers, bolstered by help from the Nichibenren's anti- 
minbo committee, decided that it would be possible to launch a counter-suit on the 
grounds that the existence of the gang office infringed the human rights of the local 
residents. In response to this counter-suit, in July 1987, the head of the local 
residents' legal team was seriously injured in a knife attack. Other prominent 
' Suggesting, perhaps, that even the böryokudan are not immune to this increased propensity to 
litigation. 
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members of the movement were subject to intimidation and attacks. 
The main legal arguments deployed by the gang in court were highly similar to 
those that were later to be used by various böryokudan in their doomed legal fight 
against designation under the bötaihö. These were that the Ichiriki-ikka was not a 
criminal organisation but a `chivalrous group' (ninkyö dantai) and that the local 
residents' movement was perpetrating an infringement of the gang's constitutionally 
guaranteed rights of freedom of association, property rights and equality before the 
law. They also argued that the residents' rights were an abstract thing and not a 
recognisable legal right. 
Despite these arguments, on 9th October 1987 the district court found for the 
litigants of the counter-suit and issued a provisional injunction demanding that the 
gang refrain from using the black building as a gang office. However, use of the 
office continued as before, and on 20th October, the residents' committee appealed 
to the court demanding ¥5m for each day that the Ichiriki-ikka continued to use the 
premises as an office. The defendants argued that gang members were not 
assembling at the building but merely spontaneously coming and going. This being 
the case, the injunction did not apply. 
One month later, the court provided a more precise definition of action covered by 
the earlier injunction, which effectively prevented continued use of the office. The 
defendants appealed to the Tokyo High Court and then, when this appeal was 
rejected, to the Supreme Court. Finally on 19th February 1989 the Ichiriki-ikka 
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abandoned its case, reached a peaceful settlement agreeing to all of the resident's 
demands and left the area. 
This incident is significant for a number of reasons. Firstly, it was the first time in 
which a böryokudan-owned, rather than rented, office had been driven-out 
(Nichibenren 1998b, 53). Secondly, this was a citizen-initiated movement (though it 
later came to garner large-scale police support with several thousand police 
mobilised throughout Ebizuka-cho). The Nichibenren's account of this incident 
(from which the above is largely derived) claims that the resolve of the residents 
was only increased by the gang's attempts to intimidate them. This public solidarity 
in the face of a hostile böryokudan group shows what can be done by a motivated 
and united public. Raz (1996,228-9) suggests, however, that behind this solidarity 
was enormous social pressure on uncommitted residents to join the movement and 
this pressure was backed up by the potent sanction of ostracising non-participants. 
Thirdly, it shows that, even where no criminal laws were being violated, the law 
extant prior to the introduction of the bötaihö could be successfully applied to 
restrict the use of gang offices. This should not be taken, however, as evidence that 
the bötaihö was merely a public-relations exercise rather than a law with a genuine 
role to play. It should be remembered that the new law's provisions were wider 
than just the imposition of limitations on the use of gang offices. Furthermore, the 
fact that the local residents' fight lasted three long years contrasts with the much 
quicker application of administrative orders to restrict usage of gang offices. It is 
perhaps more plausible to suggest that the eventual success of restricting usage of 
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the Ichiriki-ikka's gang office led to the introduction of similar measures in the 
provisions of the bötaihö. 
Fourthly, due to the unusual spectacle of a böryokudan group launching a legal suit 
against a citizens' movement, this incident attracted enormous media and public 
interest (Raz argues that it was actually inflamed by the media (1996,230)). This 
incident therefore was also influential in changing the public consciousness of 
böryokudan groups. The fact that the local residents successfully forced the 
Ichiriki-ikka to give in, showed the Japanese public that there was nothing 
inevitable about local baryokudan gang offices. This factor is immensely 
important. As has been argued in earlier chapters, böryokudan groups are highly 
reliant on their reputation. Once the Ichiriki-ikka had been driven out of Ebizuka- 
cho, it was seen by rivals, customers and intended prey alike, as weak and unable to 
provide credible protection. Because of this fatal loss of reputation, the Ichiriki- 
ikka disbanded soon after this incident (Iloshino interview Yokohama, 1998). 
It is probable that this damage to the gang's credibility was, to a certain extent, also 
translated to boryokudan at large in the public consciousness. It was observed in 
the previous chapter that the general public is becoming less afraid of the 
böryokudan. Whilst it is obviously a positive development, this change in 
consciousness may actually encourage greater levels of violence. Because the threat 
of violence is no longer sufficient to achieve acquiescence, böryokudan groups may 
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feel compelled to deploy actual violence to achieve their immediate aims as well as 
pour encourager les autres. 
It should be apparent from the three cases described above that proactive use of the 
civil law presents an extremely powerful device against the böryokudan. For gang 
bosses to be held accountable for the actions of their subordinates and liable for 
compensation vis-ä-vis predatory actions, is of potentially far greater usefulness 
than the bötaiha. Given that the criminal law may not allow for the successful 
prosecution of gang superiors (though, as the cases of Tsukasa, Kuwata and 
Takizawa show, even here we see greater flexibility of interpretation), the use of 
civil law is evaluated here as a most positive development. 
However, as should be apparent from the three cases outlined above, the use of the 
civil law is still a highly lengthy process. No reform of Japan's legal system has 
occurred to encourage this growth in litigiosity. Access to cheap, efficient justice, 
through, inter alia, reform of the 1949 Lawyers Law to provide for a greater number 
of lawyers, judges and prosecutors, would be a useful step in facilitating members 
of the public to seek redress for böryokudan victimisation. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
CONCLUSION 
The arguments presented in chapter six go somewhat beyond the initial objectives of 
this dissertation and, in many ways, lay the groundwork for future research. In 
particular current developments in Japanese policing and the consequent pressure to 
reform the existing system of police regulation under the Public Safety Commissions, 
are areas which demand greater scrutiny. Interesting though these may be, let us now 
return to the main focus of this thesis. 
In chapter two a theoretical structure of organised crime was developed to inform our 
subsequent analysis of the böryokudan. This approach, identifying organised crime as 
"structures which exercise rule-making, tax-collecting and protective functions over 
primarily, but not exclusively, illegal markets in a given geographical sector", has, it 
is hoped, been shown to be a powerful analytical tool providing important insights 
into this necessarily obscure phenomenon. Chapter three's empirical description of 
the böryokudan's development up to the introduction of the bötaihö illustrates the 
relevance of this, American-European-derived, theoretical model to the Japanese 
context. Chapter four discusses the bötaihö with reference both to the problems of 
framing effective countermeasures and the two main legal prototypes which informed 
the academic debate preceding the new law's formation. 
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Whilst much of the material in chapters three and four is unavailable elsewhere in 
English, it is not the main contribution to existing scholarship that this thesis 
endeavours to provide. It is rather establishing the essential background information 
against which the core research question identified in chapter one may be answered. 
This is: what effects has the böryokudan countermeasures law had on the 
böryokudan? 
In attempting to evaluate the effectiveness of crime control measures, we always face 
the problem of disentangling the impact of extraneous factors. In the case of the 
botaihö this problem is particularly acute in that the collapse of Japan's economic 
bubble in 1990 and the subsequent recession have dealt an enormous blow to the 
böryokudan. Many böryokudan-watchers in the Japanese weekly press avoid 
attempting to separate these two factors by simply referring to them as a combined 
`double-punch'. 
Despite this, there are certain perceptible changes in böryokudan behaviour that can 
be attributed to the bötaihö. The first of these is the way in which böryokudan groups 
have removed plaques, emblems and other gang-related paraphernalia from the 
outside of gang offices. Similarly gang members became less prone to flaunt 
membership in their dealings with the outside world; for example, name-cards 
generally now show some legitimate commercial front whilst cards identifying the 
bearer's gang membership and rank are now generally restricted to use within Japan's 
underworld. 
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Whilst this seems at first glance to be a highly superficial effect, it is significant in 
that it undermines the böryokudan's claim to legitimacy (and difference from the 
American mafia) in that it operates openly from clearly identifiable offices. The 
lower profile that the b6taihö has forced the böryokudan to adopt has also had an 
important impact on how they are perceived by ordinary members of the public. 
Many have commented favourably that, since this law's introduction, they no longer 
see yakuza `cutting the air with their shoulders' when they strut down the streets. 
The flip-side of this tendency is that baryokudan groups are now going underground. 
Many of the gang-members whom the police report to have left their organisations 
have actually formally seceded only to carry on their activities as before under the 
guise of `business brothers' (kigyö shatei) or newly-formed spurious political 
organisations. Whether this development is socially beneficial or not is unclear. 
The second development that can be unambiguously attributed to the bötaiha is the 
greater efforts that the böryokudan community has made over the last decade to 
reduce inter-gang conflicts. This can be seen in the two `gokudö summits' around the 
time of the bötaihö's introduction and the subsequent diplomatic ties forged through 
sakazuke between the main syndicates. Although these have not succeeded in totally 
eliminating conflict, there now exists the mechanism and will to facilitate the rapid 
resolution of conflict when it arises. In this respect the Yamaguchi-gumi is being 
forced to adopt the norms of the gangs comprising the Kanto Hatsuka-kai. 
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There is, of course, an inherent strain in this shift to peaceful coexistence within the 
böryokudan community. The life-blood of any industry is revenue, and the 
böryokudan economy is no exception to this. The changing economic opportunities 
caused by the `double punch' of the bötaihö and the bubble's collapse have increased 
the, already significant, pressure on gang members to develop new sources of income. 
This almost inevitably brings them into conflict with other yakuza. 
This need to develop new sources of revenue has also generated strain within 
böryokudan organisations in another way. A significant proportion of böryokudan 
diversification has been into areas that carry a high degree of opprobrium within both 
the traditional yakuza world and that of the general public. Most notable of these are 
the increase in amphetamine peddling (most significantly to minors) and organised 
theft rings. Whilst the leadership cadres of large syndicates constantly exhort sub- 
group members to refrain from participation in such activities, they try to square the 
circle by continuing to demand payments of monthly jönokin dues. The succession of 
directives issued by the Yamaguchi-gumi leadership demanding that sub-group 
members avoid those businesses subject to major social condemnation is a nice 
illustration of Schelling's theoretical observation that organised crime may 
collectively attempt to limit externalities generated by individual criminals by 
moderating their behaviour. It also illustrates that such attempts may not be 
successful and that the rule-making function, identified in our definition of organised 
crime, is not always satisfactorily enforced. 
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Whilst it is impossible to attribute the development in böryokudan economic activity 
exclusively to the introduction of the bataihö, it is clear that the new law has played a 
significant contributory role. If we look at the post-war history of the yakuza, this 
should come as no surprise; one of the most important factors driving the evolution of 
these groups has been the law-enforcement climate in which they have survived. The 
first summit strategy of 1964, which made use of a change in the law lowering the 
criteria for prosecution of gambling offences, and the reform of the commercial code 
in 1982 to combat sökaiya, are two clear examples of this. 
Whilst the bötaiho has provided a legal remedy for the formerly `grey zone' of minbö 
it has by no means eradicated this type of böryokudan activity. Part of the reason for 
this is elucidated by our observation that the various protective services that 
böryokudan groups provide actually meet a demand. Whilst much of this demand is 
created by the existence of the böryokudan themselves, as well as the various spurious 
political organisations, social movements and poison-pen journalists, it is not 
exclusively so. Whilst the necessity for protection is strongest in those illegal markets 
where legitimate alternatives do not exist, it is also to be found in legal ones where 
official protective services are, at best, partial. In this light it is interesting to note 
Ujihara's observation that the bar/club/restaurant industry in his area of central Japan 
only significantly stopped making payments to the böryokudan in 1998-9 after 
concentrated pressure from the local police. 
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The existence of a demand for the goods and services provided by organised crime 
was identified in chapter one as the phenomenon's major aetiological factor. 
Attempts to eradicate organised crime without addressing this consideration are not 
likely to achieve their objective. Szymkowiak (1996,148-9), talking with reference 
to the 1982 reform of the commercial code (which had the aim of tackling the 
sökaiya), clearly identifies this problem: 
Lawmakers seldom if ever attempt to reconcile the basic considerations 
causing the dilemmas that legal reform is expected to solve. The dilemmas are 
symptoms of the problem, not the problem itself. Given this, the expectation 
is that new conflicts and dilemmas, changed in some fashion by new 
constraints, will emerge out of the still existing contradictions. 
Whilst the bötaihö does not address these underlying problems, if we see this law as 
having more limited aspirations than those mooted here by Szymkowiak, then perhaps 
we should not judge it too harshly. In so far as it closes a particularly problematic 
legal loophole, the bötaiho has been successful. Ordinary members of the public now 
have a largely effective means for dealing with bogus protection or other types of 
minbö 
Perhaps of greater significance than this concrete achievement of the bötaihö is the 
unquantifiable psychological impact of this law. For the first time a law explicitly 
identifies the böryokudan as a social evil. This has undoubtedly had an effect not 
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only on the böryokudan members themselves, but also on the police and ordinary 
members of the public. Whilst this effect is intangible, it has had concrete spin-offs. 
Perhaps most important of these is that, since the introduction of the bdtaihö, 
böryokudan groups no longer extend lines of communication to the police. The pre- 
existing system, whereby officers from the relevant police departments would wander 
into gang offices to discuss over coffee and cigarettes what was happening on the 
streets, has come to an end. Though this obviously entails a loss in information to the 
police (a fact clearly lamented by many of the older detectives involved in 
boryokudan investigations), it is illustrative of the breakdown in the `remarkable 
cordiality' (superficial though it may have been) noted by Ames in the police- 
böryokudan relationship. 
In chapter four it was suggested that the bötaihö may have been introduced for 
reasons of political symbolism. Regardless of the sincerity, or otherwise, of this 
move, even a symbolic law of limited scope can have significant effects beyond its 
concrete provisions. The bötaihö has clearly increased the böryokudan's sense of 
isolation from the wider society. At the same time it has reduced public fear of 
böryokudan. In chapter two it was argued that it is the reputation for violence, 
rather than the actual use of violence, that is the main resource of organised crime 
groups. In the light of this, the psychological impact of the bötaiha may be of even 
greater significance than the more tangible effects discussed above. 
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Organised crime is a complex and dynamic phenomenon enjoying an ambiguous 
relationship with the wider society in which it exists. Because of this, our 
expectations of the effectiveness of organised crime countermeasures should never be 
raised too high. Given the extent to which Japanese böryokudan syndicates have 
entrenched themselves in the economic and political fabric of Japan in the last half- 
century, the goal of böryokudan eradication remains, at best, a long-term aspiration. 
Such realism should not suggest defeatism; insoluble though a problem may be, its 
worst effects may be ameliorated. Within the limited scope of providing a legal 
remedy, to böryokudan predation, for ordinary members of the public, the bötaihö has 
effected such an amelioration. 
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APPENDIX 1 
PROPORTION OF BOR YOKUDAN MEMBERS WITH 
CRIMINAL RECORD NECESSARY TO SATISFY CRITERIA FOR 
DESIGNATION UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF THE BOTAIHO 
Number of 
members 
Percentage with 
criminal record 
Number of 
members 
Percentage with 
criminal record 
3-4 66.6 170-179 5.89 
5-6 60.01 180-189 5.65 
7-9 42.86 190-199 5.65 
10-14 30.77 200-209 5.51 
15-19 26.67 210-219 5.24 
20-24 25.01 220-229 5.16 
25-29 24.01 230-239 5.16 
30-34 20.01 240-249 5.01 
35-39 17.15 250-259 4.81 
40-44 15.01 260-269 4.78 
45-49 13.34 270-279 4.78 
50-54 12.01 280-289 4.65 
55-59 11.00 290-299 4.49 
60-64 10.01 300-349 4.45 
65-69 10.01 350-399 4.29 
70-74 10.01 400-449 4.26 
75-79 9.34 450-499 4.23 
80-84 8.76 500-549 4.21 
85-89 8.34 550-599 4.19 
90-94 8.34 600-649 4.17 
95-99 8.34 650-699 4.16 
100-109 8.01 700-749 4.15 
110-119 7.28 750-799 4.14 
120-129 7.09 800-849 4.13 
130-139 6.93 850-899 4.12 
140-149 6.43 900-949 4.12 
150-159 6.29 950-999 4.11 
160-169 6.26 1,000 and over 4.11 
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APPENDIX 6 
EXCHANGE RATES ¥-£ (1970-99) 
1970 858 
1971 845 
1972 752 
1973 665 
1974 683 
1975 658 
1976 535 
1977 468 
1978 403 
1979 466 
1980 526 
1981 445 
1982 435 
1983 360 
1984 317 
1985 307 
1986 247 
1987 237 
1988 228 
1989 226 
1990 257 
1991 238 
1992 224 
1993 167 
1994 156 
1995 148 
1996 170 
1997 198 
1998 216 
1999 184 
Source: Economic Trends, Office for National Statistics, HMSO 
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APPENDIX 7 
NAMED INTERVIEWEES 
Fujimoto, Takashi: Assistant Chief, First Böryokudan Countermeasures 
Section, NPA 
Herbert, Wolf: Lecturer, Tokushima University 
Hoshino, Kanehiro: Criminology Professor, Teikyb University. Formerly 
Director, Division of Prevention of Crime and 
Delinquency, NRIPS 
Inagaki, Hiroshi: Community Leader, Kamagasaki 
Ino, Kenji: Writer and journalist on böryokudan matters 
Iwai, Hiroaki: Retired Professor - Dai-sensei of bOryokudan studies 
Katb, Naotaka: Lecturer of Criminal Law, Kokushikan University 
Kühne, Hans-Heine: Professor of Criminology and Law, University of 
Trier 
Miyazawa, Setsuo: Professor of Law, Kobe University 
Mizoguchi, Atsushi: Writer and journalist on böryokudan matters 
Mugishima, Fumio: Professor of Criminology, Teikyo University. 
Formerly Director, Division of Prevention of Crime 
and Delinquency, NRIPS 
Nishimura, Haruo: Professor of Criminology, Kokushikan University. 
Formerly Director, Division of Prevention of Crime 
and Delinquency, NRIPS 
Shiibashi, Takayuki: Professor of Law, Director of Institute of Comparative 
Law in Japan, Chub University 
Shimamura, Tadayoshi: Criminal Defence Lawyer specialising in böryokudan 
Tamura, Masayuki: Director, Division of Prevention of Crime and 
Delinquency, NRIPS 
Tudor, Geoffrey: Spokesman, JAL 
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Uchiyama, Ayako: Chief of Juvenile Guidance Section, NRIPS 
Yamada, Hitoshi: Lawyer, Head of Nichibenren's Anti-Minbö 
Committee 
Yamanouchi, Yukio: Lawyer, writer and former legal advisor to 
Yamaguchi-gumi 
Yonezato, Seiji: Research Sociologist, Social Environment Section, 
NRIPS 
Pseudonyms have been used for all other interviewees mentioned by name in this 
thesis. 
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